






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THE

Review
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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA,

AND

THEOLOGICAL ECLECTIC.

EDITED BY

EDWARDS A. PARK AND GEORGE E. DAY,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF

DR. J. P. THOMPSON, DR. D. W. SIMON.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

CHRISTIAN ERNEST LUTHARDT'S REFUTATION OF FALSE VIEWS AS TO THE DESIGN OF ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

TRANSLATED BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, PRINCETON, N.J.

THE aim and the occasion of a book are two very different things. In the Gospel of John they have been entirely too much mingled together. Baumgarten-Crusius¹ distinguishes them carefully, and looks for the first only in the book itself. But Lücke thinks that what is given in xx. 31 as the complete aim is not enough to explain the peculiarity of the Gospel. He therefore asks for the particular occasion, so as to learn from it the special aim. In doing this, he tries to find and prove the special aim outside of the book itself, and thus treads the same path that most men had gone in before, and against the consequences of which he, at least in part, contends. Baumgarten-Crusius certainly has not shown that the aim which is common to all the Gospels brings out the individuality of John's Gospel simply by being more distinctly marked.² In attempting to show this, he lays before us a history of the apostolic teaching concerning Jesus,³ like that given by Lücke. On the whole, Brückner has struck the right path.⁴

¹ Theologische Auslegung der Johanneischen Schriften. Von D. L. F. O. Baumgarten-Crusius. Jena, 1843, Vol. i. p. xli.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid. p. xiv. sq.

⁴ Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis. Von Dr. W. M. L. deWette. By B. B. Brückner (4th ed., Leipzig, 1852), p. ix. sq.

VOL. XXX. No. 117. — JANUARY, 1873.

1. *The Supplement Hypothesis.*

When we compare the fourth Gospel with the three earlier Gospels, we cannot help thinking that its author had them before him. The regard he pays to them can be taken in two ways. We may understand it of the historical matter, or of the whole character of the Gospel. Even in the earliest times they tried to explain the peculiarity of the fourth Gospel from this,¹ and this view has often been defended in later times.²

The evangelist certainly takes for granted much that is told in the synoptical Gospels, and that is necessary to make his account intelligible. The baptism of Jesus, as we have seen, is not excluded, but is rather required by the account of John. And some other things are only made clear by the help of the synoptical accounts (e.g. xi. 1, 2; xviii. 24, 28). At times, again, it fills up the synoptical accounts, or secures itself against false relations with them. Indeed, at ii. 12, and especially at iii. 24, we can scarcely avoid the impression that the evangelist paid a conscious and determined regard to those who went before him. It is too much, however, to say, as Ebrard seems to,³ that it was the evangelist's set purpose to prevent every appearance of contradiction. Lücke, on the other hand,⁴ denies that John has paid any regard to these books; and Baumgarten-Crusius⁵ pronounces it altogether impossible, on account of the many gospels, which had spread far and wide by the end of the second century. But the introduction to Luke scarcely calls

¹ See Lampe, *Commentarius Analytico-Exegeticus tam literalis quam realis Evangelii secundum Joannem*, Amsterdam, 1724, vol. i. p. 174 sq., or Dr. F. Lücke, *Commentar über das Evangelium des Johannes* (2d ed. Bonn, 1840), Vol. i. p. 187 sq.; or the Introductions, as Dr. K. A. Credner, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in die biblischen Schriften* (Halle, 1832), Vol. i. p. 248 sq.

² By Schultze, *Schriftstellerische Charakter und Werth des Johannes* (Leipzig, 1801), p. 194, Hug, Ebrard, and others.

³ *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der Evangelischen Geschichte*. Von J. H. A. Ebrard (2d ed. Erlangen, 1850), p. 150.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 198.

⁵ Vol. i. p. xl.

for such a very great number at that time. Besides, an apostle's Gospel, like Matthew's,—its authenticity being taken for granted,—would have obtained general access and validity more easily than such separate private works as Luke seems to have had in mind. It can by no means be proved with mathematical certainty from John's Gospel that the other three must have been before him. And as little can it be proved that he assumed that his readers possessed them, or even one of them. However, it is clear that he takes for granted the existence of a knowledge of the gospel history; not only a knowledge going so far into particulars that it could not have sustained itself for any time without good gospel records, and that, too, in the possession of the community, but also a tradition by word of mouth, with this record and joined to it. All we can say is, that the fourth evangelist assumed the existence of one or more Gospels of such contents as our synoptical Gospels.

But it is another thing to say that he went to work to complete these Gospels. Lücke and Baumgarten were right in opposing such a notion. An aim so extraneous and fragmentary could never be made to agree with the internal and decided unity presented by the fourth Gospel. The evangelist has passed over much that we read in the synoptical Gospels that would have been very serviceable in carrying out his main idea,¹ for example, the frequent confessions that Jesus is the Son of God, and the transfiguration. From this Hug tries to make out² that he not merely takes those books for granted, but also that he has only worked up such material as the earlier evangelists left untouched. This, however, is inferring too much, and contradicts the book itself. We see that the evangelist uses in his book not only unknown, but also known things (i. 23 sq.; iv. 44 sq.; vi. 1 sq.; vi. 16 sq.; xii. 1 sq., 12 sq.; xiii. 21 sq., 38; xviii. 12 sq., etc.). He did not set himself to make a gleanings. With all the mate-

¹ *Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testaments von Dr. J. L. Hug* (4th ed. Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1847), Vol. ii. pp. 171–175.

² p. 174.

rial lying before him, he chose whatever proved to be directly fitted to carry out his special aim. Hug, thinking that these testimonies concerning Jesus could have served most directly the design of the evangelist, comes to the conclusion that he must have used matter that often had a significance by no means common with that actually employed. In this Hug certainly takes a false view of the synoptical Gospels, as if they must have fully depicted the kind of things of which they speak. And he considers the fourth evangelist too curiously, when he adopts the opinion that the writer could have made a better choice and collation of discourses and histories suited to carry out his fundamental thought, and that, just as he was able to make not a few of the synoptical accounts essential elements of his own book, so he could not but have brought others into essential correspondence with the rest, and so have won for them a new point of view. Thus the supplement hypothesis in this external form will in nowise comport with the book itself, or with the respect we owe to such an author.

A somewhat different turn has been given to this hypothesis by referring the supplementation to the dogmatic character of the synoptists. It is well known that Clement of Alexandria suggested this long ago, in designating the fourth Gospel as the spiritual one. Even Lampe, after waging war upon the supplement hypothesis, comes back to it;¹ he implies, however, that we must not hold this up as the chief aim of the book. It is well known, too, how wittily Lessing has interwoven this thought with his theory of the Gospels.² When he implies that true believers first got the idea of the divine person of Christ and of his mediation from the Gospel of John, it is as much as saying that it was by this Gospel that Christianity first became a doctrine. On this supposition, it becomes purely a book of doctrine, and ceases to be historical. This gospel teaches nothing about Christ that was not part of the self-witness of Jesus. Christ himself laid the foundation of the knowledge of Christ as the Son of

¹ Lampe, Vol. i. p. 178 sq.

² Compare Lachm. Aug. XI. pp. 495-514, § 42-44. (?)

God. Such knowledge is, therefore, older than the account of this self-witness, unless the self-witness is just a form invented for the teaching of this newly-gained knowledge. The last thought offers a view which we think is excluded by all that precedes.

Baumgarten-Crusius and Lücke have given another form to the answer of the question concerning the relation of the fourth Gospel to the first three. For my part, it seems to amount to the same thing. Lücke is of the opinion that at first they needed simply the most complete possible collection, prepared in writing, of the gospel tradition contained in the oral accounts. Matthew and Mark belong to this class of the Gospels. Then, after a time, they needed one that handled the gospel history critically and in a more chronological and pragmatistical connection. Here came Luke. And at last, the advance of *πίστις* to *γνώσις* converted the history of Jesus to dogmatical matter of doctrine. This demanded a Gospel that set forth the life of Jesus under certain points of view in reference to then present questions, doubts, and divergent conceptions, and in which history and doctrine, fact and dogma, practical meditations and dogmatical vindications reciprocally interpenetrate each other.¹

To my mind, this view of the generic history of the Gospels contains a multitude of errors of wide and pernicious consequences. It has been shown above that the first and fourth Gospels resemble each other exactly in the fact that they both turn the history to doctrine. Matthew, again and again, always at the end of the separate divisions, points out the fulfilment of the Old Testament scriptures in the events of the life of Jesus. It is clearly his design to teach the appearing of Jesus Christ by the history of Jesus. The Sermon on the Mount, with its whole character and situation at the beginning of the Gospel, and the woes, parables, and prophecies at the end of the Gospel, teach that Jesus had to form for himself a new church in unbelieving Israel. He had to establish in the apostles a new authority for his

¹ Lücke, Vol. i. p. 202 sq.

church in opposition to the hostile authority of Israel (compare Matt. xix. 28). The New Testament church of God was not to fall to ruin with the Old.¹ All this presents the life of Jesus clearly in a definite point of view. Others, however, apprehend in these words a false representation of the interest which the first Christians had in the gospel accounts. They did not preach the gospel, and then write the Gospels because of the interest in the history as such, and to satisfy this interest. They wished to prove the saving decree of God in its historical fulfilment in Christ Jesus. When Peter preached the gospel to Cornelius (Acts x. 36 sq.), he did it after the method of our Gospels.² He told the single events, not for their own sake, but in order to make known to the heathen by the historical account the saving decree of God which he had revealed in Israel in the person of Jesus Christ. We see that Peter went over the life of Jesus, from the beginning to the end, in all its essential points. A searching examination of this cannot fail to perceive a great likeness to the Gospel of Mark. The essential contents of both are, the proclamation of salvation as it passed from Jesus forth to the apostles, and the manifold activity of Jesus in wonderful proof of the preparation by the power of the Spirit. This analogy can be carried further. This gospel message was meant to satisfy not curiosity, but desires for salvation, and so were the Gospels, which were only the fixing of this *κατήχησις* (Luke i. 4) in writing. Hence they are far from being mere collections of all that people knew of Jesus; as if they would have had nothing else to tell, if they had wished to recount simply the things worthy of note; and as if this was about all that could be told of Jesus's Galilean work. We have already spoken of this at the occasion of the raising of the dead. Another proof of our point is that Matthew presents two days to teach the Galilean work

¹ J. C. K. Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis* (Nördlingen, 1852), Vol i. p. 122. Weissagung, II. p. 86.

² Compare H. W. J. Thiersch, *Kritik der neutestamentliche Schriften* (Erlangen, 1845), pp. 90, 110 sq.

of Christ (viii. 18-ix. 34). This is just as an example to give a picture of his most busy life. Both the other Gospels leave this out.¹ It is another thing when a Papias gathers all the words of Jesus that had been preserved up to his day by oral tradition outside of the canonical Gospels. Here it is not desire for salvation, but curiosity, that wants to be satisfied. About this time the zeal for collecting arose in the Christian church. Lücke judges incorrectly of the Gospel of Luke. He thinks that what was wanted and what was aimed at in it was a critically viewed historical exhibition for cultured Christians—an exhibition made by a man fitted for literary work. He thinks that Luke's is especially a chronological account. Then comes the well-known strife whether *καθεξῆς* (i. 3) refers to a chronological or topical order.² And even if it means a chronological order, we need to know whether it goes upon the succession of the single events, or only of the whole in general. His collection really is determined not so much by the outward order of time merely, and by a respect to the greatest possible completeness, but rather by a topical point of view. We can easily see this, if we compare the beginning of the Gospel with the end of the Acts of the Apostles. We are fairly entitled to make such a comparison, because the Acts presents itself simply as the second book of the message of salvation begun in the Gospel. The whole work begins with the annunciation by the angel in the midst of the sanctuary of Israel, and ends with the public preaching by the apostle to the Gentiles in the chief city of the world. Hence it is easy to discover the leading thoughts.³ Later researches have shown that the second book was not only written to give the most complete possible historical account, but also that it was planned with great premeditation, and that the plan was carried out with great freedom. And so it may

¹ Compare *Zeitschrift für Protestant. und Kirche* (1851, Decbr.), p. 331 sq. especially 334.

² Compare Ebrard, p. 115 sq.

³ Compare M. Baumgarten, *Die Apostelgeschichte* (Halle, 1852).

well agree closely with the Gospel. Lücke says too much of this book as a historical work. He says too little of it as a Gospel. As to its relation to the rest he is mistaken.

Lücke refers to another circumstance in connection with the progress of *πίστις* to *γνώσις*. And here, too, we may mention Baumgarten-Crusius's view, which accounts for the fourth Gospel, not from the increased historical or literary need, but by the progress of knowledge or instruction. His opinion is this: At first they learned of the person and work of Christ only after the Palestine view and in a Messianic conception, and other teaching was limited to the most simple pious discourses. Paul made that view broader, and the story of Christ became part of the world's history. Inspiration and belief in the person of Christ were offered for consideration. In the midst of these movements and of the disturbances and party-battles which arose from them, a new doctrine and a new view stepped in. This was the theology of John. From the original simple belief on the ideal or on the superhuman essence in Christ, and from the Pauline view of Christ as a personality divine in powers and effects, they rose to speculation upon the God in the man Jesus, to whom they now gave the mysterious name of the Logos. Christ himself, from being something external came to be something internal. From this time they began to take up his work rather spiritually than historically, and in a broader manner.¹ If Baumgarten-Crusius means that the Gospel of John neglects the history of Jesus's life, and devotes itself to his word, he has overlooked two facts; namely, that Matthew and Luke contain much of the words of Jesus, and in return, that in John the history of Jesus's life, and especially the facts of his death and resurrection, have as facts a great deal of importance. At the same time, he has not explained how, upon this supposition, the difference between the two instructions is to be understood. His explanation² of the conception and presentation as arising from the spirit of the gospel which had become free

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, pp. xiv. xv.

² Ibid. p. xxxiv.

and strong, does not agree well with his assurance that Christ certainly spoke exactly as the fourth Gospel represents him as speaking.¹ In the next place, he has overlooked the fact that, far from permitting the history of the life of Jesus to fall out of view behind his word, our evangelist wishes only to lead us on by the word to understand the life rightly. He is dealing with the essential meaning of the person and history, and not with some speculation or new doctrine which he has started. Besides, the notion that the fourth Gospel is an account of a new doctrine concerning Christ that was only put in the mouth of John is opposed by the fact that Baumgarten-Crusius holds to the decidedly historical character of the said Gospel. Scarcely any weight can be laid on "his theologizing about the Logos," for this "does not come up anywhere in the discourses of Jesus." As for the rest about "the speculative flight of the prologue," to which "even the most outspoken passages in Christ's own discourses about his person do not reach,"² we shall show, after a while, that the prologue contains nothing that did not appear in the discourses of Jesus, and that was not taken from them.

The New Testament doctrine — or perhaps we had better say, the word of God in the new covenant — has certainly had a history. Its history, however, is far different from that which Baumgarten-Crusius and most men along with him are accustomed to present or assume. The ruling view among these men is this: Each apostle or New Testament writer has at heart had his special system, separate from, and often, in essential or subordinate parts, opposed to that of every other. They emphasize the views of the person and work of Christ, and declare that these views developed and raised themselves from the lowest grade of Jewish knowledge clear up to the freest and most spiritual conception in Paulinism. Little by little the separate points in the doctrine concerning Christ shaped themselves out. At the end of the dogmatic movements appeared the highest, as pre-

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, p. xxxv.

² Ibid.

existence, likeness of essence with the Father, etc. It is but a step from this the easiest view to the view of the Tübingen school. They observe that the writings of the second century appear to stand on a lower stage of dogmatical knowledge than our Gospel, and hence they stretch out that first dogmatic movement even beyond that time. The common view makes the same fundamental mistake as this hypothesis, in supposing that Christianity is essentially speculation concerning Christ. Wrong as this is, it was just as incorrect to bring in the idea of a history of doctrine into the scriptures. Suppose that Christianity is really a present, essential union with Christ, and that the teaching of the scriptures is nothing but a doctrinal statement and explanation of that; then, there can be no development of the doctrine within the latter, except in so far as the former contains a historical progress. In the apostolic church new conceptions arose only in union with the scriptures. The historical conclusions at the different periods can, from this point of view, be told separately and progressively. But that is only continual statement of present knowledge, and a certain individual conception and turn of the same. It is not setting up new doctrines.

Just after the day of Pentecost the apostolic church did not need new doctrines concerning the person of Christ. With the outpouring of the Spirit the history of Jesus Christ came to a preliminary conclusion. The apostolic preachers of Christ, by mouth and pen, only stated and explained, in manifold changes and applications, the then present matters of fact. There was a history of the doctrine concerning Christ before this, because there was a history of Christ himself and of his self-witness. The knowledge of Christ was a very different thing after his resurrection from what it was when he first spoke openly of his death and resurrection. It was a very different thing when he began these prophecies from what it was when he stood at the beginning of his active ministry. It was a far different thing, too, when, at the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost, the apostles learned that Jesus had become the Lord, and had brought to a pre-

liminary conclusion all the Old Testament prophecies concerning him, from what it was while he tarried forty days upon the earth. At Pentecost they came to a full understanding of Christ. They understood the word of the Old Testament and the word of the self-witnessing Christ. Both of these joined in his history, and therefore their knowledge of his person lacked nothing (compare John ii. 22, and other passages). There was neither chance nor room given for the rising of a new doctrine or a new theology concerning Christ. There could be nothing but a manifold witnessing to one and the same known fact of Christ. Finally, when we see that the doctrine is only the interpretation of the history, we are not at all in a position to think or to say that some other then existing doctrine, as perhaps the doctrine of a Logos, was brought forward with the person of Christ, and bound up with the doctrine concerning it. But another thing had a history then, namely, the church of Jesus Christ. This had a progress. The church started in Israel. Then the gospel passed over to the heathen, and, consequently, purely Gentile Christian churches appeared. The church out of the two parts grew up as one. Israel lost its hold more and more, and the church had to draw back especially to Gentile Christian grounds. The perversity of Israel and the erring spirit of heathendom wished to seize a place in the church, and had to be cut off. The Jewish commonwealth fell, and the former separation of Jewish and Gentile Christians in the church lost its importance. Now, in view of all this progress, and in so far, also, as the apostolic church had a history, the apostles gained new perceptions. If they wish to speak of such things with Paul, they can only do it in so far as these things with their divinely-ordered historical office within the church stand in essential union. How, then, can it be said that John has brought out and laid down in his book some peculiar speculation on theology?

The history of the word of God in the New Testament takes altogether a different shape for us. We find neither room nor right here to speak of a history of doctrine. Both are

found in the church only after the apostles' time. To carry back this notion to the time of the founding would be laying aside the essential distinction of the two periods. As little can we agree with Baumgarten-Crusius's conception. We cannot even agree with Lücke, when he explains the difference between the Gospel of John and the synoptical Gospels by the progress of *πίστις* to *γνώσις*. The less dangerous this view appears, the more undecided it is. And the more decided it becomes, the more it leads us out of the pure doctrinal movements of the apostolic spirit within the church to the region of the false knowledge of the day. It would present John merely as giving a form to the contents of that knowledge.¹ Now, it is hard to conceive how an apostle could have accommodated² himself to the *gnosis* which was upturning the very foundations. How John, especially, to whom Lücke attributes the Gospel, and who is described to us in tradition as certainly not the most friendly in his relations to Cerinthus, could do this, is to me utterly inconceivable. This whole hypothesis falls to the ground when we observe that no special doctrine of a Logos is given in the Gospel, and that it tends not to *γνώσις*, but to *πίστις*. The fact that *πιστεύειν* is used for *γνώσκειν*,³ as in other places for *ἀκούειν*, *ἀκουλουθεῖν*, etc., is not a proof for, but against, this theory. The last word of Christ (xx. 29), like the last word of the evangelist (xx. 31), speaks not of *γνώσκειν*, but of *πιστεύειν*. According to that, not the former, but the latter is the aim of the Gospel. And, if we compare the conclusion with the separate parts, we find throughout that *πίστις* in opposition to Jewish unbelief, and not *γνώσις* in its relation to belief,⁴ is the essential and designed substance of the Gospel. If all comes to *πίστις*, we need not stop to prove that it has the same meaning in the Gospel of John as in the Epistles of Paul. Closer observation could easily show that its idea is the same. Notice

¹ Lücke, Vol. i. p. 215.

² Ibid. p. 214.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Compare Lücke, p. 215: "Thus John leads the Christian *gnosis* back to its true ground and purport in living belief."

just one fact. It is opposed to sight (xx. 29; compare Heb. xi.). Its object throughout is the essential purport and meaning of Christ and of his life. Its effect is *σωτηρία* in its fullest extent, as well as a salvation from the wrath of God (iii. 15 sq. 36).¹

We have the gospel proclamation of Christ before us in a fourfold form. The different books do not offer different doctrines. They teach historically and preach for instruction one and the same Christ; only each has his own method. These various methods of preaching and teaching Christ are founded not in different conceptions, in progressive knowledge, and the like. They are determined by the form of the scope and of the historical stage within which and in relation to which Christ is made known. For the first church of Christ, within the bounds of Israel, the method of the first Gospel was the right form for preaching Christ. Hence Matthew used a definite material exactly fitted for this design. The next two Gospels show us what shape the same material takes when it is made known to Gentile Christian churches. These Gospels confine themselves to the same material, because they are neither apostolical, nor yet original, but of a secondary origin. Then something else came to be needed. The commonwealth of Israel fell to ruin, and the distinction between the Gentile and Jewish Christians within the Christian church lost its earlier meaning, so that it was no longer to be considered in the evangelical teaching concerning Christ. At this time, in opposition to the general enmity against belief in Christ, they needed the general proof of the necessity, possibility, and nature of belief. And against the reviling of Christ they needed the most general declaration of him. The fourth Gospel supplies this want. It presents the person and life of Christ in its most essential and most comprehensive significance for a church which by this time was simply the church of Christ united in one. As the separate divisions of the church were

¹ Compare, too, what Brückner, *ut supra*, says of the "prevailing practical interest and aim" of the fourth Gospel.

no longer of any importance as divisions, instead of presenting separate sides of the appearance of Christ in evangelical writings, they had but to tell plainly the whole of it. If any one chooses to call this a supplementing of the synoptists, seeing that, although not done out of respect to them, yet that it was not done without respect to them, we have no objections. It is unnecessary to show how hard it is to distinguish this from the common opinion, which speaks of John's Gospel as an addition to or a development of the apostolic theology.

We have remarked that there was need of an evangelical proclamation of Christ in opposition to a certain form or to certain appearances of the period. This leads directly to the next view of the polemical or apologetical purpose of our Gospel.

2. *The Polemical or Apologetical Purpose.*

There is scarcely a heresy that the ancients did not think our Gospel was directed against. Irenaeus names Cerinthus and the Nicolaitans; Jerome adds the Ebionites; Epiphanius continues *καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς αἵρέσεις*; Victorinus Petavionensis, however, strays off to Valentinus. The same paths have been used ever since in searching for an answer to the question about the purpose of the Gospel and the explanation of its peculiarity. Hugo Grotius thinks that the Gnostics, the Judaizers, and the disciples of John are the ones aimed at by the evangelist. The Gnostics reckoned among their Eons, *λόγος*, *ζωή*, *μονογενής*, and *σωτήρ*, the Creator, Christ, and Jesus separate from each other. The evangelist proves that all these mean one and the same Jesus Christ. In like manner, he was against Cerinthus and Ebion, because they Judaized under the Christian name. And he also strikes at such as wished to be called disciples of John the Baptist, rather than of Jesus.¹ Some, as Vitranga, confine the opposition to the Gnostics to the prologue. Others, as Hug, think

¹ Compare Grotius, *Annotationes in Evangelium κατὰ Ἰωάννην*. Works (London, 1679), tom. ii. Vol. i. p. 473.

that this contains the controversy against Cerinthus and the disciples of John the Baptist. They have made a great ado about the latter, since the last century. They believe that these disciples of John are the Sabceans that have been discovered.¹ Chapter i. 8, however, is the only passage in the Gospel that gives any support to this theory concerning the disciples of the Baptist. Yet such a view even of this passage is wrong. Olshausen misunderstands it. Striving against an exaggerated view of the Baptist, he makes the importance of this much more prominent. The meaning is, that, though he was not the Light himself, yet that it was his charge to bring about belief upon the Light. Hence the importance of his testimony, and hence the importance of a contempt for it.² It certainly is not easy to see why this book should contain a controversy against the disciples of John. It is much more likely that we should find the opposite in it. (Luther: "The evangelist praises John the Baptist, and says they could not do without his office.") In fact, as Baumgarten-Crusius³ grants, there is no reference to such a controversy in either the general thought or compass. As to the polemical direction against the Gnostics, Lampe has already reminded us⁴ that in itself it would be a very strange thing to make a historical polemical book at the same time with an evangelical book, and then not to show a trace of such polemical writing. He is right, though his demonstrations are not valid in all their details. Beyond dispute, the fourth Gospel does not bear the stamp of a polemical writing. These writers bring this notion with them to the study of the Gospel. They would never reach it by simply considering the book itself. They have tried in all sorts of ways to give these views a form that seems to fit.

Schneckenburger thinks that he finds a negative opposition to the Docetic gnosis.⁵ He says that the evangelist has left

¹ Compare Lücke, Vol. i. pp. 222-227.

² Compare W. F. Besser, *Das Evangelium St. Johannis* (Halle, 1857), p. 21.

³ *Ut supra*, p. 17.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 181.

⁵ *Beitr. zur Einleit. VI.* (Stuttgart, 1842), *das Evang. Johannis und die Gnostiker*, pp. 60-68.

out everything which seemed to sanction the error of these Gnostics. The transfiguration, the agony in Gethsemane, and the cry of Jesus on the cross: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" are wanting. But Luke leaves the last out, too, and Matthew and Mark omit the strengthening of Christ by an angel. And if this were the case, why did John dare to mention the walking on the sea (vi. 16 sq.)? And so for other points. Lücke has already said enough to disprove that hypothesis.¹ If the anti-Docetic aim is so clear, how does Baur come to find plain Docetism in it? It is arbitrary to try to prove this by comparing *ὡς ἐν κρυπτῷ* with verses 15, 20, and 25, claiming that the failure to recognize Jesus indicates some change in his appearance. Lay aside the anti-Docetic purpose, and Baur could hardly have got this strange idea into his head. At all events, to assume fear of Gnostic misinterpretations as a motive for composition, is altogether unworthy of a New Testament writer, and, moreover, of an apostle. If the interpretation of the book does not compel recourse to a polemical reference to the Gnostic errors, — and the commentaries of De Wette, Lücke, and Baumgarten are sufficient vouchers for that, — and if there is no need of the supposition of this purpose, to explain the peculiarity of the book, then there is no room at all for such a supposition.

If the supposition of a polemical purpose is as wrong as that of supplementation, it will not mend the matter to join the two together, as Hug² and Ebrard do.

We read, thus, in the last: "The aim with which John wrote his Gospel lay, first, in an external and internal completion of the apostolic proclamation of Christ — to recall the events passed over by the synoptists, the journeys to the feasts, and the history from the baptism of Jesus to his open appearance, to bring to light those words and features of Jesus in which the speculative, mystical side of his work and character reveals itself; and secondly, in the warring, not only against Gnosticism and Ebionism, but also against the

¹ Vol. i. pp. 219–222.

² Vol. ii. pp. 166–171.

want of love and life.”¹ Again: “The polemical aim is directed, in the clearest manner,”² chiefly against Docetism, as i. 4 shows. And again: The plan of John was “to present Jesus in so far as the glory of the Father appeared in him,” so that he brings to perfection “the idea and the conception of the real, eternal *δόξα*, made manifest in the historical Jesus,” and the “*δόξα* as an object of speculation.”³ Thus, outside of the condemnation of false estimates of John,⁴ Ebrard has combined nearly all the different opinions which have been suggested for the design of the Gospel. No explanation is given, nor can any be given, to show how such a variety of purposes should form such a unity—how from such a multiplicity of points of view and aim a book of such unity as our Gospel certainly is could have arisen.

Schott⁵ has replied to the whole hypothesis of a polemical purpose that there is nothing polemical in the whole Gospel. He prefers to speak of an apologetical purpose. Seyffarth⁶ had, before that, named our Gospel “an apology for the sublime words of Jesus.”

I cannot see that this makes much difference. It comes to pretty much the same thing that we had to reject in the polemical purpose. Thus Schott⁷ yields to those who think that the evangelist refers at one time to the disciples of John, who did not sufficiently recognize the Messianic worth of Jesus (i. 7, 8, 15, 19–34; iii. 26 sq.; v. 33 sq.; x. 41 sq.); at another time to the error of Cerinthus, who separated Christ from Jesus (i. generally, and especially i. 18); and then, again, to the opinions of the Docetae (i. 44; xix. 34; xx. 20, 27); and, lastly, to all doubts and scruples about the worth of the Saviour and the truth of his history (ix. 13 sq.; xi., especially 47 sq.), and about his death and his

¹ Ebrard, p. 831.

² Ibid. p. 142 note.

³ Ibid. p. 143.

⁴ Ibid. p. 144.

⁵ Schott, *Isagoge*, p. 144.

⁶ *Ein Beitrag zur Special Characteristik der Johanneischen Schriften* (Leipzig, 1823), p. 39 sq.

⁷ § 40, p. 144.

resurrection (xix. 34 sq.; xx. 24 sq.): Here, as before, arises the same dividedness of the thoughts and of the view of the evangelist, which is irreconcilable with the finished unity and internal necessity of the whole composition. In the discussion of the text we shall see that the passages to which Schott appeals do not support his view. Credner's attack¹ upon such attempts will ever stand to uphold the right view. De Wette² thinks as Schott does. He gives the Gospel an anti-Judaistic and an anti-Gnostic aim. But is the strife against Jewish particularism essentially stronger and more designed in John, especially when we think of iv. 22, than it is in the synoptists? Do not the latter teach the rejection of Israel and the calling of the Gentiles? And with regard to the second point, its purpose to combat the errors which "would not own the mutual agreement of the old and new revelation" cannot be so very clear, for Fisher and Schweizer have found exactly the opposite purpose.³ Thus this is in the same situation as the above-mentioned contest against Docetism, which De Wette takes up too. The idea that the evangelist throughout wars against gnosis especially, — that he sought to give the true direction to the awakening Christian speculation upon the relation of Christ to God — leads us to Lücke. He has by preference given the polemical view this turn and form.

This scholar likewise calls our Gospel anti-Gnostic and anti-Ebionistic in its purpose.⁴ But if the evangelist wished to show the essence and the fulness of Christ by the most comprehensive and most general declaration of him, how could his book have helped standing in opposition to Ebionism? It certainly could not well do otherwise. From the beginning to the end, therefore, it is in contradiction to the Ebionistic view. The contradiction is one that lies

¹ Vol. i. pp. 243, 251 sq.

² *Kurze Erklärung des Evangeliums und der Briefe Johannis.* Von Dr. W. M. L. DeWette (3d ed. Leipzig, 1846), p. 2.

³ Compare also Brückner's contesting of DeWette's view (4th ed. of DeWette), p. 17.

⁴ Vol. i. p. 217.

necessarily in the thing itself. It did not need to be specially aimed at Ebionism, nor do separate passages show such an aim. The opposition is common to the whole book. According to Lücke, however, the anti-Gnostic relation is the prevailing one. But if we ask for the place at which it appears, he does not name the whole Gospel, as before, but only the prologue. In the rest of the Gospel the purpose does not rule, except in so far as the doctrine of a Logos overmasters the historical recital.¹ Now, of course, as this is peculiar to the author, he cannot present it in the discourses of Jesus. Moreover, as far as the Gospel is historical, there is no doctrine of a Logos in it, and so far, too, it is not anti-Gnostic. As the whole anti-Gnostic purpose is thus reduced to the doctrine of a Logos and to the prologue, how can this be called the prevailing purpose? See how this supposed relation of the Gospel escapes us when we try to grasp it. Look at the prologue, too. The ideas *ζωή*, *φῶς*, *σκοτία* are not a whit more anti-Gnostic here than in other parts of the Gospel. *Μονογενής*, as well, is used, not to oppose a Gnostic Eon of like name, but upon the ground of a later-given self-declaration of Jesus, and includes nothing more than that did. All these ideas rest altogether upon the words of Jesus himself, and are all drawn from his own proclamation of the same. We should not dare to say of Jesus's evidence concerning himself that it "refers to the speculative opposition of light and darkness, life and death, and the like," and we must not dare to say that of the evangelist, and on that account to speak of a "speculative tendency, and therefore of a philosophical cultivation of mind," in him.² Still less do Jesus and the evangelist refer to the "contrasts of eternity and time, God and creature, heaven and hell," in a "speculative" sense.³ Whether the latter or the former contrasts are spoken of, the discourse is meant to be saving, and at the same time ethical and practical. Indeed, this is a rich conception. Where everything aims at the practical religious relation between God and man; it

¹ Vol. i. p. 217.² Against Ebrard, pp. 832 and 834.³ *Ibid.*

certainly is not advisable to suppose that this was meant speculatively, and then to talk of a speculative purpose, and moreover of a philosophical cultivation of mind. After all, we are here led back to the single word *λόγος*, and to this solitary idea. I call it solitary, because there is no unfolding of its contents which would be different from the doctrinal contents not only of the Gospel, but also of the prologue, which were then present and complete, entirely apart from the Gospel. We stand, again, at a point where we are compelled to ask how it is conceivable that the author should have brought over a word and an idea from an unchristian view and from its sphere of thought, and used it in a modified sense, without somewhere stating this sense. On this account, too, we can find no authority for the position¹ that the evangelist intended to overpower the false Gnostic speculation by opposing to it that Christian gnosis and speculation which externally was like it. Should we say, with Thiersch,² that this Gospel is meant to raise the Nazarite view of Christ to true and full knowledge? But it is altogether unlikely that it was written "with Israelitish Christians in view." The sphere in which it rose, and for which it was first of all meant, was almost exclusively Gentile Christian. If, indeed, the *διασπορά* in 1 Pet. i. 1 necessarily marks Jewish Christians, then this position might be untenable. But it has already been said, by others, that i. 14, ii. 9 (compare Acts xxvi. 18), iii. 6, and iv. 3 of necessity point to Gentile Christians.³ Acts viii. 4; xi. 19 show and teach that *διασπορά* could be said of Gentile Christians. The New Testament church had to scatter itself outside of Jerusalem, and the Christians also are *διασπαρέντες*, hence they live in *διασπορά*. Nor can we think it a matter of indifference that 1 Pet. i. 1 wants the article which James i. 1 has. Besides, the word is rather a mark of a condition than a firmly-fixed boundary of a society. In this expression, Peter sets the

¹ Historisch-Kritische Einleitung in das Neue Testament. Von H. E. F. Guericke (Leipzig, 1843), pp. 289-295.

² Kritik, p. 264.

³ Compare Steiger.

Christians who are without in the world in contrast with the earthly centre of the church, Jerusalem below, just as in *παρεπιδήμοις* he contrasts them with their heavenly home, the Jerusalem above. What we already know, however, from Paul's epistles, makes it clear that these churches in Asia Minor were made up chiefly of Gentile Christians. The Jewish Christian element had wholly blended itself with the preponderating mass, and the distinction between Gentile Christians and Jewish Christians had here lost all importance. Judaism here took only a hostile position, and that outside of the church. We neither can say, with Lange,¹ that the Gospel was written to testify against the Jewish Christianity of the time, nor can we agree with like assertions by Thiersch. The book itself gives us an utterly different impression. The Jews and Judaism appear in it as the most outspoken opponents of Jesus. The Gospel is directed not against incomplete belief, but against unbelief. We shall not dare to say, with Thiersch,² that the first three evangelists—especially Matthew—represent a lower stage of knowledge, and that John represents the true and full knowledge. We have found the same things in both. They only make use in different ways of the same facts and knowledge. If, however, the Gospel opposes not a lower belief, but unbelief and Judaism as the representative of it, then it is as incorrect for Ebrard³ to talk of “opposition to Ebionism within the church,” as for others to talk of opposition to Gnosticism within the church.⁴ Both Ebrard and Thiersch⁵ allow that it is aimed at the Gnosticism of Cerinthus, which was certainly outside of the church. For the rest, Thiersch, as I see, in his last book,⁶ has so modified his view of the design of the Gospel of John that I agree with him with pleasure.

. Suppose that we reject all these purposes. It does not

¹ Beitr. zur ältesten Kirchengesch. I. Die Ebioniten und Nicolaiten (Leipzig, 1828), p. 124 sq.

² p. 264.

³ p. 831.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ p. 262.

⁶ The Church in the Apostolic Age. By H. W. J. Thiersch. Translated by T. Carlyle (London, 1852), pp. 247–249.

follow that we must put this book out of all sympathy with its age, as Reuss does, and think that it is only the exposition of a speculative idea. Credner¹ had confidently thrown aside the "supposed subordinate aim, which, in fact, they had to treat as the chief aim," and said that they should take from the book itself and prove in it the unity of the recital conditioned on the aim. Reuss² agrees with him so closely that, like Baumgarten-Crusius,³ he refers exclusively to xx. 31. Lücke asks how the peculiarity of the book is explained by this purpose, since it is common to all the evangelists? He tries to answer by saying that the fourth is distinguished from the others by being a dogmatic or speculative Gospel. Baumgarten-Crusius is certainly right in declaring against this. After all that we have presented above, there is no need of further proof that we cannot agree with the view that this book contains ideas which were begotten by speculation, and then joined in form to the discourses of Jesus, or much more were sought out and proved in them.⁴ In the first place, as we have learned, the Gospel is too strictly historical for this. As to other things, the evangelist's knowledge has not that independence and individual originality which it must have had according to Reuss's opinion. It rests, to a great degree, on the fit self-communication of Jesus, as Reuss is inclined to allow from the new life of the evangelist.⁵ Finally, however, we are not able to think of the evangelist as so much out of all relation to the state of the times and the essential need of the church when he wrote his Gospel about Jesus, that we can understand the supposition of a theological treatise of such a kind. Writing and publishing such a treatise would bear in a high degree the stamp of arbitrariness. The evangelist was too little a mere Christian philosopher and speculative theologian, and too much a preacher of the word, whose duty it was to witness of Christ. He could not write such a book.

¹ § 199. Vol. i. p. 243 sq.

² Die Geschichte der heiligen Schriften neuen Testaments entworfen von Edward Reuss (Braunschweig, 1853), § 222, p. 211.

³ p. xli

⁴ Reuss, § 214, p. 203, 204.

⁵ Ibid. § 219, p. 208.

To get rid of this uncertainty, the school of Baur tried to bring back the point of the ideal purpose into more living contact with temporal relations.

3. *The View of the School of Baur.*

Baur combines the hypotheses of Strauss and Br. Bauer. He supposes that the Gospels were built up both out of fabulous tradition, and at the same time out of the Christian consciousness. Thus he lays down for the fourth Gospel a traditional basis, but one which is in many ways modified by the ruling idea, and is joined to discovered facts. The external historical connection is in his eyes simply the reflection of the idea. This idea, he thinks, could not have been drawn from the circumstances of the appearance of Christ himself. In the first place, it was brought into union with the history of Jesus. Hence it must have been essentially modified throughout. This *petitio principii* he has not found it easy to make good. The idea is naturally that of the Logos which was found in the whole period. The writer of the fourth Gospel took it up with keen insight and great skill, developed it fully, and settled it. The Gospel is nothing but the self-development of this idea, and the objective history is a mere dialectic process. This agrees with his view of the early church. To him the early church presents different parties or schools striving with one another about all sorts of ideas. At last they determined to establish a reconciliation of the various views, and so out of the schools of the early Christians to make the Catholic church. Reuss made the idea live in solitude. This view removes it from solitude to the movements of time, and gives it manifold temporal relations. But then we are referred at once to the second century. So much is settled.¹ The essence of this book rests in the completion of doctrine. Now, the invariable law of development is that intellectual movements progress from incomplete to complete. Manifold kindred appearances of the second cen-

¹ Compare *Das Evangelium und die Briefe Johannis nach ihrem Lehrbegriff dargestellt* von Dr. A. Hilgenfeld (Halle 1849), p. iv.

tury stand on a lower stage than the fourth Gospel. Therefore the Gospel must come after those. They might, on this principle, have put it too early; though, in fact, they thrust it away as far as possible. There must, however, be some limit, beyond which opposing facts become too numerous and too undeniable. This limit lies somewhere about the year 170, or, according to Hilgenfeld, 150. Schwegeler was the first to publish this discovery in regard to our Gospel.¹ Montanism and the fourth Gospel agree in relation to the clear dogmatic separation of λόγος and πνεῦμα,² which before that were always used interchangeably by the Fathers. The question arises, Which of the two is the later? If Montanism nowhere refers to the Gospel³ of John, as it might have been expected to, the open controversy against the Asia Minor passover carries it still later.⁴ It could not have been written until after the middle of the second century.⁵ At that point, however, the Jewish Christianity and the Gentile Christianity would be represented by Montanism and Gnosticism. The fourth Gospel, therefore, holds an offensive, as much as an accommodating⁶ position towards both the movements of the period. The former it opposes by its doctrine about the Trinity; the latter by its gnosis.⁷ And as against gnosis, it is hostile also to Ebionism.⁸ The same attempts to explain the peculiarity of the Gospel which we had to reject above come back here. The difference is that the second century is put in the place of the first. That makes the matter only so much the worse. Against all this comes the fact which Thiersch has so forcibly called attention to.⁹ The gnostic system of the second century was much more developed, and the strife against it was much more special, than they were in the end of the century of the apostles, and than they appear to be in the Gospel of John. How should two

¹ Compare Montanismus und chr. Kirche des 2. Jahrh. By Dr. F. C. A. Schwegeler (Tübingen, 1841), pp. 183-215.

² Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit Gottes, I. 1. 2 (Tübingen, 1841), Vol. i. p. 164

³ Schwegeler, p. 189.

⁴ Ibid. pp. 195-198.

⁵ Ibid. pp. 200, 203 sq.

⁶ Ibid. pp. 204 sq.

⁷ Ibid. p. 211 sq.

⁸ Ibid. p. 205-210.

⁹ Kritik, p. 241 sq. 251 sq.

passing remarks (xiii. 1, 29; xviii. 28), whose interpretation, moreover, is by no means settled, be able to, or intend to decide the passover controversy? Such a decision would have been much more clear and much more emphatic. Dietlein, in his book upon the early Christianity, has sufficiently refuted the idea which lies at the bottom of this. It is that Christianity is a doctrine, an idea, a new philosophy of the divine humanity whose consciousness came forth first in Jesus of Nazareth, and the idea of which then, like all truths, came into validity only after a struggle of one-sided views.

Baur's view does not differ much from this. He shows that the essential contents consist in the movements of the supposed relations of the Logos to the world. The former put on the things allied to the latter, and put away the things contradictory to it. Belief is presented as the synthesis of the two. The question is asked how this Gospel by the great unknown obtained so speedy an entrance and such a great, positive importance in the church. He replies that, though it holds itself above all strife, yet that it touches all the disputed questions and interests of the time. Now, we shall not recall how Hug and Thiersch have directed attention to the use of the Gospel by the heretics of the middle of the second century, and that this necessitates the already generally recognized validity of the book. Nor shall we repeat the often-made reference to the infinite difference between this book and all the productions of the second century. How could a work of such original intellectual greatness as our Gospel have arisen in an age of such literature as that of the second century is? Or how could the author of such a book have remained unknown, while we seem to know pretty much all the authors of so many stupid, dull books of this period? Nor can we delay to show that he who wishes to oppose, as has been done, to these two propositions the example of the Clementine Epistle, which is so often insipid, betrays a complete unfitness to judge of intellectual productions, as well as ignorance of the fact that that was and still is an isolated book, while the fourth

Gospel became at once the property of the whole Christian church.

We let all this pass. The question of criticism is not before us now. We may refer to the circumstance that Baur presents the fourth Gospel as free from the color of party position, entering into no mooted questions, but only grazing their borders. Such a book is not suited to decide an active strife, or to end a great period of vehement intellectual battles. In the best case, it would be ignored by the different parties, and only become important at a later time, after the war was at an end. On the contrary, we see that our Gospel is in possession of the greatest validity and importance by the middle of the second century. It may be remarked that Baur finds an opponent partly in himself, and partly in his scholar, Hilgenfeld. Baur names gnosis, the idea of the Logos, Montanism, and the passover controversy as the appearances of the period to which the Gospel pays conscious and designed respect. He tries to explain the character and significance, as well as the unity, of the fourth Gospel out of a regard to these and a purpose to decide such disputed questions. Here he falls, in a moment, into the very mistake for which he blames Lücke so sharply. He explains the Gospel not out of itself and its fundamental idea, but out of the external circumstances of the period. And thus he destroys again, in part, the good he had done by his energetic attempt to explain the whole book and its unity out of the fundamental thoughts. Hilgenfeld opposes him, as far as I can see, with perfect right; because he too is not once satisfied with the idea, but refers also to the circumstances of the time, so that only one half of the task is occupied with the explanation of the Gospel out of itself.¹ We must seek from the histories of doctrine what was the period and what was the form of the dogmatic consciousness which correspond to this book. Now, Hilgenfeld thinks he has found these historical-doctrinal positions by a comparison with the Valentinian gnosis. The likeness of

¹ Hilgenfeld, pp. 17-19.

the two, especially in the prologue, is evident. There were, namely, three periods of gnosis:¹ First, the Jewish; then, that free from the Jewish form, though still recognizing Judaism and Jewish Christianity; and, at the last, that which was hostile to both Judaism and Jewish Christianity. The Gospel of John stands between the second and third periods,² between Valentinus's and Marcions's doctrine.³ The fact that it makes the transition from the former to the latter appears especially in one point. Like Marcion, it unites the multitude of Valentinus's Eons into one. That has its foundation in the practical purpose. It puts practical piety above speculation.⁴ It was fit that this practical character should lift up the Logos from the subordinate position which was assigned to it in Gnosticism, to give it the high place of the Only-begotten, and to gather in it the whole world of cons.⁵ It is no trouble to answer this, the parallel is so quickly and so easily drawn. The whole way in which the school of Valentinus uses this book speaks unanswerably against the hypothesis, especially as Hilgenfeld puts the Gospel in the year 150.⁶ The sure knowledge of the church authors who make mention of this Gospel is fatal to the view in question. Everywhere high simplicity is the first, and arbitrary wantonness the second. The order is never reversed. It is to be regretted that so much knowledge and honest industry has been wasted, and come at last to such miserable foolishness. The critic of Baur's school has reached such an extremity that he cannot possibly stay there long. The supposition is the same as before. The Christian religion is a knowledge. The fourth Gospel contains the completed knowledge, as it is borne in the thought and in the self-consciousness.⁷ A great doctrinal movement must have preceded this form of religion.⁸ Therefore the Gospel belongs to the middle of the second century.⁹

¹ Hilgenfeld, p. 66. ² Ibid. p. 67. ³ p. 123. ⁴ p. 123 sq. ⁵ p. 132 sq.

⁶ Compare Thiersch, *Kritik*, pp. 323 sq. 391 sq. Ebrard, p. 903 sq. and F. Bleek, *Beiträge zur Evangelien Kritik* (Berlin, 1846), p. 214 sq.

⁷ Hilgenfeld, p. 319.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid. p. 321. For the rest compare Brückner (4th ed. of DeWette), p. xxxi sq

Thus we are brought back to the fundamental idea, and Lücke's question meets us again. How is the peculiarity of the book to be explained out of this? Lücke recalls the general purpose of all the Gospels. Baur thinks to explain the peculiarity of the Gospel by the peculiarity of the fundamental idea. There is nothing said about the Logos after the prologue, and yet he sees the idea of the Logos developed in the Gospel. He has thus in an arbitrary manner given the fundamental thoughts of the book itself as the purport of it. We saw, however, that these thoughts were not essentially different from the doctrinal contents of the synoptical Gospels? Could it be the same with the idea of the Logos? Is this entirely peculiar?

How would Köstlin's view do?¹ He says that the distinction of this book consists in its presenting Christianity as absolute religion, in opposition to Judaism and heathenism. It gives a doctrinal declaration which is at the same time apologetical and polemical. The book intends to teach not only religion, but also a history of religion. It presents Christianity as it became and was and was to continue to be, in opposition to Mosaic teaching and to polytheism.² We shall not answer, with Hilgenfeld,³ that those whom the Gospel opposes are to be sought inside, and not outside of the church, and that who they were must be learned from the history of doctrine, and not from the New Testament. The last is arbitrary, and the first is wrong. There is an opposition in the Gospel, not to Judaism, however, but to the Jews. No opposition to heathenism can be found in it. Where heathen come into view, they appear as inclined to believe. The heathen world is mentioned as called to believe. Nor can they say that it gives a history of religion. It does not speak of the mutual relations of the religious powers in the world. It treats of the personal relation to Christ. It does not deal with religion as such, but only in so far as it existed in the person of Jesus Christ and in the personal

¹ *Lehrbegr. d. Ev. und d. Br. Joh.* (Berlin, 1843).

² *Ibid.* p. 40 sq.

³ Hilgenfeld, p. 14 sq.

relation to him. Therefore it is not apologetical and polemical; but it is a testimony and an instruction. It is testimony concerning Christ and the society united with him by faith. And it contains instruction to the latter.

This brings us to our own answer to the question as to the final design of the Gospel. We shall scarcely need to do more than gather the results of the previous inquiries.

[To be continued].

ARTICLE II.

THE DIACONATE.

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THE question has recently been raised, whether the diaconate was an office in the apostolic church. Some have contended that it was not; but rather an ecclesiastical growth of a later date, and that if we would return to apostolic simplicity the office, as it now generally exists in our churches, must be discarded. If this be so, we ought to know it, and act accordingly. Our fundamental principle is, that the Scriptures alone are our guide in all matters of faith and practice. To this principle we should unhesitatingly conform, whatever may be the result. We should not shrink from its application, even if it should overturn customs which have been most venerated by us, and should lead us to act contrary to all the teachings of our fathers. In this there will be universal agreement.

Let us then examine the Scriptures on the question at issue. In this examination we must bear in mind that the polity of the New Testament churches grew up gradually. Christ laid its foundations when he gave to his disciples the ordinances, — baptism and the Lord's supper, — and the great law of discipline found in Matt. xviii. On these foundations the apostles built, as the necessities of the churches,

gathered through their labors, demanded. We should naturally expect, therefore, to find the polity of the apostolic churches most complete in the latter part of the apostolic era. This expectation is not disappointed. The polity of the New Testament churches is most clearly outlined in Paul's Pastoral Epistles.

Moreover, the object of these later epistles furnishes an additional reason, which does not conflict with, but re-enforces, the preceding, why the polity of the New Testament churches is more clearly presented in them than in the earlier and more weighty letters of Paul. The object which the apostle had in view, when he wrote the Pastoral Epistles, was to give to both Timothy and Titus special directions concerning the formation and government of churches, while the object in the earlier epistles was mainly to correct false notions of the gospel, and to hold in check corrupt tendencies, or to reform corrupt practices. Hence all allusions to church polity in the earlier epistles are merely incidental. Outside the Pastoral Epistles Paul never uses the term *πρεσβύτερος*, and writes *ἐπίσκοπος* only once, in the salutation of the Epistle to the Philippians. In Ephesians he speaks of presbyters, but calls them pastors and teachers. He names them again in 1 Thess. v. 12, but designates them as *προϊσταμένοι*. In the same incidental manner he speaks of deacons certainly once in Philippians, and probably also in Rom. xvi. 1, xii. 7, and 1 Cor. xii. 28. But when we turn to the Pastoral Epistles we find that the discourse of Paul is directly and explicitly concerning church officers. It is most reasonable, therefore, that what is there said concerning deacons should first claim our attention.

In 1 Tim. iii. Paul writes of church officers. He first mentions the office of a bishop and declares that if any one earnestly desires it, he desires a good work. He then states the qualifications of a bishop or overseer. This accomplished, at vs. 8 he introduces to our notice deacons, and proceeds to point out their qualifications. It is natural to suppose that if the apostle presents to us in the first passage one office

and officer of the church, he designates still another in the second; for the adverb *ὡσαύτως*, in like manner, which is here employed to introduce the passage referring to deacons, is used to separate classes which have very intimate relations with one another. Thus it is employed in chapter ii. 9 to separate women from men, and in Tit. ii. 2, 3, 6 to place in separate groups the aged men, the aged women, and the young men. In both instances these classes were united in church-fellowship. Now the subject of 1 Tim iii. is unquestionably church officers and their qualifications; these officers are intimately associated, but *ὡσαύτως* separates them into classes. Even those who deny that there were deacons in the apostolic church are ready to admit this; but they deny that the classes here referred to are of different ranks — that the deacons held an office inferior to that of a bishop. They affirm that there was only one order of officers in the apostolic church, the classes into which it was divided were co-ordinate; both were preachers, — the bishop or presbyter was a local preacher, the pastor of a single church; the deacons or helpers were preachers at large. They were such as Paul, Titus, Archippus; and in our own day, superintendents of missions, evangelists, and professors in our institutions of learning are deacons or servitors.

Now it is true that *ὡσαύτως* in this passage does not show that deacons are subordinate in office to the bishop, nor does it show that they are co-ordinate with him; it simply separates them as a class of officers from him. That they were a different order of officers from the bishops, though intimately associated with them, is clear from the qualifications of the two orders. In some respects the qualifications are identical; but so far as they are so, they refer to character and administrative ability, but differ as to the ability required for teaching. The bishop or overseer must be “apt to teach,” or “apt in teaching,” and also “able with sound teaching both to exhort and to refute the gainsayers,” while no such qualification is demanded in the deacons; it is sufficient in their case if they hold “the mystery of the faith in a pure

conscience." Now this difference is so marked as to settle, it seems to me, beyond all controversy, that two distinct orders of officers are here placed before us. The one must have power to teach the churches and to refute those who speak against the truth taught, the other need not possess this power in any unusual degree. And there is scarcely a more radical difference as to intellectual endowments than that between him who possesses the gift of aptly communicating truth and him who is destitute of it.

It is in vain to oppose to this conclusion, as some have done, that ἐπίσκοπον, in verse 2, has the article, while διακόνους, in verse 8, wants it. It is urged that the article in the first instance definitely points out the bishop as a church officer, while its absence in the second instance leaves διακόνους a general and indefinite term, which by no means clearly indicates a class of officers separate from the bishops. But the two cases are not parallel. One word is singular and the other plural. If both had been singular, both would doubtless have had the article; but, as it is, the latter is just as definite as the former, for the anarthrous plural is commonly used to designate classes of things which are well known. The Greek article is employed when a thing is not sufficiently definite without it, but when there can be no mistake in reference to the object named it is omitted. Its absence, therefore, especially when the substantive is in the plural, usually denotes the highest degree of definiteness. Thus Winer says (§ 19): "The article is omitted before such words as, signifying objects of which there is but one in existence, are nearly equivalent to proper names. . . . Hence the names of virtues and vices, etc., are often anarthrous." A note at the bottom of the page says, that to these "must be added the names of sciences and arts, of superior dignities and offices." Thus διακόνους points out a class of officers who alone were so designated. Their name had become "nearly equivalent" to a proper name, and as the article could not have added greater explicitness, it was omitted.

As exactly parallel cases, we point to presbyter and bishop,

in v. 19; Tit. i. 5; 1 Pet. 5. 1; and Phil. i. 1. In the first passage we have the anarthrous singular, and in the rest the anarthrous plural. In the last, bishops and deacons are conjoined, but both are without the article. Must we conclude that it is doubtful if there was an order of officers called bishops or presbyters, because we so frequently meet the words without the article? But if we cannot come to such a conclusion concerning bishops, in Phil. i. 1, can we concerning deacons, in the same passage? But we have spent too much time with this trivial argument.

It is, moreover, asserted, because *διακονεῖν* and its cognates express the generic idea of service, and are used to designate all sorts of labor, from that of an apostle of Christ to that of a household servant, that deacons could not have been a regular order of church officers, designed to perform a specific work. But this argument proves too much. The words "apostle," "bishop," and "presbyter" severally express generic ideas. Apostle means one sent; its Greek equivalent in the classics designates a messenger or ambassador, and a commander of a naval expedition. In the New Testament, it designates any one sent by a superior (John xiii. 16), the messengers sent with Paul to convey the contributions of the churches of Achaia and Macedonia to the poor saints at Jerusalem (2 Cor. viii. 23), and also Epaphroditus, sent by the Philippian church to minister to Paul's necessities in prison (Phil. ii. 25). Bishop signifies an overseer, a watcher; the word so translated was used in Greece to designate the officers placed over subject states, a military scout, one left to guard the luggage of an army, and a watch of a fleet. Presbyter denotes an aged man; and as old men, on account of their wisdom and experience, were chosen as envoys of the state, it sometimes meant an ambassador. Neither of these words is so common as *διάκονειν* and its cognates; but each expresses a generic idea. If deacons were not a regular order of church officers, because the word may denote one who does service of any kind, it follows from the same process of reasoning that there were no apostles of Christ, because

the word "apostle" means one sent by a superior on any kind of an errand; that there were no bishops, since the word merely designates overseers; that there were no elders, for that term primarily means simply old men.

Finally, in determining who are meant by *deacons*, in vs. 8, we are told that Paul (1 Cor. iii. 5; Eph. iii. 7; Col. i. 23) and his companions in the ministry (2 Cor. iii. 6), Apollos (1 Cor. iii. 5), Tychicus (Eph. vi. 21), Epaphras (Col. i. 7), and Timothy (1 Tim. iv. 6) are styled servants, or deacons; hence these, with Paul at their head, are the persons intended. But, if we are to reason in this way, why exclude from the number Phebe, a *servant* of the church at Cenchrea, or the civil ruler called by Paul (Rom. xiii. 4) a deacon or servant of God, or Christ, called a *διάκονον* or minister to the Jews (Rom. xv. 8), or those *διάκονοι* or ministers of Satan who were "transformed as ministers of righteousness" (2 Cor. xi. 15)? The word standing apart by itself is too general to determine the kind of servants intended; so whenever Paul uses it, he indicates by the connection the kind of ministers meant. He speaks of himself as a minister of the gospel (Eph. iii. 7), of himself and Apollos as *ministers* by whom the Corinthians believed, and proceeds to state what he and Apollos did (1 Cor. iii. 5, 6). Coupling himself with his companions, he declares that God made them all *ministers* of the New Testament (2 Cor. iii. 6). This shows what he meant still later in the same epistle, when he calls himself and them "ministers of God" (2 Cor. vi. 4), and also when in other epistles he speaks of Tychicus as a "faithful minister in the Lord" (Eph. vi. 21), of Epaphras, who was for the Colossians, "a faithful minister of Christ" (Col. i. 7), and of Timothy as "a good minister of Jesus Christ." These passages, in their connections show plainly enough that the *ministers* spoken of were preachers of the gospel. But when we turn to 1 Tim. iii. 8, we find no descriptive phrase attached to *διακόνους* to indicate that the servants spoken of are preachers; nor are they mentioned in their immediate relation to God, or Christ, or the gospel

of Christ, but solely in relation to the church. The apostle begins the chapter by referring to an office and officer of a Christian church; near its close, he says that he has written as he did in order that Timothy might know how to conduct himself in the house of God, which is the church of the living God. As these deacons are spoken of in reference to the church alone, and as there is no intimation that they were preachers, — which, judging by Paul's usual method, if they had been, would have been given, — we conclude that they were servants in some other capacity, and that the argument by which some have attempted to identify them with Paul and his companions is baseless. To fortify this conclusion, we notice that it would be very strange if Paul had mentioned bishops before himself and his preaching companions, as his work and that of his coadjutors was superior to that of local presbyters or bishops, and that it would be still more strange if he had required of local pastors "aptness in teaching," while he demanded no such qualification for these preachers at large, with whom he was himself associated, whose mission was to found and superintend the churches.

The view that Paul presents to us, in the third chapter of First Timothy, two separate orders of church officers best accords with the briefer and less explicit references to the same subject in other parts of the New Testament. Some of the best interpreters think that the "ministry" mentioned in Rom. xii. 7 and 1 Pet. iv. 11, and the "helps" mentioned in 1 Cor. xii. 28, probably refer to deacons and their work; and, since the apostles speak in these passages very explicitly of the different kinds of teachers in the church, it is plausible, at least, to interpret "ministry," "minister," and "helps" as referring to deacons and diaconal service. But if we throw out these passages as having nothing whatever to do with the case, the salutation of the Epistle to the Philippians is unquestionably in point: "Paul and Timotheus, servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus who are at Philippi, with the bishops and the deacons." It must be noted that bishops and deacons are here spoken of as the

officers of the church at Philippi; so that "deacons," in this instance, are certainly not preachers at large. Moreover, ἐπισκόποις and διακόνους, as we have already intimated, are both without the article, showing them to be classes of officers so well known that the article could not have given greater explicitness, and they appear here in the same order as we find them in 1 Tim. iii.

If we now turn to Acts vi. I think that we shall find even that vexed passage of apostolic history harmonizing with the above interpretation and re-enforcing it. It is not, however, necessary for our purpose to enter into a minute and thorough discussion of the occasion which led to the appointment of the seven by the church and the apostles. It will suffice to say that certain widows of the Hellenists were neglected in the daily distribution of alms. There is no evidence that this neglect was intentional; it probably was the natural result of the unorganized condition of the church when it first sprung into existence, having as yet no settled polity, no local officers. But this neglect elicited muttered complaints from the Grecian Jews; something must be done to remove the injustice, and thus prevent schism. The apostles, therefore, called to them "the multitude of the disciples," and said, "It is not proper that we should leave the word of God and serve tables." Then they bade the church to select seven men "full of the Holy Spirit and wisdom" whom they might "appoint over that business," declaring that they would give themselves "to prayer and to the ministry of the word." The church did as directed, and the apostles confirmed its choice by praying and laying their hands on the seven who had been chosen "to serve tables."

Were these seven men deacons? They are not called deacons: If the daily "ministration" (vs. 1) is διακονία, so is also the "*ministry* of the word" (vs. 4) to which the apostles devoted themselves. They are spoken of in Acts xxi. 8 as distinctively "the seven." Nothing then as to their official character can be determined from the name which they bore; that must be inferred solely from the work which they were

expressly appointed to perform. Whatever it may have been, it was not preaching. It was work so secular in character that the apostles could not do it without interfering with that most important of all labor, "the ministry of the word." It consisted in caring for the poor widows of the church, or in so caring for all the poor that not even the foreign widows should be neglected. The seven were to serve, or provide for, their tables. Now this corresponds to the representation in the Pastoral Epistles (1 Tim. iii.; Tit. i.). Just as the apostles here must give themselves wholly to prayer and preaching, so there the bishop must be "apt to teach" and "able to refute the gainsayers." Although the work of the deacons is not pointed out in Timothy, their case is so put, that we see that they were not required to teach; if not, of course they must in some way have devoted themselves to the temporalities of the church, which, in the apostolic day, consisted mainly in the care of the sick and poor. We conclude, therefore, though in the beginning of the apostolic era those who performed diaconal service were not yet distinctively called deacons, that the seven were in reality the beginning of that order of church officers.

Some, however, have maintained that the seven were elders, on the ground that two of the number, at least, Stephen and Philip, preached, and that the latter is called an evangelist (Acts xxi. 8). We reply that Stephen is not presented to us as a regular preacher. Being zealous for the truth, he provoked the opposition of some of the Jews who disputed with him concerning the gospel. But, girded by the Spirit, and filled with divine wisdom, he triumphed over his opponents. Stung by their defeat, through false accusations, they caused him to be summoned before the Sanhedrim. There he defended the gospel with such terrible earnestness, and with such cogency of reasoning that his judges were filled with rage, and "gnashed on him with their teeth." The power to make such a defence is particularly attributed to the Spirit (Acts vi. 10). As the face of Moses shone with preternatural lustre when he came from

immediate personal intercourse with Jehovah, so the countenance of Stephen was lighted up with unearthly radiance when he stood before the Sanhedrim, showing that he was under special divine influence. His bold, clear utterances of the truth, therefore, may be attributed to one of those special *charisms* so common in the early church.

But if this consideration is without force, we notice that the heralding of the gospel by some of the seven is a fact entirely consonant with the general spirit and acts of the apostolic church. The laymen of this church, when scattered by persecution, went everywhere making known the glad tidings. The first church gathered among the Gentiles was the fruit of their preaching. Their labors at Antioch in Syria so perfectly accorded with the ideas of the apostles that when Barnabas, who had been sent from Jerusalem to investigate the matter, saw what had been accomplished by zealous laymen, he did not rebuke them, but rejoiced; and for a whole year he and Paul labored to perfect the work so unexpectedly begun. For a deacon or any one who was full of the Holy Spirit to preach in the apostolic church is just what we might expect, and his preaching would not show that he was an elder. And if a deacon had gone from place to place heralding the glad tidings, he would probably have been called an evangelist, or if Philip became an ordained preacher at large, if he were the first, he was by no means the last deacon who has stepped from the lower to the higher order of the ministry. But so long as these seven lived undisturbed by persecution at Jerusalem their main work was to care for the poor, — “to serve tables.” While they did this they doubtless made known the truth so far as they had opportunity, or more perfectly instructed in the gospel those to whose bodily wants they ministered; but the public and more formal preaching of the word the apostles claimed as their own special work.

But another reason urged to show that the seven were elders is, that, if they were not, then we have a particular account of the choice and ordination of the deacons of the

mother church, while we have nothing in reference to the choice of its elders, which is regarded as very improbable. But why? We have no account of the choice and ordination of elders in any church of Macedonia and Achaia, or in the church at Rome, or in the seven churches of Asia, to say nothing of the churches of Galilee, Samaria, and Judea. Nevertheless, we do find references to the elders of several of these churches. When, however, the seven were chosen, there were probably no elders, as yet, at Jerusalem, for the very good reason that none were demanded. Several, if not all, of the apostles were still there doing the work of elders. The apostles and church, in the exercise of good common sense, selected only those officers that were demanded; afterwards, when James the brother of the Lord took the oversight of the church and needed coadjutors, they were doubtless selected. If they had been chosen before, or when the seven were, it would have been strange, as in that case they would have been thrust upon the church when there was no necessity for them.

There is another argument still which is thought to show that the seven were elders. In the apostolic churches, the elders, it is said, instead of the deacons, had the care of the poor. What is the proof of this? When the church at Antioch made a contribution for the brethren of Judea, they sent it to the elders (Acts xi. 30). The elders here spoken of may have been those of Jerusalem; but probably the reference is to the elders of the different churches of Judea. Contributions for the poor of their congregations would naturally be sent to them, since they were the overseers, rather than to any inferior officers. But this does not show that it was their special work to look after the bodily necessities of the poor—that it officially devolved on them to distribute the gifts received. Moreover, as no one denies that the chief work of an elder is to preach the gospel, if the seven were elders, their capacity for labor must have been superior to that of the apostles, who felt that they were unable to care for the poor without trenching on their higher

duty of preaching the word. We sympathize, therefore, with Professor Lightfoot, who says, that "with strange perversity Böhmer supposes" the seven "to be presbyters."

With this view of the seven early tradition agrees. Irenaeus holds that they were deacons; and in the third century, when the church of Rome had forty elders, she had only seven deacons, in imitation of the church at Jerusalem;¹ and the Council of Neocaesarea (A.D. 315) ordained that no city should have more than seven deacons, basing its decree on apostolic example.²

The view that bishops and deacons were different orders in the ministry is sustained by the uniform representations of the apostolic Fathers. Clement (1 Ep. chap. 42) mentions both orders three times—once with the article, twice without it, just as Paul mentions them in the salutation of the Epistle to the Philippians; and he represents the deacons as officers of the churches established by the apostles, not as ministers at large. Polycarp mentions in the same way both presbyters and deacons.³ And, though the untrustworthy epistles of Ignatius accord to deacons an elevation wholly unwarranted by the New Testament; yet they constantly represent them as an order of officers separate from bishops or elders. We find, also, that Justin Martyr (1 Apol. chaps. 65 and 67), when describing the usual services of the churches of his time, presents to us a scene the counterpart of which may be witnessed in most Presbyterian, Congregational, and Baptist churches when the Lord's supper is administered. In reproducing his sketch, we may unite both chapters without doing violence to either. He represents the church as gathering together in one place. Passages of scripture are read. The president or pastor exhorts the people to conform themselves to the things which they have heard. Then they all rise together and pray. When the prayer is ended, bread and wine mingled with water are brought. The pastor gives thanks; then those called deacons distribute the elements to

¹ Schaff. *Apost. Ch.*, p. 532.

² Lightfoot's *Philippians*, p. 186.

³ Epistle of Polycarp, chap. 5.

all who are present, and bear a part to the absent. It must be remembered that Justin Martyr was a man of education and travel; his observation was both extensive and accurate. He is defending to intelligent Romans the Christian churches, which had been misrepresented and maligned. He writes in behalf of their doctrines and practices; so that the representation here made is not of any single community, but of the churches generally; and it is clear that the deacons were an order of officers separate from and inferior to ordinary Christian pastors. They did not preach, but assisted in the administration of the Lord's supper, just as deacons of Congregational churches do now. But it came not within Justin's scope to mention any other duties of the diaconate. If, now, as some who clamor for the abolition of the diaconate assert, deacons as found at the present time in Congregational churches are an ecclesiastical growth, and the deacons of the apostolic day were preachers at large, then it follows from this testimony of Justin Martyr that the growth was backward—from being preachers at large, they became mere assistants of the bishops. But the truth is, that when bishops in the modern sense were developed from the apostolic bishops or presbyters, the deacons were also lifted along with them above their original position; and then conflicts arose whether deacons should be permitted to preach. Some declared that this was one of their duties and privileges; others denied it. Jerome distinguished them from presbyters, and called them Levites,¹ and once, “ministers of widows and tables.”² The Council of Trullo said, “that the seven deacons spoken of in the Acts are not to be understood of such as ministered in divine service or the sacred mysteries, but only of such as served tables and attended the poor.”³ Now, this conflict about the preaching of deacons shows that their claim of the higher ministerial functions was an inno-

¹ We see in this representation the development of the hierarchical notion of church officers. The presbyters corresponded to the high-priest and priests, the deacons to the Levites. See Julius Müller's *Dogmatische Abhandlungen*, p. 562.

² See Bingham's *Antiq.* Vol. i. pp. 213, 214.

³ *Ibid.* p. 212.

vation which at first met with opposition. This opposition, then, is another proof that the earlier and apostolic deacons were not preachers.

In the sixteenth century the Reformers attempted to bring back the diaconate to its apostolic simplicity. Luther declared that it must be so restored, that "Its service may not be the reading of the Gospel or the Epistle, as is customary now-a-days, but the distribution of the goods of the church to the poor; for we read in Acts vi. that deacons were instituted for this object. After the office of preacher, there is in the church no higher office than this administration, that the goods of the church be justly and honestly distributed, in order that the poor Christians who are unable to support themselves may be helped so as not to suffer want."¹ This evidence from the Reformers might be extended; but it is unnecessary. Enough has been adduced to show that deacons were an order of officers in the apostolic church distinct from bishops or presbyters.

But in the apostolic diaconate there were two branches, the male and the female. Having noted the former, it now remains for us to consider the latter. In collating the evidence of its existence, we must turn once more to 1 Tim. iii. When, in verses 8, 9, 10, Paul has set before us several qualifications for the diaconate, and pointed out the method which should be pursued in the selection of deacons, he adds, in vs. 11, "Women, in like manner, must be grave, not slanderous, sober, faithful in all things." This is followed by designating two more qualifications for the diaconate, namely, that the deacons must be monogamous, and must preside well over their children and their own houses. Finally, the reward of those who serve well is held forth as an incentive to faithfulness: They shall "obtain for themselves a good degree, and great boldness in the faith which is in Christ Jesus."

It is maintained by some excellent interpreters that "women" (*γυναῖκες*), of vs. 11, means the wives of the

¹ Herzog's R. E. Vol. iii. p. 368.

deacons; but in the verse itself there is no such intimation: "Their wives," of the common version is an interpretation, not a translation. *Τυνή*, to be sure, sometimes designates a wife; but whenever it does, its immediate connection reveals the fact. It is so used in vs. 12; but there the word which it limits makes its import perfectly clear. As, however, an entirely new thought is introduced by that verse, we cannot reason from it back to vs. 11.

Moreover, if *γυναῖκας* designates the deacons' wives, then vs. 11, which names their qualifications, is thrust into the midst of the passage which presents to us the deacons and their qualifications. Before Paul has finished all that he has to say concerning the deacons, he drops them, and presents their wives, and then returns to them again, in vs. 12. It is true that the apostle, when unfolding the great doctrines of the gospel, does sometimes permit himself to be borne away for a time from the direct line of his argument upon some side, yet intimately connected truth, and does then return and pick up the thread of his discourse where he had dropped it; but at such times he seems to be at the mercy of the flood which bears him on. But here no such great and overmastering truth is in hand. The apostle is merely presenting the classes of officers in the Christian church, and pointing out their qualifications. There is no special warmth in his discourse. It is calm and cool. In such circumstances, to leave what he is saying of deacons, in order to delineate the character of their wives, and then to return to the topic so abruptly dropped, is a construction so harsh that we may well doubt if such an interpretation be really correct.

But still more decisive is the objection that Paul would not have mentioned the wives of the deacons, and omitted all reference to those of bishops. Calvin so felt the force of this consideration that he declared that the wives of both deacons and bishops are intended—a position which cannot be maintained with the least show of reason. Others, to parry the objection, have urged the still more untenable interpretation

that women generally are meant. Huther thinks that Paul had in mind deacons' wives, and says that the reason why he mentioned them, and not the wives of bishops, is found in the consideration that so far as the duty of deacons consists in the care of the poor and sick, their wives must share in it. This would not come far short of making deacons' wives an order of deaconesses. But against this we may successfully urge that bishops' wives, from the necessities of the case, must always hold a more prominent place in the estimation of a church than those of deacons; and their influence, other things being equal, is consequently greater. If it were necessary to insist that the character of deacons' wives should be praiseworthy, it would be much more necessary to demand a like character in those of bishops.

Furthermore, unless we regard vs. 11 as simply good advice, such an interpretation would exclude any man from the diaconate, no matter how well qualified for its duties, if his wife did not possess the requisite character; while no one, for the same reason, would be debarred from the higher and more important office of the bishop. This, to my mind, is absurd, and if absurd, it is clear enough that Paul never taught it.

We must, then, seek for an interpretation to which less fatal objections can be urged, even if it be not altogether free from difficulties. Is it not a much less objectionable view to regard the "women" of vs. 11 as deaconesses? They are introduced by *ὡσαύτως*, just as the deacons are in vs. 8. We have already seen that Paul employs this word to separate from one another different classes, as well as to intimate that the classes so distinguished are closely allied. As deacons are distinguished from bishops, so are the women from the deacons. *Ὡσαύτως*, as we have also seen, determines nothing as to the subordination or co-ordination of the classes distinguished by it. The bishop's ability to teach shows that he is superior in rank to the deacons; but the qualifications of deacons and the women of vs. 11 are to a considerable extent identical, and there is nothing in the

difference of their qualifications which shows any official superiority of the one over the other. We conclude, therefore, that "deacons" of vs. 8, and "women" of vs. 11, are co-ordinate branches of the same office. We may, then, regard vs. 12 as setting forth what deacons should be in their domestic relations, and vs. 13 as presenting a motive to faithfulness in their official duties, or we may adopt Chrysostom's interpretation, and consider vs. 12 not as alone applicable to deacons mentioned in vs. 8, but as equally applying to both branches of the diaconate. On that supposition, the masculine includes the feminine. The deacon and deaconess are alike required to be monogamists, and to preside well over their own households. Both, by faithfulness in office, will secure a high place in the estimation of the church, a good degree of influence over those whom they serve; and their faith, being augmented by diligence in Christian labor, will manifest itself by great boldness in bearing testimony to the truth, both by act and word, as opportunity presents itself in their labors on behalf of the needy in the congregation.

This interpretation is sustained by a passage in the Apostolic Constitutions. These Constitutions, as they now stand, are confessedly made up of fragments written at different periods; but it is strongly probable that the passage which illustrates the use of *γυναικας* in 1 Tim. iii. belongs to the portions written nearest to apostolic times; for, while some parts of the Constitutions present three orders of church officers, and confer on the bishop power and authority unknown to the apostles, this passage mentions only two classes of church officers, — the bishop and deacons, — indicating that it was composed before the period when the later bishop reached his complete development. We find in it these words: "And let also the deacons be unspotted in all things, as also the bishop, only more active. Let their number correspond to the number of the church, in order that they may minister to the needy as workmen who are not ashamed; and let *the woman* (ἡ γυνή) be diligent in serving the women, and both in the things pertaining to messages, journeyings, assistance,

and service." As deaconesses are mentioned a score of times in these Constitutions, there can be no doubt that this general word *γυνή* here means deaconess, and that it is used to designate a class, just as *τὸν ἐπίσκοπον* is in 1 Tim. iii. and in Tit. i.; and Whiston translates the latter part of the passage freely as to the words of the original, but with absolute fidelity to the thought, "let both the deacons and the deaconesses,"¹ etc.

If, however, objections may still be urged to the above interpretation of 1 Tim. iii. 11, are they not much less formidable than to that one which regards "women" of vs. 11 as deacons' wives? The interpretation which we maintain avoids the abrupt break in the apostle's discourse with which the other must contend, and presents in perfect unity all that Paul here writes of church officers. For this reason we are constrained, until we see greater objections than have hitherto been urged against it, to defend it.

An additional evidence that there were deaconesses in the apostolic church is found, if I mistake not, in 1 Tim. v. 3-16. The main object of the apostle in this passage is to point out what widows a Christian church ought to sustain by its charities. This will be most apparent if, without taking up verse by verse, we disentangle, as well as we are able, the intertwined threads of the text.

We notice, then, first, that there are certain widows whom a church is not bound to support. They have no just claim for maintenance who by their wantonness or voluptuousness show that they are destitute of spiritual life (vs. 6), and those whose conduct is irreproachable, if they have children or more distant relatives, must look to them for succor (vs. 4), that the church may not be burdened (vs. 16). And to enforce upon each family the duty of caring for their own widows, the apostle affirms that those who will not provide for the destitute among their dependants and in their households, have denied the faith, and are worse than an unbeliever (vs. 8).

¹ Apost. Const. Book iii. chap. 19.

But, on the other hand, there are those whom Paul styles "widows indeed." These have no relatives to whom they can look for aid. There is no one from whom, through consanguinity, they can claim help; they are solitary, desolate; hence they turn to God for help; they set their hope on him, and continue in supplications and prayers to him night and day. Among these there were some who, for some purpose, were enrolled or put on the list (*καταλεγέσθω*). Who were they? Some have maintained that only those put on the list were to be supported by charity; but to this it has been decisively objected that those who did not have the qualifications enumerated in vss. 9 and 10 might be equally needy, and in some instances even more so, and that to deny them aid because they had not been quite so diligent in Christian labor as others, or were not threescore years old, would be so unreasonable, so harsh, so unchristian withal, that we may know for a certainty that Paul taught no such thing.

A better interpretation is that they were enrolled for diaconal service, and were probably deaconesses. If there was a class of widows to be supported by the church, why should not the church expect some service in return from those of the class who were best qualified to render it? The qualifications demanded of them certainly harmonize with this conclusion. No one could be put on the list who was under sixty years of age. She must possess that wisdom which many years of service alone can bestow. Moreover, those enrolled seem to have voluntarily pledged themselves not to marry (vss. 11, 12), as it would not be suitable for one engaged in the service of the church to be encumbered with family cares, and a widow of sixty would ordinarily be freed from any temptation to enter into the marriage state. Young widows, even though widows indeed, could not be enrolled, lest having some tempting offer of marriage, they might be led to break the engagement which they had voluntarily made with the church (vss. 11, 12). Paul would not subject them to any such temptation, nor would he lay any obstruction in the path of one who desired to enter into wedlock,

which was ordained by God and sanctioned by Christ. Hence he advises the younger widows to marry (vs. 14), and positively forbids their enrollment.¹ Those put on the list were also required to be monogamists, the qualification demanded in the third chapter, if Chrysostom's interpretation be correct, of both deacons and deaconesses. It was, moreover, essential that they should have a reputation for good works, the experience acquired in the training of children, and the habit of hospitality. They must also have been inured to the most menial services on behalf of the saints; and to the work of relieving the afflicted. In short, they must have diligently followed every good work.

To have required such qualifications in order to entitle a helpless widow to the charities of the church would have been exceedingly strange, and a flagrant violation of the law of love; but if we consider those enrolled as set apart to diaconal service these qualifications are entirely fitting. As the latter interpretation so naturally meets all the demands of the passage we conclude that it must be correct.

We do not, however, suppose that all the deaconesses of the apostolic church were widows of threescore years and upwards. There were many women who labored with Paul, and, whether they were regularly appointed deaconesses or not, they certainly performed, to a greater or less extent, diaconal service. Some of them were not widows, and we have no evidence that they were aged women. Nor is it certain that this enrollment of aged widows for diaconal service was a general practice of the apostolic churches; yet it may have been practised in all those churches which had aged widows who possessed the requisite qualifications. As to these things, it is immaterial. We see that certain widows were formally enrolled for diaconal service. They may have

¹ Perhaps the younger widows were at first deaconesses; as such their duties called them to go from house to house (*περιερχόμεναι τὰς οἰκίας* "going round," or "while going round to the houses,") but they neglected their special work and gave themselves up to tattling and mischief-making. From his experience with them in the past, Paul may have forbidden their enrollment. See Jacob's *Ecl. Pol. of the N. T.* p. 167.

been elected to this honor by a popular vote ; judging from the spirit and acts of the apostolic church, we should say that this was altogether probable. Belonging to the diaconate in the same church, there may have been not only widows, but also virgins, and even married women who were childless, or whose children had grown up so as to leave them comparatively free from domestic care. If the persons rendering official service had no need of charity, the service was probably gratuitous.

It has been objected by some that a woman sixty years of age was too old for a deaconess. But such men must shut their eyes to the most patent facts. In many of our churches some of our most efficient female workers are sixty and upwards ; and such is their discretion and dignity that their labor is beyond all price. One such worker is worth a score of the most zealous misses.

Moreover, deaconesses of threescore years and upwards are not unknown in modern times. In a note appended to the article on the "Deaconess" in "Smith's Dictionary of the Bible," Dr. Hackett says: "The Separate or Congregational church of Gainsborough, England (1589), had 'relievers' or 'widows,' who must be 'widows of sixty years of age at least,' whose work it was 'to minister to the sick.'" "Johnson and Ainsworth's Congregational church in Amsterdam (1606) had 'one ancient widow for a deaconess.' Though sixty years old when chosen, 'she did frequently visit the sick and weak and if they were poor, she would gather relief of them that were able, or acquaint the deacons ; and she was obeyed as an officer of Christ.'" The Cambridge Platform (ch. VII. § 7) recognizes this office of deaconess. "The Lord hath appointed ancient widows (where they may be had) to minister to the church, in giving attendance to the sick, and to give succor unto them and others in like necessities."

There is still another scriptural testimony of importance. Paul commends to the Roman Christians, Phebe, "who is a deaconess of the church which is at Cenchrea." Neander found in this passage an explicit reference to the female

diaconate.¹ Some indeed assert that we should render *διάκονον*, servant instead of deaconess, and that there is no evidence that Phebe was anything more than some prominent woman who efficiently served, not as an office-bearer, but as a private Christian, the church to which she belonged. But we answer that Paul's language naturally applies only to an official personage. Phebe was a servant of a particular church in a sense which distinguished her from its other members. The most natural interpretation, therefore, of the passage in hand is that it represents her as a deaconess. This being true, it is not unreasonable to suppose that Mary, who bestowed much labor on Paul and his co-workers, and Tryphena, Tryphosa, and the beloved Persis who "labored much in the Lord," were also deaconesses at Rome. If the little church at Cenchrea had a deaconess, it is fair to conclude that the larger churches in the great cities had a still greater number of women filling the same office.

Our interpretation of the above passages is sustained by both the practice and the expressed views of the early churches.

Some lapsed Christians informed Pliny the younger, who was propraetor of Bythina, in the first decade of the second century, that their only crime or error was that they met before day, sung a hymn to Christ as God, and bound themselves never to commit fraud, theft, or adultery, and never to falsify their word. "Wherefore," he says, "in order to ascertain the truth I deemed it the more necessary to examine by torture two female servants, who are called deaconesses."² As Pliny gives so much truthful testimony in his letter concerning the early Christians, the above statement is very probably correct. It is, moreover, most reasonable to suppose that he would have chosen for examination those who filled some office, and who would be most likely to understand thoroughly the doctrines and practices of the church.

¹ Planting and Training (Robinson's Translation), p. 155.

² Quo magis necessarium credidi, ex duabus ancillis, quae ministrae dicebantur, quid esset veri, et per tormenta quaerere. Letters 10. 97.

Ignatius,¹ after saluting the presbytery and deacons, writes: "I salute the households of my brethren with their wives and children, and the *virgins* who are called *widows*." Hefele says in a note, "Deaconesses, although they might be *virgins*, were nevertheless called *widows*, because in the primitive times of the church, widows were customarily chosen to the office of deaconesses." Hefele suggests the most probable interpretation of this passage, since it appears from Tertullian, that not only married women and mothers, but also virgins were sometimes placed in the order of widows;² and that Tertullian identifies widows and deaconesses can hardly be doubted, since he declares that the experimental training of the mothers and educators of children belonging to the order of widows would qualify them readily to aid others with counsel and comfort. In still another passage, he speaks of the apostle's prescription that permits not men twice married to preside over the church (a false interpretation), nor grants a widow admittance into the order unless she has been the wife of one man.³ As here the first reference is to the bishop of 1 Tim. iii., it seems unnatural that Tertullian should have failed to mention the deacons of whom the same qualification was required, unless he looked on the widows as belonging to the diaconate. At least, as the first reference is to an order of church officers, it is difficult not to regard the second in the same light. That there was a class of widows in post-apostolic times, as in apostolic, which performed no official service and was supported by the church, is doubtless true; that there was an official class seems to me to be equally clear, and that Tertullian had this order in view when he wrote the passages referred to above. In this the most trustworthy patristic scholars agree.⁴ The passages so understood illustrate the salutation of Ignatius to the "virgins called widows," and support the comment of Hefele.

In the Pastor of Hermas,⁵ the aged woman who represents

¹ Smyr. chap. 13.

² Tert. De Virg. c. 9.

³ Ad Uxor. Lib. 1. c. 7.

⁴ See Essay on "The Constitutions and Canons of the Holy Apostles."

Translated by Prof. Ira Chase, D.D. p. 374.

⁵ Lib. 1. Vis. 2. c. 4.

the church, directs Hermas to write two books, and send one to Clement, who would send it to foreign countries, and the other to Grapte, who would admonish the widows and orphans. Hefele says, "Grapte appears to have been a deaconess." In the conception of the writer she evidently was one accustomed to instruct the feeble and destitute, probably in their own homes. The incidental character of the testimony enhances its value. The author of the Visions speaks of Grapte and her work as though such labor on the part of women was a very familiar thing in his day (middle of second century).

Clement of Alexandria, in his *Paedagogus*,¹ says that there are in holy scripture innumerable commands to chosen persons, "some to presbyters, some to bishops, some to deacons, others to *widows*."² As widows are here enumerated with the "chosen persons," presbyters, bishops, and deacons, he unquestionably regarded them as church officers, and in his *Stromata*,³ he points out the scripture on which his view is based. He says that the women whom the apostles (1 Cor. ix. 5) took about with them were not as wives, but as sisters; these sisters were "helpers of the women who stay at home; by them also the doctrine of the Lord slipped without blame into the harem; for we also know what things the high-minded Paul ordained concerning female deacons in the second Epistle of Timothy." Clement refers to the wrong epistle, and his interpretation of 1 Cor. ix. 5 may be very wide of the mark, yet his words not only show the existence of the female diaconate in his day, but also that he believed it to be founded on apostolic teaching. Jerome in his commentaries identifies the deaconesses of the early churches and the women referred to by Paul in Rom. xvi. 1 and 1 Tim. iii.⁴

¹ Lib. 3. c. 12, § 97.

² Dr. Howson, in his book on "Deaconesses," p. 37, changes, unwittingly it is to be hoped, the order of the words, and affirms that Clement specifies the "select persons" as "bishops, priests, deacons, and widows." Nor is it quite fair to use the ambiguous word "priests" instead of the unambiguous term "presbyters."

³ Lib. 3, c. 6. § 53.

⁴ Rom. xvi. 1. *Sicut etiam nunc in Orientalibus diaconissae mulieres in suo*

These testimonies from the early church might be considerably multiplied; and nothing impresses the reader of them more than their unanimity. In the first centuries all seem to have understood the First Epistle to Timothy in one way. We listen in vain for a discordant note. It is a fact worthy of attention, that conflicting views concerning the third and fifth chapters of First Timothy did not spring up until the office of deaconess had become so distorted that it had lost all apostolic simplicity, or had nearly died out in the Christian church.

But suppose it to be proved that this branch of the diaconate existed in apostolic times, can we account for it? Was there any necessity which called it into being? The answer at hand is so reasonable and natural that it would be difficult to understand how the New Testament churches could have grown up without deaconesses. For when these churches were gathered, women in Greek communities usually lived in seclusion, just as they do now in Mohammedan countries. On account of this, Paul was sometimes, not to say often, assisted by women in preaching the gospel. The best exegetes tell us that we must so interpret his words in Phillipians, "Help those women who labored with me in the gospel, with Clement also." These females went from house to house, making known the glad tidings to those from whom the apostle was excluded. The deacons of the churches, planted where such customs prevailed, could not enter into the houses to care for the females who were suffering from sickness and poverty. If they had attempted it, their conduct would have been the occasion of scandal, and the churches which they served would have been disgraced in the eyes of the heathen. To meet this necessity, the labors of suitable women were demanded. At first they may not have been regarded as a distinct order in the church; but, since their services were constantly required, they became known as

sexu ministrare videntur in baptismo, sive in ministerio verbi. 1 Tim. iii. 11. Similiter eas ut diacones eligi jubet; unde intelligatur quod de his dicat, quas adhuc hodie in Oriente diaconissas appellant.

belonging to the diaconate, and were probably regularly chosen by the churches for their work.

This apostolic institution, although, like the other offices of the church, more or less perverted, long maintained itself. It lingered in the East, where females lived in seclusion, thirteen centuries, and though the West was unfriendly to it, it did not disappear there until the eleventh century. It is not difficult to note the causes of its final extinction. In post-apostolic times one duty of the deaconesses was to prepare candidates of their own sex for baptism, and to assist them when the ordinance was administered. But, as sprinkling gradually supplanted immersion, their occupation in this respect finally disappeared.¹ But the principal cause of their extinction was monasticism. It was thought that special sanctity could be secured by a secluded life, and just those women who were destitute of family cares and specially qualified for deaconesses were shut up in the cloister, where a life of contemplation was regarded as the supreme good, rather than one of outward activity for others. Yet the early female solitaries, and even nuns, took upon themselves the care of the sick and poor. In later times there sprang up the Roman Catholic sisterhoods, whose special work of charity is the care of the sick and poor, which was the pre-eminent work of the primitive deaconess. In these sisters, many of whom are unquestionably noble women, we see the lingering shadow of the early female diaconate, which disappeared in the monastery.

The earliest Independents of England attempted to revive this branch of the diaconate. They were opposed in their effort by the "judicious" Hooker, who showed, in what he wrote, strange ignorance of the subject. We find, also, in Neal's History of the Puritans,² that sixty clergymen of Norfolk, Suffolk, and Cambridgeshire assembled in London, in 1575, came to certain "conclusions" for the direction of their parishes, among which we find one in reference to

¹ See Herzog's R. E. Vol. iii. p. 369.

² Vol. i. chap. vi. p. 140 (Harper's ed.), 1844.

“collectors for the poor, or deacons.” They said, “Touching deacons of both sorts, viz. *men and women*,” etc.

Robert Browne (1582) speaks of the deacon as “the reliever,” and of the deaconess as “the widow.”¹ In another connection, we have already spoken of the “ancient widow” at Amsterdam, in 1606; we find, also, that at Wesel, in the Low Countries, there was a female diaconate, from 1575 to 1610.² But all these efforts to revive an apostolic institution at last failed.

The establishment, in our own day, of deaconesses’ institutions in Europe, which bids fair to provoke into being similar institutions in our own country, is a clumsy effort toward the revival of the apostolic female diaconate. These deaconesses’ houses, even the most praiseworthy, have as much in common with the Roman Catholic sisterhoods as with the primitive deaconesses. Their inmates, indeed, with constancy and zeal devote themselves to works of charity; but they are not, like the deaconesses of apostolic times, members of the churches which they serve. They form independent communities by themselves.

Ought we not to revive the female branch of the diaconate in its apostolic simplicity? We have many unemployed females in our churches, who might become efficient laborers in this office. What such women could achieve for Christ is shown by their ministrations in army hospitals during the more recent wars. Should not this force, so far as possible, be used in ministering to the poor and sick of our towns and cities? Have we any right to ignore it? And if this power for good went out immediately from the churches, would it not vastly augment their influence? Would not our pastors, strengthened and encouraged by such laborers, begin to say, with Paul, “Help those women who labor with us in the gospel”? Some in our churches could, and would gladly, labor without compensation; but many poor women, who now lean on the needle for a precarious support, might be

¹ Smith’s Dictionary, Art. “Deaconess.”

² Ludlow’s Woman’s Work in the Church, p. 199.

maintained by the churches so that they could devote all their time to charitable labor. One such woman, in St. Louis, in a single year introduced into a mission Sunday-school two hundred scholars that became permanent members of it, helped by the use of the charitable fund many of the worthy poor, and so preached the gospel privately that sixteen persons received Christ as their Saviour, and were baptized into his death.

A friend asked Spurgeon who was the most efficient man in his church. He replied, characteristically, "Mrs. Bartlett." She began, a few years since, at his suggestion, to labor for the mothers of his congregation. She first instructed three or four from the scriptures on the Sabbath. Her class has increased to more than a thousand, and is seldom less than eight hundred. She instructs them in the gospel, and does all she can for their bodily comfort. If she is not a regularly appointed deaconess, she does diaconal service; laboring with her pastor in the gospel, as certain women did with Paul. As great success might by no means ordinarily crown the labors of the most faithful deaconesses; but such facts show that there slumbers within the church vast power for achieving good, which at the present day is almost wholly overlooked.

We must now speak briefly of the Duties, Qualifications, and Ordination of deacons.

1. Their Duties. We have been compelled, in the foregoing discussion, in a measure, to anticipate this point; but it needs to be treated more thoroughly. Guided by Acts vi., we must conclude that the chief duty of deacons is to care for the poor of the church, to provide for their tables; and, if the widows of 1 Tim. v. 9, who were put on the list, were expected so far as they were able to perform diaconal service, judging from the experience in works of charity demanded of them, it is clear that the same duty belonged to the female branch of the diaconate. And whenever, in post-apostolic history, the duties of deacons are mentioned, this duty of caring for the poor is almost invariably most prominent.

They are not, however, restricted to this alone. The term "deacon" means a helper, and in Acts vi. they were to care for the poor in order to relieve the apostles from that labor. Thus they helped them to preach the gospel. A deacon, being the helper of his pastor, should always be ready to relieve him, so far as possible, of every burden which hinders him from giving himself wholly to prayer and the ministry of the word. In the language of the Apostolic Constitutions, he should be his bishop's "soul and perception."

Moreover, while it is the main work of the deacons, both male and female, to care for the bodily wants of the poor and sick, yet, since they are Christian laborers, they are bound, so far as they are able, to preach to them the gospel. Thus they minister to both body and soul, and, in the highest and best sense, become co-workers with, and helpers of, the elder or elders with whom they are associated.

In perfect accord with these views, Bunsen writes: "The office of deacon, or helper, implies, in the full sense of the word, the attendance on the poor and the sick. To offer spiritual, as well as bodily aid, and, indeed, to supply all common wants, was the individual duty of every Christian; and this divine idea of services of charity had so deeply pervaded the mind of the church that the office of deacon and deaconess grew out of it. The latter were ordinarily widows, and the sisterhood of widows is nothing more than that of deaconesses."¹

There is not, however, the slightest evidence, either in the New Testament or in ecclesiastical history, that it is the duty of apostolic deacons to care for the general finances of the church. Their financial work is limited to a wise distribution of the poor fund. And this is reasonable. If deacons perform the duties that plainly devolve on them, they will have neither time nor inclination for finance. Moreover, an excellent deacon may be a very poor financier. Shall he be excluded from his office because he cannot devise ways and means to meet the expenses of his church? If, however,

¹ Hippolytus and his Age, Vol. iii. pp. 230-231.

a deacon has good financial ability, he may be placed on a financial committee; but his committee work is aside from his diaconal service. If, from any cause, his pastor has become burdened with the finances, he ought to relieve him of them; but by so doing he performs a service which does not belong to his office any more than to that of his pastor.

And as to deacons ruling a church by virtue of their office, they have no more right to do so than an elder has by virtue of his; and, as the New Testament permits elders to govern their churches only through their good works and consequent personal influence, it certainly cannot accord to deacons control over the churches on any other basis. To see deacons put the governing of the churches among their duties is quite as unseemly as for an elder to attempt to lord it over God's heritage.

2. Their Qualifications. We learn from the words of the apostles in Acts vi. 3 that a deacon should be thoroughly pious. The seven were to be "full of the Holy Spirit." Moreover, this piety should be linked with wisdom. The seven were to be filled with it, as well as with the Spirit. The wisdom here referred to, whether a gift of the Spirit or a natural endowment, appears to be good judgment, discretion, sound sense, which would help them to care for the poor with judiciousness and tact.

We need not wonder that such qualifications are required in deacons; by their piety they would commend the gospel to any in the households visited by them who had not yet received it, and would be able to instruct more perfectly those who had believed, or to comfort them when despondent under trials. If one ever needs the help of the Spirit it is when engaged in such duties, that he may be able to discern rightly the mental and spiritual condition of the afflicted, and to speak the fitting word; and if a man ever needs wisdom it is in distributing to the necessities of the poor, that he may grant relief just where it is most needed, and withhold it from the unworthy, who may be most clamorous for it, that he may give even to the truly needy so as not to

pamper them in idleness, but to encourage in them self-reliance and industry, and also so delicately as not to wound those who possess sensitive natures and are of a manly independent spirit.

With the foregoing general and comprehensive qualifications of deacons accord the more minute specifications of Paul in 1 Tim. iii. 8-12. He teaches that deacons must be "grave," dignified in conduct, or reputable in deportment in all the relations of life (cf. Phil. iv. 8). They must also be sincere and truthful, "not double-tongued," not saying one thing and meaning another, or not saying, concerning the same thing, one thing to these, another to those. Temperance in the use of wine is also required. Nor must they be "greedy of gain," lest they should appropriate to their own purposes the money or goods entrusted to them for the poor.

As to their inner, spiritual life, they must hold "the mystery of the faith," the doctrine of the gospel apprehended by faith, "in a pure conscience," a conscience undefiled by greed, or any unholy act or lust.

Moreover, they must be examples in their domestic life. Like elders they were required to be monogamous. If any man, before his conversion had been carried away with the loose morals of the times, and for some unscriptural reason had divorced his wife, and then married another, he must not be made a deacon. Tried by the word of God he was a polygamist; and as such conduct was disreputable even in the eyes of the better heathen, to make such a man a church officer, though he had thoroughly repented, would have scandalized the church.¹ They must also preside well over their own households. In short, they must be "without reproach," as to their moral character, faith, or domestic life. And this demand in Paul's letter that they should be "without reproach," or "blameless," answers to the demand of the apostles in reference to the seven, that they should be men of "good repute" (Acts vi. 3).

¹ Conybeare and Howson's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, Vol. ii. p. 452; Hovey's *Scriptural Law of Divorce*, p. 64.

Several of the qualifications required of those belonging to this branch of the diaconate are also required of those belonging to the other. The deaconesses, in like manner, must be dignified in deportment, and the wives of one husband (1 Tim. v. 9). If the male deacon must not be given to much wine, the female deacon must be "sober" (*νεφάλια*), must ever keep herself under such restraint as to avoid all excesses.

But some qualifications peculiar to her are named. She must not be a "slanderer"; and if the enrolled widows of v. 9 performed diaconal service, she must have an inclination and aptitude for works of charity, and experience in them; and, to crown the whole, she must be "faithful in all things," must be one who is accustomed to perform the duties which belong to every relation which she sustains, with strict fidelity.

3. Ought deacons to be ordained? If we follow the example of the apostles we ought certainly to ordain male deacons, and if we have just views of ordination there can be no objection to it, even in the case of deaconesses. It does not confer any special sanctity nor any power which has not already been conferred by election. It is simply a public inauguration. Its benefit consists in the prayer of faith offered for the divine blessing to descend on those who are thus solemnly set apart to their work. The laying on of hands is the fitting symbol of the bestowment, in answer to the prayer, of ordinary spiritual influences, and it also emphatically points out the ordained in the presence of the community as a church officer. Such a setting apart was quite common in the apostolic day. The seven were thus consecrated to their work. In a similar manner the apostles ordained elders in the churches of Asia Minor. Titus was directed to do the same in the churches of Crete. When Barnabas and Saul were about to enter upon the work of preaching the gospel to the Gentiles, the church at Antioch, after having fasted and prayed, through its representatives, laid hands on them, and sent them forth on their mission. If we catch the spirit of an apostolic ordination, there is manifestly nothing im-

proper, nothing contrary to the spirit of the New Testament in laying hands in prayer on deaconesses, and craving the blessing of God on them in their work. In post-apostolic times the churches did this. We find in the Apostolic Constitutions the very prayer that was offered when a deaconess was set apart to her work. And as all the hints in the New Testament go to show that deacons are permanent officers of the church, chosen for life or during good behavior, it seems to be most fitting that they should be ordained. There is nothing in the teachings or acts of the apostles which justifies the annual election of deacons, as though their office was of no more importance than the charge of an annual committee. Directed by the Acts and Epistles, we should say that it would be just as proper to elect an elder annually, and bid him preach unordained, as to pursue the same course in reference to deacons. The one office is just as particularly named by Paul as the other, and we have the example of the apostles in the ordination of both orders of officers.

And now, in view of the above facts, can we permit the diaconate to die out in our churches, and be guiltless? Can we join the crusade against an apostolic institution, and one which common sense teaches us is so much needed? Because there are "crooked deacons," shall we scout the wisdom of the apostles, and abolish the diaconate? As there are crooked elders also, shall we apply the same logic to their office, and do it away? Deacons, as a class, certainly ought not to suffer for the misdeeds of a few of their number. Take them as a whole, no nobler band of Christian men lives to-day; and when some of them come into collision with their elders, it is not certain that the fault is always with the deacons; it is sometimes, unquestionably, with a wrong-headed elder, who finds it convenient to lay the responsibility of his quarrels off on some deacon who may be, perhaps, too resolute in opposing what he believes to be injudicious or wrong.

But nothing can ever harm the apostolic diaconate, so long as it faithfully performs the duties enjoined upon it in

the New Testament. If deacons care for the poor; if, as opportunity presents itself, they preach the gospel from house to house; if, by all means in their power, they remove the things which hinder their pastors from giving themselves wholly to prayer and the ministry of the word, then all attempts to overturn their office will be utterly futile.

ARTICLE III.

THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.

BY JOHN EDGAR JOHNSON.

THE Chinese is a language by itself, perfectly unique. It is the only specimen of a purely primitive tongue that now remains to us, and for this reason, if for no other, possesses great interest for the student of philology. It is just such a language as two persons would probably devise if thrown together in a desert, neither ever having seen a human being before. It is to be regretted that, whereas the manners, customs, and religion of the Chinese are dwelt upon at great length by our book-makers and letter-writers, little or no interest is manifested in the language of a people who number more than a third of the entire population of the globe.

We shall never be able to understand the Chinese, until we know more of their language. Our great ignorance in this respect is the cause of nine tenths of our prejudice against and distrust of them. This is not strange. Indeed, it is always so. Englishmen and Americans, travelling upon the continent of Europe, are apt to bring home a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the people in France, Germany, and Italy, just as they happen to be conversant with or ignorant of the languages spoken in those countries. To the former, especially, everything that is not English falls under the contemptuous and comprehensive head of "gibberish." The writer of this once met an Englishman in a

crowded beer-garden at Munich. After exchanging a few words, the Briton leaned over the table, and said, with a significant leer: "Do you speak the Japanese?" The conversation going on about us was to him a jargon; and it is needless to observe that he entertained a very unfavorable opinion of a people who could not speak what he chose to call "God Almighty's English." And I confess that, some months earlier, I had often looked at a German, who was speaking rapidly, with much the same feeling as one has when staring at some wild animal in a menagerie, wondering inwardly if he had a soul like another man, and if, before God, I should be guilty of murder in case I put a bullet through his head. And so it happens that writers for the newspapers, who *ricochet* around the world, ignorant of every language but their own, when they come to China are impressed with the oddity of everything; and, unable to communicate with the better class of people, receive all of their impressions concerning the country from the washerwomen and hucksters, who speak "pigeon English," and who do not mean to speak it for nothing. It is not strange that their letters, under such circumstances, usually give the Chinese a poor reputation for honesty. On the other hand, all missionaries and other persons who remain long enough in the country to acquire even a slight knowledge of the language, bear universal testimony to the integrity, industry, and intelligence of the people.

It is not probable that many persons in this country will ever find it desirable to acquire an extended knowledge of the Chinese language; but if the stream of immigration from China, which is now interrupted, should begin to flow again, as we may rest assured it will, there would be practical reasons why some would wish to make the subject a study. For scholars it will always possess an abiding interest; and we hope to see, before long, at Cambridge, or at some other first-class university, a chair in the Chinese language and literature. We charge the Chinese with exclusiveness and national bigotry; and yet they have established at Peking,

within a few years, a foreign college, where instruction is given in the languages and arts of Western people. The number of Chinese youth now being educated in Europe and America is not small. Establish this chair at Cambridge, put into it some one of the learned Chinese scholars who are now in this country, and these students will all congregate there. The prospects are, that in ten years from now, if it is not so at present, the Chinese will know far more about us and our civilization than we know about them and theirs. There is one thing that we must do at all hazards, and that is, to get rid of the utterly erroneous and supremely ridiculous notions concerning the ignorance and cowardice of this people, which we have suffered to be palmed off upon us by a lot of sensational correspondents of the press.

The main object of this Article is to convey some idea as to the genius of the Chinese language—no easy task. A good many of its characters are ideographic; their meaning is suggested by their form or sound. There is no alphabet, and each object or idea is represented by a distinct sign. Of course, there is really no end to the language; it is infinite. Some writers have estimated the number of words as high as two hundred and sixty thousand, eight hundred and ninety-nine (Montucci); but the total of really different symbols in use among good writers will not exceed twenty-five thousand. Ten thousand signs, however, will enable one to read any book; while three thousand is sufficient for all ordinary purposes. The origin of these characters, like that of the alphabet among Western nations, is lost in tradition. Chinese writers ascribe it to Hwangti, an early emperor, or to Tsang-Kieh, a celebrated statesman, both of whom are said to have lived about 2700 B.C. The first characters were derived from a study of nature, and were imitations of its forms. Heretofore events had been recorded by means of knotted cords—a specific knot stood for a particular event. But now a medium was invented whereby ideas could be imparted to others, and then handed down to posterity. At this crisis, Chinese historians say, “the

heavens, the earth, and the gods were all agitated. The inhabitants of Hades wept at night; and the heavens, as an expression of joy, rained down ripe grain. From the invention of writing the machinations of the human heart began to operate; stories false and erroneous daily increased; litigations and imprisonments sprang up. Hence, also, specious and artful language, which causes so much confusion in the world. It was for these reasons that the shades of the departed wept at night. But from the invention of writing, polite intercourse and music proceeded, reason and justice were made manifest; the relations of social life were illustrated, and laws became fixed. Governors had rules to refer to; scholars had authorities to venerate; and hence the heavens, delighted, rained down ripe grain. The classical scholar, the historian, the mathematician, and the astronomer can none of them do without writing. Were there no written language to afford proof of passing events, the shades might weep at noon-day, and the heavens rain down blood."

The first characters, we have said, were rude outlines of natural objects. A crescent, for instance, was recognized as representing the moon. A circle with a dot in the centre, stood for the sun. The word *sin*, heart, was represented by a figure which resembled that organ. It is evident that the number of such signs that could be invented was comparatively limited, and so it became necessary, quite early, to combine those symbols, already understood, for the purpose of conveying new ideas.

Chinese philologists divide all the characters in their language into six classes, which they call *luh shu*, or "six writings." The first class, called *siang hing*, or "imitative symbols," are those which plainly recall, by their form, the object represented. They were the first characters invented, and number something more than six hundred. These pristine signs have since undergone a great change, which was brought about by the invention of ink and paper for writing purposes. Curved lines have given place to angular ones, as

the latter can be more easily struck with a brush than the former. In the days of Confucius, 550 B.C. an iron style, with bamboo tablets, was used in writing. Paper was invented in the first century; ink came into use in the seventh century; and the present mode of printing from blocks was adopted in the tenth century. On account of this change in the materials used in writing and printing, the resemblance between the character and the object represented has almost entirely disappeared. This may be seen from an examination of the labels, which are trade-marks or advertisements, on a bunch of fire-crackers or a tea-chest. The second class, including one hundred and seven signs, is called *chi sz'*, or "symbols indicating thought." They are formed by the union of two other characters, and express some idea by the position of their parts. For instance, the sun, a circle with a dot in the centre, written above the horizon, a straight line, denotes morning. A dash drawn in the sign which signifies mouth, a rectangle, means something sweet.

The third class, seven hundred and forty in number, is called *hwui i*, or "combined ideas." It is composed of characters formed by the union of two or three symbols which convey, jointly, some new idea, suggested by the influence exerted upon each other by the objects which they separately represent. Thus the union of the sun and moon, *ming*, signifies brightness; *kien*, a piece of wood in a doorway, denotes an obstruction; a mouth in a door, signifies to ask; a woman and a broom, means a wife; a dog and a mouth, means to bark.

The fourth class, *chuen chu*, "inverted significations," includes three hundred and seventy-two characters which are such as acquire a new meaning by some change or inversion in the position of their parts. Thus the hand turning towards the right, means the right; towards the left, the left.

The fifth class, called *Kiai shing*, i.e. "writing sound symbols," contains twenty-one thousand, eight hundred and ten characters, or the greater part of all in the language. They are formed by the union of two ideographs, one of which

suggests the meaning of the new word, and the other, which is written usually at the right, loses its own signification entirely and serves only to fix the pronunciation of the new symbol. By this means the Chinese can multiply the number of their characters *ad infinitum* without increasing the number of primitive symbols.

The sixth class, *Kia tsie*, "borrowed uses," includes five hundred and ninety-eight characters. They are metaphoric symbols. Thus, the sign which means a written character is composed of a *child* under a *shelter*, written characters being regarded as the well-nurtured offspring of hieroglyphics.

It is far from true, as some seem to think, that the meaning of any considerable number of words in the language is easily inferred from their form or position.

Perhaps seven eighths of all the characters in Chinese have been formed from the union of about two thousand symbols. We may suppose that the mode of procedure was something as follows. The spoken language was already well understood. Hwangti, or Tsang-Kieh, instead of adopting arbitrary signs to represent sounds, as has been done in other languages, depicted the object and applied to it the name which it had in the colloquial language. There was nothing about the character itself that gave one the least idea as to its sound; that had to be learned arbitrarily. Just, in fact, as is the case with the letters of our alphabet. But it will be seen that this method had its limits. When about two thousand signs had been devised, human ingenuity was well-nigh exhausted and the symbols were getting to be very complex. But meanwhile nearly every sound of which the vocal organs were capable having been represented, the emperor or the statesmen, whichever it was, hit upon the plan of combining these original characters to form new ones.

These compounds or derivatives which constitute, as we have said, the large mass of all the words in the Chinese language, were formed in this manner. The symbol on the left was to indicate, though oftentimes remotely, the meaning of the new sign; the symbol on the right was purely pho-

netic, lost its signification, but gave to the compound its name. For instance, in the spoken language, *ma no* meant a cornelian or agate. It was impossible to make an ideograph which would distinguish this stone from others, and hence recourse was had to the syllabic method. The symbol which signifies *gem* or *stone* was taken, and to this were joined two other characters which together had the sound of *ma no*. In this manner it will be seen that in a short time there came to be a great many words of widely different meaning but pronounced in the same way. *Ting*, which is an ancient hieroglyphic for a sting, or nail, gives its name to at least thirty-six combinations. And hence a native of China would not understand, oftentimes, one of his own countrymen when reading aloud. Suppose the former hears the word *ting* pronounced; how can he tell, except from the context, which one of the thirty-six compounds is meant? He must look on the book. There is a difference in the written character, but none in the spoken word. The range of pronunciation in Chinese, however, is much greater than in any other language. The different cadences which they are able to give a word lie quite beyond the descriptive powers of a European. Some words, and especially foreign ones, are formed by the union of signs which sound like the new word when pronounced. There is no root, which gives meaning, and the reader is frequently cautioned against falling into error on this account by placing the sign for "mouth" beside the new compound to show that all of the component words are merely phonetic. This is, in fact, the syllabic method of writing. Thus, at Canton, where the Chinese come in contact with foreigners, it was found necessary to have some symbol to represent *Mister*; so they took the character *mi*, "beautiful," and *sz*, "scholar," not because there was anything in the meaning of these words to suggest the object; far from it, but simply because when pronounced together they sounded like *Mister*. So too coffee is written *ka fi*; *ka* means "frame," and *fi* means "not," and of course they do not indicate the idea. An inhabitant of Canton who should meet these words

would pronounce them mentally, and immediately detect their meaning. But a man back in the country, who knew nothing about foreigners, and never heard them named, would puzzle over them, seeking to discover their signification from the meaning of their parts. Good scholars are very careful how they employ purely phonetic words, and their use is therefore quite limited. The better way is to translate foreign names. For instance, instead of trying to represent the name Englishmen, phonetically, as above described, they use the term *Hungman jin*, or Red Bristles men; Americans they call *Hwaki*, or Flowery Flag; the Danes are known as *Hwangki*, or Yellow Flag.

There are several methods by which the characters of the language have been arranged for the purpose of reference. The one adopted by the dictionary called Kanghi Tsz' Tien is in general use. Two hundred and fourteen familiar symbols, which enter into nearly all the derivatives, are taken as clefs, or radicals. These are arranged according to the number of strokes of which they are composed. First, those of one stroke, etc., down to those formed by seventeen strokes. Then again, the derivatives under each radical are arranged in the same manner. So that if you wish to look out a word in the dictionary, notice first its radical part, distinguish that. Most usually it is written, as has been said, at the left of the compound; but sometimes it is placed above, below, or so as to enclose the rest of the symbol. Having discovered the radical, which, on account of variations, is not always an easy task, count the number of strokes of which it is composed. A little caution is needed even in this last operation, for the Chinese oftentimes make a character with one stroke of the pen which we should count as two. Among the radicals formed by a given number of strokes you find the specific radical, and under this last you find the word which you seek.

The great number of phonetic characters in the language, and the perfectly arbitrary manner in which their pronunciation is determined, give rise to a good many patois and

dialects. There are more than two thousand symbols the sounds of which are fixed just as arbitrarily as are the sounds of the letters in our alphabet, some of which we no longer pronounce after the manner of our Teutonic ancestors. But in all alphabetical languages one word braces another, and hence any change in the sound of a letter is quickly detected, and may be immediately corrected. In China the moment a man passes out of his own village he notices a slight difference in the pronunciation of the common people, and hears a few new words; for any one may make a word who chooses. Before he has gone many miles, however, the conversation of the natives becomes perfectly unintelligible. His only recourse, then, is to writing. A citizen of Canton finds as much difficulty in making himself understood, in conversation, at Pekin or in Japan as he would meet with in New York. A pencil and a piece of paper, however, render him master of the situation. This same difficulty is met with when an Englishman or American undertakes to converse in Latin with a German or Frenchman. At the papal college, in Rome, there is always a roar of laughter when, at the beginning of the session, the first American arises to read in the classics. An anecdote is told of Scaliger, who, being visited one day by a Scotchman, and addressed in Latin, begged his pardon, and requested him, if possible, to speak in some other language, as he did not understand Gaelic.

By a dialect, the Chinese grammarians mean a variation in the idioms of a language, as well as in its pronunciation. According to this definition, there are three principal dialects, which but for the written character would amount to three distinct languages. There are, however, an infinite number of local patois. These are called the Court, the Canton, and the Fuh Kien dialects. The Court, or Mandarin dialect is, more properly speaking, the Chinese language *par excellence*. It is the official, the polite, the scholarly language of the country. It is spoken everywhere in the empire by the educated.

The local patois, or village brogue, is called *tu tan*. The

citizens of Canton call their dialect *pak wa*, or “plain language.” The wide difference which exists between the Court and the Canton dialects may be illustrated with a single sentence. The phrase, “I do not understand what he says,” is, in the Court dialect, *Wo min puh tung teh ta kiang shim mo*; in the Canton dialect, *Ngò'm hiu kii kong mǎt yé*. It is evident that, if the uniformity of the written character were taken away, the Chinese empire would be split up into a large number of small nations.

In reading Chinese begin at the upper right-hand corner, and read down. What we call the back part of a book is with them the fore part. The paper used for printing is thin. The leaves of a book are cut at the ends, but not on the side. From one page read right over or right around on to the other. When notes are added, they are placed at the top of the page, with a heavy line dividing them from the text. There is an abbreviated form for writing; in this the characters run from left to right and are joined together. This mode stands in about the same relation to the method employed in the books, as with us the written hand occupies with reference to the printed character.

In China there is no copy-right law, and no censorship of the press, except that no one is permitted to write about the present dynasty. Books are cheap—varying in price from one cent for a work containing from twenty to thirty pages, up to a dollar for one embraced in several volumes. The *San Kwòh Chi*, “History of the Three States,” is bound in twenty-one volumes 12mo, and sells for about seventy-five cents. Books are printed in a great variety of sizes, from 32mo (“sleeve editions”) up to quartos, fourteen inches square.

Those who have asserted that the Chinese language has no grammar ignore the primary and radical signification of the word. It has no etymology, it is true, since neither the characters nor their names undergo any change to indicate number, gender, case, mood, tense, or voice. This is done by means of adjuncts; the character always remaining the same.

Syntax and prosody, therefore, constitute the grammar of the language. In every sentence, where nothing is understood, there is a regular order in which should be written the subject, verb, object, and indirect object. A word modifying another word is placed before it — the adjective before the substantive, the adverb before the verb, etc. The Chinese grammarians divide all words into *shi tsz* and *hii tsz*, i.e. essential words and particles. Comparisons may be made in a variety of ways. The comparison of ideas is indicated by antithesis or parallelism. For instance, "Entering the hills and seizing a tiger is easy; opening the mouth and getting men to lean is difficult," is the way of expressing the comparison, "It is easier to seize a tiger in the hills than to obtain the good offices of men." There are thirteen numerals, and numbers are written out just as they are to be read, as *yih peh sz shih san*, one, hundred, four, ten, three, i.e. one hundred and forty-three.

The passive voice is expressed by means of prefixing particles indicating agency to the active verb, as, "The villain *received* my sword's *cutting*," for, "The villain was wounded by my sword." No punctuation marks are used in writing or printing, and the author who should insert them in his book would run the risk of being laughed at.

It will be seen, from what has already been said, that the Chinese language is infinite in extent. And the question whether or no a man can read or write is altogether a relative one. Charlie Sing, the foreman at North Adams, assured the writer of this that every one of the men under his charge could read simple books and write a fair hand. "Some knew a good many more signs than others. It was just so at home. Nearly every man could read some; but there was every grade of knowledge, from the person who knew five hundred words up to the scholar who was acquainted with ten thousand. His countrymen went to school forever. In some of the schools they did not admit a 'boy' until he was sixty years old; in others, the pupils were quite young.'

Our first piece of advice, then, to a person who thought of taking up the study of Chinese, would be this: Forget everything you know about the genius of language. Your present ideas will be a positive damage to you. Get rid of them at any cost. Begin over again. First, commit to memory the two hundred and fourteen radicals; they are all familiar words, and the time thus expended will not be thrown away. Then, learn the names and meaning of all the common phonetics or primitives, which are rather more than a thousand in number. With this alphabet you will be prepared to enter upon the acquisition of the derivative forms, which, after all, constitute at least seven eighths of the language.

An author whose name is now forgotten recommends the student, after he is pretty well advanced, to commit to memory the four books and the five classics. This is the method pursued by the Chinese youth. Or rather, they begin by committing to memory sentences, pages, and then whole books, before they are instructed in the meaning of a single character that they have learned. A dozen sit in one room, and repeat aloud the words which they wish to fix in their minds. Of course, it makes a noise. But the quick ear of the pedagogue detects the slightest inaccuracy of tone, and, reaching over with a long bamboo, he somewhat forcibly calls the attention of his pupil to the fact.

Although there are few persons, perhaps, who would be willing to devote the time and labor necessary to acquire a reading knowledge of the Chinese language, there are many students of philology among us, who would be amply paid for an examination into its genius and spirit.

The lack of proper books deters, without doubt, a good many from taking up the subject. And no one knows where to look for information. When the writer of this first desired to begin the study, he was entirely ignorant as to where the necessary books could be obtained. After having waited patiently some time for answers to the letters which he had sent off to Washington, San Francisco, and at last to China; it accidentally occurred to him that something on this

subject might possibly be obtained at the Cambridge library, a mile distant. Thither he went, and was so fortunate as to find an abundance of everything he needed, with the exception of a native teacher to give him the pronunciation of the language. He consoles himself with the thought that this is not the only instance where a man after having diligently sought his spectacles found them at last within a very few inches of his nose.

The library at Cambridge contains a little work by S. W. Williams, entitled, "Easy Lessons in Chinese," which is just what the beginner requires. He will also find there a grammar by Schott, in German; a dictionary in French and Chinese, as well as an imperial Chinese dictionary, and several other works which will assist and guide him in his labors. Mr. Abbot, that citizen of the world of letters, will afford him much valuable information. There are also several libraries in the city of Boston where books on this subject may be found. We close this hurried and imperfect sketch by appending a literal translation of a short narrative, which is as familiar to Chinese youth as the story of Washington and the cherry-tree is to the children of our own land. It illustrates, better than anything that we can say, the plan and genius of the language. The parenthetical remarks are ours, and are thrown in to explain the idioms where the meaning is obscure.

CONFUCIUS AND THE BOY.

Confucius, named Yau, styled Chungni; set up to teach in Lu. One day, followed all disciples, sitting carriage, went rambling; road met several children childishly playing; among was one lad not play. Confucius then stopping carriage, asking said, Only you not play, why eh? Small boy replying said, all play without advantage, clothes torn difficult mend, certainly have fighting quarreling; labor and without gain, how is good business? Therefore is not (I do not) play. Then hanging head with tile pieces made city (in the road). Confucius reprimanding him said, why not turn out carriage eh? Little boy replying said, From antiquity till now is proper carriage turn out for city, not proper city turn out for carriage. Confucius then held in (stopped) carriage, discourse reason. Leaving car and asked so, Your years still young, why much quickness

eh? Little boy replying said, Man born three years distinguishes (tells apart) parents; hare born three days runs earth ridges fields; fish born three days wander in rivers, lakes; heaven produces just so, how called brisk eh?

Confucius replied, You reside what village, what neighborhood, what surname, what name, what style (name of profession or complimentary title)? Lad replying said, I reside poor village, mean land; surname Hong, name Tok; not have style.

Confucius said, I wish with you together ramble; your thought as how (what do you think of the proposition)? Lad answering said, Home have stern father, very proper serve him; home have indulgent mother, very proper cherish her; home have worthy elder brother, very proper obey him; home have weak younger brother, very proper teach him; home have intelligent teacher, very proper learn of him; what leisure together ramble?

Confucius said, My carriage within have three tens two (thirty-two) chess-men, with you play game; you think down as how? Lad answering said, Heaven's sons (emperors) love playing, four seas not ruled; all nobles love playing, have disordered government; scholars love playing, learning lost discarded; lower classes love playing, lose quite family support; domestics love playing, must get whip cudgel; husbandmen love playing, sowing ploughing lose time; is reason not play.

Confucius said, I wish with you equalize (socially, politically) truly empire; you think down as how? Lad, replying said, Empire not can equalize. Perhaps are high hills, or are rivers lakes; perhaps are princes nobles or are maids servants; level-ed high hills, birds beasts without resort; fill-ed rivers lakes, fishes turtles without home; remove king, nobles people many right wrong (will have disputes); discard servants, prince employ whom? Empire vast vast, how can equalize eh?

Confucius rejoined, You know sky under, what fire without smoke? What water has no fish? What hill without stones? What tree has no branches? What man has no wife? What woman without husband? What cow no calf? What horse has-no colt? What cock without hen? What hen has-no cock? What constitutes excellent men? What constitutes inferior men? What is-there not enough? What is-there having overplus? What city has-no market? What man has-no style?

Lad answering said, Glow-worms fire without smoke, well water has-no fish; earthy hills have-no stones, rotten trees have-no branches; genii without wives, gem girls without husbands; earthen cows have-no calves, wooden horses no colts; orphan (solitary) cocks without hens, orphan hens without cocks; worth makes excellent men, folly makes inferior men; winters day not enough, summers day has overplus; imperial city has-no market, little folks no style.

Confucius inquiring said, You say father mother are near, husband wife not near (which is the nearest relation, etc.)? Boy replying said, father

mother are near, husband wife not (so) near. Confucius replied (while), Husband wife alive then same coverlet, dead then same grave; how be not near? Boy rejoining said, Man alive without wife like carriage without wheels; have no wheels again make, must obtain his new; wife dead again seeks, also obtains a new; three windows six skylights not equal one doors light; all stars sparkling brilliance, not equal solitary moon single splendor. Father mothers affection, how can lose!

Confucius, sighing, said, Clever how! clever how! Lad asking Confucius said, Just now asked T'ok, T'ok one (by) one answered them. T'ok now wishes seek instruction; pleased request not reject. Lad said, Mallards ducks what by able swim? Wild geese cranes what by able sing? Firs pines what by winter green? Confucius replied, Mallards ducks can swim all because feet broad; wild-geese cranes can sing, all because necks long; firs pines winter green, all because heart strong. Lad answering said, Not so; fishes turtles can swim, how all feet broad? frogs toads can sing, how because necks long? green bamboo winter green, how because heart strong?

Lad again asking said, Sky above altogether how-many stars? Confucius replying said, just now ask (about) 'earth, how certain converse sky? Boy rejoined, Earth every-one (in all) how many houses? Confucius said, still converse eyes before's things (about things before our eyes), how certain converse Sky (or) discourse-of earth? Lad answered, if speak eyes before's things, eye-brows among how many hairs?

Confucius smiled but not answering, turned calling all disciples, said, After born can fear (to be feared now); truly know future person he not as now (the future man different from the boy).

On that ascended carriage and departed.

MORAL.

Ode says: Do not despise years young, intelligent bright lad; extensive had great talents, wisdom beyond men; converse discourse without limit affairs; perceive clearly ancient sage expose his body (has manifested himself in the body).

ARTICLE IV.

THE SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINE OF THE TRIUMPH OF
CHRIST'S KINGDOM DISTINGUISHED FROM MILLE-
NARIANISM.

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THE kingdom of Christ is destined to triumph. It will be universal in extent: "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." A higher type of Christian life will be common: "The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold." Civilization will be Christian, and society transfigured into a kingdom of "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost," under the spiritual reign of Christ: "In his days shall the righteous flourish, and abundance of peace so long as the moon endureth." The entire conception of the kingdom is nugatory, if it does not include its triumph.

I propose to consider the Scriptural Doctrine of the Triumph of Christ's Kingdom, in Contrast with Millenarianism.

There is no disagreement on the following points: The final triumph of the kingdom; Christ's second advent; the completion of redemption and the delivery of the kingdom to the Father; the resurrection and general judgment; the eternal, heavenly blessedness of the redeemed going on in ways and methods not revealed to human comprehension.

The millenarian error is essentially this: The dispensation of the Spirit under which we live is not intended to secure the gradual extension and ultimate triumph of the kingdom; the preaching of the gospel to every creature is not intended to convert the world, but to be a witness to all nations; the dispensation of the Spirit, therefore, will fail to effect the triumph of the kingdom, but is intended only as a

preparation for it; the kingdom is to come hereafter and suddenly, at Christ's second advent. When the gospel shall have been preached as a witness to all nations, and the failure of the dispensation of the Spirit shall have become apparent, Christ will come in the clouds, will destroy by natural and supernatural judgments the anti-Christian powers, "except a residue certain, but indefinite"; "will raise from the dead the elect of past ages," "take to a place of security all the elect then living," and change or transfigure them in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye; will miraculously subvert and transform the present state of things, purify the earth by the fires of his judgments, deliver it from the curse of sin, and restore it to a paradisiacal state — new heavens and a new earth. "On the restored and purified earth a new social, civil, and ecclesiastical organization shall be set up among the generations of men then ensuing, who will be all converted by the continual presence and power of the Holy Ghost, so as was unknown in the preceding ages." Over this renovated society Christ will reign in person, and "sit as king upon his holy hill of Zion," assisted by the risen saints, who shall preside with him over "the successive generations and inhabitants of the repeopled earth." "After this millennial age — the great theme of prophecy — the seventh decade — the Sabbath of time" — Satan will be loosed for a season to deceive the nations; will gather the nations which are in the four quarters of the earth to battle; God will then send fire out of heaven to devour the hostile forces that shall compass the camp of the saints and the beloved city; will raise the rest of the dead, and award the sentence of the final judgment.¹

In opposition to this, the scriptural doctrine is: Christ sets up his kingdom at his first coming. After his ascension, he reigns in heaven over his kingdom on earth, and administers its government, and advances it to its triumph through the Holy Spirit; the dispensation of the Spirit is the last; in it, by the efforts of Christ's redeemed going into all the world

¹ President Nathan Lord's *Essay on the Millennium*, p. 35–39.

and preaching the gospel to every creature, the kingdom of heaven — being spiritual and coming not with observation — will gradually grow like a seed, and extend like leaven, till at last it will pervade the world with its life, and “the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord.” This happy condition will be of long continuance. Whether this period will be followed or not by an apostasy, in the fulness of time Christ will come in the clouds; the dead will be raised, and the living changed; the earthly work of redemption will be completed, and the kingdom presented to the Father; the final judgment will be pronounced, and the righteous shall go away into everlasting life. In connection with this will be a grand epoch in the physical world, represented by the earth being burned up and the elements melting in fervent heat, preparatory to a new cycle of the divine manifestations, which the glorified in heaven will see, but which it is not permitted us to understand.

Among millenarians there are many differences as to details, and not a few extravagances.¹ But the more judicious millenarians are not to be held responsible for peculiarities and extravagances of opinion which they do not accept.

I. The Literalism insisted on by Millenarians is a False and Impossible System of Interpretation.

The argument is, that prophecies so explicit as that of the first resurrection (Rev. xx.), the establishment and exaltation of the mountain of the house of the Lord (Micah iv. 1, 2), the standing of the Lord's feet on the Mount of Olives, and the cleavage of the mount, and its removal, half to the north and half to the south (Zech. xiv. 4), must be literal; and that, if they are interpreted as figurative, or as symbolical of events in the progress of Christ's kingdom under the dispensation of the Spirit, every prophecy and promise of the

¹ “The king is a perfect human being, the Son of man and the Son of God; now possessed of flesh and bones, but not of blood, because that he shed for the race of Adam.” — *Prophetic Expositions*, by Josiah Litch, Vol. i. pp. 17, 18. Mr. Litch was a follower of Wm. Miller, whose millenarianism differed in several particulars from that which is described above.

Bible may be explained away and divested of its literal and obvious meaning.

This is a plausible way of putting it, and probably is more effective with the popular mind than any other argument; especially when accompanied by an appeal to the importance of adhering to the literal historical sense of the Bible, in opposition to rationalistic interpretations. My limits forbid a complete answer to this argument, which would require an extended exposition of the principles regulating the interpretation of figurative language and of symbols, and of their application to the figures and symbols of the Bible. I will confine myself to two remarks.

In the first place, this reasoning leads to conclusions so extravagant as to prove that there is a fallacy in it. David N. Lord, lately editor of the "Theological and Literary Journal," and a most able advocate of millenarianism, insists that the eighteenth Psalm describes a literal deliverance of David, not elsewhere historically recorded, and wrought with all the sublime visible and miraculous manifestations there set forth. The argument would be, if these are not literal, how can we prove from any words of scripture that God ever made any visible manifestation of himself to men?¹ The same reasoning would require us to interpret as literal history the familiar hymn beginning:

"Once on the raging seas I rode;
The storm was loud, the night was dark."

By similar reasoning Mr. Lord is driven to the conclusion that the carnivorous animals mentioned in Isaiah (xi. 6-9) will be transformed into graminivorous animals and continue to exist in the millennial period.² Some millenarians are led by similar reasoning to maintain that the prophecies teach not only the literal restoration of the Jews to Palestine, but also the revival of circumcision, sacrifices, and the temple-worship.³ The same principles of interpretation must carry

¹ Treatise on Figurative Language, by D. N. Lord, pp. 191, 192.

² Theological and Literary Journal, Vol. i. pp. 386-390, and Vol. iii. p. 601.

³ Theological and Literary Journal, Vol. ii. pp. 262, 266, 457, 472.

us still further. Ezekiel prophecies that in the future triumph of Israel, David shall be their king forever.¹ Literalism requires that it shall be David in his own person who is to reign over the renovated earth forever. In truth this method of interpretation is precisely that of the Jews in interpreting the prophecies of the Messiah's first coming. If it is the right method, the Jews were right in expecting Elijah to come in his own person, and not merely one coming in Elijah's spirit and power; and in expecting the Messiah to set up a temporal kingdom and be a mighty conqueror, according to the predictions in Psalms ii. and cx. Since events have proved that this is a wrong method of interpreting the prophecies of Christ's first coming, it must be equally wrong in interpreting the prophecies of his second advent.

President Lord insists that the millenarian doctrine is necessary from the historical character of redemption; that to deny it is to abandon this simple historical character and to substitute for it speculation and rationalism.² But this position is not well taken. The doctrine that Christ's second advent will follow the millennial triumph of the church emphasizes the historical character of Christianity and distinguishes it from rationalism as really as does the doctrine of his pre-millennial advent. The difference pertains to the question: What are the future events predicted and the order of their occurrence; not at all to the question whether Christianity is a philosophy or an historical redemption. President Lord here uses an argument *ad invidiam* which his character and standing would not have led us to expect.

My second remark, respecting the principles of interpretation which we are considering, is, that their incorrectness is exposed by reducing them to a precise and definite statement. This Mr. D. N. Lord has attempted to do. The third principle of figurative language which he lays down is: "The figurative terms are always predicates, or are employed in affirming something of some other agent or object."³ It is

¹ Ezek. xxxiv. 23, 24, and xxxvii. 23, 24.

² Essay, p. 42.

³ Theological and Literary Journal, Vol. i. p. 354.

not easy to apply this principle to such expressions as these: "When the cat is away the mice play"; "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." Mr. Lord calls a figure of this kind a *Hypocatastasis*; although he insists that "in that figure, as well as in the metaphor, the trope lies wholly in the predicate, not in the subject to which it is applied."¹ But though he does call this figure a *Hypocatastasis*, and insist that the trope is in the predicate, yet it is true that such a figure may run through an entire sentence or series of sentences, and, so far as the sentence or sentences are concerned, with all the appearance of literalness. And the admission that such figures abound in the Bible is the admission of all that is demanded to justify the interpretation of figurative language in the Bible in harmony with the doctrine, that Christ's kingdom is to be extended through the world under the dispensation of the Spirit and before the second coming of our Lord.

Mr. Lord enumerates four hundred and fifteen symbols, which, he says, is the whole number in the scriptures. From an examination of these and their interpretations, he educes "the laws of symbolic representation." The first is, "that the symbol and that which it symbolizes are of different species or orders, and that the relation of the representative to that which it represents is the relation of analogy." Yet he is obliged to admit this sweeping exception: "When the symbol is of such a nature, or is used in such a condition or relation that there is no analogical agent or object which can represent it, it is then used as its own representative, or the representative of one or more of its own kind." Among the many symbols belonging under this exception, he includes the souls of the martyrs, in Rev. xx., and acknowledges that this vision itself is symbolical.²

It is evident, then, that the argument which we have been considering is a popular appeal, rather than an argument. It legitimately leads to conclusions that are extravagant;

¹ Theological and Literary Journal, Vol. iii. p. 601.

² Ibid. Vol. i. pp. 182, 214, 237, and Vol. iii. pp. 669, 670.

and when we attempt to give it definite statement, and to educe the law or principle of interpretation which it involves, it breaks down entirely. Therefore, the doctrine that Christ reigns in heaven over his kingdom on earth, that he administers and advances it through the Holy Spirit, that its triumph will be completed under the dispensation of the Spirit and antecedent to Christ's second advent, is a doctrine which violates no valid law of interpretation. In advocating it, we cannot be stopped at the outset by the objection that we are forsaking the literal, historical meaning of the Bible for abstractions and fancies. The Bible abounds in imagery and symbols. We approach it recognizing this fact. We determine whether any passage is literal, figurative, or symbolical from the passage itself and its connection, and in like manner we interpret the figures and symbols which we find.

II. Millenarianism is Inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Bible as to the Time, Object, and Concomitants of Christ's Second Coming.

1. Christ's second advent is at the completion of his kingdom on earth, and not at its beginning or establishment.

The dispensation of the Spirit is habitually spoken of as the last, the last time, the completion of the ages (*συντελεία τῶν αἰώνων*, Heb. ix. 26). These texts cannot be explained as denoting the end of a dispensation; for they were applied to the dispensation of the Spirit at its beginning in Christ's first coming. Joel, in the passage quoted by Peter on the day of Pentecost, was comparing one dispensation with another; and so Peter applies it.

The kingdom is to be complete at Christ's second coming, and as such to be delivered to the Father (1 Cor. xv. 24). Whatever difficulties attend this text, it certainly means that the mediatorial work on earth is finished, the number of the redeemed completed and presented to the Father. And it is certain, from the context, that this delivery of the completed kingdom to the Father is connected with Christ's second advent and the resurrection of the righteous.

Christ's second coming is habitually called the end, and presented as the terminus of all gospel invitation and all Christian endeavor to save men from sin (1 Cor. xv. 24; Matt. xiii. 37-49; xxiv. 31; xxv. 1-13; Luke xix. 13).

2. Christ's second coming is declared to be to judgment, in marked contrast with his first coming, which is declared to be to salvation (John iii. 16, 17; xii. 47, contrasted with Matt. xxv. 31; 2 Thess. i. 6-10).

3. Millenarianism is irreconcilable with the assertions of the Bible as to the events which will accompany Christ's second coming.

Christ's second coming is to be attended with the resurrection of all the saints who have previously died, and the change of the living saints from corruptible to incorruptible and from mortal to immortality.

It is accompanied, also, by the resurrection of the wicked. The prediction of Daniel (xii. 2) is interpreted by millenarians as a prediction of Christ's second advent; yet it expressly foretells the resurrection both of the righteous and the wicked. Our Saviour predicts the resurrection of the righteous and the wicked (John v. 28, 29). Their resurrection is evidently simultaneous, hearing together the voice of the Son of Man; and the dead hearing the voice of the son of Man and raised thereby is a form of expression which elsewhere indicates the second coming of Christ.

The second advent is accompanied by the conflagration of the earth, and the saints are caught up away from the earth to meet the Lord in the air. This is entirely incompatible with the continued occupation of the earth by the human race, and the personal reign of Christ at Jerusalem (2 Pet. iii. 7-13; 1 Thess. iv. 16, 17). Millenarians resort to various expedients of interpretation to evade this insuperable difficulty, in which they depart very far from the literalism on which they insist in other cases.

Another concomitant of Christ's second coming is the general judgment and the separation of the righteous and the wicked to their final and eternal state (Matt. xvi. 27;

xiii. 37-43 ; xxv. 31-45 ; 2 Thess. i. 6-10 ; 2 Tim. iv. 1). The assertion is explicit that the judgment here mentioned is to be at the second coming of the Lord. Millenarians are obliged to interpret these and similar passages as referring to the destruction of the wicked who will be alive on the earth at Christ's second coming. These sublime predictions of the judgment of the wicked mean, therefore, only that a part of the ungodly in the generation living when Christ shall come will be put to a violent death. Universalists do not more violently wrest passages of this sort from their obvious meaning. While thus interpreting passages inconsistent with their own theory, millenarians cannot consistently enforce their literalism on their opponents.

Millenarians assert the continued existence and propagation of the human race under Christ's millennial reign. The Theological and Literary Review asserts that there will be three classes of men — the risen and glorified saints, who will reign with Christ ; the saints living at Christ's coming, who by their change will be made immortal, but will not receive the spiritual and glorified body ; and the remnant of the wicked who escape destruction at the second coming, and who, being converted, will continue the human race in its natural life from generation to generation. This class President Lord calls " a residue certain but indefinite," who will repeople the earth. All of the foregoing biblical representations are utterly incompatible with the continued existence and propagation of the human race in its natural life after the second advent.

It remains to glance at Rev. xx., which is claimed as teaching a first resurrection and a pre-millennial coming of Christ.

The vision here described is a vision of the *souls* of certain martyrs, who lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. Observe what this vision is not. It is not of a resurrection, but distinctively of the *souls* of martyrs. This is subsequently called the first resurrection. It is not of all the saints, but only of those martyrs who had been beheaded,

or, if the several verbs each has a different subject, only of those who had been beheaded and those who had been faithful to Christ under the persecutions and deceitful arts of the beast — whatever particular period that may denote. It is not a vision of Christ's second advent, which is not mentioned, and which necessarily connects itself with the events subsequent to the thousand years, and represented at the close of this chapter and in the next. It is not a vision of Christ's personal reign on earth. It is not said that the thrones seen and the martyrs reigning were on earth; but consistency with the antecedent and subsequent representations of the book requires that the scene of the vision be in heaven. It is not a vision of the destruction of the wicked living on earth; but it is preceded by a vision of the binding of Satan, and the consequent deliverance of the nations from his temptations and deceits, which indicates their conversion rather than their destruction. In view of the use made of this vision as putting millenarianism beyond all question, it is remarkable to notice what is *not* in it. It is extraordinary reasoning that, because John saw the souls of some of the martyrs living and reigning with Christ in heaven, therefore Christ's advent will be pre-millennial, he will at his coming put the majority of the wicked to a violent death, raise the dead saints and transfigure the living, and reign in person in Jerusalem for a thousand years.

If, therefore, you are constrained to admit that the vision implies a literal resurrection of some of the martyrs in connection with the coming triumph of Christ's kingdom, that carries with it no necessity of admitting millenarianism. Such a resurrection would be analogous to the resurrection of some of the saints when Christ rose, and would be consistent with the triumph of Christ's kingdom before his coming and under the dispensation of the Spirit. This admission, however, the right interpretation of the vision does not require.

The vision presents a symbol of the final triumph of Christ's kingdom and the long continuance of its universal sway.

This interpretation is necessary to harmonize this with the whole Apocalypse. To suppose this vision to be of literal historical events would be to give it an entirely exceptional interpretation. Especially this interpretation harmonizes with the vision of the souls of the martyrs in chap. vi. 9-11. There they are seen under the altar, crying: "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth"? And they are comforted, and bidden to wait a season. There are presented to us the depression and conflict of Christ's church. In chap. xx. the souls of the martyrs are seen again, not beneath the altar, but reigning with Christ. As the former vision symbolized the church under oppression and persecution, this necessarily symbolizes the church in its prosperity and triumph; and there is nothing whatever in it which intimates that its triumph is to be realized any otherwise than under the dispensation of the Spirit, through the faithful efforts of Christians carrying the gospel to all mankind, and applying its principles to the conduct, usages, laws, and institutions of human life.

III. Millenarianism is Inconsistent with the Scriptural Doctrine of the Nature and Growth of Christ's Kingdom.

1. Christ, at his first coming, came as a King, set up his kingdom, and began his mediatorial reign.

The Jewish prophets predicted the Messiah as a King, coming to establish a kingdom of righteousness and peace, and to extend his reign throughout the world. These are uniformly prophecies of his first coming, the prophecies which created the Jewish expectation of the Messiah, and which Christians believe to have been fulfilled in Jesus. If the Messiah was foretold at all, he was foretold as a King who was to set up a kingdom to endure as long as the sun and moon endure.

Jesus began his preaching by declaring: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." He announced himself as Messianic King; his kingdom was the constant subject of his preaching. He expressly teaches that his kingdom is not of this world,

but is spiritual; that at his ascension all power is to be given him in heaven and on earth; that he is to sit at the right hand of the Majesty on high, and reign there as Messianic King, continuing his agency on earth through the Spirit whom he should send. He avowed himself a King to Pilate, and as claiming to be such he was crucified. He is acknowledged as King in the Acts and the Epistles. His common appellation is *κύριος*, or "Lord," a name applied at the time to the Roman emperor. Peter says explicitly: "Let all the house of Israel know assuredly that God hath made that same Jesus whom ye have crucified both Lord and Christ. . . . Him hath God exalted to be a Prince and a Saviour." In the Epistle to the Hebrews we have this explicit declaration: "This man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God, from henceforth expecting until his enemies be made his footstool." This certainly intimates that there is to be no other mediatorial reign, and that under his reign in heaven he expects the triumph of his kingdom.

Both the Old Testament and the New teach that the mediatorial reign begins in connection with Christ's first coming, and particularly his ascension and the outpouring of the Spirit, and not with his second. So Jesus says: "There be some of them that stand here who shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power."

2. The New Testament, in treating of the growth of Christ's kingdom, emphasizes his humiliation and death, his ascension and intercession, and his sending the Spirit: "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me"; "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." Jesus also bids his disciples rejoice that he goes away, because it is the appointed condition of the descent of the Holy Spirit; thus implying that his administering his kingdom by the Holy Spirit is better than his personal presence on earth.

3. The kingdom is not of this world, is within the soul, is

spiritual and invisible; its progress is gradual, and its coming is without observation. It is "righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." It is the leaven working unseen within the flour. It is the mustard-seed growing into a tree. Even Daniel's prophecy of the stone smiting the image on the feet, though cited by millenarians to prove that the coming of the kingdom is sudden, miraculous, and public, proves the contrary. It is explicitly said: "*In the days of these kings* shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed." An event yet future cannot be said to happen *in the days of these kings*. And the stone, which represents Christ's kingdom, was at first so small that it could smite the image *on the feet*, and after the image had fallen the stone grew into a mountain and filled the whole earth.

It should be added that in the very discourse in which Jesus declares that his kingdom cometh not with observation, but is invisible and internal, he distinguishes it from his second coming, which, he declares, shall be sudden, public, and startling as the lightning.

4. The triumph of the kingdom is dependent on human agency.

The whole scriptural representation is that redemption goes on in human history, and the advance of Christ's kingdom is by human agency. Millenarianism makes the human element and agency to be only docetic, not a reality. The kingdom is not established by man working together with God, but miraculously, by the Son of God himself. After thousands of years seemingly working in and through and by humanity, he at last breaks free from all human relations and from all the continuity of history, and establishes the kingdom by a miraculous stroke of Almightiness.

5. The kingdom depends for its advancement, under God's Spirit, on truth and love, and not on force.

The genius and spirit of Christianity take men off from the reign of force, and establish the reign of ideas, of truth, and love. But millenarianism strips Christianity of this

its essential glory, confesses that the world cannot be saved by truth and love under the dispensation of the Spirit, and falls back on force as that by which alone the kingdom of God can triumph, and on which it ultimately rests. When millenarians are charged with teaching that Christianity is a failure, they reply that, while they do not expect the conversion of the world under the dispensation of the Spirit; they do expect the triumph of Christ's kingdom at his second coming. But I charge them with teaching the failure of Christianity in a sense far more profound. They acknowledge the failure of truth and love by the power of the Spirit to save the world from sin. They acknowledge that the triumph of Christ's kingdom must depend at last on force. Faith in the triumph of ideas and the reign of truth and love by the convincing of men's intellects and the renovation of their wills through the Holy Spirit passes away. The world will be subdued by Almighty power, never converted by redeeming love.

6. The kingdom, as supposed to be realized under Christ's personal reign, would not be a realization of the highest ideal of Christianity.

On the one hand, it presents a semi-sensuous paradise. It does not concentrate the Christian's efforts on attaining an overcoming faith, a divine love and purity, as constituting blessedness or true well-being under whatever circumstances; it rather leads to waiting and longing for an adjustment of outward circumstances to make life blessed. It does not set the Christian's heart on toiling and, if necessary, suffering to deliver men from error and sin, as constituting their misery; it rather leads them to wait supinely for the coming of the Saviour to rid them of their enemies by his destroying sword. It tends, therefore, to ascetic disgust with life, and separation from the world, instead of a compassionate and Christlike interest in the world to save men from misery and sin. Thus it unconsciously runs into that false philosophy which places blessedness in indulgence and gratification, to the abandonment of the Christian and only true philosophy

that man's blessedness consists in his character and action, rather than in his circumstances and possessions; in what he is, rather than in what he has; in working and serving and achieving, rather than in receiving and being indulged. "All that is in the world passeth away; but he that *doeth* the will of God abideth forever."

On the other hand, the conception of the personal reign supposes the introduction into the natural life of men of the elements of the heavenly state, and a consequent state of things in which the interests and affairs of man's natural life seem insignificant and out of place.

Thus the personal reign, anticipated as the issue of all Christian endeavor, vitiates the Christian character and life in the present dispensation.

IV. Millenarianism gives no satisfactory Theodicy, or Vindication of the Ways of God with Man.

It affords no tolerable explanation of the delay in the coming and triumph of Christ's kingdom, nor of all the processes and agencies during the long ages preceding it. The true doctrine is, that redemption must of necessity enter into humanity, act through human agencies, and realize its results through the courses and the continuity of human history. It follows that God's redeeming love may fail of bringing man at once to him; that the growth of his kingdom must be modified by the human element connected with it; and thus that only in the fulness of time and through innumerable trials and difficulties can the kingdom possess the earth.

But if, after all, the kingdom is not to be established in this way, if all God's working in and by humanity and in the courses of history is to be a failure, and the Messiah is at last to throw himself clear from all the human elements and historical courses through which he has worked so long, and to set up his kingdom by sheer Almightyness, no reason can be given why that might not have been accomplished four thousand years ago as well as now. Redemption ceases to be a true and satisfactory philosophy of human history;

it becomes something outside of it and above it, and is consummated at last in a violent disruption of all the continuity of that history. And every explanation of the slow progress of Christ's kingdom founded on the fact that it is advanced in humanity and by human agency ceases to be available.

V. The Practical Influence of Millenarianism is Evil.

It takes away the most powerful motives to Christian endeavor, and tends to an incomplete type of Christian life.

It is the glory of Christianity that it first and alone has spoken the word of promise and of hope to man, and predicted for mankind in the progress of Christ's kingdom a future on the earth ever better than the past. Under the stimulus of this promise civilization has become progressive and progressive in justice and love to man. Under this stimulus Christians have learned to have faith in truth and right and love, and in God's present and redeeming grace. In this faith and hope they are valiant for the truth; believing that, however opposed, it will through the influence of God's Spirit establish itself, and find expression in the lives of individuals and in the customs, laws, and institutions of society.

Millenarianism "keeps the word of promise to our ear, and breaks it to our hope." It dissociates the triumph of Christ's kingdom in the future from its antecedent progress and from the endeavors of Christians to advance it. The triumph comes at last miraculously, magically, by the stroke of almightiness, with no dependence on previous fidelity to truth and right and God; by occasion, indeed, of the persistence and prevalence of sin, not of the persistence and prevailing power of Christ's saints.

Modern progress is humanitarian. Christian civilization is characterized by regard for man, by the recognition of his individual personality, which can never be absorbed and lost either in race or organization; of his greatness and the sacredness of his rights; of the principle that institutions exist for man, not man for his institutions; of the brotherhood of all nations; of the obligation to turn human en-

deavor in every line of thought and action to the promotion of human welfare. It will be characterized by the recognition of the Christian law of service restraining the self-assertion and rapacious self-seeking of individualism, and leading men to live not for themselves, but for others. In our modern apologetics we insist that the world owes these ideas to Christ. But the millenarian system has no place for these ideas. Christianity, as that system presents it, does not aim to renovate society by truth and love. It aims in the present dispensation only to save a few elected ones from the pains of eternal death, while it looks to the total overthrow of the existing state of society and the re-creation of the earth itself preparatory to the miraculous establishment of a preternatural kingdom, having no dependence whatever on the present progress of Christian civilization or the Christian culture of men. It therefore repudiates the promise and hope of human progress, and declares them delusions of philosophy and rationalism, and no part or incident of Christianity. It therefore must regard Christianity, in its very conception, alien from all efforts to put an end to slavery and tyranny and to reform social abuses, and thus it gives its support to an argument which is at this day prolific of scepticism, that Christianity is not in sympathy with human progress. It must insist that the one business of Christianity is to convert souls—to save a few, if possible, from eternal death amid the hopeless errors, sins, and sufferings of the present state. President Lord, for example, declares that one of “the appalling practical consequences” of the current belief is that “Christian men and ministers of the gospel are wasting much of their energies upon delusive schemes of educating, reforming and reorganizing society, with a view to its supposed development into a perfect state.”¹

The Christian, it is indeed admitted, is required to work for Christ; for the command is: “Occupy till I come.” But he is to work with the deadening consciousness that his efforts will fail to make the world better. President Lord.

¹ Essay, pp. 46, 47.

says: "It is historically and certainly evident that hitherto every tribe, nation and race of men on the earth — a few righteous men alone excepted, — have successively declined into greater wickedness, and that at this present time Christianity is spreading in the world in no proportion to the increase of the wicked population of the globe and the spread of atheistic, pantheistic, or polytheistic belief. The rapid development of our present worldly civilization is more and more alienating society from God, and making it more difficult for his servants to preserve themselves in the simplicity of their faith."¹ So it is to be until Christ shall come. Under the dead weight of this certainty Christians are to fulfil the command: "Occupy till I come." They are to toil and suffer, knowing that all their efforts avail nothing to establish the kingdom of righteousness and peace on earth.

In the light of the Christian promise rightly understood, we accept Christian work as a privilege, because in it we are workers together with God to save sinners from their sins, to multiply the number of Christian workers, to hasten the deliverance of the world from its sin and misery, and to advance the Christianizing of civilization and the progress and universal prevalence of Christ's kingdom. Work thus becomes a part of the Christian's education. It trains him to love all men as Christ did, to be valiant for the truth, and to be strong in faith and hope; it develops a broad and intense interest in humanity and in all that affects human welfare, and creates a large-hearted, genial, and healthful Christian manhood. Millenarianism, teaching the inevitable failure of all efforts to reform and renovate society, deadens the interest in human affairs, trains the Christian to disgust with life and a desire to flee from the world in order to save himself from its dangers, and to nurse his own spiritual emotions in retirement rather than to interest in toil for the world's renovation. It trains him to a longing to die in order to escape from the toil and conflicts of the Christian — a saintliness which is ungenial, ghastly, and remote from all the interests of human life.

¹ Essay, p. 27.

ARTICLE V.

THE NATURAL BASIS OF OUR SPIRITUAL LANGUAGE.¹

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The Influence of the Hebrew Theocracy.

IN these Essays the words "evolve," "develop," and others of like import, will be used in their ordinary, popular acceptance, with no reference to any scientific theories of development or evolution, either physical or philological. With the results claimed to have been reached by the latter science (which alone can have any bearing upon the subject of these Essays) the writer has not sufficient acquaintance to form a definite opinion. But even those who believe that the basis of reliable philological facts is too narrow and feeble to sustain the superstructure reared upon it, and therefore look upon such investigations with suspicion,—especially when carried into the domain of religion,—will find no occasion to distrust the application of such terms to the matter under discussion. There is, unquestionably, a sense true and safe in which development and evolution may be predicated of that verbal medium by means of which we acquire our religious knowledge. No one who has not derived his ideas from Milton, rather than Moses, will maintain that the spiritual nomenclature of Adam was as rich and varied as that of Abraham, or that the sweet singer of Israel did not add largely to the lexicon of the lawgiver, or that the evangelical prophet contributed nothing to the verbal wealth of David. We are told, by one who could not be mistaken, that there had arisen no greater prophet than John the Baptist, and yet that the least in the kingdom of

¹ This is the second Article of the Series, commenced in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxix. p. 1.

heaven was greater than he. Thus development advanced from stage to stage, higher and richer, until Paul wrote his last Epistle, and John the divine closed the gorgeous visions of the Apocalypse.

It is along this line of evolution alone that we propose to carry our investigations, leaving scientific explorers to dig amongst dry roots of languages, dead and forgotten "before antiquity began," to find, if they can, how the "idea of God" first germinated in human consciousness, and, above all, who sowed the seed of it in the virgin soil of man's mental or moral constitution. There is no call upon us to search for the one or the other. We set out in possession of both. They constitute the first recorded facts in the Genesis of the universe — the most appropriate place possible for their announcement. All, except the few who exclude divine aid utterly and everywhere, admit that at some point in the long line of religious development such aid was actually super-added to that dim feeling after the Lord if haply they might find him which was merely human; and we see no reason, scientific or other, why the information so essential to man's spiritual well-being, may not have been communicated "in the beginning," when the Creator breathed into him the breath of life, and man became a living soul, created in the image of God. We find here both the sower and the seed, and there is good evidence in history that this divinely-imparted knowledge was never wholly lost, by at least one branch of the Semitic family. Unhappily, those who emigrated eastward into the land of Nod gradually forgot, and then corrupted it, as they wandered farther and farther from the presence of the Lord. The religious history of all those peoples — Aryan, Turanian, Kanian, or by whatever name scientists designate the various families of mankind — is that of debasement and degradation lapsing into deeper and still deeper abysses of polytheistic superstition, down to the lowest forms of fetichism found in the savage tribes of Africa and in the isles of the sea. The process we propose to elucidate was the heaven-guided, happy reverse of all this.

The one ends in a dismal eclipse; the other is the steady oncoming of the glorious day of gospel light and life.

One other remark before we turn to the specific theme of this Essay. From their stand-point, and with their inherited knowledge of God and his attributes, the Hebrew prophets and inspired poets were not, and could not be, perplexed with speculations about the unknown and the unknowable, by which bold obstructive negations some of the great lights of modern science seek to push aside all inquiries in relation to the ultimate cause of all things. To them Jehovah was no vague abstraction, unknown and unknowable, but the greatest and most patent fact in the universe. In everything above, around, and beneath, they saw and heard and felt his presence and his power. Nor were they feeble intellectual children, misled by idle figments of imagination to "see God in clouds or hear him in the wind," like the poet's "poor Indian of untutored mind." They were not mistaken. There is a sense true and orthodox in which God is most immanent in all the works of his hands, —

" Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees ";

as we lads were taught to declaim half a century ago. And a far greater poet than Pope calls upon all created things to magnify and praise the Lord — "Sun and moon and stars of light, earth and all deeps, fire and hail, snow and vapor and stormy wind fulfilling his word, mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars, beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying fowl. Let them praise the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent." To the inspired poet all natural objects were transfigured into divine symbols, whose higher spiritual meanings, rendered into verbal equivalents, revealed phase after phase of God's mysterious and many-sided character. They were heaven's trained interpreters, set to translate into our dialect nature's ten thousand different tongues, which otherwise might have remained silent and dumb. To educate them for their mission, and aid them in it, they were born and bred in this land of

Palestine, crowded by divine forethought and skill with objects the most suggestive and phenomena the most instructive; and they were also brought into close personal relations with a vast system of pre-arranged institutions, social, civil, and religious, all contributing to the grand result. To the combined action of these things are we indebted, in large measure, for that spiritual language whose natural basis we are attempting to illustrate. In the present Essay the influence which the Hebrew theocracy has had in its development will be the prominent topic discussed.

The main results to be reached by a divine revelation — so far, at least, as our present inquiry is concerned — are three: To reveal God to man, man to himself, and the manifold relations of one to the other. A little reflection will convince any one that the first is not only the most essential, but also by far the most difficult. To find in human speech (or to invent) terms adequate to describe the infinite and the incomprehensible, to explain the invisible and the immeasurable, would seem to be a hopeless undertaking. And, indeed, it may be safely asserted that it absolutely transcends the unaided powers of the human mind. This was most impressively taught by Simonides to the tyrant of Syracuse. This poet-philosopher, as the anecdote is told by Plutarch, — when asked by Hiero to give a definition of God, requested a day to prepare an answer. On the morrow he demanded two days, and then four; always doubling the time. Finally, when the king expressed his surprise at this conduct, Simonides confessed that the longer he meditated on the problem the more incomprehensible it became. A similar conclusion was reached long before Simonides. “Canst thou by searching find out God?” said the Naamathite to Job (Job xi. 7) “Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and broader than the sea.”

The Westminster divines asked the question, What is God?

And, not being able to answer it, we are told that they sought divine aid in a solemn act of special prayer. He who led their devotions addressed the Hearer of prayer as a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. His co-laborers were so impressed with this beautiful and comprehensive exordium that they at once adopted it as the answer to the fourth question of the Catechism; and there it remains to task the memory and puzzle the understanding of the young by its formidable array of great words. I mean no reflection upon this answer. It is safe to challenge the literary world for a better, although each of the first four words is about as incomprehensible as the Being to whom it is applied. And what Christian, however unlettered, does not know and feel that his God is to him far more than this list of philosophical abstractions! Still, we cannot worship, like the Athenians, an unknown God; and if the end and aim of divine revelation is reached at all, the means must be found or devised by which the Lord can make himself known to his feeble children. And they have been. How this has been achieved is the exact point of our present inquiry; and we shall find that the course pursued by the inspired writers is totally different from that adopted by the Westminster divines. To confine ourselves to the course which we have marked out for these Essays, we shall attempt to show that this necessary revelation of the Supreme Being has been communicated not by formal, logical definitions, but by exhibiting God himself in an endless variety of acts, aspects, and offices, in each and all of which something of and about his being, attributes, character, and relations to man is made known. Human language is competent to set forth in intelligible terms these acts and relations, and by them to impart true and available information in regard to the infinite and almighty Author of all things. In this process divine wisdom has taken up and appropriated numberless facts and phenomena, natural, physical, moral, and historical, found in or connected with this land of the Bible, and so elevated

and transfigured the whole as to evolve from them a spiritual nomenclature adequate to reveal himself to us just so far as he designs to do and our wants require. The idea at the head of this Essay calls attention to one of these methods under consideration. And this particular one is selected now, because of the immense influence it has had more especially upon the practical and emotional domain of revelation.

It is not necessary to enter into any minute account of the theocracy. What is meant by it is, in brief, the fact that Jehovah condescended to assume towards the Hebrew people the office, attributes, and titles of Sovereign, Lord, and Governor, to accept the obligations and perform the duties of this office, and of course to claim and enforce the rights, authority, reverence, and obedience of the people as his servants and subjects. Out of this theocratic relation has been evolved a very large part of our spiritual language.

It will be well at the outset to meet an objection which may be raised against the specific use which is made of the fact under consideration. It may be said that the kingly office is in no sense peculiar to the Hebrew people, or to this land of the Bible; that it, in fact, was common to nearly all lands and amongst all nations, and is so to the present day. This, of course, is admitted; and, indeed, without this the theocracy would have been an unmeaning and barren bit of pageantry. It might be sufficient to our purpose merely to show that the kingly office was actually in existence in this land, and that the sacred writers were brought into such relations to it by an overruling Providence as would naturally suggest the thoughts, words, and phrases which owe their origin to this source. But this is far from the whole truth in the matter. Palestine, in ancient times, was pre-eminently a land of kings. Every district—nay, every considerable city—had its king and its court. However, the office was not then that pompous, but powerless abstraction, which it has become in modern times in constitutional governments. In most cases the king was an

autocrat absolute and irresponsible, lawgiver, judge, and executor, the source of all honors, offices, and emoluments, the commander of the army, the dispenser of favors, the awarder of punishment. The rights, claims, and prerogatives of royalty extended to every person and to every relation of life. The king was the master, the people were his subjects,—nay, slaves,—his property. In a better sense, he was the common father of the community, they his children, with all the kindlier duties and obligations implied and included in this most sacred of human relations. Royalty, thus constituted and administered, was selected by Jehovah as the synonyme and exemplar of his special relation to and with the Hebrew nation. And we shall have frequent occasion to call attention to the wonderful influence which this relation, thus assumed and enforced, exercised, not only on the national character, but especially on the moral and religious development of it, as manifested in their literature, and more particularly upon their emotional and devotional language. And we hazard nothing in saying that a very large proportion of our own could not have been learned in any other school, or under any other conceivable regime. This general idea can easily be brought down to the comprehension of the humblest Christian. Let him attempt to conduct even his most private personal devotions in thoughts, words, and phrases suggested by pure democratic institutions; for example, eliminating from his vocabulary everything derived from the theocratic idea, and he will find himself dumb in the presence of his Maker. He will not know how to come before the Lord aright—how to order his speech at the throne of grace; and if, instead of prayer, he lifts his heart and voice in sacred song, he will encounter the same difficulty. Names, figures, titles, thoughts, and emotions derived from or suggested by the divine theocracy meet him in every Psalm. I had the curiosity to examine a small portion of a book of psalms and hymns in reference to this matter, and in more than ninety the word “king” occurred; in some, repeated several times; and in nearly the entire selection,

and in every verse of them, thoughts, words, and phrases occurred, derived from this theocratic idea and regime, such as Lord, Prince, Sovereign, Monarch, majesty, throne, sceptre, dominion, kingdom, and others, of like import, without number. To eliminate them from our psalmody is quite impossible. Now, how was such an all-pervading influence introduced into our spiritual language? Simply by bringing the Hebrew people and the inspired writers into such actual relations to and with monarchy as suggested and even required such language; and biblical history tells us that such was the fact. The whole atmosphere of Palestine was pervaded with the display, the paraphernalia, and etiquette of royalty. The words representing it were in every child's mouth, as the power itself was everywhere visible, felt, and feared. When, therefore, Jehovah appropriated to himself the title and office of king, all understood its meaning at once. They had the visible, tangible thing before them and around them in just those forms that were best adapted to impress the imagination, affect the heart, and inspire the lips of sacred prophet and poet. Analogy is the basis of this spiritual nomenclature, and unless the thing had been there and familiar, no analogies could have been suggested by it. Divine wisdom had so arranged the social and political condition of Palestine that the people of God, and especially those of them who were to be their teachers, prophets, and poets, were necessarily brought into the closest relations with royalty, and were subjected to its ever-present and all-pervading influences. They must, of necessity, learn and practice the dialect of the court; and when called to write about spiritual things it was natural and inevitable that this should furnish their highest conceptions of majesty and might, and from it should be derived their most significant formulas for the expression of them in the service of their sacred vocation.

The correctness of the above general remarks can easily be illustrated and confirmed by almost numberless examples. Regarding Jehovah as Sovereign, Lord, and King, it would at once become natural to speak of God's throne, and to

invest it with every possible attribute of glory, majesty, reverence, and fear. Such was the fact, and no one needs to be reminded that from Hebrew prophet and poet the Christian church has learned the same dialect. It is as natural for us to sing,

“ Before Jehovah’s awful throne
Ye nations bow, with sacred joy,”

as it was to David or Isaiah. Hence, too, the august *court*, with its etiquette and ceremony; the *crown*, with what it signified and represented; the *sceptre*, with its dread prerogatives of power or favor, life or death; the attendant guards, ready executors of the royal mandates; the *footstool*, and those awe-stricken crowds who fell prostrate and kissed it, as they still do in this Eastern world; the *mercy-seat*, and the earnest petitioners for favors or for pardon. There is no need to carry this enumeration into further detail. It is only necessary to remind ourselves that all the religious phraseology derived from these and similar sources is a mere transference from things external and natural to things spiritual and divine. All the names, titles, and offices ascribed to royalty, all the expressions of honor, reverence, and devotion, all the acts and postures of suppliants before the dread tribunal of an earthly monarch and judge, were transferred by easy and natural analogy to the King of kings. Of course, in the process of thus transferring these things the ideas and emotions expressed were purified, expanded, and elevated. Nor was this at all difficult. Indeed, the analogy is so manifest that we constantly employ the terms under consideration without being conscious of the fact that they are all figurative, and in their primary signification had no reference whatever to things spiritual and divine. Who ever now pauses to inquire how he has learned to “come before the throne of grace,” or to “bow around the mercy-seat,” or to use a hundred other expressions derived from the theocratic regime established by divine wisdom in this land, and administered for many eventful centuries of miraculous inter-

vention and marvellous history? Nevertheless, though this large vocabulary has become familiar as household words — has, in fact, been learned on our mother's lap, — yet its basis and origin are found far back in time, and far away in this land of kings and courts, thrones and sceptres. With this thought in view, examine carefully any one of our Psalms, or study the devotional portions of the prophets, or read over the religious experiences of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles, as recorded in their personal history, and we find the perpetual, unconscious use of words and phrases which could only have been derived originally from the source under consideration.

Our object in this Essay is to show in what way and to what extent a government with Jehovah as King, Lawgiver, and Executor actually had an influence upon the character of the Hebrew people, and more specifically upon their religious language. In prosecuting this inquiry, we shall at present direct attention mainly to the poetical portions of the Bible, because, whatever the nature and extent of this influence may be, it there finds its most vivid expression.

And, first, the ongoing and outworking of the theocracy led inevitably to the adoption of a certain tone of lofty and enthusiastic loyalty, and the observance of even a divinely-ordered court etiquette, if the expression may be allowed. The position of the sacred prophets, poets, and orators was, in this respect, wholly peculiar. It was so by providential arrangement, and for a specific purpose. This fundamental fact should be ever remembered and allowed for in attempting to explain, or even to understand, the extremely intensive language of many Psalms and other poetical and devotional parts of the Bible. The sacred writers have in mind, and do actually address not merely a present, personal Sovereign, but one of infinite exaltation, purity, power, and majesty. This, of necessity, not only exercised a controlling influence over their thoughts and emotions, but must also have suggested much of their language, and imparted a peculiar tone and color to their entire style. Thus, for

example, we should ascribe to this source much of that extreme sensitiveness to reproach, shame, and disgrace so often manifested by Hebrew poets and their heroes. As pledged and sworn soldiers of their august King, they were educated to the most punctilious sense of duty and honor. Everything that could add intensity to this feeling of loyalty was implied and included in the relations between Jehovah as King, and Israel as his servants and subjects. He was not merely their sovereign Lord, to whom allegiance was due, but, above and beyond this, their Maker, their Owner; they his property, his household servants. As members of his family they were participants in all that affected his honor, power, or happiness, or detracted therefrom. It is a fact well known and often commented upon, that servants and slaves in the East assume to themselves a large share of their Master's power and magnificence, take the utmost pride in his wealth and superior position, and most keenly sympathize with him in any misfortune or disgrace which may befall the family. Such, *in kind*, was the feeling of the loyal Hebrew towards Jehovah. Of course, it was greatly ennobled, exalted, and purified by the character of the divine Sovereign and the nature of the relations established between him and his servants. To a sincere and devout Hebrew these relations were more intimate, comprehensive, and potential than any which could possibly exist between an earthly sovereign and his subjects. The theocratic institution was no cold, barren abstraction, not a beautiful poetic fancy or fiction, but an all-pervading and momentous reality.

To reveal, inaugurate, and confirm the theocracy, and to derive from its ongoing and outworking the results contemplated, a gorgeous and complicated ritual, a vast and imposing machinery, so to speak, was devised and established. We shall have occasion to dwell on this more in detail in other connections, and introduce it here merely to elucidate the specific idea under consideration. Among the institutions or the machinery devised for the establishment

of the theocracy as a practical scheme of government, the first place must be assigned to the tabernacle, and to its successor, the temple. The tabernacle, erected by divine command, was avowedly their King's palace, prepared for this special purpose, that he might have a visible habitation in the midst of his subjects. There he promised to abide. There he did actually dwell, in solemn, mysterious, and awful seclusion; and thence he issued his divine commands and ordinances. To render this royal residence the more sacred and impressive, all possible arrangements calculated to inspire reverence and dread were gathered around those "holy courts." Even before this royal pavilion was constructed, a long series of stupendous incidents had been enacted, intended to impress upon the imagination and the heart of the nation that "Jehovah was a great King," and that carelessness, presumption, or heedless irreverence in approaching his presence would be punished with fearful severity. Such must have been the effect produced upon their minds by the plagues of Egypt, the passage through the Red Sea, the marvellous interpositions, deliverances, and judgments experienced during their journey, the strange and irresistible guidance of the reluctant, perplexed, and trembling tribes as they were drawn deeper and deeper into that dreadful wilderness, and led along those tremendous, rock-bound defiles up to the foot of that smoking, trembling, awful Sinai which might not be touched on pain of death. Most of all, the mighty physical phenomena which announced the presence of Jehovah when the law was to be promulgated, — the blinding lightning and crashing thunder and quaking mountain covered with thick darkness, and the voice of the trumpet long and loud, — so dreadful that even Moses was exceedingly terrified. All these, and other things innumerable had been arranged and enacted to awaken and deepen in the heart of the nation the profoundest reverence and dread of their great King. Again, the materials used in the construction of the tabernacle and its furniture were the most costly. It was surrounded by a grand inclosure,

and divided into outer, middle, and interior compartments ; the approach to each being more and more sacred, until the last — the “ holy of holies.” Into this secret pavilion of their august Sovereign none could enter, on pain of death, except the high-priest, and he only once a year, and then “ not without blood ” and the most minute and scrupulous preparation. Now, Oriental monarchs have always sought by arrangements somewhat similar to surround their thrones and their persons with like reverence and awe. The best examples of this are furnished by the Pharaohs of Egypt, and by the kings of Babylon and Persia in the times of Daniel, Esther, and Mordecai. It was death for even the queen to appear uncalled before the king. With such awful court-etiquette, Moses, educated by Pharaoh’s daughter, was perfectly familiar. He was also acquainted with the devices and architectural arrangements in the temples of Egypt, designed to render the precincts of the gods sacred and inviolable. Whether any — and, if any, how much — of all this machinery and contrivance was made use of in preparing the special dwelling-place of the Most High we need not now inquire. If there should appear to be certain resemblances between them, no one need be scandalized by it. Why should not Moses adopt — nay, why not be divinely directed to adopt — plans and arrangements which experience had shown to be most effectual ? If the best possible for the end in view, it would have been folly to ignore or reject them. Without wandering into debatable territory, we may safely admit that, if Moses had been born and bred in Greece, instead of being learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, he would not have constructed just such a tabernacle as that erected at Sinai, nor have provided just such furniture, arranged in just such typical and symbolic relations and positions as to render the whole structure and every part of it, with all the prescribed services and ritual observances, one grand visible embodiment of spiritual truth, of divine revelation. And — to revert for a moment to the specific aim of our Essay — had these things been wanting, or essen-

tially different from what they were, an innumerable number of religious and spiritual thoughts, words, and phrases now familiar to every Christian would never have found expression. They have grown out of, have been taught by, this educated feeling of profound reverence for the dwelling-place of the Most High.

As this courtly etiquette, divinely established and sternly enforced, resembled that of earthly monarchs, we should expect to find a corresponding resemblance in the external manifestations of reverence by those who approached the sanctuary of the King of kings. And such is the fact. The postures assumed by the worshippers — standing, kneeling, falling prostrate, and the like — are all conformable to Oriental usage before temporal sovereigns, even at the present day. It thus happens that much of our most common and familiar language comes down to us from the royal court, and in a costume devised by it. To such an extent is this true, that persons educated in our day, under circumstances widely different, cannot readily adopt as their own many of those very intensive expressions which fall naturally from the lips of Old Testament saints.

In illustration of these remarks, we might quote at random, and to almost any extent, from the poetical parts of the Bible. The sweet singer of Israel thus proclaims his vehement loyalty towards Jehovah: "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee, and am I not grieved with those that rise up against thee? I hate them with a perfect hatred. I count them mine enemies" (Ps. cxxxix. 21, 22). "Confounded be all they that worship graven images — that boast themselves of idols. Worship him all ye gods" (Ps. xcvi. 7. See also Ps. lxxviii. ; lxxi. ; lxxii. ; xcix. ; c., and others too numerous to receive mention and too familiar to need it). The same intensity is seen even in a higher degree, in a different mode of giving expression to this absorbing loyalty. Jehovah was their pride, their boast all the day long, their joy and rejoicing. The utmost capacity of language is tasked to set forth his honor, glory, might, and majesty. There is nothing

equal to it, nothing like it, in the entire range of literature, sacred or profane, in prose or in poetry. Every name, title, figure, and comparison by which overflowing love, fear, devotion, trust, and triumph, adoration, and consecration could be expressed were eagerly seized upon and appropriated. One is strongly tempted to quote, in illustration, whole Psalms; but this our limited space will not allow, and we pass on, merely observing that there is nothing left for subsequent worshippers to add or invent. This great department of man's spiritual language is worked out and finished, and no pious mind ever attempts to address "the Majesty on High" in terms not found ready coined and sanctioned by biblical warrant. It would be impertinence and presumption to attempt it. We have already remarked, and shall have occasion hereafter further to show in detail, that this immense vocabulary has its natural basis in this land of the Bible, and could not have been invented, understood, or employed by persons born and bred under conditions essentially diverse from those in Palestine during the ages in which it was wrought out and perfected.

Again, it is from this same source that we derive the true and allowable language of spiritual desires and emotions; and, as this dialect of the heart was largely suggested by the theocratic relation and regime, it was inevitable that it should come forth glowing, and even exaggerated to a degree of intensity almost incomprehensible to persons not conscious of any such relation nor influenced by it. God was no distant, unconcerned spectator to the devout Hebrew, no hazy figment of the imagination, no impersonal force or energy diffused through an infinite and incomprehensible universe, but a present, living Person, endowed with intelligible human attributes, most intimately associated with his people in their daily life, taking cognizance of all their affairs, and constantly, visibly, and efficiently interposing in their behalf and for their good. He was ever at hand to protect, bless, and prosper them; pleased with their obedience and rewarding it; grieved with their rebellion and

punishing it. He was their Captain, leading them to victory. He gave them their inheritance, driving out their enemies. His eye was upon their land from the beginning of the year to the end of it; sending rain in due time, and fruitful seasons; filling their hearts with food and gladness. He was their Shield and Buckler in battle, their Fortress and High Tower, their Rock of defence; or he was their Shepherd, guarding, guiding, feeding them by night and by day. In a word, it was one main design of the theocratic regime to bring down the eternal, invisible, infinite Jehovah to the capacity and comprehension of feeble man. To secure this essential result, it was necessary to present him as a living, acting Person, endowed with human attributes. And this they do without reserve or hesitation. The same acts, emotions, and even imperfections are ascribed to him as would be appropriate to or expected from a temporal sovereign. In fact, Jehovah, in the language of these sons of song, is not only a *man*, but a *Hebrew*, and an *inhabitant of Palestine*.¹ To such an extent is this carried on, that they are led thereby to keep back, and hold in reserve, as it were, the spiritual, the unseen, and the eternal. Indeed, it has often been objected to the Mosaic economy, and to the Old Testament teaching generally, that the infinitely greater matters of eternity and the future life, with their tremendous array of relations and responsibilities, are entirely ignored. This is certainly not the case. There underlies the entire scheme of revelation the fundamental assumption that this life is not the whole of man. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob "is not the God of the dead, but of the living." This is everywhere taken for granted, and this, in fact, even to the present day, is not the side of revelation which it is most difficult to present and establish. On the contrary, that which is most essential to man's religious life is just that conception of the Divine Being and of his relations to man

¹ This is of course to be restricted to the specific subject under consideration. There are numerous passages in which the anthropomorphism of the Theocracy disappears entirely amid strains of pure Theism of unrivaled sublimity.

that the theocratic institution was intended and adapted to convey. But, be this as it may, it is clearly demonstrable that it is to this that we owe a very large part of our spiritual language, and to the illustration of this fact we restrict our present Essay.

One of the marked peculiarities of the Bible is the large space devoted to the personal history of individuals. There is little of formal, dogmatic teaching — nothing, in fact, like systematic theology, especially in the Old Testament. The fundamental doctrines, even concerning the Supreme Being, are brought out, as it were, incidentally, in connection with the personal experiences of patriarchs, prophets, judges, generals, kings, and others, male and female, old and young, rich and poor, learned and ignorant, Jew and Gentile, good and bad. It was part of the divine plan to create, educate, and bring individuals possessing the needed qualifications and endowments into circumstances such as would suggest just the moral and religious lessons intended to be taught. The mere situations included the truths to be made known; the simple telling of the story suggested the proper words and phrases. Of course, only such acts, incidents, and experiences (amongst others innumerable) were caused to be recorded in the Bible as did contain or imply the teaching and the terms required.

It is in this selection that we are to find the guidance of divine inspiration, rather than in the things themselves. The acts, incidents, and experiences of patriarchs, prophets, and other biblical worthies were, at least in most cases, natural, not supernatural, as were also their motives, aspirations, hopes and fears, joys and sorrows. They felt, spoke, and acted, in the main, as other men would in similar circumstances. But, standing in the divine record where and as they did and do, they include and proclaim just that spiritual truth which was needed and was contemplated by the Author of revelation, and they declare it in a style perfectly natural and human. Let any one examine carefully, and with this thought in mind, the sources whence

he has derived most of his ideas of God, his attributes, ways, and works, of man and his relations to God, of sin and salvation, of the life that is and that which is to be hereafter, of heaven and hell, of angels and devils, of morals and duties, faith and prayer, work and worship, and other matters of like nature and importance, and he will probably be surprised to find how large a part has been taught by the personal history of biblical celebrities. But the influence upon the *language* of inspiration from this source has been greater even than upon the *substance matter* of revelation. For example, the adventures and incidents in the life of David not only suggested most of the thoughts and awakened the emotions expressed in his Psalms, but in numberless instances the words, phrases, and figures are the direct product of those facts in his history. It has thus come to pass that the personal experiences of one man have exerted an immense influence upon the spiritual vocabulary of the religious world, and will continue to do so through all ages to the end of time.

Examples and illustrations occur in almost every Psalm. Thus to express his ardent love towards God, his longing to enjoy his presence and participate in his worship, he exclaims: "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so panteth my soul after thee, O God. My soul thirsteth for God, for the living God. When shall I come and appear before God? My soul longeth, yea, even fainteth, for the courts of the Lord. My heart and my flesh cry out for the living God." Now, almost every sentence in such passages contains one or more figurative words borrowed from something in this Bible land. Again: "Rivers of water run down my eyes, because they keep not thy law. The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up. I am weary with my groaning. All the night make I my bed to swim. I water my couch with my tears. O Lord God, if I have done this, if there be any iniquity in my hands, let the enemy persecute my soul and take it. Yea, let him tread down my life upon the earth, and lay mine honor in the dust." This, and much more of the same

kind, is the vehement assertion of innocence, as in the court and the presence of a personal lord and judge. So, again, the complaint and the prayer burst forth thus: "For thy sake are we killed all the day long; we are counted as sheep for the slaughter. Awake; why sleepest thou? Arise; cast us not off forever. Wherefore hidest thou thy face, and forgettest our affliction and our oppression? for our soul is bowed down to the dust; our belly cleaveth unto the earth."

We may readily admit that a multitude of expressions, of which the above are but samples, are exaggerations, permissible only in poetry, and even then to be taken with due allowance for the circumstances of the author and the license of Oriental imagination and style. To appropriate, or even to sympathize with them, one must be brought into conditions of danger, trial, suffering, and anguish analogous to those which extorted such vehement language from the sacred poet. But, vehement as they are, there are states of mind and phases of Christian experience for which no other terms seem appropriate or at all adequate. They are then the natural and genuine exponent of the heart, and are employed without any abatement of this intensity. Thus, too, we must wait for conditions analogous to those which called forth such jubilant anthems as the following, or must imagine them before we can join in their lofty strains: "Oh, clap your hands, all ye people. Shout unto God with the voice of triumph. God is gone up with a shout, the Lord with the sound of a trumpet. Sing praises to God, sing praises. Sing ye praises unto our God. Sing praises; for God is King of all the earth. Awake up my glory. Awake psaltery and harp. I myself will awake early. I will sing unto thee among the nations, for thy mercy is great unto the heavens, and thy truth unto the clouds. Be thou exalted, O God, above the heavens; let thy glory be above all the earth."

Again, we owe to circumstances divinely permitted to occur in the lives and experiences of the sacred writers most of our language of penitence, confession, shame, and sorrow for sin. Many of the utterances—not to say all—which

appear to us unnatural and violent exaggerations are best interpreted in connection with the historic incidents which gave birth to them. For example, there is but one fifty-first Psalm, and there is no parallel to it in human literature. Nor could it have been penned by any other penitent than David, nor by him under any other circumstances. It is the outgushing cry of the greatest of criminals before his offended Sovereign and Judge. Amazed, confounded, overwhelmed, and crushed to the earth, with all his hypocrisy, treachery, cruelty, ingratitude, and unutterable baseness suddenly unmasked and staring him in the face; with the astounding history in mind, the expressions of his confession and prayer, even the most vehement and comprehensive, sound only natural, or rather seem feeble and inadequate. "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving-kindness; according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgressions. Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin. Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight, that thou mightest be justified when thou speakest, and be clear when thou judgest. Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow. Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me. Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy Holy Spirit from me." Now, there is no presumption in maintaining that some of these utterances could never have been heard from any lips but those of David, nor from him on any other occasion. It required the antecedent, startling enormities perpetrated by one holding relations with the theocracy and its King wholly exceptional, intimate, and exalted, to give birth and being, color and costume to this Psalm. But pause, and mark well the result. This was the plan which divine wisdom selected to inspire the emotions and teach to man the language of deep and genuine repentance. And it has done it. The end has been accomplished. Unnumbered millions

have learned the lesson and the language. Every true Christian has the Psalm by heart, and, though not guilty of the same enormities, repeats without hesitation or reservation its most intensive and comprehensive terms; and such will ever be the case, so long as there shall be penitent sinners on the earth to plead for pardon and peace, for clean hearts and right spirits, before the throne of a sin-hating, but merciful God.

The same general remarks apply to numberless other expressions of a kindred character sown thickly over the whole field of sacred psalmody. "Mine iniquities have taken hold of me so that I am not able to look up; they are more than the hairs of my head. Therefore my heart faileth me." "I am a worm and no man." "Mine iniquities are gone over my head; as a heavy burden they are too heavy for me. My wounds stink and are corrupt because of my foolishness. I am feeble and sore broken. I have roared because of the unquietness of my heart. My heart panteth; my strength faileth me." Now, these and similar passages, scattered everywhere up and down through the psalter and through the emotional and devotional parts of God's word, were suggested by, or received much of their verbal costume from, the ever-present consciousness of the immediate personal presence of Jehovah, as established and guaranteed by the theocratic institution.

To this same source, too, such expressive verbal formulas as that oft-repeated petition, "Lord, lift thou up the light of thy countenance upon us," is best understood and illustrated by picturing to one's self a royal sovereign and judge in his hall of audience, seated upon a low cushion, rug, or mat, according to Oriental custom. In this position, the accused or the suppliant, *standing* before him, could not see his face, especially when bent down in displeasure, as implied in the form of the petition. This relative attitude can be seen any day in the audience-room of Turkish pachas and judges. The petitioners are not allowed to *sit down*, but must *stand*, with hands humbly clasped together, and thus wait the

pleasure of him whose will is law. If the petition is accepted, the favor granted, or the suppliant pardoned, the man of doom and destiny lifts up his head, and with a benignant smile dismisses the rejoicing suppliant. But to turn aside the face, look down, and thus hide the countenance, has always been, and still is in this Eastern world, an alarming omen, foreboding rejection, imprisonment, or death, as the case may be. Moreover, these Orientals can, and do when they choose, wonderfully darken the countenance. I have seen it gather absolute blackness, like a portentous cloud, ready to explode in death-dealing thunderbolts. And, on the other hand, when greatly delighted, the whole face is overspread with a warm, brilliant glow, very beautiful and fascinating. This is what suggested the petition so oft-repeated in the eightieth Psalm: "Turn us again, O God, and *cause thy face to shine*, and we shall be saved." Imagine a suppliant for mercy, *standing* in an agony of doubt and fear before his offended sovereign, who hides his frowning face, and refuses to give one glance towards the trembling wretch, and you have the exact conditions which may have originated the peculiar costume of the prayer: "Lift thou up the light of thy countenance. Cause thy face to shine upon us."

Quotations illustrating this subject might be made to an unlimited extent; for in this respect there is nothing in the entire compass of known literature that can bear comparison with these songs of Zion. To account for this inexhaustible wealth and variety, we must remember that these divine poets and prophets had, as intimated elsewhere, passed through every school of human experience, and had thereby learned the language most appropriate for all possible emotions of the heart. The warmth of affection, the fervor of love, the frenzy of jealousy, the exhilaration of success, the abyss of despair, the dreams of ambition, the prostration of defeat, the triumph of victory, the repose of a good conscience, the horrors of remorse, the eagerness of pursuit, the miserable satiety and disappointment of possession, poverty

and wealth, honor and disgrace, glory and shame, peace and war, youth and old age, sickness and health, life and death, and all between these widest extremes they had known and felt, and could and did describe. Moreover, all was experienced and expressed in this land of the Bible, and in immediate association with this kingdom of heaven, the origin of whose peculiar language and literature it is the object of these Essays to explore and explain. It is presumption to hope that we can do justice to, much less can exhaust, a theme so rich and vast. So all-comprehending is it that the man whose spiritual condition and wants are so peculiar that they cannot be expressed and answered in the word and by the word of God is yet to born. And this boon so precious and priceless has been bestowed upon the world through, in, and by the land of the Bible, her people, her institutions, and her marvellous vicissitudes and exhaustive experiences.

This latter idea, being the hinge of our whole argument, will bear still further illustration. To many minds in this age of fastidious refinement, much of the poetic language and imagery seems forced, unnatural, or extravagant. But they were not so at the time and amongst the people who first employed them. Just here is to be applied an essential canon of interpretation by which we find the true equivalent of such terms in modern phraseology. *We* do not now vent our complaints in "words of roaring." No modern poet would venture to say, "Mine eye is consumed, yea, my soul and my belly. There is no rest to my bones. My heart is like wax; it is melted in the midst of my bowels. I am poured out like water, and all my bones are out of joint. My strength is dried up like a potsherd, my tongue cleaveth to my jaws, and thou hast brought me into the dust of death." Nor, on the other hand, do we now give expression to our joyous emotions by leaping, dancing, shouting, and clapping hands. Our mental manifestations of all kinds are more subdued and, as we think, more decorous. But it is not thus in this Eastern world. The customs of the people have

undergone very little change in these things. At every genuine Oriental wedding, for instance, there is loud singing, shouting, clapping of hands, leaping, rude dancing, beating of kettle-drums, and other boisterous manifestations of hilarity, in exact accordance with ancient manners. At funerals the weeping, groaning, wailing, and verbal vociferations are loud and tempestuous as in the days of Job or Jeremiah. These exhibitions of both joy and sorrow appear to us unseemly, and often hypocritical. Still, it is certain that a large part of biblical imagery (transferred without change or abatement into the ordinary dialect of Christian experience) was derived from just these things. It could not but be so. "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." And this heart-inspired language is more impressive, easier learned, and is remembered with greater tenacity than any other. It is nature's dialect, common to all, understood by all. Those who first learned and spoke it were taught in God's school of personal experience. Had the individual conditions and experiences of David, Job, Jeremiah, and other divinely-appointed masters been essentially different from what they were, their thoughts and emotions could not have been the same, and the verbal costume in which they were clothed must have been equally different.

It is necessary to keep the above-mentioned canon of interpretation constantly in mind when dealing with the poetry of the Bible. Else much of it will appear to us false and fictitious, or sheer exaggeration. But, in fact, the words, phrases, and figures were the most natural possible to the times, the individual, and the attending circumstances and conditions. Thus David, the great exemplar and master, dwells continually, and in nearly every one of his Psalms, upon personal dangers from and conflicts with enemies. Now, he did this because, beyond almost any man that ever lived, he had enemies, and suffered most intensely from their causeless jealousy, cruelty, and treachery. Painting in poetic costume their character and conduct he naturally deals in words, figures, and phrases, even in his most direct

appeals to God, which we, dwelling in well-ordered commonwealths, where omnipresent law guarantees personal safety, dare not employ, except with great abatement, and then in reference to spiritual foes and conflicts. This transference, however, from the natural to the spiritual, is not mere fanciful accommodation — an after-thought, with no basis to rest upon. There was that about these divinely-appointed exemplars and patterns, and in their relations to the kingdom of God and its King, which included this other and higher domain.

We need not now pause to establish and illustrate this fact; but it is important for our purpose to show that the language under consideration owes its peculiar form and costume to a divinely-constituted condition of things in this land of Palestine. Thus, when David compares his persecutors to lions, leopards, and other ferocious beasts of prey, it is evident that he copied from life. The numerous, minute, and accurate references to their habits show that he was perfectly familiar with them, and with them had even been engaged in deadly conflict. And from his personal history we learn that such was the fact. The southern part of Palestine, where he spent his youth as a shepherd, and the adjacent deserts into which he was driven by the mad and murderous jealousy of Saul, were at that time greatly infested with these savage beasts. In justification of his request to be allowed to encounter Goliath, he said: "There came a lion and a bear, and took a lamb out of the flock, and I went out after him, and smote him, and delivered it out of his mouth; and when he arose against me, I caught him by the beard, and smote him, and slew him" (1 Sam. xvii. 34, 35). This was a very different encounter from that of modern lion-killers, with their deadly rifles; it was a desperate, hand-to-hand, personal conflict. And this imparts great additional force to such petitions as the following: "O Lord, my God, save me from all them that persecute me; lest they tear my soul like a lion, rending it in pieces while there be none to deliver." Again, describing

the conduct of his enemy, he shows the same intimate knowledge of the lion and his behavior: "He lieth in wait secretly, as a lion in his den; he croucheth and humbleth himself," etc., etc. Such, it is well known, are the exact attitudes and habits of the lion, and David and other biblical writers were brought into familiar acquaintance with them; and this continued to be so until the entire volume of God's word was written. Now, this was not accidental, but providential, and for a purpose — to enrich our spiritual vocabulary with important words and phrases, and our inspired literature with many noble moral lessons. "The lion," says the proverb, "is the strongest of beasts, and turneth not away from any." Hence he is mentioned symbolically, and with favor or otherwise as different aspects of his character become the subjects of comparison. Thus, in his father's blessing Judah is a lion's whelp: "From the prey thou art gone up. He stooped down; he couched as a lion, and as an old lion; who shall rouse him up?" This prophecy was strikingly fulfilled in David and his royal house, and symbolically in David's greater Son — the true Lion of the tribe of Judah. These and similar passages refer mainly to the more noble attributes of the animal. But, as he was also well known to be fierce, cruel, cunning, and terrible, his name became the synonyms of the devil himself, who goeth about as a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour. Then, by natural analogy, the lion stands as representative of oppressors, tyrants, and wicked men in general. "My soul," says the Psalmist, "is among lions — the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows and their tongue a sharp sword."

It is certainly remarkable (something which our present knowledge of the chosen haunts of the lion would not lead us to anticipate) to find such constant and familiar allusions to this monarch of the woods in a land where there are no forests — a land, like Palestine, the highway of the nations between Asia and Africa. Yet Job and Jacob, Moses and David, and those that followed after, thus mention them, in prose and in poetry, — old lions and young, male and female,

—as beasts with which they were only too well acquainted. They could not have so written in this day. The terrible roar that shook the wilderness has long since died away in the far off desert—dwindled into the contemptible bark of the fox or the despairing wail of the jackal. The original basis of all this poetical imagery and moral symbolism has utterly disappeared from the land of the Bible. We must resort to the wilds of Africa or the jungles of India to meet and fight this king of beasts, whose presence and attributes suggested to sacred poet and prophet the most striking symbols of majesty and might, of terror and destruction.

As the biblical poets derived their thoughts, words, and imagery from life, must we suppose that there were in this land of Palestine, in their day, actual savage men, who literally dug pits, hid snares, and spread nets to catch human victims, just as trappers and Indians in the wilds of America now do to capture animals? Doubtless. Indeed, the literal must have preceded the figurative and the symbolical. Hence alone could have come such phrasology as the following: "The proud have digged pits for my soul, which are not after thy law. For without cause have they hid their net in a pit which without cause they have digged for my soul. . . . Let his net that he hath hid catch himself; into that very destruction let him fall. The heathen are sunk down into the pit that they have made; in the net which they hid is their own foot taken. Pull me out of the net that they have laid privily for me." Now, these are but specimens of many similarly minute and specific statements, which certainly refer originally to literal, material, not moral, snares, nets, and pits. In those ancient times, the means of destruction were far less efficient and fatal than our modern rifles and revolvers, and, consequently, men had recourse to trick and stratagem, to pits, traps, and hidden snares to capture or destroy their enemies, both human and brute. And no Bible reader needs to be reminded that from this source have come a multitude of words, figures, and phrases in our moral and spiritual vocabulary. We shall

refer to them in other connections, and merely add that they are not out of place here, since their most frequent occurrence is found in vehement complaints addressed to their King and Sovereign against those who employed such villainous artifices to slay the righteous. On this general subject, it is well to remember that there was in those ancient times a degree of treachery, ferocity, and brutality in life and manners which rendered possible deeds of revenge that would not now be allowed in any civilized society. Custom tolerated, and in some cases even legal enactments commanded, things to be done which must have tended to foster these terrible passions. Amongst these may be mentioned the law of blood revenge, which required for its execution that every man's heart and hand should be steeled and hardened up to the point of that bloody deed which is now only possible to the legal executioner. The effect which even a modified form of this cruel custom must have had on the character of the people is distressingly illustrated in our own time, and in this same land. We dwell amongst tribes many of whom walk about in open day, ostentatiously weaving into unshaven beards the stern purpose, the diabolical vow to murder certain victims of their revenge, whenever and wheresoever opportunity offers. Moreover, Orientals, even those nominally Christian, are addicted to envy, jealousy, treachery, and kindred vices, to an extent almost incredible. Against these odious characteristics and those who manifested them a large part of the Psalmist's most vehement denunciations is addressed. And we should not be scandalized if we find them clothed in language severe and even shocking to our milder and more humane institutions. They are simply true to the age and the conditions of society wherein they were uttered.

On the other hand, there is no display of triumph over a fallen enemy that is not matched in the present generation of evil-doers in certain parts of Syria and Palestine. In biblical phraseology, "They clap the hands, shout and hiss, shoot out the lip, wag the head, wink with the eye, and gnash

the teeth, crying, Aha! aha! Our eye hath seen. So would we have it; we have swallowed him up" (Ps. xxxv. 21-25).

To account for the extreme intensity in the imprecations of David and other sacred writers, it is but justice to remember that they could not but abhor the character and conduct of those men of Belial whom they denounced, and, whilst pleading the cause of justice and righteousness before the tribunal of God their King and Governor, they must describe them in their true colors. That was no place to conceal the plain truth, or to soften down their condemnation into the dulcet notes acceptable to the ears of modern refinement. Accordingly, they spoke out bravely what they knew surely and felt strongly. Some of their expressions may seem to us harsh, and even offensive; but they should be interpreted with due allowance for the circumstances, the customs of their age, and the peculiar capabilities of these rugged Oriental languages. Besides, these holy men were, in most cases, invested with solemn official responsibilities—acted as guardians of the law—the public, recognized prosecutors of transgressors. Generally, too, more is to be understood than what lies on the surface. There were wicked men and bad women, who dug moral pits and spread spiritual nets to catch and destroy both soul and body. Traitors to their country, their religion, and their God, they were far more than mere personal enemies and persecutors of those who denounced them. In a real and controlling sense the slanderers of David, for example, were the enemies of God and rebels against his government, in league with the grand adversary, the devil. Hence, when the Psalmist rebukes these sons of Belial, who plot against the just and gnash upon them with their teeth, he adds: "The Lord shall laugh at him; for he seeth that his day is coming. They have drawn out the sword, and bent the bow to slay such as be of upright conversation. Their sword shall enter into their own heart, and their bow shall be broken. The wicked shall perish, and the enemies of the Lord shall be as the fat of lambs; into smoke shall they consume away" (Ps. xxxvii. 12, 15, 20).

In all such passages, and they are very numerous, the rebukes and denunciations were not hurled against mere personal enemies. The eye glances on beyond to those implacable foes of God and his law by whom David was assailed, hated, and persecuted — beyond even them to those principalities and powers and rulers of the darkness of this world with which they were in league. The mighty sweep of those divinely-inspired comminations falls, finally, on that hierarchy of apostate angels. There we find their ultimate significance and most perfect fulfilment.

In accordance with this line of remark, we suggest that not only has the Hebrew theocracy the realistic conception of the Supreme Being as a personal King and Governor, greatly enriched our religious vocabulary in the ways described and many others, but we are thereby guided to the right interpretation of much of this language. We feel authorized to restrict those terrible imprecations which meet us at every turn in the Psalms to special and exceptional cases and characters; and in general to tone down and modify their awful import. Thus, when David prays, against those flatterers whose throat was an open sepulchre, “Destroy thou them, O God! let them fall by their own counsels; cast them out in the multitude of their transgressions, for they *have rebelled against thee*,” the spirit that dictated the prayer is indicated by this last clause. These persons were open, declared rebels against David’s God and King. Death is the penalty for treason in all governments; and the Psalmist, as God’s zealous servant and loyal subject, demands that the merited punishment should be inflicted. The language is, so to speak, official, and does not necessarily imply a cruel, bloodthirsty spirit of vengeance. The substance of the petition might be urged by a faithful officer of any modern sovereign. Indeed, the official prosecutor of dangerous conspirators and rebels does, in fact and in form, make just this demand. He might clothe it in words more mild and polite; yet the demand itself would be the same. But, adopting the style and language of the age, David, the

supreme executive officer of the theocracy, claims, in strict legal terms, that these incorrigible revolters might be destroyed out of the land. These considerations may not apply in all their mitigating force to every imprecation and commination found in the Bible. There are some which seem to require other explanations and a different method of treatment. Nor is it necessary to hold ourselves responsible for every outburst of indignation on record. But we do believe that very many passages in the Bible which give pain to sensitive minds are best understood when interpreted in connection with the Hebrew theocracy as the official language of an actual and august court.

Nor does this conception of the circumstances and relations of the speakers and actors merely serve to eliminate and moderate the intensity of that apparently vindictive language which disturbs many gentle and compassionate hearts. It also imparts a life-like simplicity and naturalness to that terrible earnestness and agony manifested so frequently by even good men in the presence of their offended Lord and King. Transfer the scenes, the actors, and the expressions to an actual Oriental court and judgment-hall, and there is no exaggeration whatever. Nay, we need not travel to the East, nor very far back in even English history, to find exact parallels. When conspiracies and rebellions were common, and multitudes stood arraigned for bloody treason, there is no form of denunciation found in the Bible more stern than was heard in every court, nor words of supplication more abject and agonizing than those urged with all the energy of despair, even by the high-born and most noble of the land.

Now, under the Hebrew theocracy, resistance to or violation of God's law was *rebellion*. Idolatry was actual *treason*. There was no place under this divine regime for that hazy sophistry which men now throw over such conduct, and thereby obscure the enormity of guilt. To a devout Hebrew, God and his government were tremendous realities, not vague, mythical abstractions, with no underlying basis of fact to support them. Jehovah was their actual King and Gov-

error, dwelling amongst them, visibly executing his own laws, and administering his own government. These facts and convictions gave tone to their feelings and color to their language. We are far, however, from maintaining that, by this exceptional order of things, emotions of contrition, of shame, of penitence, on the one hand, or of peace, joy, gratitude, love, thankfulness, adoration, trust, and triumph, on the other, were rendered so mundane that they are unfit vehicles for the spiritual thoughts, emotions, and desires of devout souls under our changed circumstances. Indeed, we only deceive ourselves by imagining that the conditions are *essentially* changed. Transgression is still *rebellion*; idolatry, spiritual *treason*. Jehovah has not abdicated his kingly office, nor withdrawn from the government of the world. All that is meant is, that the theocratic institution and regime rendered these things more realizable. Even the most pious amongst us acknowledge the difficulty of preserving this vivid consciousness of a present, personal, governing God. Many reject or ignore the doctrine, and of necessity they can neither appreciate nor appropriate the thoughts or the words which such consciousness inspired. The best among us walk through this field with feeble, faltering steps. We believe and accept, but use with many abatements and practical reservations, this fundamental doctrine of a personal God. Many set it aside altogether, or resolve it into hazy metaphor, or vague, Oriental symbolism. It is, in fact, the hardest of all moral problems — the stumbling-block of the age, over which the boasting sons of science seem to be drifting towards the bottomless abyss of sheer atheism. Our specific purpose, however, is not to elucidate and confirm the *teaching* of the word of God, but rather to discover and describe the *vehicle* through which, the *machinery* by which it is taught, and even this mainly in one department of the general subject. Our aim has been to show that the verbal medium of revelation (divinely selected and developed) was largely modified and colored by the theocratic regime, more especially in the domain of the

emotions, the true centre and core of all genuine religion. And since the best elucidation of this is furnished by the book of inspired Psalms, it is no departure from our chosen theme to dwell thus at length upon this topic. By this divine economy, and by the most intimate association of his people with it for long centuries of pre-arranged incidents and exceptional experiences, God designed to educate them for their mission — to teach them the peculiar language of his kingdom, and how to use it. The successful result is seen and felt throughout the whole religious world. His ancient people, in all their wide dispersions, still chant these divine odes, *literatim et verbatim*, and translations of them constitute much of the liturgy and hymnology of every Christian church on the earth. It is an interesting and significant fact that the people distinguished above all others for high spiritual culture are precisely those who cling with the greatest tenacity and love to these grand old Hebrew odes and anthems. In the closet, the family, and the public sanctuary they read, recite, chant, and pray them, year in and year out, and sing them in triumph as they pass through the Jordan of death to the Canaan of eternal peace and rest on high.

In the further conduct of our theme, and in many different connections, we shall be brought back to this inexhaustible field of illustration. But this must suffice for the present, while we turn to other topics whose bearing and agency in evolving and enriching our spiritual language require to be considered.

ARTICLE VI.

PAUL'S PANEGYRIC OF LOVE. — A NEW CRITICAL TEXT,
TRANSLATION, AND DIGEST.

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NO. I.—INTRODUCTIONS AND TRANSLATION.

IN May, 1870, the Convocation of Canterbury, by a unanimous vote in the Upper House, and by a large majority in the Lower, declared, "That it is desirable that a revision of the Authorized Version of the Holy Scriptures be undertaken." This was the first of a series of resolutions which were proposed by a committee of eight bishops, the late Dean Alford, Dean Stanley, and other dignitaries of the Church of England. That church is justly proud of having formed our present incomparable version, and nothing is more fitting than that with her should originate the steps looking toward bringing it into accordance with what is rightly demanded by the present state of biblical science. A new *translation* is neither proposed nor needed; but what is wanted is a *revision* of the present version, which shall be worthy of the scholarship and Christianity of to-day, and which shall therefore most fully avail itself of the latest researches among the rich stores of manuscript treasures which have been recovered during the present century, and which shall embody the results of the most mature and discerning criticism which can be brought to bear upon the manuscripts, versions, and Fathers, for the restoration of the *ipsissima verba*, as nearly as may be, of the sacred text.

The Convocation also appointed a committee of eight bishops and eight presbyters to take the requisite steps for carrying out the resolutions. The Committee of Revision, as finally constituted, consisted of some thirty-six members, divided into two companies—one for the revision of the New Testament, and the other for that of the Old. Authority

was given to the committee, by the Convocation, "to invite the co-operation of any eminent for scholarship, to whatever nation or religious body they may belong."

Especial interest was felt in this country, when it was found that, under the authority thus granted, the British committee had invited Rev. Dr. Philip Schaff, of New York, to form an associate committee of competent American scholars, who should join in the execution of the great work proposed. The American committee is also divided into an Old Testament company of eleven members, and a New Testament company of fifteen. Eight denominations are represented in their ranks, and many of their number are of acknowledged ability and tried skill in biblical criticism or exegesis. They have now fully entered upon the prosecution of their work.

As no building which is not founded upon rock can withstand the tempest, so no translation can bear searching criticism unless the text it renders be grounded upon all attainable evidence which is of a character worthy of confidence. In the opinion of the writer, the sources from which the primitive text is to be sought are the oldest uncials (with such secondary aid as the later uncials and the cursive manuscripts can render), the ancient versions, and the early ecclesiastical writers, whether Greeks, Latins, or Syrians. It must not be denied that many and serious difficulties beset the use of citations from the ecclesiastical writers; but these difficulties render it none the less imperative that we should sift the wheat from the chaff, and avail ourselves of whatever the Fathers, so called, have preserved for us. (This subject will be discussed more fully in the Introduction to the second part of this Article, which will appear in the April Number.)

It ought to be an axiom in the criticism of the text of the Greek Testament, as it is in that of the classics, that the nearer we can get to the age in which a work was written, the more likely are we to obtain a pure text, and the less probably shall we find it corrupted by accident, carelessness, or design. Holding this to be the case, the writer sets the

highest value upon the uncial manuscripts of the fourth and fifth centuries, which have been so largely given to the Christian world through the indefatigable and painstaking researches of the master critic, Tischendorf. (It must not be forgotten that it is to him we owe it that we have at last a trustworthy edition of the great Vatican manuscript; for had he not shamed the pope into permitting the publication of the *fac-simile* edition of 1868, we should still have had to be satisfied with the very imperfect and faulty editions of Cardinal Mai, supplemented by such corrections as Tischendorf, Alford, and others were enabled, from time to time, to obtain by stealth from the manuscript itself.) The manuscripts of the sixth century, whether of the Gospels or Epistles, are of scarcely less value than the earlier. Still, a slight deterioration begins to make its appearance. Below the sixth century, we notice a very decided change for the worse in the character of text presented in what we may style the secondary uncials. These were copied from exemplars which greatly varied in the excellence and purity of their text. Occasionally, indeed, they may preserve a reading in its purity which has suffered change even in its transmission to the oldest manuscripts now extant. But this was by no means always, or even ordinarily, the case. Besides the frailties which beset all copyists, those of the later uncials were prone to attempt to assimilate or "correct" the text of the exemplar which they were copying into an accordance with that with which they were familiar, in their church lectionaries, or service-books, or in their daily work. This assimilation was often unintentional, and was caused by the habits of thought of the scribe; as, for example, when he would look at a passage with which he was verbally familiar, and then heedlessly fail to notice its differences from the text which he had in his mind. (Any one who has collated texts of ancient writers, or even corrected proof-sheets "by copy," need scarcely be reminded how easy it is to fall into this error, or rather how great exertion it requires to keep out of it). The later scribe was

also more likely to incorporate marginal notes, or *scholia*, into his text, ignorantly supposing them to be omissions which should be inserted in their proper place. It would be pleasing to believe that most of the variations found in the manuscripts and versions arose from these causes, or from other inadvertence, especially could there be any ground whatever for thinking that the famous interpolation, ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ . . . ἐν τῇ γῇ, in 1 John v. 7, 8, had any such innocent origin for the Greek form found in the Textus Receptus. But the phenomena of the manuscripts force us to the conclusion that many changes were those of design; some of them caused by a desire to harmonize or assimilate parallel passages; others to enforce some doctrinal opinion which was at the time occupying a prominent place in the discussions of the councils, or in the controversies of the bishops and heretics; yet others to remove difficulties, real or supposed, in the text itself, (and this last will amply account for the corruption of *καυχῆσθωμαι* into *καυθήσωμαι*, in vs. 3 of our passage); and still others arose, where the copyist did not, or could not, comprehend the passage as written, and attempted to form a smooth, grammatical reading from his own conception of what ought to be read in the passage before him.

Even better than most of the secondary uncials are some cursives, which possess a text retaining in a great degree its pristine purity and excellence. Such are 1. 33. 69. of the Gospels (which are, unfortunately, designated by other numbers in the other divisions of the New Testament); notably 61 of the Acts; and 38 of the Apocalypse. In important passages, these cursives nearly always join the ranks of the earlier uncials, rather than those of the later.

In manuscript authorities we finally come to the mass of cursives, numbered by hundreds, and the lectionaries or service-books of the Greek-speaking churches. These are to be trusted only so far as they approve themselves worthy of confidence. As auxiliaries, rare instances will occur where their testimony may be valuable; for example, in 1 John v. 7, 8, where every Greek manuscript of any char-

acter fails to furnish any evidence whatever for the spurious addition. The conservative critics, if they may be so styled, in a case where the truest conservatism is radicalism, protest against this sweeping condemnation of the mass of MSS., and urge that we may yet find cursives which were transcribed from exemplars older in text, if not in vellum, than our most venerable uncials. It is a sufficient reply to this, that no cursive manuscript has yet been produced for which any such origin can be claimed.

Upon investigation, we find the cursives agreeing, to a remarkable degree, with the later Fathers, — notably with Occumenius and Theophylact, — and the uncials with the earlier Fathers and versions, where the text of the latter can be depended upon. This state of affairs is utterly irreconcilable with the claim of antiquity set up for the text of the *Receptus* and of the mass of cursive manuscripts.

The next source from which we must seek the primitive text is in the oldest versions. Not a few of these were executed long anterior to the oldest Greek codices now extant. As now existing in printed editions, the text of but few of the versions is in a condition to satisfy the reasonable demands of the critical student of the originals of the New Testament. We need thoroughly critical editions, of the Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, and Aethiopic versions. Even in their present unscholarly and unworthy condition, the testimony of these versions is frequently of the greatest moment, and in many cases can be cited with some degree of confidence. The editions of the works of the Fathers, which are our last source of evidence, are in nearly as bad a condition as the text of the versions. But this will be spoken of elsewhere.

The *final edition* of the Greek Testament cannot be produced while so many of our sources of evidence are in the confused and chaotic condition in which they now exist. For the present, at least, we must be satisfied with provisional texts and provisional translations. But it is the high privilege of each generation, and every biblical scholar, to make a fair

contribution toward the recovery of the text of our Scriptures, in the state in which it was delivered to man.

The translation published herewith is in no sense a popular one, but aims to present in English the shades of thought in this matchless passage, more nearly than is possible in such a version, and to note the force of the original as closely as may be. In some cases the literal rendering of the Greek will hardly be as clear as is desirable, and, therefore, in such places, brief notes of explanation have been appended.

The uncial manuscripts containing the Pauline Epistles, and that to the Hebrews are:

ℵ. The Codex Sinaiticus, Century IV, now in the Imperial Library at St. Petersburg. Most probably it was written about the middle of the fourth Century, by *four* scribes, one of whom (Tischendorf's D) revised the work when completed. His corrections are of the highest value, frequently exceeding that of the text itself. In our digest he is cited, as well as in Tischendorf and Tregelles, as ℵ^a. A corrector of Century VII, is ℵ^c, who touched the manuscript very frequently. We cite from Tischendorf's fac-simile edition of 1862. A. The Codex Alexandrinus, Century V, now in the British Museum. Cited from Woide's folio edition of 1786. B. The Codex Vaticanus, Century IV, now in the Vatican Library at Rome. B² a corrector contemporary with the original scribe. B³ a corrector of Century X or XI, who retouched the whole manuscript, where the original writing was fading out, and made many corrections. Cited from the Roman fac-simile edition of 1868. C. The Codex Ephraemi, Century V, now in the Bibliothèque Nationale (sometime Impériale and Royale), at Paris. A most valuable palimpsest, having many sad hiatuses, one of which occurs at verse 8 of our passage. C² a corrector of Century VI; and C³ one of Century IX. Cited from Tischendorf's edition of 1843. D. The Codex Claromontanus, Century VI, now in the same library with Codex C. A highly important Graeco-Latin manuscript, having the Greek and Latin in parallel columns. It is blemished with a vast number of corrections, the work of many hands, only two of which we need notice here: D^b of Century VII, and D^c of Century IX or X. Cited from Tischendorf's edition of 1852. E. The Codex

San-Germanensis, Century IX or X. A Graeco-Latin manuscript copied from D, *after* it had received many of its corrections, and abounding in absurd readings resulting from the attempt to blend text and corrections. Cited from Tischendorf's digest. F. The Codex Augiensis, Century VIII, now in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, England. Despite the inaccuracy of its spelling its readings are ancient and most valuable. (G is almost identical with it in this particular.) Cited from Scrivener's edition of 1859. G. The Codex Boernerianus, Century IX, now in the Royal Library at Dresden. This manuscript and F are copies of the same exemplar, though perhaps not directly, and their united testimony to its readings is of importance. They rarely differ from each other sufficiently to make a new reading. In G the Latin is written *over* the Greek, while in F it is in a column parallel with it. G is cited from Matthaei's edition of 1791. H. Fragmenta Coisliniana, Century VI, now in the same library with C. They do not contain our passage. I. Fragmenta Palimpsesta Tischendorfiana, Centuries V to VII, now at St. Petersburg. They do not contain our passage. K. Codex Mosquensis, Century IX, now in the Library of the Holy Synod, at Moscow. Matthaei's collation does not contain all the information desired by editors of to-day, and so it must be cited as agreeing with the Receptus where he is *silent*. In such cases it is marked Ks. Cited from the digests of Tischendorf and Tregelles. L. The Codex Angelicus Romanus, or Passionei, Century IX, now in the Angelican Library at Rome. Cited from Tischendorf and Tregelles. M. The Codex Uffenbachianus, Century X. Fragments in the British Museum and at Hamburg. They do not contain our passage. P. The Codex Porfirianus, Century VIII or IX. This highly important palimpsest now belongs to Bishop Porfiri, at Moscow. Cited from vol. v. of Tischendorf's *Monumenta Sacra Inedita, nova collectio*, 1865.

Certain cursive manuscripts, having texts of especial excellence, are: 17. The Codex Colbertinus, Century XI. It is in the same Library with Codex C, and is known as "the Queen of the Cursives." (Cited as 33. in the Gospels; and as 13. in the Acts and Catholic Epistles). 37. The Codex Leicestrensis, Century XIV. Now in the Town Library at Leicester, England. (Cited as 69. in the Gospels; and 31. in the Acts and Catholic Epistles). 47. A MS. designated Roe 2, in the Bodleian Library, at Oxford. The readings of these three Cursives are cited from Tregelles's digest, he

having collated them very thoroughly. 2^h. An Apostolus, or Lectionary, in Cabinet K. 1, at the Harvard University Library, Cambridge, Mass. "Perhaps of the XIIth Century. Procured at Constantinople, in 1819, by the Hon. Edward Everett, then Eliot Professor of Greek Literature, through Mr. Cartwright, the British Consul-General." This beautiful ms. has two columns to the page, and averages twenty-three lines to the column, though it sometimes has a line less or one more. It was kindly collated for this Article, by Mr. E. A. Guy. The other cursives which are cited, are described in the prolegomena to Tischendorf's Seventh edition, and in Scrivener's *Plain Introduction*; those collated by the latter gentleman are described at length in the introduction to his edition of the Codex Augiensis.

The ancient Versions are cited as follows: *Vulg.* The Vulgate, as formed by Jerome at the close of the IVth Century, which is generally cited in this Article from the Codex Amiatinus, at Florence, written about A.D. 541, as published by Tischendorf in 1850. The other codices cited are: *Demid.* Demidovianus, XIIth Century; *Fuld.* Fuldensis, VIth Century; *Flor.* Floriacensis; *Harl.* Harleianus; *Lux.* Luxoviensis; *Tolet.* Toletanus, at Toledo, VIIIth Century; *f.* The Latin column of F. These MSS., except *Am.* and *f.*, are cited from the digests of Tischendorf and Tregelles. *Am.* includes *Demid.*, *Fuld.*, *Harl.*, and *Tolet.*, as well as the Clementine edition (*Vulg.-Clem.*) unless they are expressly cited. The *Old Latin* is cited from: *d.* The Latin column of D; *e.* that of E; *g.* the interlinear translation of G; *m.* Readings found in the *Speculum* ascribed to Augustine, and published by Mai, in vol. i. of his *Nova Bibliotheca Patrum*. The figures attached to *m* denote the page of the *Speculum*. The other Versions are: *Pst.* The Peshito Syriac, supposed to have been made in the IIth Century. Its MSS., however, are of much later date, and its text is in a very unsatisfactory condition. *Hcl.* The Hareclean Syriac, made in the Vth Century, and revised, A.D. 616, by Thomas of Harkel. *Memph.* The Memphitic, or Coptic, probably of the IIIth Century. *Theb.* The Thebaic, or Sahidic, an older and ruder version than the Memphitic. *Bash.* The Bashmuric fragments of a third Egyptian version. From the *Rudimenta Linguae Coptae sive Aegyptiacae*, published at Rome, 1778, by the college of the Propaganda, important readings of *Memph.* and *Theb.*, which have appeared in no Greek Testament, are cited under the designation of *Memph.-Rom.*

and *Theb.-Rom. Aeth.* The Aethiopic, perhaps of the IVth Century. *Aeth.-Platt.* Pell Platt's edition, 1826-30. *Aeth.-Rom.* That printed in the Roman Polyglott, 1548-49. *Aeth.-Platt* is by far the more accurate; *Aeth.-Rom.* being little more than a paraphrase in difficult passages. The Aethiopic of Walton's Polyglott is identical with that of the Roman. *Goth.* The Gothic, executed by Ulphilas in the IVth Century. *Arm.* The Armenian of the IVth Century. The Versions are cited from Tregelles's digest, sometimes from Tischendorf's.

In the list of Fathers below, the abbreviation given is that usually employed in the digest, and from which the others will be readily understood. The Fathers are cited as nearly chronologically as is practicable, in the order of the list. The first time, in each verse, that a Father is cited, full reference is made to treatise, book, chapter, section, volume, and page, so that the citation may be readily found in any edition of his works. Afterwards, *in that verse*, a new reference, to a citation already given, is made only by volume and page. However, as the works of Origen and Chrysostom are so frequently cited, and the standard editions are so easily accessible, (Migne's reprints also giving the paging of the originals,) they are referred to only by volume and page. Wherever errors of Tischendorf and Tregelles have been corrected, it is done in no carping spirit (for in the midst of so many minutiae, absolute accuracy is well nigh unattainable), but that the actual facts may be known for future use. In every such case reference is made to the very editions used by those accomplished critics. The dates are generally taken from Darling's *Cyclopaedia Bibliographica*, London, 1854, and are those of the birth and death of each writer, unless something else be stated.

The Greek Fathers are cited as follows: *Clem.-Rom.* Clement of Rome, flourished A.D. 91-101. From vol. i. of Gallandi's *Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum*. Ignatius of Antioch, died A.D. 107 or 116. From the second edition of Cotelier's *Apostolic Fathers*, Amsterdam, 1724. Justin Martyr, fl. A.D. 140-164. From Otto's second edition, Jena, 1849. *Iren.* Irenaeus, fl. 167-200. From Massuet, Venice, 1734. Phileas Martyr, second century. From Routh's *Reliquiae Sacrae*, Oxford 1846, and from Eusebius. *Clem.* Clement of Alexandria, fl. 192-215. From Potter, Oxford, 1715. *Orig.* Origen. 185-254. From the Benedictine edition of De la Rue, Paris, 1733-59. *Archel.* Archelaus, fl. about 278. From

vol. iii. of Gallandi. *Meth.* Methodius of Patara, fl. 290–312. From vol. iii. of Gallandi; and from Jahn, as cited by Tregelles. *Eus.* Eusebius of Caesarea, fl. 313–338. From Viger, Paris, 1628; and in the Psalms, from Montfaucon's *Collectio Nova Patrum*, Paris, 1706. *Eph.-Syr.* Ephraem Syrus, fl. 363–379. From the Benedictine edition, Rome, 1732–1746. *Athanas.* Athanasius of Alexandria, fl. 326–373. From the Benedictine edition, Padua, 1777. Aphraates, “the Persian Sage,” fl. about 337. From vol. v. of Gallandi; and from the Syriac of his Homilies, as published by Prof. Wm. Wright, LL.D., London, 1869. (By an error as old as the time of Jerome, his writings have been credited to Jacob of Nisibis. Dr. Wright has now cleared up the matter, and published the Syriac originals of his Homilies, which are said to be of great importance and value). *Cyril.-Hier.* Cyril of Jerusalem, 315–386. From Touttée, Paris, 1720. *Macar.-Aegypt.* Macarius of Egypt, 301–391. From vol. vii. of Gallandi. *Amphil.* Amphilochius of Iconium, fl. 370–385. From Combefis, Paris, 1644. *Didym.-Alex.* Didymus of Alexandria, fl. 370–394. From Mingarelli, as reprinted in vol. xxxix. of Migne's *Patrologiae Cursus Completus*; and from vol. vii. of Mai's *Nova Patrologia Graeca*. *Nazian.* Gregory of Nazianzus, fl. about 370. From Morel, Paris, 1615. *Nyssen.* Gregory of Nyssa, fl. about 370. From Morel, Paris 1609–11. *Basil.* Basil the Great, 326–379. From Garnier, Paris, 1721, as reprinted by Gaume, Paris, 1839. The original edition has been frequently referred to. The Egyptian Fathers, Antonius Abbas, 356, and Isaias Abbas, 372, are cited from vol. xl. of Migne. *Epiph.* Epiphanius of Constantia, 320–403. From Dionysius Petavius (Petau), Paris, 1622. Marcus Eremita, fl. about 395. From vol. viii. of Gallandi. *Chr.* Chrysostom of Constantinople, 354–407. From the Benedictine edition of Bernard Montfaucon, Paris, 1718–38, as reprinted by Gaume, Paris, 1839. The original edition has been referred to whenever advisable. (Tischendorf's method of citing Basil and Chrysostom is confusing, if not fully understood. He has used Gaume's reprints of both, but cites Basil by the pages of Garnier, which are given in the centre column of the reprint; but in the precisely similar edition of Chrysostom he cites by Gaume's pages, ignoring the original pages of the centre column. Where he has done so in this passage, the pages of the reprint are given in parentheses, after those of the original). *Theodor.-Mops.* Theodore of Mopsuestia, fl. 399–429. From

Cramer's Catenae. Severian of Gabala, fl. 401. From Cramer's Catenae. Philo Carpasius, fl. about 400. From vol. ix. of Gallandi. *Cyrl.* or *Cyrl.-Alex.* Cyril of Alexandria, fl. 412-444. From Aubert, Paris, 1638, as reprinted by Migne, vols. lxxviii.-lxxxvii. Apophthegmata Patrum, about 420. From vol. lxxv. of Migne. *Theodoret.* Theodoret of Cyrus, 393-457. From J. L. Schultze, Halle, 1769-74, as reprinted in Migne, vols. lxxx.-lxxxiv. Proclus of Constantinople, fl. 438. From vol. ix. of Gallandi. Basil of Selucia, fl. 448. From Migne, vol. lxxxv. *Isid.-Pelusiot.* Isidore of Pelusium, d. about 440. From P. Possin, as reprinted by Migne, vol. lxxviii. Nilus Asceta, fl. 440-451. From Migne, vol. lxxxix. Marcus Diadochus, of Photice in Epirus, fl. 400 or 450. From Migne, vol. lxxv. Euthalius, fl. 460. Cited as *Euthal.-cod.* i.e. the ms. of Euthalius, which was written *over* the text of the Codex Porfirianus. Its readings are cited from the Eighth edition of Tischendorf's Greek Testament. Johannes Carpathius, middle of fifth century according to Migne; seventh century according to Darling; eighth century (701) according to Cave. From Migne lxxxv. *Ps.-Dion. Areop.* By this is meant the spurious writings at one time accredited to Dionysius the Areopagite. See McClintock and Strong's *Cyclopaedia of Biblical Literature*, vol. ii., for a good account of these writings, which were probably written about 500. From B. Cordier, as reprinted by Migne, vols. iii., iv. Andreas of Caesarea, of the last half of the *fifth* century, according to Delitzsch and other good authorities. From Sylburg, Heidelberg, 1596, as reprinted by Migne, vol. cvi. Procopius of Gaza, fl. 520. From Migne, vol. lxxxvii. Cosmas Indicopleustes, fl. about 535. From Montfaucon's *Collectio Nova*, vol. ii. *Hesych.-Hier.* Hesychius of Jerusalem, fl. 601. From Migne, vol. xciii. Joannes Maxentius, fl. 520. From Migne, vol. lxxxvi. Leontius Byzantinus, fl. 590 or 610. From Migne, vol. lxxxvi. Barsanuphius Gazaesus, fl. 548. From Gallandi, vol. xi. *Eus.-Alex.* Eusebius of Alexandria, fl. 259 according to Cave; 400 according to Darling; 600-610 according to Migne, from whose vol. lxxxvi. he is cited. *Thalas.-Abbas.* Thalassius Abbas, fl. 640. From Migne, vol. xci. *Max.-Confess.* Maximus Confessor, 580-662. From Combefis, Paris, 1675, as reprinted by Migne, vols. xc., xci. *Damascen.* John of Damascus, 676-760. From Le Quien, Paris, 1712. *Theod.-Studit.* Theodore of Studium, fl. 813-826. From vol. v. Jacob Sirmond's works, Venice, 1728. Photius of Constantinople, fl.

858-886. From Migne, vols. ci.-civ. *Oecumen.* Oecumenius of Trica, fl. latter part of the tenth century. From the Paris edition of 1631. *Theophyl.* Theophylact of Bulgaria, fl. 1077. From De'Rossi and Finetti, Venice, 1754-63. During the years 1838 to 1844, J. A. Cramer, of Oxford, England, published a series of Catenae upon the whole Greek Testament. They are cited by volume and page; e.g. Severian Cat. Cor. 243, Orig. Cat. in 1 Joan. 115, etc.

The Latin Fathers cited are as follows: *Tertul.* Tertullian of Carthage, fl. 192-200. From Semler, as cited by Roensch, Leipsic, 1871. *Cyprian* of Carthage, 200-258. From Baluze, Paris, 1726. *Auctor Libri de Rebaptismate*, about 254. From vol. iii. of Gallandi. Found also bound up with Cyprian. *Hil.* Hilary of Poitiers, fl. 350-368. From the Benedictine edition, Paris, 1693. *Zeno* of Verona, fl. 360-380. From vol. v. of Gallandi. *Optatus* of Milevia in Numidia. Wrote his treatise on the Schism of the Donatists about 370. From vol. v. of Gallandi. *Ambros.* Ambrose of Milan, 340-397. From the Benedictine edition, Paris, 1686-90. *Ambrosiast.* Ambrosiaster, or Hilary the Deacon, fl. 354. Bound up with the second volume of the works of Ambrose, but separately paged. *Hier.* Hieronymus, or Jerome, of Stridon, 331-422. From Domenico Vallarsi, Venice, 1766-1772. *Aug.* Augustine the Great, 354-430. From the Benedictine edition, Venice, 1729-1739. *Gaudentius* of Brescia, d. 410 or 427. From vol. v. of Despont's *Bibliotheca Maxima Patrum*, Lyons, 1577. *Epistola ad Demetriadem Virginem*. Cited from the copy bound and paged with the works of Prosper of Aquitaine. Written about 440. *Prosper* of Aquitaine, 403-463. From the edition printed at Bassano, 1782. *Julian* of Pomeria, fl. 494-98. Bound with works of Prosper, but separately paged.

The critical Greek Testaments referred to are the following: *Tisch.* The Eighth edition of Tischendorf, Leipsic, 1871. *Ti.* His Seventh edition, 1859. *Tif.* His Second, 1849. *Ti.* and *Tif.* concur with *Tisch.* except when the contrary is stated. *Tr.* Tregelles's 1869. *Alf.* Alford's Sixth edition 1871. *Alf*². His Second edition, 1855. Cited to show how his valuation of MSS. evidence changed with the advancement of his studies. *Ln.* Lachmann's *editio major*, 1842. *Wd.* Wordsworth's Sixth edition, 1868. *Eras*¹. Erasmus's First edition, 1516. *Eras*². His Second, 1519. *Eras*³. His Third, 1522. *Eras.* includes the three, except the contrary be

stated. 5. Stephens's edition of 1550. (The so-called Textus Receptus of America and England.) 5°. The Elzevir edition of 1624. (The Textus Receptus of the Continent.) 5°. The Complutensian, dated 1514, but not issued till 1522. Mill is sometimes cited as 5^m. The sign 5 includes these four editions except the contrary be stated. The following abbreviations require explanation: An asterisk, (*), after the notation of a codex signifies that the *original reading*, thus noted, has suffered correction by a later hand. Throughout this Article, the abbreviation MSS. refers to uncial manuscripts, and mss. to those written in cursive letters. *Int.* with the name of Father refers to the Latin *interpretation* of his works where the Greek is not extant. *Ps.* or *Pseud.* denotes the *spurious* writings attributed to the Father to whose name it is attached. Migne's reprints are noted by *M.*, and the page in parentheses. In the *text* an asterisk (*) refers to the digest, where a reading of *equal value* with that adopted will be found. A reading slightly inferior, but strongly supported, is noted by a dagger (†) in the digest, but not in the text. Readings adopted which differ from those in the Textus Receptus, are *spaced*; e.g. μείζονα.

1 CORINTHIANS XII. 27 — XIII. 13.

- 27 Ὑμεῖς δὲ ἐστε σῶμα χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρουσ.
 28 Καὶ οὐς μὲν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, πρῶτον ἀπο-
 στόλους, δεύτερον προφήτας, τρίτον διδασκάλους, ἔπειτα
 29 δυνάμεις, ἔπειτα χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, ἀντιλήμψεις,
 30 κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν. μὴ πάντες ἀπόστολοι; μὴ
 πάντες προφῆται; μὴ πάντες διδάσκαλοι; μὴ πάντες
 31 δυνάμεις; μὴ πάντες χαρίσματα ἔχουσιν ἰαμάτων; μὴ
 πάντες γλώσσαις λαλοῦσιν; μὴ πάντες διερμηνεύουσιν;
 31 Ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα· καὶ ἔτι καθ'
 1 ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι. ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀν-
 θρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα
 2 χαλκὸς ἡχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον. καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω προφη-
 τεῖαν καὶ εἰδῶ τὰ μυστήρια πάντα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γνώσιν,
 *καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω πᾶσαν τὴν πίστιν, ὥστε ὅρη μεθιστάναί.
 3 ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐθέν εἰμι. *καὶ ἐὰν ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ
 ὑπάρχοντά μου, *καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα *καυχή-
 4 σωμαι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, *οὐθὲν ὠφελοῦμαι. ἡ ἀγάπη
 μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται· ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ ζηλοῖ· ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ

- 5 περπερεύεται, οὐ φυσιοῦται,¹ οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ
 6 ἑαυτῆς, οὐ παροξύνεται, οὐ λογιζεται τὸ κακόν,¹ οὐ χαίρει
 7 ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· πάντα στέγει,
 πάντα πιστεύει, πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει.
 8 Ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτει· εἴτε δὲ προφητεῖαι, κα-
 ταργηθήσονται· εἴτε γλῶσσαι, παύσονται· εἴτε *γνώσεις,
 9 καταργηθήσονται. ἐκ μέρους γὰρ γνωσκομεν καὶ ἐκ
 10 μέρους προφητεύομεν· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον τὸ ἐκ μέ-
 11 ρους καταργηθήσεται. ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς
 νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλογιζόμην ὡς
 νήπιος· ὅτε γέγονα ἀνὴρ κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου.
 12 βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρό-
 σωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ
 13 ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις
 ἐλπίς ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα· μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη·
 διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην.

A LITERAL TRANSLATION.

- 27 Now are ye the body of Christ, and members individually.
 28 And God placed some in the church, first apostles, secondly
 prophets, thirdly teachers, then powers, then gifts of healing,
 29 assistants, governings, diversities of tongues. Are all apostles?
 Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Are all *possessors of*
 30 powers? Have all gifts of healing? Do all speak with tongues?
 Do all interpret?
 31 But earnestly desire the greater gifts; and moreover I am
 1 showing you a supereminently excellent way *to them*. If I speak
 with the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love,
 2 I have become *as* sounding brass or a clanging cymbal. And
 even though I have the gift of prophecy, and comprehend all
 the mysteries and all knowledge, and even though I have all
 faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing.
 3 And even though I dole out all my goods *to feed the poor*, and
 even though I deliver over my body that I may glory, but have
 4 not love, I am in no wise advantaged. Love suffereth long, is
 kind; Love envieth not; Love vaunteth not herself, is not self-
 5 inflated, doth not behave herself unbecomingly, seeketh not her
 6 own, is not easily provoked, reckoneth not the evil, rejoiceth not

7 at iniquity, but rejoiceth together with the Truth ; beareth all things, trusteth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.
 8 Love never faileth ; but whether there be gifts of prophecy, they will be brought to naught ; whether there be tongues, they will be silenced ; whether there be knowledges, they will be brought
 9 to naught. For we know in part, and we prophesy in part ;
 10 but when the perfect is come that which is in part will be brought
 11 to naught. While I was a child I spake as a child, I thought as a child, I reasoned as a child ; since I have become a man I
 12 have laid aside the things of the child. For now we are seeing in a mirror obscurely, but then face to face ; now I know in part, but then will I fully know even as *here* I was fully known.
 13 And now there is abiding Faith, Hope, Love, these three, but the greater of these is Love : pursue after Love.

NOTES.

Verse 27. ἐκ μέρους may here mean "in part" (as in verses 9, 10 of Chapter xiii.), referring to the Corinthian church. So Bengel, *Gnomon*, ed. Edinburg, 1859, vol. iii. p. 299.

Ver. 28. δυνάμεισ "powers," (Latin, *virtutes*), i.e. possessors of powers to perform "mighty works." See Trench, *Synonyms*, seventh edition, London, 1871, pp. 320–325. For usage of the word compare Acts x. 38 ; 1 Cor. ii. 4 ; 2 Thess. ii. 9 ; and as referring to the "mighty works" wrought, Matt. vii. 22 ; Mark vi. 2, 5 ; Luke x. 13 ; Acts ii. 22 ; viii. 13 ; xix. 11 ; 1 Cor. xii. 10 ; 2 Cor. xii. 12 ; Gal. iii. 5 ; Heb. ii. 4, and elsewhere repeatedly throughout, the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. ἀντιλήμψεισ "assistants," the deacons and deaconesses of the early church.

Ver. 1. ἀγάπη. It need hardly be said that the rendering "charity" is, in the words of Hodge, "peculiarly unhappy." Compare his admirable note upon this word, *Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, N. Y., 1857, p. 265. ἤχων would be better "resounding," but the "sounding brass" of the Authorized Version, is now proverbial. ἀλαλάζον is *not* "tinkling" but, as a cymbal is struck with a sharp clang, the onomatopoeia "clanging" alone appears to represent the original.

Ver. 3. ψομίζω signifies to break into morsels and distribute. "Dole out" seems to represent the action pretty nearly. Some phrase must be supplied to complete the sense, as above. The Latin supplies, *in cibos pauperum*. After "body" must be supplied "to

death," or something similar. Is not this a strong point in favor of *καυχῆσθαι*? Copyists seeing that with this word the sense was incomplete, would readily light upon *καυθήσθαι*, which would at once remove the difficulty, and at the same time make a smooth reading. *καυχῆσθαι* is supported by *AB. 17.*, and the *two Egyptian versions*, *Memph.* and *Theb.-Rom.* (sic) made in the third century. See digest for a full statement of the evidence. The change, whichever way made, was a very early one.

Ver. 5. οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, perhaps "doth not thrust herself forward," i.e. *scheme*, which has its root in the four letters *σχημ.* οὐ ζητεῖ τὸ μὴ ἑαυτῇσ. If this very probable reading be preferred, render: "seeketh not that which is not her own." λογίζεται, "reckoneth not the evil," i.e. doth not remember evils suffered, in order to avenge them.

Ver. 6. "Truth" must be personified, or the force of the preposition in *συγχαίρει* is lost. So Meyer and Alford.

Ver. 8. γνώσεισ. The word "knowledges" was formerly in good usage, and, as Sir Wm. Hamilton says, "ought not to be discarded." It renders exactly the *γνώσις* of the text, and the *scientiæ* of Tertullian.

Ver. 9. τὸ τέλειον, "the perfect," or, if preferred, as *A.V.*, "that which is perfect."

Ver. 11. ὅτε γέγονα ἀνὴρ. It should be remembered that the "since" by which ὅτε is rendered, is temporal and not causal. It is unfortunate that our word "since" can translate such entirely different conjunctions as ὅτε and ὅτι. We must mentally distinguish its use, even if it be not apparent to the ear.

Ver. 12. δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι. The metallic mirrors of the ancients gave very obscure images, quite unlike those of our own glasses.

Ver. 13. μείζων, "greater" not "greatest." De Wette beautifully remarks, "The greater, because it contains in itself the root of the other two: we believe only one whom we love, we hope only that which we love." "Pursue after Love." See digest for reason for joining these words to this passage.

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE VII.

UNCONSCIOUS GREEK PROPHECY.

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To the anthropological argument for the divinity of Christ Dr. Baumstark's labors in the present work¹ have been profitably devoted. It starts with viewing man as a spiritual being, and from this assumption proceeds to a series of pregnant inquiries: Can the spirit be viewed as a mere accident of matter? Does not the soul act as efficiently on the body as does the body on the soul? Must not materialism as an exclusive theory, therefore, be rejected, and must we not hold to the separate and continuous existence of the soul as a spiritual entity, distinguished by high prerogatives of intuition and reason from not merely matter, but from brute life?

So, also, as to the *individuality* of the soul as opposed to pantheism. By pantheism, as held by Spinoza, the individual has a phenomenal, and not a real existence. But can pantheism elucidate the problem of life, or resolve its difficulties, or direct its course? Must it not, as is shown by Dr. Baumstark, fail not only as a revealer of truth, but as a comforter in trouble and a vivifier of life?

But it is to man as a religious being that Dr. Baumstark mainly directs his argument. Man, he holds, has no intuitive divine consciousness — has no innate capacity that enables him, without the aid of revelation, to discover the divine nature. But, while such is the case, man has a need of religion, and to find out religion his various psychical powers are and have been constantly engaged. In other

¹ Christliche Apologetik auf anthropologischer Grundlage; von Chr. C. Baumstark. 1 Band. Frankfurt, a. M.: Heyder und Zimmer. 1872.

words, some true religion there must be. Which religion is true?

As facilitating this inquiry, Dr. Baumstark takes an elaborate survey of the various non-Christian religions, showing that by none of them are the religious needs of the soul satisfied. He begins with the lowest and less cultivated types, treating prominently among these the religions of the Africans, and of the North American and Australian aborigines. From this he ascends to consider the religions of nations of higher culture, noting successively the Peruvians, Mexicans, Chinese, Hindoos, Persians, Babylonians, Syrians, Canaanites, Phoenicians, Egyptians, Gauls, and Germans. The last stage in this ascent comprehends the religious system of the Greeks and Romans. Mohammedanism he touches under a subsequent and independent head. The argument founded on this material is not new. It is simply this: The religion which we need is either A, or B, or C, or D. But it is not A, nor B, nor C. It is therefore D. But, while the argument in this its formal statement has been anticipated by others, nowhere have the proofs been brought out so fully and felicitously as in the pages of Dr. Baumstark. Rarely, indeed, has there been a more valuable contribution to that branch of Christian literature which is at once apologetic and elucidative, — which at once exhibits the defences of Christianity and unfolds its character.

But to follow Dr. Baumstark in the full course of his argument is not what I here propose. I prefer to take up a single point made by him, and to amplify it in directions towards some of which his scrutiny does not extend. My object in the following remarks is, first, to show — following, in this respect, Dr. Baumstark — that Greek culture, while stimulating, does not satisfy the religious need. And, secondly, I would advance a step further, and indicate some points in which this culture may be viewed as one of God's chosen agencies for preparing the nations, in the fulness of time for Him that is to come.

The office of Greece, in the preparation for the fulness of

time, was that of the discipline of the mind. There is a difference between this office and that of Rome, which we cannot too closely study. Rome trained communities ; Greece, individuals. Rome governed by subjecting the masses to her laws ; Greece, by the culture of those of whom the masses were composed. Roman civilization moved forward in column ; breaking roads, but not changing opinions ; establishing colonies, but not tutoring the colonist ; retaining in its remotest marches its proud national type, and disdaining the communication of that type to others. The Greek, however, was sociable, flexible, and curious. He went everywhere, as a merchant or as a traveller ; adapting his attire and usages to those whom he visited, and thus all the more completely subjecting them to his culture. If Rome acted as country upon country, the influence of Greece was that of individual upon individual. Rome was like a powerful water-flood, such as those which geology records, which swept through the land, altering land-marks, levelling hills, filling up valleys, and opening in mountains and plains new passes or channels through which the future currents of civilization were to run. But Rome, when this work of re-organization was over, disappeared, like the same torrent, leaving behind no signs except those of territorial change. Far otherwise was it with Greece. Her influence dropped like rain wherever her scholars or her traders went. She was unorganized herself, nor did she attempt the organization of others. Subtile, pervasive, quiet, she appeared to lose herself in others, when, in fact, she was assimilating others to herself. She fertilized and harmonized, until there was not a form of mental life which she did not stimulate, regulate, and vivify. So it was that while Rome dealt with *corporate*, Greece acted on *individual* life ; and that while by Rome the nations of the north were arranged as in a vast audience-chamber to hear the divine word, the individuals were so trained by Greece as better to understand what the word meant.

Let us look, for a moment, at some of the qualities which

adapted the Greek to this work of mental training. In the first place, notice the national flexibility and quickness. What the Jew now is in trade of goods, the pre-Christian Greek was in the trade of thought. Mental speculation was his business, his delight, his instinct. He had no national or personal pride which prevented him from adopting the guise of any nation whom he might visit, conversing with gossipy ease, always glad to hear and glad to communicate. Those whom the stately Roman would stalk by in supercilious gloom, the affable Greek would sit down with in sociable, if not kindly talk. And, unlike the Roman, who never moved except in armies, the Greek was an active, often solitary traveller. Wherever he went, he seemed to feel it his duty to spread the entertainments and impart the arts of his home. In lower Italy, long before Rome became imperial, along the shores of the Mediterranean and of the Black Sea, even among the Scythian tribes, the Greek adventurers carried their literature, their arts, their mythology, and their theatre. And then, when Rome sent forth her conquering legions, Greece, as the iron share of the conqueror furrowed the ground, had her scholars and artists hovering over the soil to drop in it the seeds of thought. And, observe, to take up the second point,—that of cultivation,—this was not a mere superficial and vapid restlessness. The Greek hurried about Europe, telling and hearing news, it is true; but we must recollect that his mission was a great one; for the thought he communicated, next to that of revelation, was the highest that the mind of man could receive. It embodied the results at which, after centuries of labor, the quickest and most cultivated intellects of the world had arrived. His nation had reached the highest perfection in the exercise of the imagination, of the artistic powers, and of the reason; and he was freighted with the treasures which these labors had produced. And as it was the unconscious mission of the Roman to open paths over which Christianity was to pass, so it was the equally unconscious mission of the Greek to discipline the minds who

about these roads were to be collected. And, in God's good providence, the work to be done by each of these agents was not for self alone. The mental training of Greece, as well as the material training of Rome, was so carried on as to leave the *mind* of the barbarian, as the Roman left his *country*, open without prejudice to receive the doctrines of the truth that was to come.

As we contrast Greek with Roman literature, the more strikingly will this peculiarity appear. Rome, so catholic in the mechanism which she was to perpetuate, was singularly local and self-introverted in her literature; Greece, who was so narrow and provincial in her mechanism, was in her literature catholic and free. Rome wrote and taught for Romans who were to be kept Romans; Greece, for all men, who were to remain in that same common brotherhood of humanity in which she found them. It will serve to illustrate the individual completeness of the preparation in which these two great nations took part, to look for a moment at their respective literatures, and see how deeply this distinction penetrates. Let us consider, first, the imagination; beginning by showing the distinction between the poetry of Rome and that of Greece.

In Rome the greatest epic poet takes the primacy of his country as his theme, and seeks to account for it by a divine appointment, which, however inoffensive it may appear to us now that Rome has passed away, must have been exquisitely galling and repulsive to those into whose very quick the iron foot of the legions was pressing. So the satirist, if he be grave, as Juvenal or Persius, uses a weapon so deeply encrusted with Roman allusions, that often we are unable to see the blade; or if he be gay, like Horace, only reflects the times, without seeking to explain them to foreign or future worlds. What we have here is not the genius which creates an epoch, but the talent which an epoch draws out. And so it is with the historian. In the stern and concise narrative of Tacitus, it is the measured tread of empire that we hear; in the more diffusive and colloquial pages of Livy, the gossip

of the court; but in either case it is but the autobiography of Rome. So even pre-Christian Roman philosophy, in its prevalent form, was one of a hard and implacable fatalism; Rome being the determining fate, and the rest of the world the slave. With but rare exceptions, the philosophers, like the historians and poets of Rome, so far from desiring to conciliate or convert the barbarian, greeted him on every page with the expression of indelible scorn and implacable caste.

Far otherwise was it the case with Greece. Providence, which committed to her the mental disciplining of the pre-Christian mind, had endowed her with every grace and charm which might make this discipline attractive and successful. Let us go on viewing this in connection with the *imagination*, a faculty, we must remember, essential to the true conception of the beauty of things divine. Let us take, as an instance of the catholicity of the Greek culture of the imagination, the first great epic of Homer. The theme in itself, it is true, is narrow. It is the petty siege of a petty town. Yet this theme is treated in a way which touched the sympathies and incited the heroism and appealed to the humanities of him who dwelt on the amber coasts of the Baltic, or who in Sarmatian forests hunted his prey. Thus, e.g. that *commonness of the grave*, into which fall, not merely the poor and friendless, but

“The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain;
Whose limbs unburied on the naked shore,
Devouring dogs and hungry vultures tore;”

is painted in connection with an universality of brotherhood which brings all men together in one current from birth to death. And observe to the same effect the following:

“Like leaves on trees, the race of man is found;
Now green in youth, now withering on the ground;
Another race the following spring supplies;
They fall successive, and successive rise:
So generations in their course decay;
So flourish these, when those have passed away.”

Nor can we be unmindful of those frequent though vague allusions to the traditions of patriarchal revelations which

the ruder nations retained with, at least, equal tenacity with the more refined. Thus Achilles, while defying all human sanctions, bows with solemn dread before those piacular sacrifices the priesthood offered, and by which alone guilt could be removed;

“ Perhaps with added sacrifice and prayer
The priest may pardon and the god may spare.”

So there is a common god omnipotent over all :

“ Supreme of gods, unbounded and alone
Who in the heaven of heavens has fixed his throne.”

And then again we are arrested by constant allusions to that sad common nature of sin under whose bondage groaned barbarian as well as Greek.

To these consciousnesses, which, when touched, awakened a thrill in the rudest slave as well as in the most polished scholar, is added that wondrous catholicity of expression which has opened the fountains of hearts of all climates and years. It would seem as if the sunlight of Homer's genius, making everything glitter that it touched, — that sunlight that gave, as common objects of beauty to all men, the laughing sea, the all-enshrining storm, the glittering but silent armies of the heavens, the breezy azure where dwell the blest,—which gave these objects of beauty in flashes so swift and sudden as to arrest the most thoughtless, and so brilliant as to fascinate the most dull, should have been the chief agency in drawing the barbarian mind to that severer discipline which was to adapt it to the reception of the coming truth. For wherever went Roman conquest, in its march indurating and repelling the hearts among which it trod, thither went the verses of the oldest of Greek poets awakening the brutalized mind to the consciousness of a higher nature, of a common inheritance of beauty, of new and generous and heroic impulses, and of a common discipline of preparation for the word to come. Still more peculiarly was this distinctiveness of mission observable in the Greek tragedians. The Roman stage must have withered up every generous feeling both of the conqueror and the conquered. The serried ranks of the

spectators, as they beetled over the terraces of the amphitheatre gloating on the scene of blood beneath; the murmurs which burst from the lips of the noble as well as of the slave, as the gladiator seemed to strike sparingly on his prostrate foe; the scream of delight that eddied up and quivered over the arena as the spear entered the vitals, and the blood of the heart bubbled out, and the eye of the victim began to glaze and his frame to totter, — these things, if they brutalized and degraded the Roman, must have planted in the barbarian a bitter hate and horror of the civilization which made such scenes its recreation and its symbol. Yet wherever Rome went she carried the amphitheatre as her representative.

Widely different was the case with that complex, flexible, and gifted people whose mission it was, not to teach military drill, but to impart intellectual culture. The Greek drama, whose less pretending screens and awnings were unfurled wherever Roman conquest built in the walled city the amphitheatre, addressed the purest and most generous sympathies of which the unregenerate nature is capable. It scrupulously rejected all representations of blood or lust. It unfolded on its simple stage, — a stage, not like that of our modern theatre, but a mere elevated platform where living dialogues were uttered, — many scenes which must have evoked the finest sympathies of men the rudest or the most hostile. On that stage presided not the artificial and insolent conventionalism of an arrogant conqueror, or of a supercilious metropolis, but those high and pure impulses and passions which, like the mountain winds, circulating as they do around our free humanity, reveal its nobler aims and stimulate its sublimer energies. How grandly, for instance, must have sounded in the barbarian ear, those deep and awful notes of Aeschylus, in which, in his Prometheus, he declares that neither torture nor contumely nor imprisonment, — nothing but the abandonment by the proud heart of *itself*, — can destroy man's true freedom. How must barbarian hearts have swelled as they saw how Prometheus, so strange a pre-

monition of what they might be, if they took courage, was able, though lashed to the rock, and though torn by vultures, to lift his brow in invincible defiance against the tyrant; and how to that tyrant the tortured prisoner was able to predict a retribution certain and complete. Must not the rude but heroic Gaul or Goth have exulted when he heard from the hoarse voice of Aeschylus how the noble and brave, rough though he might be, must ultimately overcome?

Nor, when the author is changed, and the audience is taken from the austere and rugged, but sublime, creations of Aeschylus to those more polished scenes where Sophocles brings out the tenderer influences of humanity, was the effect less perceptible. Let us go, for instance, as invited by a late able thinker, to Lyons or to York or to Coblenz, to any one of the old Roman fortified cities. There, where the sullen Roman, on his own particular mission, builds and breaks, the supple and sociable Greek introduces his language, his literature, and his theatre. If it be Sophocles that is represented, we may collect before our eyes, on that rough stage, surrounded by barbarian as well as by Greek, the scenery of *Electra*, where female character is draped in a refinement and dignity unknown to imperial Rome, in its then union of arrogance and lasciviousness; or we witness *Antigone*, showing, in eloquence chastened and smooth, how easy it is to sink from luxury to corruption, from frivolousness to folly, from insolent confidence to wretched despair. Or, it may be that the scene changes, and we hear recited the impressive periods of Euripides, greatly inferior, it is true, to those of his great predecessors in energy and boldness of imagination, but superior to them in philosophic culture. It would seem, indeed, as if Euripides thus closed the canon of the great Greek tragedians for the purpose of bringing the maxims of Socrates and of his pupils the more vividly before an audience to whom this dramatic dress was essential to the willing reception of philosophic truth. For, inferior as was Euripides in sublimity and boldness to his predecessors, inferior as he was in breadth and purity to Socrates, of whose teaching

he had the benefit, yet, as a poet of society, possessed of singular grace and flexibility, he reflected that philosophic culture of which Athens was then the seat. And what thinker was there in those motley audiences, barbarian though he might be, who would not have been roused to a higher life by the representation, though in a dramatic shape, of the grand truths of the old philosophy. He might not be compelled to leap forth for the defence of the right, as he would have been under the electric sparks of Aeschylus, nor to yearn for a purer life, as under the tenderer eloquence of Sophocles, but under Euripides he would be at least made to *think*, and this, not merely in the conventionalisms of a province, but in the terms which awaken a response in all mankind.

I have taken the works of the three great tragic poets of Athens as illustrations of the way in which Greece performed her mission of training the intellect of man for the fulness of time; and I have endeavored to show how, in this case, this was done by a branch of literature which of all others was the most calculated at once to attract the attention and refine and exalt the imaginative powers. Let us now turn to see how other faculties were in like manner trained and invigorated. Let us notice, in illustration of this topic, *psychology*. Look, for instance, at that extraordinary period when culminated Socrates and his disciples. The topic is one which, in some of its relations, will be glanced at presently, under another head. Two features only, as belonging to this branch of philosophy, we can now pause to notice: First, its appeal not to provincial, but to universal, feeling, and secondly, its severance from all such theological definiteness as would change it from a mental discipline to a religious faith, and thus make it a hinderance, instead of a forerunner of the truth to come.

Peculiarly is this worthy of notice in the Greek recognition of the *Psyche*, or soul, as a distinct and dominant factor in our common nature. Roman psychology knew but two factors—the intellect and the heart. Hence came the

truncated and blighted view of life that Roman psychology exhibited. If it was the heart that viewed and spoke, then life was a tragedy; we could not but sympathize with others' griefs and horrors, we could not emerge from our own; there was no future of reunion, restoration, and hope. If it was intellect that viewed and spoke, then life was a comedy; we may be amused, for we need not feel. But the Greek *Psyche*, calling to her side both Intellect and Heart, taught that life was represented by neither tragedy nor comedy, but rather by the grand old chorus, where tragedy indeed spoke in the dithyramb and comedy in the phallic, but which, incomplete in itself, was simply the premonition and incitement to a real life to come. Such, indeed, is the spectacle witnessed by the soul as it gazes on the stage of human life. The Roman, untaught by the soul, says: "This is all either comedy or tragedy, as I may view it with the mind or the heart." But the Greek says: "This is a choral prophecy of a future of retribution, of atonement, of immortal happiness or immortal woe."

But of all the branches of mental science, *logic* was that which was the most important as a guide to lead from the false to the true. Here, indeed, pre-Christian philosophy achieved its chief work. Logic is the only science that we know of which since Christianity has received no important additions. Logic was the science on which the reception of Christianity by the cultivated and intelligent most depended.

Before Aristotle the human mind was in the same condition as was the mariner before the invention of the compass. The sea of speculation was then as capable of being marked out into longitudes and latitudes as now; but there was no power by which this measurement could be applied. The mind that ventured out on the deep could have no certainty whether the course it followed was right or wrong. It might pursue the voyage of discovery on a plan which if carried out might be successful; but it had no confidence, for it had no *test* of truth. Hence, also, came the impostures of the old superstitions. An ingenious speculatist would introduce

a new scheme, which he declared would produce the universal good. Those whose hearts told them that this good was somewhere to be obtained would gather round the adventurer, listening eagerly to his report. It was on the narrow shore of immediate experience they would stand, and, like the sea-faring men of their own day, would attend, with half belief, half uncertainty, to the wild narratives of fabulous coasts which the pretended traveller would give them as they stood by their rude boats. They had no means of testing the truth of what he had said. They could not say: "Let us strike out into the deep, and see whether these wonderful lands of which you speak really exist." They could not say: "Here are charts compiled by the experience of others; let us see whether the coasts you describe are here marked out." They were equally unable to sustain a truth or to detect a fallacy; and hence the appeal from the gospel miracles, if it had fallen on them then, might have fallen on them, humanly speaking, as a mere shadow. If they had seen the miracles, it might have been one thing; but if they had merely heard of them, they would have placed them with the myriads of other wonders to discriminate between which the human mind possessed no test, and which must either be received as a mass, or rejected as a mass.

But logic supplied this want. It gave a process, as the magnet gave a needle, by which a true course could be verified and a false course detected. Take, for instance, as an illustration of this, this very subject of *miracles*. Logic established two forms of syllogisms — the *inductive* and the *deductive* — the first, reasoning up from a given number of facts to a principle; the second, reasoning down from the principle to all the individuals of the class to which the principle applies.

Before Aristotle there had been no attempt to establish the uniformity of nature. The mind was as credulous of the supernatural as of the natural. It was as likely to believe that next year the sun would move backward as that

it would move forward, or that across the sea there were monsters instead of men, or fish that were gods, or gods, fish. But Aristotle first laid firmly down the great truth that there were certain fundamental principles from which all minor results were to be drawn, and that one of those principles was the uniformity of nature. He inaugurated the scepticism of the unreasonable, which is so essential to a belief of the reasonable. Whatever was inconsistent with these principles must be rejected; for, to speak of it technically, it would be a conclusion drawn from a term which was either ambiguous or undistributed. And all the hosts of false religions began to hurry off when the test was applied. They had all of them been believed, because what was supernatural, instead of being presumed to be false, was presumed to be true. And here were opened those methods by which Christianity could alone have been proved to the cultivated mind—those methods of severe, exhaustive criticism which exposed the gospel narrative to an examination more searching than was ever bestowed, before or since, on any other history, and which hence has given to that a degree of certainty to which no other history can lay claim.

Such, then, was the direct office of Greek culture—that not merely of sublimating the imaginative powers so that they could conceive the loveliness and majesty of Christianity, but of so disciplining the reason that the mists before existing could be dispelled, and the truth made sure. And it brings before us very clearly the accurate sweep of God's providence in this respect, that, when the fulness of time drew near, men whose unaided vision had before so much failed them were supplied with an instrument by which the clouds could be pierced, and the coming word perceived. When the mariner was about to launch forth into the deep to seek this before unknown land of bliss,—when that land was about to be revealed,—there was placed in his hand the compass by which the truth could be approached, and error detected. And it brings this providence the more strikingly before us, that this science is the only one, which we know

of, that in one generation was introduced, was perfected, was universally disseminated. Aristotle conceived it and completed it; and in the shape in which he left it, the new grammar of thought, with its arbitrary but catholic symbols for the verifying of the truth and the detection of the fallacy, spread over the Levant to Egypt and Arabia, over the Adriatic to Lower Italy, and over the Euxine to Persia. Wherever Roman arms went, there went the Greek school, affording as well an exorcism by which local as well as metropolitan superstitions were expelled, as a test by which the approaching gospel was to be established. It was the work of mental discipline to which Greece was elected, as was Rome to that of material preparation. And in this discrimination of office we may see the same wise purpose by which the particular mission of each had been directed.

Had Rome added the fascination of Greek culture to the vigor of her own arms, she might have perpetuated her government; had Greece added Roman administrative power to her own culture, she might have perpetuated her own philosophy. But it pleased God that their work should be severed, and that both should only *prepare*, — neither, *establish*. Rome was the builder of the roads, and hers the bugle-note which called the nations together; Greece gave the language and the discipline by which they could know the word to come. Then, when the work of building and summoning and training was over, and He that was to come approached, the forerunners and summoners disappeared, and Greece and Rome sank into the church.

But to Greece was not assigned the work of mental training alone. If her psychology taught how to seek the truth, her ethical philosophy produced a yearning which the truth alone could satisfy. Let us now turn to see how this work was performed. The philosophy of Plato was not a *system*, but a *summons*. It was as if men should have been convened on some great plain, to listen, as in the ancient tournaments, to a proclamation claiming to be supreme. A mysterious knight appears, of gigantic though shadowy pro-

portions, having about him something greater than man, and calling to deeds of heroism which human selfishness, in its unaided strength, finds beyond its reach. Such was Platonic philosophy; and yet, if its vague but sublime form shows forth the supernatural in its shadowiness and loftiness of aspiration, it is almost less than human in its feebleness of arm. It stirs the soul, but it strengthens not. It is the awakening cry to a slumbering world, but it gives not life nor action; and soon the crowds whom it addresses fall back as if from an uneasy dream. It is a collection of sublime aspirations, but not of life-giving principles. And even those aspirations are so mingled with weakness and follies that, like the alarm-clock that is followed by other and more familiar sounds, they are dreamed into the dream of the sleeper, and thus make his torpor only the more profound.

Yet, if the Platonic philosophy did little to awaken the *practical* side of ethics, it achieved wonders in stimulating the *speculative*. The deep and mystical utterances of the great philosopher called up school after school which sought to satisfy the craving he had aroused. That vague longing for truth which Plato had rather excited than created, could only be met, it is true, by Him who was the way, the truth, and the life; but, as if to show that nowhere else but in him was the truth to be found, hypotheses after hypotheses of speculative ethics were advanced by minds the most acute, the most accomplished, the most profound. Gradually these hypotheses narrowed themselves to two—the Stoic and the Epicurean. If these failed, it would be clear that there was no human system of ethics which would succeed. *How* they failed, and in what way the soul, thus heart-sick, and yet agitated by these sublime aspirations, was led to truth, we will now consider.

First, let us observe the *Stoic* philosophy; and let us successively notice the contrast between it and the Epicurean, and the way in which by the divine power of Christianity the truths of these two philosophies, repugnant as such truths were before considered, were united in a harmony

which is in Christ alone. Let us notice, severally, the relations, first of the Stoic, and then of the Epicurean schools, to the questions of God's government of the world, and man's government of himself. First, in reference to divine power. God, according to the Stoic, is the energy, the life, and the order of the universe. He is a semi-corporeal, nervous essence that absorbs the whole world in his embrace. As Aristotle, on the one hand, separated the divine essence from the world as the pure eternal spirit from the eternal matter, so the Stoics, on the other hand, rejected this severance, and united God and the world as power and substance in one. "Matter is the passive base of existence, the substratum of the divine activity. God is the active, creative power of matter, and is essentially inwrought with it. The world is the body of God; God is the soul of the world." Thus they held God and matter to be an identical substance, which, viewing it on the side of its passive and changeable properties, is matter; on the side of its active and eternal power, is God. The world has no substantive existence; it has no purport or mission of its own; it is produced, inspired, and directed by God. "It is nought but a great living frame (*ζωόν*), whose intelligent soul is the Godhead. All it contains is equally divine, because the divine soul pervades all of it equally. God is to it the eternal necessity which controls everything in unchangeable sequence; as an intelligent providence, which appropriately creates and shapes; as perfect wisdom, which holds undisturbed the order of the world, punishing evil and rewarding good. Nothing can isolate itself from God, or move out of its pre-ordained limit. Everything is unconditionally dependent on the order of the whole, of which the Godhead is the principle and the power."¹

By this theory there is an entire absorption of the human in the divine. The human will ceases to exist as a substantive agent, capable of voluntarily following or voluntarily rejecting good or evil. Of the two great factors which the Christian

¹ I translate this from Schwegler's excellent synopsis in his "Geschichte der Philosophie" (p. 88), as giving substantially the theodicy of the Stoic.

recognizes in God's moral government, — his constancy and his special providence, — the Stoic recognized only the first — his constancy, and rejected the last — his special providence. Of the two great factors which the Christian recognizes in man's moral agency, — his impotence and his free-will, — the Stoic recognized only his impotence, and rejected his free-will. That divine union of contradictions in the plan of salvation — that arch out of the ken of philosophical vision by which are united, in the revealed word, God's constancy and his special providence, man's impotence and his free-will — neither Stoic nor Epicurean was able to comprehend. While the Epicurean, as we presently will see, seized the last of the two factors, and built a system upon it, so the Stoic seized in like manner and built upon the first. Let us picture to ourselves the world which the Stoic thus produced. The shadowiness of philosophical phraseology vanishes, as we gaze on it, and we see a vast and gloomy factory, in which is forever droning through its monotonous rounds a great central wheel, which is the motive power, as well as the regulator, of the entire mechanism. There is no future beneficent purpose for which this factory runs, no blessed change in the far future to which these labors are to yield, no delicate fabric of love they are to generate. The work is to be eternal. Eternally is that giant wheel to grind on its uniform rounds. Nor can the slightest member of this vast mechanism pause; to do so would be death. Man is, as it were, on a tread-mill. Onward and onward must he move on his predestined path, without choice or rest. Forever, at least while life lasts, will the cold, metallic grinding of this monotonous machinery sound on his ears; forever will that heavy, impassive, relentless wheel revolve. It is despair in life, and, on the Stoic's theory, it was despair in death. Human life, when the stamp was worn out, was like a defaced coin, to be picked up again and re-issued, but not as the same continuous existence. It came out, blind to the past and blind to the future, to again move through this hopeless, dreary cycle, to be again, when its impress was

worn out, resumed and re-issued, and so on forever. There was no immortality of the soul, no hope in life and no hope beyond life, no consciousness of separate existence now or hereafter, no power of choice in the creature, no power of forgiveness in the Creator, — nothing but an eternal round of helpless, hopeless, passive endurance.

Then observe the Stoic's idea of *virtue*. Pleasure, even innocent pleasure, was to him a sin, as a stepping aside from the inexorable purpose of life; it was a wrong, a sacrifice of the whole to the individual. The slave chained to the wheel could not pause a moment, even to pick up a flower, for the pitiless wheel would roll on and crush him, and then continue to roll on as impassively as before. It was a sin to sanction the household feast, to smile at the play of children, or with pleasure to watch the myriads of gay and joyous life that were glancing through the summer stream, or to dwell on the rich contrasts of the woods yellowed in the light of autumn, or on the gorgeous retinue of clouds and of shadows, each crowned with gold, with which the royal sun departs between the gates of the western hills.

So the energetic pursuit or the joyous play of *individual* talent was sinful to the Stoic, as contravening that general purpose and that common good to co-work in which was the sole virtue. To the Stoic, the poet whose gentle eyes turned so tenderly on the hare that he caressed in his solitude at Olney, and who wrote John Gilpin, would have sinned in thus looking and writing. To the Stoic, Milton would have sinned in the designing of *Paradise Lost*, Michael Angelo in the sculpturing of that sublime statue of Moses on which even the thoughtless cannot look without awe. Everything that falls not into the common, mechanical progress of things — which separates the individual purpose or passion from the aggregate — is sin. The ideal is absolute perfection. Whoever falls short of this at all, falls entirely. There is no way of covering up his sins, or of atoning for them. He is an alien in the harmony of the universe, a victim to be forthwith crushed under fate's grim wheel.

Such was the philosophy of the Stoic — a philosophy which truly recognized the absoluteness of God, but untruly rejected the individuality and autonomy of man ; which truly recognized the existence of a divine and absolute standard of virtue, but untruly rejected that universal corruption which made man incapable of reaching this standard. An absolute Providence, a perfect ideal of virtue, was the half of the coming truth upon which the Stoics seized ; but that half, exhibited alone, only reduced man to the greater despair.

On the other hand, the Epicureans, who with the Stoics, in the era immediately preceding Christ, divided the schools, took the opposite factors, and equally failed. The Epicurean philosophy, upon which we can now barely touch, withdrew God from all practical government of the world, and made the individual will supreme. God, it is true, might occasionally intervene to help out a human impulse ; but there were no laws by which events were pre-adjusted, no external force by which the individual purpose was swayed. Man's happiness or misery was left to his own free choice, and what he won he owed to himself alone. Each individual must seek for his own happiness, not the happiness of society ; for the social is to be subordinated to the individual. *Pleasure* is to be the object of life. But we should be doing injustice to the Epicureans did we assume that the pleasure thus to be pursued was to be the mere lust or passion of the moment. It was the ease and satisfaction which, having the future in view, as well as the present, were diffused over a whole life by so adjusting the tastes that they would relish such pleasures as were without undue fatigue attainable — pleasures such as the quiet endearments of social life, the varied beauties and comforts of the seasons, the charms of music, of painting, of statuary. With regard to virtue, if the Stoic's standard failed because it forgot *man*, the Epicurean's failed because it forgot *God*. The Stoic made a system which rejected human weakness ; the Epicurean one which rejected the divine perfection. The road of the first was unapproachable to human foot, because it was stretched like a

drawbridge between inaccessible heights ; the road of the last failed, because it was laid unsupported over those quicksands of human corruption on which none can step without ruin.

And this difference between the two philosophies in respect to ethics sprang from the corresponding difference in their theodicy. The Stoic absorbed man's individuality in God's omnipotence ; the Epicurean, God's omnipotence in man's individuality. The Stoic destroyed man's moral agency in God's sovereignty ; the Epicurean, God's sovereignty in man's moral agency. The one's ideal was a perfectly divine man ; the other's, a perfectly human God. In theodicy, as well as in ethics, each seized upon one of the great pillars of the arch of truth, but, clinging to it as a fragment, found in it, as the passenger finds on the single pier in the dismantled bridge, not the shore, but a fathomless abyss.

Let us pause, for a moment, to look at the pre-Christian world as the time was approaching when the Desired of all Nations was to appear. It was as if all men, under the strain of some prophetic voice, like that which told in older days of the deluge, were gathering for refuge about one or the other of the two disjointed fragments of truths which these philosophies uncovered. That there was in each *some* truth, those may well have thought who looked at those massive piers ; but that these were hostile and irreconcilable no one could doubt who saw how broken and incomplete were their ragged sides. How were these truths, each in part certain, yet the two wholly contradictory, to be reconciled ? Man had attempted it in vain, and now, conscious that even in his faith he was wretched, he waited for the word to come.

And the word thus came in the fulness of time. In the God-man was the way shown how God could be just, and yet the Justifier ; how his eternal purpose and man's moral agency could be united ; how the same Divine Being, at once perfect man and perfect God, could at the same time bring us to God and bring God to us ; how as our High-Priest he was to bear our sins, as our divine and yet human friend was to be touched with our infirmities, as our perfect

substitute to cover us with a mantle of righteousness such as no human virtue could approach.

So were reconciled the truths of those two philosophies which had divided among themselves the thoughtful minds of pre-Christian heathendom. For, in theology there were then first brought together those two elements, of the Creator's sovereign power and the creature's moral responsibility, which make up the doctrines of grace; since, as St. Bernard tells us, if you abolish free grace, there is no God to save us, and if you abolish free will, there is no man to be saved.

And so in ethics were the *ideal* of the divine perfection and the *actual* of human dependence united in Christ Jesus. For the divine pattern set by him combined a rule of holiness severer than Stoic ever imposed, with a tenderness of humanity beyond that of the purest and gentlest of the Epicureans. For he who declared that blessed were the pure in heart; who declared even that angry and impure *thoughts* would bring danger of the judgment; who said it was better to pluck out an eye or cut off a hand than that eye or hand should offend; who directed no treasures to be laid up on earth, and no thought taken for the morrow; he who laid down these rules so austere, divine was the same whose divine presence sanctified the marriage feast; whom Pharisaism rebuked as one who ate with sinners; who so yearned over little children that he could not be held back from blessing them; who provided, even when the shadows of the passion were gathering over him, for the comfort of his disciples, and, in the hour of agonizing death, for his mother's home; who wept over the grave of those whom he loved as tenderly as he had blessed the wedding; and who thus sympathized with the sorrows and hallowed the innocent pleasures of men at the same time that he afforded them a perfect standard of right.

So it was that the philosophers of heathenism, in the failure of their systems pointed the way to him, the God-man, in whom alone was truth. To recur to an illustration that has been heretofore used, it is as if you should see in a great and stormy estuary two island piers, all that remain of a bridge

which once had united shore to shore. Around these piers are collected multitudes of shipwrecked travellers; feeling that what they clasp is sure, but that it is purposeless unless it can be connected with the main-land of the haven where they would be. But how can this be done? No human masonry could be laid in those stormy waters. No human skill could construct that necessary arch. Philosophy has tried this, but in vain; and now each of her great schools can do no more than impotently cluster around the insulated pier of its own half truth. Then a voice is heard above the waters, "Lo, I come! in the volume of the book it is written of me"; and by the God-man the arch is spanned, and its piers consolidated in a structure which is the revealed way of God.

Some there are who still refuse to look up with the eye of faith, and to see how to the soul this stream is bridged over and escape secured and home to the lost restored. They still cling to those half truths which alone are revealed to the eye of sense, unable, in this mere sensuous perception, to see the arch at once of union and of salvation to which revelation points. Our duty to them is a duty of humility as well as of power. It belongs to us to show that philosophy, not merely from its own human limitedness of vision, but from the evidence of its past failures, is incapable of discovering that which belongs to the highest counsels of God. Ours, therefore, is the humility which flows from the consciousness that by human wisdom alone we cannot find out God. But the weakest believer, besides this humility, is adorned with that faith which is in itself power. For to him the half-truths of philosophy unite in a sublime and harmonious whole.

The perfection of God and the feebleness of man, the righteousness of God and the sinfulness of man, the sovereignty of God and the free-will of man, — these, the solitary and disrupted piers of the Stoic and the Epicurean, — these are united not merely to the sight but to the tread of faith. The pilgrim, once clasping desolately the shivered and insulated buttress, looks up and finds a road open to his ascent. That road is holiness and its end heaven.

ARTICLE VIII.

THE PURIFYING MESSIAH.—INTERPRETATION OF
ISAIAH LII. 15.

BY TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., PROFESSOR IN UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, N.Y.

יְנַחֵם גוֹיִם רַבִּים. “*So shall he sprinkle many nations.*” There is something so evangelical in these words, so strongly favoring the idea of an expiating, purifying power in the coming Messiah, so directly pointing, in fact, to the Christ of the Gospels, that the rationalist or unevangelical commentators, who cannot bear such an idea, have labored very hard to destroy its force. The verb נָחַם, or נָחַם in Hiphil, is best explained from Num. xix. 18, 19: “And a man who is pure shall take hyssop, and dip it in *water* and sprinkle it upon the tabernacle,” וְנָחַם עַל-הַאֹהֶל. In like manner, Lev. viii. 10, 11: “And Moses took the oil of anointing, and he *sprinkled* thereof upon the altar.” The nature of the action indicated, the substance used (a fluid of some kind — blood, water, oil), or the immediate object, as well as the remoter object (the tabernacle, the altar, etc.) are so clearly presented, that no lexicon could give a better definition than that which offers itself in the very words of the passages quoted. Both in Hebrew and Arabic there are many terms far more frequent in their occurrence, but which leave, nevertheless, a far less distinct impression of their primary significance upon the mind. This clearness and uniformity of meaning appears in all places where it is to be found; as in Kal, Lev. vi. 20, 2 Kings ix. 33, Isaiah lxiii. 3; in Hiphil, Lev. iv. 6, 17, v. 9, viii. 11, 30, Ex. xxix. 21, Lev. xiv. 7, 16, 27, 51, xvi. 14, 15, 19, Num. viii. 7, xix. 4, 18, 19, 21. The ceremonial nature, too, of the actions indicated would fix it deeply upon the mind. It would give it a kind of sacredness, rendering very unlikely any departure from the usual and primary

image in any metaphorical application, or any substitution for it, or any confounding with it, of an unusual sense derived from a cognate dialect and found nowhere else in the Hebrew Bible. This would especially be the case with any prophetic application of it to the kingly and priestly Messiah, such as it is, on all hands, admitted to be in the passage before us. Here the old consecrated language of the law would most readily come to mind, as something peculiarly emphatic, and peculiarly demanded in the announcement of the Messiah's office.

In view of the well-established meaning of the word, there is only one objection that seems to have any real force, and that vanishes entirely on a close examination. In other cases, says Rosenmüller, the object of the verb is the fluid sprinkled, whereas in this place [Isa. lii. 15) it is the persons or nations sprinkled. But the very same change takes place in respect to other Hebrew verbs, and is common to all languages. Witness the Greek βάλλω, *to throw*, which may have for its object the weapon thrown, or the person at whom it is thrown. It is the same with the Greek ραίνω, ραντίζω, *to sprinkle*, corresponding in this and all other respects to the Hebrew רָחַץ. Thus it is all the same whether we say ραίνειν αὐτοὺς ὕδατι, or ραίνειν αὐτοῖς ὕδωρ, *sprinkle them with water*, or *sprinkle water upon them*. Compare Aristophanes, Ranae, 1440, ὀξίδας ραίνοιεν ἐς τὰ βλέφαρα τῶν ἐναντίων, "Let them sprinkle vinegar in the eyes of the enemies"; for examples of the other idiom, see Pindar, Isthm. viii. 110:

μέλανι ραίνων φόνω πεδίον,

"sprinkling the plain with blood," ραίνειν αἵματι βωμόν, Euripides, Iph. A. 1600. This is the Greek word by which the LXX everywhere render the Hebrew רָחַץ, and the manner in which they employ it, whether actively or passively, shows how easy and natural it is to take it either way. It is not peculiar to any form of the word, either Greek or Hebrew, but is grounded on the very nature of the action expressed, which may have either the person or the thing for its object; as is clearly shown in the use of our own corresponding word:

“I will *sprinkle* clean water *upon* you,” or, “I will *sprinkle* you with clean water, and ye shall be clean.”

The resort to the Arabic *نزا* is still more weak and far-fetched, showing a desperate determination to get rid, for some reasons, of the easy and most fitting sense that comes from the common Hebrew usage of the word. The sense of *نزا* is *salvit, exsiliit, he sprang, he leaped*. In the Hebrew the Kal and Hiphil are both transitive. To make it grammatical here, yet keep the Arabic sense, it must be rendered in the fourth conjugation, *he caused to leap*, a far greater force upon the word than giving to the Hebrew the personal object.¹ The Arabic will not bear this as commonly used, or in the few cases where that conjugation of this particular word occurs; and if it could, it would be to the last degree frigid and extravagant. Metaphorically, these translators would say, he, the Messiah, shall make the nations leap for joy. That sounds well enough, if there were not two strong reasons against it. First, it is quite a rare word in Arabic; that is, rare in their gravest and most classical writings. It is not to be found in the Koran, though the cases are many in which the sense here given by Gesenius and others, “to cause to rejoice,” “to make to leap for joy,” would demand this word for its expression, if it were at all appropriate. It occurs but a very few times in the Seances of Hariri, who so affects the antique Arabic. This unusual occurrence in the graver writings is because of its low and somewhat obscene sense. It is used only of animals: *proprie de brutis et feris dicitur* — *assilivit mas femellam*. The very few cases of its occurrence in Hariri are sufficient of themselves to show how unfit a word it is for the use the prophet is supposed to make of it, and especially in the high connection in which it is here found. In Hariri, Seance xii. p. 136 (De Sacy ed.) we have the noun *نزوة* Plur. *نزوات*, *assaults, leaps (assilio, assultus)*:

¹ The Hiphil sense of the Hebrew word is not causal, but simply intensive; that is, to *sprinkle*, not to *cause to sprinkle*. In this respect it would seem like the Kal, which is also rendered to *sprinkle* in Leviticus. But to the Kal more particularly belongs the primary image, which is, to *spirt*, etc; having the fluid for its subject. Hence, in Hiphil, to *cause to spirt*, that is, to *sprinkle*.

“Protect me, Allāh, من نزغات الشياطين, from the attacks, the provocations of the devils, and from the *assaults* (the sudden leapings or springing upon me) of kings” من نزوات السلاطين. In Seance xxxi. 393, 8 the same writer employs the participle in an obscene comparison, or proverb, كل كثر الى قتل وكل ناز الى لين, which cannot decently be translated, it is so animal and brutish. Seance xliii. 571, 6 “He leaped the leap of the male locust.” ونزا نزوان العنطب. These are the only places in which it occurs in the fifty Seances of Hariri. In the Life of Timour by Ahmed ibn Arabschah, another storehouse of unusual Arabic words, it is found but once, and then with the same obscene allusion, though occurring in one of its most turgid metaphors, (Vol. ii. 228, Manger’s ed.) ولا زال فحل كلامه ينزو على حجر جرهم nec destitit admissarius orationis ipsius *insilire* in vulvam mentis eorum. The apology for giving even a Latin translation here, is the desire to show how utterly unfit was this word, or any metaphor drawn from it, for expressing the great thought of the prophet. There is no example to be found, either in Arabic prose or poetry, of its ever being used in the sense of exultation or leaping for joy. In the examples cited from Hariri, the Scholiast explains it, as a rare word, by the more common term وثب which always has the sense of leaping at, springing upon, or *assaulting*. Even if it were the case, however, that there were examples of its being used in a different way that might be deemed suitable here, still it would give us no reason for taking an unusual term, rare in Arabic, and, in this sense, occurring nowhere else in the Hebrew Bible.

And this suggests the second argument, namely, that the Hebrew abounds in words to express exultation, or leaping for joy and triumph, if that had been intended here. We have a striking example of this, Isaiah xlix. 13, where the verbs are all of this metaphorical class, in their primary sense expressive of sudden and rapid motion, and thence trans-

ferred to the expression of joy: רָנָה שְׁמַיִם וְיָדָה אֶרֶץ וּפָצְחוּ הָרִים רָנָה כִּי־נָחַם יְהוָה עַמּוֹ וַעֲנֵנִי בְרַחֲמָיו. “Ring out ye heavens, and exult (גלל primary sense *whirling, rolling, dancing*, comp. גלל) O earth, *break out*, ye mountains with a *ringing* sound (רָנָה), for the Lord hath comforted his people, and hath had compassion on his poor.” The primary sense in רָנָה, רִנָּן is a trembling, vibrating, reverberating, pulsatile, or rebounding echo, that of פָּצַח, a *breaking forth*, used here to denote exulting, joyous action, that could not be restrained. Can we rationally suppose that if the prophet had intended to express this idea of exultation, in either its intransitive or causal sense, he would have overlooked such words as these with which his language so copiously favored him, words so purely Hebrew, and so vivid in their significance, and have taken, instead of them, a much rarer word, in a rare sense only found in a cognate dialect, and even as there employed having associations which utterly unfitted it for such an application? The difficulty of such a supposition is greatly enhanced by the consideration, before mentioned, that this word רָנָה is, in its Pentateuchal use, so consecrated, we may say, to a different idea, or so hallowed by being employed in cherished memorial rites, as to preclude its easy association with any other action, though the philological imagination may ever so remotely connect it with its supposed primary sense. It is hard to be believed. Such a far-fetched view demands the credulity of the rationalist, determined to shut his eyes against any highly spiritual or evangelical idea which the Old Testament writers may connect with Messiah’s mission.

Besides this, it may be said that there is another Arabic verb نَزَّ (*nazza*) which, although of the double Ain form, is closely allied to נוּז in its primary Pentateuchal usage. Its predominant sense is to *spirt*, as water from the pores or crevices of a cask that has no outlet. For a vivid example see Calila et Dimna, or the Fables of Bidpai, 79: وَسَالَ “whence it will flow and *spirt* (sprinkle) itself on many sides, etc.” This is the exact idea of

נוֹחַ or חָזַק, as seen in the operations indicated in the Pentateuchal passages, denoting something more intense and active, yet less diffuse, than the more frequent word יָרַק.

Jarchi renders it, "He shall lay his hand upon many nations," or, חֲגֹבֵר יָדוֹ, "his hand shall prevail against them." In this he confounds יָזָה with יָרָה; either misunderstanding it, as we can hardly suppose, or intentionally avoiding what would seem to be the more Christian sense; since he must have been very familiar with the usage of נֹחַח in the Law. We see in it also his strong prepossession in favor of the idea of a conquering Messiah. The Hebrew Lexicon of Rabbi Sal. Parchon gives only such senses of the word as are found in the Pentateuch. In the Hebrew Lexicon of Menahem Ben Saruk, it is not defined. The LXX has οὕτως θαυμάσονται ἔθνη πολλὰ ἐπ' αὐτῷ, "So shall many nations be astonished, or shall wonder, at him." This, however, besides giving a sense altogether different from any that can possibly be attached to חָזַק, except by a most far-fetched association, utterly confounds the syntax. They may have regarded חָזַק as from חָזַח the intensive verb of sight, or confounded it with it in some way, so as to get the idea of *wondering* from that of *gazing*, looking with emotion, like the Greek θεάομαι, or they may have been influenced by the Hebrew נִשְׁתַּחֲוִי in the verse above. Gesenius would reconcile this with the view he takes of חָזַח, as denoting the *leaping* or rising from the seat in reverence; but nothing could well seem more strained or far-fetched. The sense of sprinkling, or purifying, too, he regards as inconsistent with that of "the many being astonished," as expressed in verse 14, or of "kings shutting their mouths at him" (vs. 15), but this only shows the utterly unevangelical mind, which can never recognize the spiritual harmony there is between Messiah's kingly rule, and his priestly or expiating office. The Vulgate has it literally, and in accordance with the Pentateuchal sense of the word: Iste *asperget* gentes multas. The Syriac, by far the best of the ancient versions, renders it ܡܢ ܡܠܚܬܐ ܕܡܢ ܡܠܚܬܐ, "He shall purify many nations." The translator has simply

given the obvious secondary, or metaphorical sense, derived immediately from the Pentateuchal image of sprinkling. There was evidently in his mind such passages as that of Ezek. xxxvi. 25: "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be purified from all your defilements, and from all your idols will I cleanse you."

To return again to the Arabic **نزا**, which is regarded as giving the best rendering here, it may be said that Gesenius cites from Hariri one of the places just referred to, and that the unfitness of the word nowhere more strongly appears than in the very testimony which it gives us. He takes it, as others have done, from the definition given in the lexicons (*saliit, assilivit*), without any reference to the peculiar low and obscene sense which, in the places cited, invariably accompanies it, as the context most abundantly shows. Thus Hariri, Seance xxvii. 287 **ينزو ويلين**, *assiliet tunc remittet*, and xxxi. 393, before cited, **كل ناز الى لين وان هاجا**, together with the scholium that accompanies the first, are given by him as proverbial sayings simply denoting that "after activity comes weakness," but without taking any notice of the low association of ideas on which it is grounded. Thus also, he only refers generally to the expression Seance xxxi. 393, without citing the place, and pays no attention to its very explicit and unmistakable scholium giving the same *untranslatable* explanation that belongs to it in all these places of its occurrence. It is on the words **وان هاجا** at the end of the sentence or line just before cited: **هو من هيجان الفحل : وهو ان يهدر في شقشقة ويشتهي الضراب**. As in any way differing from this uniformly low sense, Gesenius refers only to one meaning given by Freytag, and that in the eighth conjugation, without any examples: *assiliit animus in rem — concupivit*. If there are any cases where this occurs in any Arabic writing, it would most probably be found to contain a turgid metaphor similar to the one already quoted from Ahmed's History of Timour. Of this, too, Gesenius takes no notice, although it is the only place in which it occurs through

out that extensive work, and its beastly sense, as there used, is so precisely like what we find in Hariri. Gesenius admits that the word which he would thus apply to the office of Messiah, is used mainly *de bestiis*, of the beasts, *de locusta*, *de asino*, etc.; but then he says also, *dein de hominibus*, omitting to notice, however, that the application to men is chiefly in the way of this beastly comparison, and that, therefore, to say it of nations would be altogether anomalous.

Again, he perverts the order of etymologies. It is more easy and natural to deduce the sense of leaping (*saliendi*), or of *springing* (see the analogy in the two senses of our word *spring*) from that of *sprinkling*, scattering (*spargendi*), than vice versa. So it is with the words to which he compares it, namely, נצה and נצץ. To *fly* is their secondary sense from the primary *splendere*, *scintillare*, *emicare*; to *flash*, *flutter*, *vibrate*, *glimmer*, *gleam*, *sparkle*, all agreeing in their primary sense-image with *spargere*, *radiare*. Compare Virg. Aen. iv. 584. *Spargebat lumine terras*; or *spargens lumen*; this Latin word having a double object like the Greek *παίω* and the Hebrew נוה. Hence to נצה, נצא, and נצץ, there is also the sense *florere*, ניץ, *flos*, *flower*. So נץ and נצה, *flos*, נצן, *flosculus*, ניצוץ, *scintilla*, נוצה, *plumage*, all allied to נוה and closely connected with the image of *scattering*, *dispersion*, *radiation*. Nothing presents this more vividly than the rapid motion, or *leapings*, of drops of water when sprinkled, and hence the secondary sense of leaping, occurring in the Arabic, but not found in the early Hebrew. It is onomatopoeic. The primary sense of *spiriting* (intransitively, the action of the fluid itself) might be almost known from the hissing, stridulous, *whizzing* sound of the root. The same might be said of that other Arabic word نزل, and the Hebrew נוז, where the addition of the liquid letter gives the idea of a more equable or flowing motion, *defluere*, *distillare*, *de rore ex nubibus*. Hence the Arabic sense of נוז (نزل) to *descend*, as the rain. Fuerst well compares נוה with the German *netzen*, *nässen*, to which we can in no way regard the idea of *leaping* as primary, any more than to the Greek *νέω*, to *wash*, which

has the same radical syllable. It is gratifying to find that the learned Fuerst in his Concordance Lexicon adheres to this old primary sense of sprinkling as truly belonging to the passage in Isaiah.

That which tries our patience to the utmost, in reading such commentators as Gesenius and Rosenmüller is their continual begging of the great question which divides them from "Christian interpreters," to use their own phrase. "*Christiani interpretes*," says the latter, "*magno consensu hoc oraculo Messiae facta describi statuunt.*" It is thus spoken of only to express an opinion adverse to its true claims. The "great consent of Christian interpreters" goes for nothing with this school. They speak as if they were themselves inspired to teach the contrary. "Not a trace," say they, *nullum vestigium*, "is to be found in the Old Testament, from which it could be gathered that the Messiah, whom they expected, was to do (or suffer) any such thing as is supposed to be set forth in this and similar passages." "Every where," they say, "it is the image of a powerful and glorious *hero*, painted in colors drawn from the pomp of Solomon, David, and other Oriental kings." They know all about this, far better than any men who lived nearest the times, far better than our Saviour and the Apostles whom he commissioned and inspired. The process of critical examination by which they arrive at such a sweeping conclusion is not a little curious. They take up all the passages which seem to teach something different, and deliberately deprive them, one by one, of any such meaning, or dogmatically assert that they cannot possibly have any such meaning, notwithstanding the fancies of "Christian interpreters," and then cry out, *nullum vestigium deprehenditur!* They have no objection to their "great and conquering hero," *felicissimus, potentissimus et gloriosissimus*, as they conceive him. Keep it in that form alone, and they can treat it as they do the myths of other nations, that never had, nor are expected to have, anything like a true historical realization. They can magnify to the utmost this grand "epic conception of the old Jewish bards";

for there is little more of a faith demanding spirituality in it than there is in the Greek conception of a Hercules. Such a hero has never appeared upon earth, nor is likely to appear; so that they are not at all afraid of him, nor of anything severely religious associated with such a belief. But a suffering Messiah, an atoning Messiah, a "sprinkling Messiah," walking solitary "in the greatness of his strength," "treading the wine-press alone, and of the people having none with him," such a hero Messiah, though he be "mighty to save," "potentissimus, gloriosissimus," they cannot believe in. It introduces, at once, a new order of thought, a new world of ideas, of which they can find "*nullum vestigium*" in their lifeless exegesis. "It is not according to Jewish ideas," they say. "The notion of the Messiah must be in harmony with fundamental conceptions as we find them in the Old Testament." The canon of interpretation is most sound; but are such interpreters aware of certain positions to which it must inevitably lead them? The figure of *anointing* in the Old Testament, whence came the name Messiah, had certainly a most pregnant significance. This name represents to the fullest whatever is included of the priestly as well as of the kingly office. "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchisedek." Surely this was a Jewish notion, however much they may have failed in their blindness and in their hardness to understand the wide meaning embraced in the deep idea of such a priesthood. Is there "no trace" of this in the Old Testament? And if there is, then it includes all that belongs to the thought of a suffering and sprinkling Messiah, although the Jew, as well as the Rationalist, had his mind most occupied with the lofty language that described the kingly state, whether it were a worldly or a spiritual glory. If a priest, "then must he have something to offer," even that which was most precious in the sight of God, namely, *self-sacrifice*, as when he "made his soul an offering for sin, and poured out his soul (his life) unto death"; when he said, "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not (that is other sacrifice), holocaust and sin-offering thou askest not.

Lo, I have come ; to do thy will (רצוֹנְךָ) is my delight, and thy law is in the midst of my heart." The Hebrew word here rendered *will* has a strong propitiatory or expiatory sense — that which is pleasing or makes pleased — and is used here, like the Greek *θέλημα*, Matt. xxvi. 42, Luke xxii. 42, to denote that one great act of propitiation which Christ came to earth to perform, and of which he spake with Moses and Elias upon the Mount of Transfiguration.

Let go the idea of expiation, if it is so distasteful ; but is there not heroism in such a sacrifice ? Is not he a hero, an אִל גִּבּוֹר (Isaiah ix. 5), who can so offer himself ? May he not most truly be called "*felicissimus, potentissimus, gloriosissimus*" ? The Rationalist would surely say this in expressing his admiration of a Codrus or a Decius ; shall it be thought a trait of character of which "not a vestige" can be found in him whom they are so fond of calling "the hero Messiah of the Jewish bards" ? There is one view that settles this conclusively. Did the priestly idea enter into the Jewish conception of the Messianic office ? And is this priestly idea inseparable from that of suffering and sacrifice, either personally, or by typical representation ? These are the great questions of which the rationalist disposes in such a summary way. If they are answered in the affirmative, there is then not merely "a trace," but a broad and luminous manifestation of such a priestly, sprinkling, purifying Messiah throughout the old scriptures. Then, too, may we say that no word would be better adapted to express this healing, cleansing, expiating power than the one which the prophet has so appropriately transferred from its consecrated use in describing the sprinkling rites of the old typical law, in which outward purity ever symbolizes the inward sanctification.

We may add here, by way of note, that in the Arabic version of Rabbi Saadiah Phijumensis, the Hebrew word הוֹחַ is rendered in a way which shows that the translator had in mind the primary sense, as it appears in Leviticus, whilst giving it an entirely different application through an Arabic

word that conveys only the secondary image. He thus translates the Hebrew, *وكذلك يبدد الامم الكثيرة*, "He shall disperse, or separate, many nations." Now here is something strange. This Hebrew word occurs quite a number of times in the Pentateuch. It is employed uniformly to denote a distinct typical religious act of purification. The Pentateuch, it should be borne in mind, is that part of the Scriptures which the Jews regard with most reverence. It is to them, as it really is in itself, the purest fountain head of "the sacred language." Their commentators are ever fond of referring to it in explanation of words. It would seem, however, that in respect to this word, occurring as it does but once out of the Pentateuch, with the exception of the single example in Kings, this honored Rabbi had gone out of his way to get a different meaning, although everything in the prophetic passage is in such harmony with the old typical usage, and the old idea of purification in its highest and most sacred sense. The anti-Christian motive is obvious; and yet to every right-thinking mind the very manifestation of such a feeling on the part of Jews and Rationalists is proof of the real meaning and spiritual power of the passage.

ARTICLE IX.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO HISTORY.

No. I.—LETTERS OF DR. JOHN RYLAND TO DR. STEPHEN WEST.

[Dr. John Ryland was born in Warwick, England, January 29th, 1753; was educated by his father, Rev. John C. Ryland, a noted instructor, author, and minister, pastor of a Baptist church at Warwick, afterwards at Northampton, England. Before Dr. Ryland was five years old "he read a chapter of the Hebrew Bible to the celebrated Hervey." In his seventeenth year he was approbated as a preacher; he preached as an assistant to his father until 1781, when, at the age of twenty-eight, he was ordained as his father's colleague at Northampton. He became, on his father's removal, sole pastor of the Baptist church at Northampton, and continued in this office until 1793, when he was called to reside at Bristol, England, as pastor of the Broadmead Chapel, and President of the Bristol Educational Society, a "Theological Institute." He preached at Northampton more than twenty years, at Bristol more than thirty, in all more than fifty years; and he died at Bristol in 1825. During his whole career he delivered "not less than eight thousand six hundred and ninety-one sermons, and at two hundred and eighty-six distinct places." Robert Hall says that Dr. Ryland's "attainments in the Hebrew language were profound, that he had a general acquaintance with the principles of science, and that his reading was various and extensive." "He had a passion for natural history, in the pursuit of which he was much assisted by the peculiar structure of his eyes, which were a kind of natural microscopes. The observations he made on various natural productions, without the aid of instruments, were really surprising; and though the peculiarity in his visual organs deprived him of the pleasure of contemplating the sublime and magnificent features of nature, it gave him a singular advantage for tracing her minuter operations." He published the following works: "*Christianae Militiae Viaticum*," "*Considerations on Baptism*," "*Life of Andrew Fuller*," and a large number of smaller works. In 1826 were published two volumes of "*Pastoral Memorials, selected from the Manuscripts of the late Rev. John Ryland, D.D.*," with a Memoir of Dr. Ryland, by his son, Jonathan Edwards Ryland; in 1862 appeared a new edition of his "*Hymns and Verses on Sacred Subjects, with a Memoir by Dr. Hoby*." The following correspondence illustrates the sympathy which Dr. Ryland had with what was called the "New Divinity" of President Edwards, Dr. Bellamy, Dr. Samuel Hopkins, and other Hopkinsian divines; the processes through which many English theologians were brought into a like sympathy; the connection between the "New Divinity" and the missionary

enterprise, etc., etc. For a more full account of Dr. Ryland see works of Robert Hall, Vol. i. pp. 205-224; Vol. ii. pp. 416, 417; Vol. iii. pp. 278-280; John Foster's Life and Correspondence; Allibone's Dictionary of Authors; but more especially Dr. Ryland's Memoir by Jonathan Edwards Ryland.]

MY VERY DEAR SIR :

Yesterday (March 30, 1814), I received your most welcome letter, and another from Mr. Lyman Beecher, for which I return my sincerest thanks. My time is exceedingly occupied, being at the head of an academy for young ministers (which was till lately the only one established on a permanent foundation for our denomination); having, besides, a large congregation, and a good deal of the concerns of our mission on my hands. Probably Captain Edwards would give you some little account of our situation.

Since the death of my dear correspondent, Dr. Edwards, I have scarcely had time to seek out another, and the unhappy disputes between the two countries have rendered it more difficult to find a mode of intercourse. I heard, also, a few times from Dr. Hart, Dr. Stillman, and Dr. Foster, and indeed from Dr. Hopkins; but they are all gone. A parcel from Counsellor Edwards came to hand, after lying several *years* in London. It was Dr. Edwards who sent me your book on the Atonement, in 1787, which I read with much pleasure. I have no taste to intermeddle with politics; and, as nothing can give me more pleasure than to hear such accounts of the work of my God as are contained in your letter and Mr. Beecher's, over which I shed many tears of joy, so no misunderstanding between the governments of the two countries can check my love to the people of God, on your side of the water as well as elsewhere. So far as I (that am no politician) can judge, the fault lies with your governors, especially since the Repeal of the Orders in Council; but you cannot help that. All my prayer is for the restoration of peace. But if all the world who know not God were mad (and certainly they are not much better), they that are born of God must love one another.

I have felt, all my days, a love for New England, like that of the Jews for the Holy Land. Mather's "Magnalia," in my childhood, and Edwards's works as I grew towards manhood, with the accounts of revivals in Gillies's Historical Collections, have made me ever feel a strong affection toward your country. Perhaps Captain Edwards could tell you I had put his grandfather's name on my second son, and if God had been pleased to order the sex of my younger children differently, I should have had David Brainerd and Joseph Bellamy born in my house.

I have often been ready to marvel at one thing,—that the fishers of men always seem to fish with a line only, and that you so often fish as with a net. One or two instances I have seen a *little* resembling your draughts, and have heard of one or two more. To be sure, here it is seldom the

case that a whole town is under the care of an evangelical minister. We are intermixed with dry-churchmen, or unevangelical dissenters. In the Church of England, indeed, there is a great increase of evangelical ministers. We have more than twenty in Bristol, or within five miles. They held their Mission Society here last week; we shut up our evening meetings, and attended the services, which were very pleasant. Almost every one spoke kindly of other missions. They collected above £500. We have in Bristol three Baptist churches, two Independents. The Presbyterians here are rank Socinians, as are almost all of that denomination in England. There is a large tabernacle here, chiefly supplied by Independent ministers, who come for a month or six weeks. There is also a chapel of Lady Huntington's, three Wesleyan Methodist chapels (one very large), many Quakers, and a small Moravian congregation. All the evangelical dissenters are united pretty cordially. In the monthly lecture the Baptists, Independents, and tabernacle are united, and in the monthly prayer-meeting the Wesleyans and Lady Huntington's people join also. We generally breakfast together (the ministers of all these congregations) once a fortnight, at each other's houses in rotation. I have a very agreeable intercourse with the evangelical Episcopalians, though they hardly dare to come to meeting, for fear of their superiors. In this respect, we are above them, and also in being able to lend them our meeting-houses, in case a church is repairing or rebuilding, which is a favor that they cannot return on any account, though some who are the least friendly to us have, in several instances, been glad to accept it.

We have lately heard a good deal of pleasing intelligence from our missionaries in India. We are in hope daily to hear of the arrival of one of my students at Jamaica; and this afternoon we have received the permission of Government to send one out to Java, or Amboyna. This last circumstance will occasion my being exceedingly hurried, so that I fear I shall not be able to write to Mr. Beecher at present. I am not sure how far off from him you are; but, if I should get a conveyance for this letter before I can possibly address another to him, I would beg you to present to him my Christian love, and tell [him] I feel unspeakably indebted to him for his letter and the kind and liberal spirit it breathes.

If I did not think myself right in the particulars wherein I differ from you, I should immediately avow my change of sentiment. But, of course, every honest man thinks his own opinion most scriptural. But I never could find my love to my Paedobaptist brethren impeded by thinking differently on that subject. Indeed, I think some subjects of diversity of judgment which do not change a man's usual denomination are far more important than others which do. But all who love our Lord Jesus, and in whom I can trace his image, I am sure ought to be dear to me. I have, for some years past, often thought of two sentences in what is called the Apostles' Creed: "I believe [in] the catholic church, the communion of

saints." Now, scarcely any man, out of the church of Rome, will say that his denomination is *the catholic church*. But I believe that expression most properly belongs to all who are really written in heaven and renewed by the Holy Spirit; and I infer that no man is sound in the Apostles' Creed who does not believe himself more truly akin to all them that he himself expects to meet in heaven, than any external form can make him to be related to those that he does not and cannot hope to meet there. Though I do not suppose the creed was actually made by the apostles, yet I believe these two Articles, thus explained, are in the strictest sense apostolic; and I trust I do believe that all who are really sanctified have one common interest, and are, indeed, living members of one common body, of which our blessed Emmanuel is really the head, and are really animated by one Spirit. I should think myself, at best, a most diseased member of the body of Christ, if I had not a fellow-feeling for every one who really loves and resembles him, which no outward agreement on things concerning which truly regenerate men can differ would in any wise equal. If a churchman, who so often repeats that expression, is more united to carnal churchmen than he is to regenerate dissenters, he is not sound in the Apostles' Creed; and if a Baptist, or any other dissenter, is more united to unconverted dissenters or Baptists than to regenerate churchmen, he is not sound in the faith. On this plan I desire ever to act, and to guard against every [thing] that would really savor of another spirit.

Good Mr. Beecher alludes, in a most candid manner, to the change of two of your missionaries. I trust there is no room to believe that any of our brethren used any intemperate measures to gain them over, but that the change was merely the result of their own reflections. I am sure I never pulled for a proselyte, in this respect, in my life. Let the truth prevail, with whatever party God knows it is to be found; but if we are right, speaking the truth in love is the likeliest way to convince our brethren that they are mistaken. And a shame would it be if an agreement in fifty important Articles should not do more to unite us than a disagreement in two or three, or even four or five inferior points can do to divide us.

If God should not yet call you home to his kingdom, I shall always be extremely glad to hear from you, and, above all, to hear of your success in the work of the Lord. We have had an unusual number of deaths, — some very happy ones, — in my congregation, and but few additions. One is proposed to the church this week, and another or two expected. Oh, that the arm of the Lord may be revealed. The other two Baptist churches have had pretty large additions lately.

May ever blessing attend you and your dear flock.

I am, my dear sir, yours most cordially,

JOHN RYLAND.

[Address: "Rev'd Dr. Stephen West, Stockbridge, Mass."]

Baptist Academy, Bristol,

March 27, 1815.

VERY DEAR SIR:

I hope Captain Edwards received and delivered to you the little packet I sent by him. After refusing to see a newspaper for several months, because I could not endure to hear of war between Britons and Anglo-Americans, among both of whom there are so many heirs of the same heavenly inheritance, I am now able to rejoice in peace being restored between these countries; though in Europe the storm is gathering afresh, and threatens the most tremendous consequences. However, I am glad to have an opportunity of writing again to one whom I so highly respect, and I hope this letter will find that your work is not yet finished. Intercourse has long been greatly impeded, and, perhaps, may still be attended with some difficulty, and my time is exceedingly occupied; yet your kindness in writing before makes me wish for the pleasure of hearing from you again, and especially of finding that the work of the Lord is still going on in your own congregation, and in other parts of your country.

I have been lately reading afresh the second volume of Dr. Strong's Sermons. I assent to nearly everything he advances; yet, taken as a whole, I feel that I could scarcely answer two objections which many readers in this country would bring. He introduces but *little* scripture, and especially he gives a smaller proportional exhibition of the *love* and *grace* of Christ than the generality of our best preachers. Is it not possible to go to an extreme in this respect? I doubt not that many go to a contrary extreme. But still I think these would more probably be amended by intermixing just views of the relation which subsists between the gospel and the moral government of God, than by dwelling so largely on what they too often omit, and omitting what not only they, but Paul, oftener introduces. You will excuse the freedom of this remark. While many have talked much of the love of Christ to sinners, who have scarcely noticed how exceedingly his sufferings display the evil of sin, some of your brethren dwell so much on the Saviour's magnifying the law and government of God, as almost to lose sight of such phrases as, God *commendeth* his love, and *herein* is love! God *so* loved the world! At least they hardly give full scope to the feelings these expressions seem calculated to inspire. I suspect we are all in danger, in the present state of imperfection, of having our minds so engrossed by attention to a few important truths, as to have them drawn off from a due attention to other truths; and the evident defect in the latter case, prejudices others against the very things we wish to enforce upon them.

[Address: "Rev. Dr. Stephen West, Stockbridge, Connecticut."]

MY DEAR SIR:

April 3d, 1815.

In my last I noticed two objections which most persons in this country would be greatly disposed to bring against Dr. Strong's Sermons: (1) That there was more use of argumentation than of scripture.

(2) That there was not a proportionate display of divine *love* in the way of salvation, but a continual and almost exclusive reference to the display of God's regard to his *own* rights, in the plan of redemption, whereas the scriptures certainly dwell very frequently and emphatically on the former. These objections do not hinder my pleasure in reading these sermons, but I am aware that many of my friends (ministers and others), would have a great deal to say on the latter especially. I judge that our divines have too much neglected what Dr. Strong so often introduces, yet I myself feel unable to vindicate him from the charge of dwelling on his favorite views too disproportionately.

But there is one point of great importance, stated in Strong's Sermons (Vol. ii. Sermon xii. p. 241): "In most cases, those who are savingly brought home to the Redeemer by submission," etc., down to the bottom of the page. I need not quote the whole paragraph as I suppose you have the book. To this statement very great objections would be made by most of our English preachers. Perhaps I come too near you to state them with full force. "This quietness and peace of submission, of coming and casting themselves at the feet of a sovereign God, and consenting that he should do his own pleasure," is what they do not understand, and what they think unscriptural and inconsistent with the gospel. It is God's *revealed will* that they should without delay fall in with the plan of salvation, *willingly come* to Christ for life. But say they, you require men to *pause before* they apply to Christ, and dwell for a while on the glory of God in their condemnation. Thus you keep them back from an immediate application to Christ, and they suspect you require this submission as a sort of qualification for mercy. God requires men to be willing to be saved in his own way; you require men to be *first* willing to be damned, *before* they may hope to be saved. What example have we of this in scripture? Paul did not treat the Philippian jailor thus, nor Peter the Jews who had voted for Christ's crucifixion. "Although they have no hope, no joys, in the light of God's reconciled countenance, yet they feel a quietness that is new," etc., says Dr. Strong. I know President Edwards in the Northampton Narrative describes exercises nearly similar, which I dare not censure. Yet still I have some suspicion that his successors, Dr. Hopkins, and his followers, have pushed matters somewhat too far. I can conceive it possible for God so to impress the mind with a sense of his perfect rectitude, both in the demands and in the penalty of his law, as [to] fill the mind with awe and submission, while yet uncertain of a gracious reception by the Saviour. But ought we to delay the immediate exhibition of an all-sufficient and gracious Saviour, able to save to the uttermost, and who will in no wise cast out? Few persons are awakened who have not repeatedly heard the gospel already. If they believe what they have often heard, they can have no room to suspect they will be rejected, if they apply to Christ. God is not used, I suppose, first to regenerate the

soul, and then try (if I may so express myself) what reception such a soul would give to law without gospel, and, after a while, try what reception it would give to the gospel, or what effect the gospel would have upon it. It is his command that sinners should come to Christ for salvation, and believe his readiness to receive them, not that they should stand speculating on the possibility and equity of his rejecting them; nor yet that they should pause and reflect on the impossibility of their believing without special grace, thinking, what shall we do if God will not give us faith. The scriptures represent repentance and faith as the immediate duty of all to whom the gospel is published.

I am not sure whether I have expressed myself with sufficient clearness to show you where the generality of our ministers would demur, if not more strongly object, to the statement of some on your side of the water. I know Marshall and Hervey have stated things very exceptionably on the other side, and that many who would not define the first act of faith as an assurance that Christ is mine, do yet sometimes speak as if no one could be justly condemned for not loving God, but in consequence of the exhibition of pardoning mercy at least in a more general way. Faith in pardoning mercy, say they, must beget hope, and then hope beget love. I cannot fall in with *this* representation. It seems to me to set aside the need of the work of the Spirit, except by the medium of nearly the same principle that reconciled Amasa to David's party, when David offered to make him generalissimo, instead of Joab. I think repentance must, at least in the order of nature, precede faith, and that nothing spiritual can *precede* love. No man can give a perfect definition of *hope* without including love in its nature. And the same is, I think, equally true of *faith*. It must include a cordial approbation of the truth, a resting with complacency in God's method of saving sinners. Mere natural truth may be believed independently of the state of the heart. Moral truth cannot. I may believe the sun is the centre of our system, though I should be as willing the earth should be the centre, if it would answer the same end. Or I may believe that Buonaparte has been re-established in France, though I had rather he were still confined to Elba. But I can [not] believe I am infinitely to blame for breaking God's law, or that it was an excellent thing for Christ to magnify the divine law, while I am under the dominion of a carnal mind.

We have just heard of a sore trial befalling Felix Carey, Dr. Carey's eldest son, who was going up to Ava, and cast away in a storm on the river; his wife, two children, and four maid-servants drowned, and he narrowly escaped with his life.

May grace mercy and peace be with you.

I am, dear Sir, your cordial brother, JOHN RYLAND.

I beg my kind respects to Capt. Edwards and all his family, and Rev. Mr. Beecher.

[Address: "Rev. Stephen West, D.D. Stockbridge, Connecticut, North America."]

MY DEAR SIR :

I have but short notice of Captain Edwards's return, and can only send a hasty line by him. My dear brother Fuller is gone, and I shall now have to bear the brunt of them that cry out against American divinity. An angry attack has been made already on the funeral sermon I published for my dear friend, in the *New Evangelical Magazine*, which is chiefly conducted by one Jones, who wrote the *History of the Waldenses*. He has a little tinge of the Sandemanian sourness, though not so much as he had some years ago. Still, he is disposed to cavil at the idea of disinterested love, and, in fact, will not try to understand what we mean by it. Many infer at once that we would have people regardless of their own salvation. I have had unspeakable difficulty to make some understand me, who, I cannot doubt, possessed the sincerest love to Christ for his own excellency, and who delighted in the law of God after the inner man.

We continue to hear good news from India; but our brethren are viewed with great jealousy by many persons in power, who can hardly believe it safe to let heathenism be attacked by simple argument, and seem more jealous for the cause of idolatry and superstition than the Brahmans themselves. Hence Mr. Chamberlain has been lately ordered down from Sindhuna, and John Peters forbidden to give the scriptures to the native soldiers in Orissa.

I was unspeakably pleased, some time ago, when Mr. Simeon of Cambridge was in town, who read me the memorials to Sir Evan Nepean, drawn up by your missionaries at Bombay. It gave me a very high opinion of their religion and good sense. I am endeavoring to prepare *Memoirs* of my dear departed friend, for which I have good materials; but it will take a considerable time to transcribe and arrange them. Though I am not yet sixty-three, yet the removal of my old friends makes me feel as if I was got very old, and must soon expect to remove hence. I have no particular complaint, and can preach three times a day without weariness, but am soon fatigued in walking. I am very glad to find your health is continued, and shall be highly gratified by hearing from you again. I hope the Lord is still succeeding your labors.

I am, dear sir, your cordial friend and brother,

Bristol, Sept. 12, 1815.

JOHN RYLAND.

[Address: "Rev. Dr. West, Stockbridge, Massachusetts. Forwarded by Mr. Timothy Edwards, with his best respects to Dr. West."]

VERY DEAR SIR :

Sept. 17, 1816.

Some months ago I sent you a copy of my dear brother Fuller's *Life*, which I hope you received safely. I should be thankful for your free remarks on the same. I since received your welcome letter, and rejoice to hear that the dew of heaven is descending around you.

May your own congregation soon receive another season of refreshing from the presence of the Lord.

By the bye, the accidental mention of the dew puts me in mind of Psalm cxxxiii. Our translators have supplied a good deal in the 3d verse "and as the dew." Now if the supplement were left out, the dew of Hermon could not be said to descend on the Mountains of Zion. And if the supplement be retained, why should the dew descending on Zion, a dry rock, I suppose, without verdure, be mentioned? I have queried whether the Psalmist does not, in the latter part of the psalm, make a transition from the subject of brotherly love to a different subject, not unnaturally connected with it, viz. the doctrine of divine influence.

As the dew of Hermon (a very fruitful hill) *is that* which descended on Mount Zion, etc., i.e. as is the natural dew on Mount Hermon, so is the spiritual dew on Mount Zion.

Brotherly love was especially promoted among the Israelites by all the males assembling at the temple three times a year, whither the godly Israelites went up in hope of spiritual refreshment, etc., "For there the Lord commanded the blessing," etc. Hence the two subjects are naturally connected.

I had but ten copies of brother Fuller's Life, as I gave the whole profit to my deceased brother's family, or I would have gladly sent one to Mr. Lyman Beecher also. We have lately had several clergymen, who have left the established church [and] at length become Baptists. But though I could not object to their agreeing with me on that point, yet I have no pleasure in their adopting our opinion respecting baptism, as they are much infected with Antinomianism, and fond of the worst expressions they can borrow from Dr. Crisp. Nor do they seek an acquaintance with the most respectable ministers in our connection, but indulge a groundless suspicion that we do not preach the gospel. They are men of large fortune. It is quite a new experiment of Abaddon to employ gentlemen of rank in a warfare in which he has been used to employ coalheavers and blackguards. I sent Mr. Baring brother Fuller's Life, and Mr. Snow the translation of Witsius' *Animadversiones Irenicae*. I wish God may cure them of this "fretting leprosy," or I had rather they had joined any denomination than ours. Alas how prone are men to error, on the right hand and the left!

I wish great success to your society for the education of pious youth. Our building, erected five or six years ago, contains thirty-three studies, with thirty-three bedrooms over them, but our funds will scarcely support our present number — twenty-five. We never take any but members of churches whose gifts have been previously tried, and who are recommended by the churches as possessing hopeful piety and talents. Training up graceless lads for the ministry, in hope they might be converted afterward, seems to have ruined the English Presbyterians, who are now almost uni-

versally Socinianized. Our present set of students are as hopeful as any I have known. Four or five are intended for missionaries.

Earnestly wishing you the best of blessings

I remain, dear sir, your cordial friend,

JOHN RYLAND.

[Address: "Rev. Stephen West, D.D., Stockbridge, Berkshire, Massachusetts, North America."]

ARTICLE X.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

Luthardt: Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen. The second edition of a work on Eschatology published about ten years ago. It consists of Essays, theological and exegetical — amongst the latter a translation and brief exposition of the Apocalypse. The former are headed: The Prophetical Word and the Church; The Ecstasies of believers and Irvingism; Eschatological Questions; Survey of the Contents of the Prophetical Word. The passages discussed are Matt. xxiv. 25; Rom. xi. 11-32; 1 Cor. xv. 20-28; 1 Thess. iv. 13-18; 2 Thess. ii. 1-12. The whole book deserves careful reading.

Sack: Theologische Aufsätze. A republication of six Essays by the venerable and eminent author of the "Christliche Apologetik," "Christliche Polemik," and other valuable works. The subjects are: The Relation of Wisdom to Science (the term used, as in Germany, for science generally); Contributions to Christian Ethics; State and Church; The Feeding of Elijah (1 Kings xvii. 2-9); The Reformed (Calvinist) Doctrine of the Supper; Observations on Schiller's "Maid of Orleans."

Merk: Das Gedicht von Hiob. A critical edition of the Hebrew text of the Book of Job, with translation and introduction. Full of bold and original ideas and suggestions, which few will be disposed to accept as they stand, though all may note them with interest.

Dietzsch: Adam und Christus. An exegetical monograph on Rom. v. 12-21, by a rising German theologian, since suddenly snatched away by death. The monograph evinces great learning, and for its materials alone will be of considerable service to theologians; but it is scarcely a thoroughly satisfactory discussion of this difficult passage.

Schwalb: Christus und die Evangelien. A series of ten lectures delivered at Bremen, in connection with the *Protestanten-Verein*. Dr. Schwalb has much to say in praise of Jesus. He styles him, for example, the "greatest genius in the domain of the religious life"; but he treats

him, also, as an "enthusiast." He even goes so far as to say: "Just because Jesus combined so much sobriety of judgment, such tenderness of conscience, and so inward a relation to God with the most extravagant and utterly ungrounded hopes, therefore is he (to Dr. Schwalb) so deserving of admiration, so heart-winning, so irresistible." One cannot help but say: "De gustibus non disputandum est."

Spiess: Logos Spermaticos. This is a collection of passages from the classical Greek writers parallel to New Testament passages. The parallels are adduced in the order of the chapters and verses of the New Testament, and not under the headings of a system of theology or of the creeds and catechisms, as in one or two similar works. Such a collection is, of course, interesting, and supplies material which can be employed for apologetic purposes.

The Lord's Prayer in the Languages of Russia. In this remarkable work the Lord's prayer is printed in no fewer than one hundred and eight versions. Some of them vary, indeed, only in minute details; but the great majority differ materially. The versions do not represent all the languages spoken in Russia. The book is splendidly printed at the press of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Lohmann. Ethische Studien aus Frankreich. Twenty-two brief Essays on subjects suggested by the war between France and Germany, and the contrasts between the two nations, which then exhibited themselves; reprinted from a periodical, entitled, "Altes und Neues." Such subjects are treated of as, The French and German Ideal of Culture; Sense of Truth; The Character of the German Soldier; Soldiers' Poetry; The Blessing of Children. A stirring book.

Die biblischen Alterthümer. A work on Biblical Antiquities, with illustrations extending over 616 pages, written in a popular style, without sacrifice of accuracy, published by the Calwer Verein, and costing only nineteen silbergroschen. A perfect marvel of cheapness, considering the quality of the work.

Wellhausen: Der Text der Bücher Samuelis untersucht. A critical examination of the Hebrew text of the Books of Samuel, with a detailed commentary thereon. In an Introduction, the author expounds the principles and method on which he has proceeded. The work will be found suggestive by those whose business it is to expound the Old Testament; for the text of the Hebrew Bible sadly needs critical revision.

Weiffenbach: Exegetische Studie über Jakobus ii. 14-26. An exegetical study on the passage in which James seems to assign to "works" a position antagonistic to, or inconsistent with, the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith. The author believes that the current notion that Paul and James really agree in substance is untenable. He affirms that James speaks of "faith and works as two co-ordinate possessions or magnitudes"; the former of which a man may or may not have in conjunction with the latter. Well-written, clear, and sincere, but scarcely correct.

Hofacker: *Leben von W. Hofacker*. Hofacker was a very popular Württemberg preacher during the earlier part of the present century, and the present work is a Memoir of him by his son, founded on his father's own papers. Well worth reading, or even translating. Hofacker was a true servant of God. The Memoir includes many beautiful letters.

Plath: *Missionstudien*. Licentiate Plath is Lecturer on what he calls the "Science of Missions," at the University of Berlin — the only lecturer on the subject at any German university. This work comprises studies on the following subjects: Missions; The Significance of Willibord for German Missions; The First Mission in America; What have the Professors Franke (father and son) done for Missions? The War of the Boers of the Orange Free State against the Bassutos; What general Points of View should Missionaries take up relatively to the Rights, Customs, and Habits of the Heathen? The Missionary work of the Greek-Catholic Church.

Zöpffel: *Die Papstwahlen*, etc. An account of the elections of the popes, and of the development of the ceremonies connected therewith, from the eleventh to the fourteenth century. A very restricted subject; but all that relates to it has been industriously collected by the author, and the subject itself is a very curious one.

Rathgeber: *Strassburg im 16 Jahrhundert*. The history of the introduction of the Reformation into Strassburg in the sixteenth century, with preliminary notices of the city prior to the Reformation. The chronological limits of the work are from 1500 to 1598.

Beck: *Umriss der biblischen Seelenlehre*. The third edition of a treatise on the Psychology of the Bible, by the celebrated, but peculiar Tübingen theologian, Professor Tobias Beck. There are three main sections: Human Soul-life, as Naphash; The Distinction between the Soul-life and the Spirit (Ruach); The Concentration of the Human Soul-life in the Heart (Leb. καρδιά). Works like this have their use; but as they tend to perpetuate the notion that the Bible is a hand-book of science and nearly everything else, we always regard them with suspicion. What Beck writes, however, is sure to be suggestive and stimulating. s.

DIE CHRISTLICHE ETHIK (Christian Ethics) dargestellt von Dr. H. Martensen: *Algemeiner Theil*. Gotha: Rud. Besser. 1871.

This is the first considerable system of Christian ethics of the speculative-theological German type which ever appeared outside of Germany. It is issued in the Danish original and in an authorized German edition at the same time. Bishop Martensen is an orthodox Lutheran, of the tendency of the right wing of Schleiermacher. He defines his own position as neither that of a supernaturalist, who takes revelation alone, to the exclusion of human philosophizing; nor that of a rationalist, who takes reason alone, to the exclusion of revelation and faith; but as that of one who

regards revelation as a help and norm for reason. Since the publication of his *Dogmatics* (1850) he has had the rare fortune of being acknowledged in Germany as one of the first theologians of the age. After the lapse of twenty years, he now furnishes us with a mature exposition of his standpoint in the ethical field. His *Dogmatics* made about as pleasant reading as one ever finds in German theology. His present work is emphatically strong meat for the strong. It traces the great ethical problems into the deepest recesses to which philosophy and science, in the hands of a vital God-consciousness, will light human speculation. One needs to be somewhat at home amid the abstrusest principles of ontology, psychology, soteriology, etc., in order profitably to undertake this system of ethics. For such, however, as approach it well-panoplied, it offers a more than royal banquet.

The stout volume before us is only one — the speculative — of the two forms under which the author purposes to treat the whole ethical subject-matter. He seems to have adopted this method as a compromise between the two more usual modes of treatment. The question was as to the proper order of handling the chief factors in ethics, viz. the subject (man), the norm (God or divine law), the process (the ethical life), and the product (the highest good, both individual and collective), — whether in the order just given, or whether to begin with the highest good, and then to recede to man and his norm and life. It is evident that, if ethics is a true unitary science, there must be some solely logical beginning-place from which the whole subject-matter may be adequately and exhaustively treated. The author does not find this *ποῦ στῶ*, but decides for a twofold treatment — a speculative and a practical one; the one looking chiefly to the principles; the other chiefly to the concrete forms of the ethical; the one treating of the subject-matter in the order — the highest good, virtue, and the law; and the other, in the reverse order. He will thus pass over the same field twice, and the results will be two almost independent treatises, with nothing in common save the chapter on the presuppositions of ethics. In regard to the second part, the author says in his Preface: "Whether, and how soon, I shall be permitted to complete the *practical part*, depends on circumstances beyond my control."

The structure of the first part is as follows: (1) On the definition of Christian ethics (72 pp.). (2) The presuppositions of Christian ethics (109 pp.), viz. the theological, the anthropological, the cosmological and soteriological and eschatological presuppositions. Then follows (3) the speculative part proper (458 pp.) in the seemingly illogical order: (a) The highest good (90 pp.), (b) Virtue (187 pp.), (c) The law (179 pp.). Irrespective of order and method, however, the book teems with rich and profound thought.

Some of the positions taken are of the most sweeping consequences. For example, the old alternate question: Is the good good because God

wills it, or does God will it because it is good? Martensen answers by saying that *both* alternates are true or false, according as we construe our God-conception truly or falsely. On the one hand, it is folly to think of the good or the right as an idea or quality existing above and independently of God. God's personality is, *per se*, in its totality, the absolute good. He wills the good, because it is good in itself; not, however, as something extant outside of him, but because the good is *his own eternal essence*. On the other hand, we may say, the good is good because God wills it; not, however, as if there were in God any balancing choice; but because his will is truly the *good* will, only in so far as he freely actualizes his own essence. And the good is immutable, because God's will cannot by any ethical possibility fall into disharmony with himself. God is, in fact, the perfect unity of the ethically-necessary and the ethically-free. This position, if well taken, suggests a settlement of the question so interminably debated in untheological school-books on ethics, as to the ground of the good, the right, etc. God's holy will, as the expression of his holy nature, is the *ne plus ultra*.

Exceedingly interesting is the author's discussion of the idea of God. This idea, he insists, is the unity of the three factors — the logical (intelligence), the ethical (love), and the physical (might). God is not merely spirit, but he has upon himself a realistic *nature*. God did not create the world out of an absolute nothing. The somewhat out of which God created it are his eternal *potentialities* — not merely logical (merely conceived by God), but at the same time, also, physical (essentially in God existing) potentialities. In these *δυνάμεις* God possesses both the something out of which he makes the world, and also the forces, instruments, and means by which he produced it. In this sense, it is literally true: All things are of God (Rom. xi. 36). This admission of a super-material *physis* in God — this spiritual realism — furnishes not only an escape from the errors of a lifeless materialism and of an abstract spiritualism, but is the synthesis of the partial truth that is in both of them.

In the discussion of man the trichotomous psychology is insisted on, and the soul, as distinctly different from the spirit and body, fully characterized.

In his treatment of the will, Dr. Martensen throws into great prominence two distinct stages of freedom — a lower and a higher one. Human freedom is at first of the lower stage, that is, it is choice between alternates, and hence the possible choosing of the less good, or even of the evil. This is a merely formal freedom without contents. It is man's task to develop this formal, empty freedom into the higher stage, that is, into the *true*, *God-filled* freedom which excludes the possible choosing of the less good, and harmonizes absolute freedom with ethical necessity. This is the sphere of a perfected moral development. In this serene air the will of God is become absolutely immanent in the human will — the human character has become absolutely and definitively determined to the good.

Nor is less interesting the discussion of the moral motives. The unsatisfactoriness of such views as exclude from this motive every form of self-interest, is abundantly shown. The true moral motive is *thankful* love to God. The heart that is not thankfully actuated by God's gifts, past, present, and prospective, is not true, but despises the Giver. It does and must love God because he first loved it.

But the book of Martensen is not merely a chain of metaphysical discussion; it contains, also, many happy poetical applications of its principles both to the problems of history and to the live questions of the day. Especially refreshing is the honest, but unsparing manner in which he criticizes, among others, that great idol of modern Germany — Göthe.

As a whole, the work deserves a hearty welcome from the student and theologian. It is strikingly peculiar only in some of its more questionable positions. On the great questions of recent ethics, it harmonizes in the main with the less abstruse and speculative work of Dr. Wuttke (See *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1866). L.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

THE PSALMS. By Carl Bernhard Moll, D.D., General Superintendent in Königsberg, Prussia. Translated from the German, with Additions, by Rev. Charles A. Briggs, Rev. John Forsyth, D.D., Rev. James B. Hammond, Rev. J. Fred. McCurdy, together with a new Version of the Psalms and Philological Notes by Rev. Thomas J. Conant, D.D. 8vo. pp. 816. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Company. 1872.

It is impossible that a volume in which so many different writers have had an agency should be free from faults. Still we regard the present volume as one of the best belonging to the "Bibel-Werk" of Dr. Lange. Dr. Conant's Version and Notes form a valuable addition to the Commentary. The American editors have made judicious use of the Commentaries of Hupfeld, Ewald, Delitzsch, and Hengstenberg. They have also inserted many notes from Mr. Spurgeon's Treasury of David, as well as from the Commentaries of Perowne, Wordsworth, and other British as well as American writers. We think that some passages from Dr. Plumer might have been wisely omitted; such as: "Voltaire has told us of the agonies of Charles IX of France, which drove the blood through the skin of that miserable monarch, after his cruelties and treachery to the Huguenots" (p. 62). This sentence refers to such verses as Psalm ii. 12.

It has been a popular opinion of American exegetes, since the publication of Hengstenberg's Commentary, that the twenty-second Psalm (in interpreting which Martin Luther "remained three days and nights shut up, on bread and salt, entirely inaccessible"), and similar Messianic prophecies refer to an ideal person, the righteous sufferer in the abstract; and they may be applied to any pious believer who is afflicted by impious persecutors, and may be appropriated by him just in proportion to the

degree of his piety and his afflictions; but they have their perfect fulfilment, are "fully verified," only in the holy Son of God, who was more afflicted, as well as more righteous, than any other man. This interpretation is rejected by Dr. Moll. He regards the twenty-second Psalm (for example) not as merely descriptive of a pious sufferer, not merely *prophetical* of Christ, not as merely *typical* of Christ, but as *typically-prophetical* of him. The difference, however, between Dr. Moll and Dr. Hengstenberg is not so great in *fact* as it is in terminology.

CYCLOPAEDIA OF BIBLICAL, THEOLOGICAL, AND ECCLESIASTICAL LITERATURE. Prepared by the Rev. John M^cClintock, D.D., and James Strong, S.T.D. Vol. iv., H, I, J. 8vo. pp. 1122. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1872.

"The first three volumes of this work were prepared and published under" the immediate supervision of Dr. M^cClintock. "The greater part of the present volume also received the benefit of his labors and advice; and before his decease he had collected and partly arranged a large amount of important matter for the succeeding volumes." Since Professor M^cClintock has been called to his rest, the surviving editor, Dr. Strong, has been aided by Professor J. H. Newman and Professor A. J. Schem, both of whom had previously labored on the work, but the former of whom, if not the latter, has augmented the amount of his editorial care. "This Cyclopaedia has not been undertaken, written, or published in the interest of any sect or party." "Scarcely more than one third of the entire number [of contributors] belong to the same communion with the editors themselves" (pp. iii and v). As we have said of the first three volumes, so we may say of the fourth, and we presume that we shall say of those which will succeed it, — they exhibit the results of much and varied learning, a spirit of candor and impartiality, and reflect great honor on the editors and publishers. To some of the statements in some of the Articles we cannot subscribe; but in the general we have been more than pleased with the accuracy, as well as perspicuity and force, with which the Cyclopaedia treats the various topics of theology. The fourth volume extends from the word "Haaag" to the word "Juxon," and contains a full Index of Articles.

ORIENTAL AND LINGUISTIC STUDIES. The Veda; The Avesta; The Science of Language. By William Dwight Whitney, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in Yale College. 12mo. pp. 416. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1873.

The clerical student will be interested in this work, and will rejoice in the prospect of receiving another (conditionally and partly promised on p. vii) from the same erudite scholar. There are various statements in the volume which we cannot endorse; but we must admit that some of these are more objectionable in their style than in their substance. If a few sentences were modified, and a few were omitted, the work might be

unexceptionable to the most orthodox theologian. As it is, it cannot be studied without much profit by him. Its language is fresh and vigorous. It is full of valuable suggestions in regard to the nature, progress, and history of language, the science of psychology, the character of the ancient religions, the doctrine of monotheism and human immortality, the Darwinian theory, etc., etc. The theories of Bleek, Schleicher, and Steinthal in regard to the origin of language are discussed with much ingenuity. We have been particularly interested in the Article I., II., and VI., on the Vedas, the Vedic Doctrine of a Future Life, and the Avesta; also in Articles VIII. and XIII., on European Philology and Ethnology, and on Language and Education.

REPUBLICATION OF THE GOSPEL IN BIBLE LANDS. History of the Missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches. By Rufus Anderson, D.D., LL.D., late Foreign Secretary of the Board. Vol. ii. 12mo. pp. 532. Boston: Congregational Publishing Society. 1872.

This volume, like the one which preceded it, and which was noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (Vol. xxix. pp. 571, 572) is a thesaurus of facts in regard to missions among the Oriental churches. It gives a lucid view of the Armenian, Assyrian, Nestorian, Bulgarian, and Syrian missions, so far as they have been under the care of the A. B. C. F. M. It contains interesting sketches of many departed worthies in whom the friends of missions have felt a peculiar interest, such as Dr. Goodell, Dr. H. G. O. Dwight, Dr. Eli Smith, Dr. Lobdell, Dr. Perkins, the murdered Merriam and Coffin, and many others whose names posterity will not willingly let die. The brief letter which Dr. Williams of Mardin wrote concerning Mr. Walker of Diarbekir is a solid lecture on Pastoral Theology. Among the interesting incidents recorded in the volume is one on p. 476. A woman expressed to Selim Effendi "a very decided desire to embrace Christianity; but she was afraid of her son. Her son had sometimes expressed the same wish; but he was afraid of his mother. Selim introduced them to each other." We have heard of similar instances of mutual dread and distrust among the converts from Mohammedanism. The eloquent pages 395-399 give reason to hope that the converts to a rational Christianity will ere long be multiplied, and the occasions of fear to make an open profession of it will be lessened.

SERMONS ON LIVING SUBJECTS. By Horace Bushnell. 12mo. pp. 468. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1872.

In the autumn of 1869 the writer of this notice engaged in a conversation with the late Professor F. D. Maurice on the published works of Rev. Henry Ward Beecher and Rev. Horace Bushnell. Mr. Maurice was familiar with the writings of both those gentlemen, and indeed with nearly all the American divines. He regarded Dr. Bushnell as a profound theo-

logian not less than a brilliant rhetorician. He considered the treatise on the Vicarious Sacrifice as the greatest work of Dr. Bushnell, and, indeed, the most original and powerful treatise on the atonement in the English language. The more common opinion, however, is that Dr. Bushnell's sermons are superior to his theological treatises. It is as a preacher that he will be remembered, with the highest gratitude, by those who will come after him. In the recently published *Hand-Book of American Authors*, by Mr. Francis H. Underwood, Dr. Bushnell is described in the following manner,—a manner in which the majority of his readers will coincide. “Neither his tastes nor his mental traits incline him to polemical theology; not that he is not a logical reasoner, but his nature is a sensitive one, and his discourses all show strong poetic feeling, and a tendency to illustrate spiritual truth by natural images and analogies, rather than to define it in exact formulas by sharp mathematical lines. It will be difficult to find in the sermons of any modern author so many passages of moral and intellectual beauty as Dr. Bushnell's discourses furnish. The current of his thought is strong, but not dogmatic; his piety is evidently the mainspring of his life, but it has no tinge of asceticism; his imagination is his strongest intellectual faculty, but it is made subservient to the noblest uses.

Dr. Bushnell is a man of unpretending and natural manners, of great energy, and with a certain decision that belongs to the leaders of men. His genius is exemplified in conversation as well as in his works, and he is among the most active and public spirited of citizens. The beautiful park in Hartford was secured, in a great measure, by his efforts.”—p. 212.

The present volume of sermons is unequal to some of his previous volumes, but is rich and stimulating.

LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND, delivered in Edinburgh in 1872. By Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, D.D., Dean of Westminster, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France. 8vo. pp. 207. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1872.

This volume was written *currente calamo*. It contains many good specimens of the author's oratorical style. It is very interesting, but not equally profound. Prefixed to the Lectures is the author's sermon delivered in Greyfriar's Church on the 7th of January, 1872. The sermon is entitled *The Eleventh Commandment*. The first Lecture is devoted to the Celtic Church; the Mediaeval Church; the Modern Episcopal Church in Scotland. The second Lecture is devoted to the Church of Scotland, that is, the Established Church, and explains its various divisions; first its National Independence; second, the Results of it; and third, its higher Religious Excellence. In this Lecture he speaks frankly of the Covenanters, the Secession, the Relief, the Old Lights, the New Lights, the Collegers, the Usagers, the Burghers, the Anti-burghers, the Free Church, the United Presbyterians, et al. The third Lecture is devoted to the Moderation of

the Church of Scotland; the fourth, to the Present and Future of the Church of Scotland. Here the writer has interesting notices of Dean Ramsay, Dr Chalmers, Edward Irving, Thomas Erskine, Robert Burns, and Walter Scott. It is not very common to consider the last two names as identified with Scotch theology. The volume is full of illustrations of the author's "broad church" views. It contains many remarks as bold as they are broad. We do not wonder that these Lectures before the Philosophical Institute of Edinburgh have excited much opposition. On that very account, as well as on others, they deserve to be read.

LUCRETIVS ON THE NATURE OF THINGS. Translated into English Verse by Charles Frederick Johnson. With Introduction and Notes. 12mo. pp. 333. New York: De Witt C. Lent and Co.; London: Sampson Low, Son, and Marston. 1872.

The poem of Lucretius on "The Nature of Things" has for ages attracted the attention of theologians. They have framed numerous answers to it—some logical and self-consistent, others forced and self-contradictory. They have evidently felt the power of several objections urged by Lucretius against the well-established truth. Indeed, some of these objections have been stated by him in words more apposite and exact than prosaic writers have selected. Poetry is not adapted to the discussion of the abstruse questions which Lucretius examines; yet in his hands it certainly accomplishes wonders. The pertinence of his style constantly surprises his intelligent readers. We regard the present translation of the poem as an admirable one. Its language is definite and precise, yet easy and mellifluous. It often reminds us of Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and suggests many phrases which have become household words in song. We have somewhat carefully examined the six books of the translation, and also the twenty-eight pages of notes, and feel ourselves much indebted to Mr. Johnson for the labor and conscientious care which he must have bestowed upon the volume. He may say of his translation, somewhat as Lucretius says of the original: "Thus I, in that my theme," etc. — p. 67.

THE OFFICE AND WORK OF THE CHRISTIAN MINISTRY. By James M. Hoppin, Professor of Homiletics and Pastoral Theology in Yale College. 8vo. pp. 620. New York: Sheldon and Company. 1870.

Professor Hoppin's works have not been noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* as they should have been. The volume which he published several years ago, on "Old England," has not been noticed at all. It merits high praise. It exhibits the author's delicate sensibility to the beautiful, and his uncommon honesty of mind. It is not so statistical and compact as a "Traveller's Hand-Book," and yet a tourist through Old England will derive more useful information, as well as more solid pleasure from it, than from almost any one of the "Travellers' Guides." It is the fruit of diligent

reading and accurate observation; is written in a chaste and yet affluent style. The present volume of Professor Hoppin, on "The Office and Work of the Christian Ministry," evinces the same fidelity to truth and delicacy of conscience, as well as taste, which are apparent in his other writings. It is well fitted to discourage all those tricks of rhetoric, those artificial and sensational qualities of style, which are so popular at the present day. It is skilfully adapted to encourage the cultivation of a correct and delicate taste. The remarks in Part II. Division 1 § 23, on Taste in Preaching; in Part II. Division 2 § 25, on Style, its invariable and related properties, and especially on Elegance of Language and Thought; § 32, 34, 40, on the Pastoral Office, cannot fail to make a good impression on the student. They are full of needed and wholesome truth. The statements in Part I. Division 1 § 3, on the History of Preaching, have suggested to several of his readers the proposal that Professor Hoppin prepare a general History of the Pulpit. He is a scholar; he loves his profession; he works because he is enamored of work; he is already well-read in English, French, and German literature; he has, or can have, command of the apparatus for writing such a history; and in various ways Providence appears to single him out as the right man for this important sphere of labor.

LIFE OF THE LATE JOHN DUNCAN, LL.D., Professor of Hebrew and Oriental Languages, New College, Edinburgh. By David Brown, D.D., Professor of Theology, Aberdeen. 12mo. pp. 496. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. 1872.

This volume is very interesting. Dean Stanley terms it "charming." Its arrangement of topics is not very clear and distinct, and it has some episodes which are rather confusing. Still, it is a remarkable volume and of much historical importance.

Dr. John Duncan was born in 1796 "at Gilcomston, in the parish of Old Machar — the more suburban of the two parishes which make up the city of Aberdeen." While a divinity student in the Established Church of Scotland he was at first an atheist, but was converted "to Theism, not to God; to Christianity, not to Christ." Under the influence of César Malan, in the year 1826, he became an humble Christian. After preaching at Persie Chapel, at Milton Church in Glasgow, he was appointed missionary to the Jews, and took up his abode at Pesth, the capital of Hungary. In 1843 he took the Professorship of the Hebrew and Oriental Languages at the New College in Edinburgh. He held this professorship twenty-seven years, and died at half past six o'clock in the morning of Saturday, February 26th, 1870.

His Letter to Sir James Graham, et al., furnishes a good illustration of his character. He had more learning than he knew how to use. He had many knowledges, but not much practical wisdom. He was a great man,

had a decided individuality of character, was himself, and nobody else. Being immersed in books, he was absent-minded to a painful degree. He was simple-hearted as a child, frank, open, and above-board; and his Christian character was pure and elevated. When in 1839 there occurred a vacancy in the Hebrew chair of the University of Glasgow, Mr. Duncan applied for the office. His application was printed in a pamphlet entitled: "Statement with Probatory Documents, for the Rev. John Duncan, A. M., Milton Church, Glasgow, as a Candidate for the Professorship of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow." When it is remembered that Mr. Duncan was one of the most humble, modest, and lowly of men, the manner in which he speaks of himself in this pamphlet will be doubly interesting. We insert his remarkable Letter entire.

Glasgow, 7th November, 1839.

"To the Very Reverend Duncan McFarlan, D.D., Principal of the University of Glasgow.

Induced by desire to promote the glory of God, the good of the church of which I have the honor to be a minister, the welfare of the house of Israel, and the interests of Eastern learning, I take the liberty of offering myself as a candidate for the Chair of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow. Assured that these interests are dear to the Electors, if I fail I shall be cheered by the consideration that Sparta has found a better man. If honored by the choice of the Faculties, I shall strive to evince my gratitude by constant remembrance of the adage: 'Spartam, quam nactus es, orna.'

I am, very reverend sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN DUNCAN."

"To the Right Honorable Sir James Graham, Bart., M.P., Lord Rector, the Dean of Faculty, the Very Reverend the Principal, and the Professors of the Faculties, of the University of Glasgow.

Having been induced, upon public grounds, stated in my letter of application to the Very Reverend the Principal, to offer myself as a candidate for the Chair of Oriental Languages in the University of Glasgow, and being placed in the somewhat untoward situation of a person who feels more conscious of fitness to grant certificates, than cognizant of individuals from whom it would beseem him to receive, I adventure—not unaware how little is in ordinary circumstances held due to one's testimony concerning himself—to submit the following *profession* of acquirements in the department of Oriental learning.

For upwards of fifteen years I have been a daily and delighted student of the Hebrew Bible, and, during the last twelve, I have contracted a pretty intimate acquaintance with the principal rabbinical writers. I think I might adventure to read according to the points from an unpointed Bible, *ad aperturam libri*—to translate, parse, and assign the reason (not the mere technical reason, but the rationale) of the points which I employ—

to read, or at least write, from the English version of the historical books into Hebrew at the moment.

I am acquainted not only with the best ancient and modern Christian grammarians, as Buxtorf, Mercer, DeDieu, Leusden, Hottinger, Schultens, Michaëlis, Gesenius, Winer, Ewald, Lee, Stuart, Nordheimer, etc., but also with those Jews who have written on Hebrew grammar in the Hebrew language, as Aben-Ezra, Rabbi David Kimchi, and Judah Ben-Zew.

In Chaldee I am acquainted, not only with the few passages which occur in the Bible, but also, with the Targums of Onkelos, the Yerushalmi, and that of Jonathan Ben Uzziel.

Of Jewish commentators on Scripture with whom I am acquainted, besides Aben-Ezra and Abarbanel, I may mention R. David Kimchi, a favorite with Christians for his close adherence to, and (for a Jew) clear exposition of, the letter; Rashi (R. Solomon Yarchi), who is idolized by the Jews who see nothing of the text but through the spectacles of his bitter, bigoted commentary; and Yalkut Shimōni, which is a congeal of all the odd, whimsical superstitious, and (but that one who trembles at God's word cannot but be grieved) the amusing stuff which constitutes the material of the Midrash, or metaphorical, and in their blind eyes, exalted and spiritual illustration.

Of law books, I may mention only the Mishnah, or text of the Talmud, with certain parts of the Gemāra, or extended commentary upon it; and with leisure, and the aid of Rashi's commentary, I feel it within my grasp to master all the difficulties of the latter, which forms by far the most abstruse part of Jewish learning, not only from the language, a very mixed Aramean (Chaldee), but principally from the subject, as a code of laws more difficult to be mastered than the Justinian Institutes, Pandects, and Novels of the Roman jurisprudence, or all the mysteries of English law.

As works subordinate to Talmudical law, I may mention only the Yad Chazākah of Rambam (R. Moses bar Maimon, or Maimonides), a copious, well-arranged, and perspicuous digest of the principles of Judaism; and the Arba Turim (four orders or ranks), which, as being more compendious, forms the every-day manual of the Jews:

I pass over controversial writers (as R. Joseph Albo, author of *Sepher Ikkārīm*, the author of the Book of Cosri, with second part by Nieto); metaphysical scholastics (as Maimonides in his *Moreh Nevōchīm*, Doctor Dubitantium); and writers in the department of the Belles Lettres (as the author of *Bechnath Olam*, the elegant *Luzattos*, and my friend Hoga, the translator into Hebrew of Pope's *Messiah*, and of M'Caul's *Old Paths*); historians, chronologists, and a long catalogue of *et ceteras*.

Of Cognate dialects, I may mention the Syriac Bible, — New Testament *ad aperturam libri*; in Arabic, the Bible, Corān, and several other books.

Other Oriental languages, not Cognate, would be of great importance to persons going to the East as missionaries, either to Jews or Gentiles, as well as in other capacities.

In Persian I read a long time ago a good deal, especially the Gulistan of Saadi.

In Sanscrit I have studied the grammars of Wilkins and of Böpp, and have read portions of the New Testament (version of the Serampore missionaries), and Nalus, an episode from the poem Maha-Bharata, edited by Bopp. This language is very interesting, not only as the oldest existing Japhetic speech, casting a flood of light on the etymology and grammar of the Greek, Latin, Teutonic, etc., but also as being the parent of most of the modern languages of India which stand related to it, as those of the south of Europe do to Latin....

In Bengali I have read the Gospel according to Matthew; in Hindostani, the Gospels and some other books. I have looked into the Gospels in Mahratti and other Indian dialects, and find the staple of the language to be Sanscrit.

In conclusion, with the exception of Cabbalistic works, which are exceedingly abstruse, and require deep study, I profess *all Hebrew*; and I would most willingly present myself, along with any other, for comparative examination, by any man throughout the world, whether Christian or Jew.

JOHN DUNCAN."

Among the testimonials which Mr. Duncan presented in favor of his appointment was one from a Jew who had been his Hebrew teacher. This testimonial was written in the Hebrew language, but was translated by Mr. Duncan for the "University authorities." The Jew speaks of himself as having had "many disciples of the Hebrew language,—the tongue of holiness," "every one of whom found me a hundred degrees above their learning, as they have testified of themselves." These pupils, "Ministers and Professors," cared only for the merest smattering in Hebrew, "but," adds the Jew, "not so my beloved, the trustworthy, whom I have found in this city, and by his letter of salutations to me in the holy language, signed himself Jochanan Duncan. And I have taught and I have read with him so many times in so many books, Mishna and Gemara, and Aggadah, and also in Yalkut; and I have seen him understanding the interpretation of the words well, and also understanding of his own knowledge (*ex propriâ scientiâ*). This is the man in whom I delight. The whole are the words of Judah Aryeh (Lion) ben Jacob." pp. 284-288.

CREATOR AND CREATION; or the Knowledge in the Reason of God and his Work. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. 8vo. pp. 360. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1872.

HUMANITY IMMORTAL. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. 8vo. pp. 362.

The last two books of Dr. Hickok are closely connected not only with each other, but also with all his previous metaphysical works. They really complete his philosophical system. His former works have been distinguished by the prominence given to reason as a source of knowledge.

While accepting the Kantian division of the intellect into sense, understanding, and reason, he goes far beyond Kant in the power which he attributes to the rational faculty. In Dr. Hickok's philosophy, the reason, instead of possessing merely empty forms of knowledge which it cannot fill, has power to know essential being—to go behind the phenomenal, and apprehend the invisible forces of which the worlds were made. Coleridge and others have, indeed, indicated substantially the same capacity; but by no other writer has this idea of the reason been presented in so scientific a form as we find it in Dr. Hickok's books.

His "Creator and Creation" is only a practical application of those distinctive rational faculties to the knowledge of God and his works. The book opens with an extended criticism of the two most prominent modern schools of philosophy—the Positive and the Critical. With a conciseness of statement and keenness of analysis rarely equalled, Dr. Hickok shows the inadequacy of these systems to attain any true knowledge of a Creator.

He then proceeds to give a more condensed, and also, we think, a more rigidly systematic exhibition than is found in his Rational Psychology, of the competency of the reason to know an outer world. "The sense apprehends distinct and definite *appearance*; the logical judgment gives probable conclusions as *opinion*; the finite reason, so far as it attains necessary and universal principles, secures *comprehensive knowledge*." Its capacity to attain such principles, and to remove those absurdities which the sense and understanding so often bring, is then shown by a variety of illustrations and arguments. There can be no sure knowledge, except as it rests upon rational insight. "The reason has both the outer and the inner in thorough contemplation," and may thus grasp absolute truth. In its very being the reason is competent to know God. What the reason, through its own intuitions, may know of God is then stated. It may know him as an absolute Person, possessing absolute being, sovereignty, agency, blessedness. Reason demands, also, that this absolute Creator shall be triune. "Essentially in reason there are three subsistent agencies, and these unite in giving to reason its own determinations; and the very essence of reason is this threefold acting." "Absolute reason is essentially threefold, and as creating reason necessarily in threefold personality." "The Father whom none seeth has the hidden ideal; the 'Word with God and was God' expresses the ideal in reality; and the Holy Spirit fashions the worlds and binds them in a universe, and so 'garnishes the heavens.'"

From such a Creator the origin of creation is sought. Dr. Hickok's method is seeking to apprehend in the phenomena those essential principles which must condition all facts.

"Creation in appearance must be in space and time; as standing or moving in space and time, creation must have essential force; and to hold and use force in organic construction and agency there must be life." All

that the universe is may be determined by what the reason knows of space and time, force and life. To give common space and common time, there must be a permanent, universal nature, and thus an absolute space and absolute time. Force is conceived of as the meeting and counterworking of two simple agencies of an executive will. Through the multiplication and interaction of three such simple forces, are derived all the laws of matter and all the phenomena of the inorganic world; through the super-induction of a life-power essentially distinct from the forces which constitute matter, are developed the various species of life; and through the addition of reason is produced humanity — the crowning work of creation.

"Humanity Immortal" forms thus a sequel to the former work. Its object is to show the divine idea in humanity as it is revealed in the historic progress of man from his creation until he is redeemed in glory. While it follows substantially the narrative of the scriptures, and conforms essentially to the prevalent theology of New England, the stand-point of the author is all the while a rational one. It is in the light of reason alone that he treats all the great questions concerning the origin of sin, the incarnation, atonement, resurrection, work of the Spirit, and a future life. His survey closes with the end of the mediatorial reign of Christ, "when the Son also himself shall be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all." Throughout the whole book the aim of the author is to show that reason in speculation and reason in revelation completely harmonize—that all the statements of the Scriptures are such as the highest reason also approves.

Such is a brief outline of these two remarkable works. Rarely has there been a more adventurous undertaking in the whole domain of philosophical speculation. In an inferior mind, such an attempt would seem presumptuous. Dr. Hickok has strength enough to make his courage respected. Those who dissent from his statements can scarcely fail to admire his extensive learning and profound thought. At a period, also, when the subtlest and ablest scepticism is boldly assuming that we can never know more than the relations subsisting between things unknown,—that the existence of God or self, mind or matter, lies hopelessly beyond our ken,—it is very encouraging to any believer in the supernatural to meet with works like these. For such scepticism they fairly treat and answer. In them physicists and positivists find at least a "foeman worthy of their steel," and are confronted with arguments which they cannot affect to despise as merely the baseless assertions of an irrational faith.

LOWELL LECTURES: 1871. Instinct; its Office in the Animal Kingdom, and its Relation to the Higher Powers in Man. By P. A. Chadbourne, LL.D. 16mo. pp. 307. New York: George P. Putnam and Sons. 1872.

President Chadbourne details many interesting facts in regard to the working of instinct in animals. He is familiar with natural history. In

reasoning on the higher functions of the human soul he is less clear and exact than in describing the functions of our animal nature. His definitions are not as perspicuous as they ought to be. Many of his readers will imagine that they disagree with him when they do not. His principles are often much better than his methods of expressing them. His mind appears to be too rapid for stopping to select the precise words. His facts, which are numerous, would have more power if they were classified more carefully.

As we understand him, he does not agree with the majority of physiologists in his definition of the main word in his Treatise. He says: "An instinct is simply an impulse to a particular kind of voluntary action which the being needs to perform as an individual or representative of a species, but which he could not possibly learn to perform before he needs to act. And the general term 'instinct' includes all the original impulses—excepting the appetites—and that knowledge and skill with which animals are endowed, which experience may call into exercise, but which it does not give" (p. 185.) Our author, however, does not believe, although he seems to assert, that instinct is "*simply* an impulse to a particular kind of *voluntary* action"; for he says that it includes certain degrees of "*knowledge and skill*," and he also teaches that we have instinctive *beliefs*, as well as impulses to perform voluntary acts. Thus he says: "We believe some things *instinctively*, and some things *intuitively*. . . . Instinct gives all that is necessary for action which we cannot learn by observation and experience—all that is necessary as a basis for experience, as well as the impulse to perform certain acts. . . . What we know *intuitively* will always be true. What we know *instinctively* is true only because this order of things is what it is. What we know intuitively we cannot believe to be different from what it is—it is, in this sense, *necessary* truth. What we believe *instinctively* might be different from what it is—it is contingent. . . . The use of instinct to animals and men is to give them impulses to action, and guidance in spheres where the appetites, as functional, cannot reach, to start them in the right direction, and to add impulses on the way; at the same time giving such knowledge and skill as could not be gained by experience" (pp. 230, 231). "The abstract notion of cause and effect, and of their necessary relation to each other, is *intuitive*. . . . But that belief in the uniformity of nature which influences action is not intuitive; it is partly instinctive, and partly from experience, in both man and animals" (p. 233). The difference between an *intuitive* and an *instinctive* belief is, then, according to President Chadbourne, not merely that the former has reference to *necessary* truth, and the latter to *contingent*, but also that the former "relates to abstract truth—to all that is necessary as a basis for correct *reasoning*, and for conducting the process," whereas the latter "belongs to beings as acting, and relates to the nature and possible combination of things and the order of events" (pp. 230, 231).

We would here ask: "Is it an intuitive or an instinctive belief that the adaptation of means to ends results from an adapting cause? Has this belief any more or less reference to action than the belief in the necessary relation of cause to effect? But does this belief in an adapting cause refer to a *necessary* truth? Is it not *possible* for an adaptation of means to ends to exist without an adapting mind? Should not President Chadbourne, then, have said that the difference between an intuitive and an instinctive belief is that between such a belief in a truth as results from evidence in the truth itself, and, on the other hand, such a belief as results from a tendency of the mind to believe it without any evidence in itself or out of itself? Is it not the very nature of instinct to act independently "of *instruction*" (Paley), independently of any *consideration* (Whately)? Hamilton says: "Instinct is an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge."

Having defined "instinctive belief," President Chadbourne considers the question whether man has an instinctive belief in the existence of God. He answers this question in the affirmative—not, however, with the meaning that man has, in his earliest thoughts on the subject, a clear and distinct knowledge of Jehovah, but with the meaning that man has certain instincts which "arise as naturally and necessarily as *impulses and conditions of progress* in the true knowledge of God and of our relations to him, as the animal instincts arise at certain times as the condition of growth in knowledge by experience" (p. 305). "These instinctive principles are: 1. Belief in some supernatural being or beings. 2. Belief in accountability or relationship to that being in such measure as for good or evil to come from it. 3. Belief in immortality and the continuance of this relation after death. 4. The instinct of prayer as a means of establishing relations with this being. 5. The instinct of worship, including the emotion of veneration and its expression" (p. 280). "These instinctive beliefs and the instinctive actions are . . . almost a perfect type of the instincts of a child towards a parent" (p. 284). The questions then arise: Is it proper to affirm that children have an instinctive belief in the existence of men and women who are parents? Does the instinctive principle of "veneration" in children, their instinctive impulse to request help or protection, imply their instinctive belief that certain men and women who have never disclosed their existence by producing any visible effects, yet have an existence, and are objects of this veneration, and are ready to aid and protect the children? Is the "belief in some supernatural being (named under 1.) the same as a belief in God, or merely a help and director to it? If it be a belief in God, then does it not imply an "innate idea" of him? If it be not a belief in God, but merely an aid to it, does it lead to such a belief more than to a belief in demons or centaurs? How can it be proved that man, antecedently to all reasoning from effect to cause, has this belief in a supernatural being?

THE HISTORY OF GREECE. By Prof. Dr. Ernst Curtius. Translated by Adolphus William Ward, M.A., Fellow of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, Professor of History in Owen's College, Manchester. Revised, after the last German edition, with an Index by W. A. Packard, Ph.D., Professor of Latin in the College of New Jersey. Vols. I., II., and III. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1872.

Curtius's History of Greece, unlike that of Mr. Grote, was not written for the purpose of maintaining any particular set of political principles. We always have some difficulty while reading the otherwise excellent work of Mr. Grote, in ridding ourselves of the suspicion that the partialities of the politician have affected to some degree the judgment of the historian. We have no such difficulty in reading the work of Curtius. We have on this account been specially gratified in observing that his judgment in regard to certain points in Grecian History, as, for instance, the comparative merits of the Athenians and Lacedemonians, substantially accords with that of the English historian. He criticises the character and conduct of the Lacedemonians with as unsparing a severity, and eulogizes the Athenians as warmly.

The strictly narrative portions of the work present but few points of difference as compared with standard English historians. It gives, however, what seem to us, at least, somewhat new views in reference to some events. We suppose, for example, that many readers, in common with ourselves, have wondered at the ease with which the huge army of Datis and Artaphernes was put to flight at Marathon by the comparatively diminutive forces of the Athenians. Curtius maintains that the Persian commanders, on finding that the Athenians were strongly entrenched at Marathon, gave up the idea of forcing a passage to Athens from that point; and that, on the day of the battle, their cavalry, which they had expected to use with so much effect against the enemy, had been already put on board the transport ships, and the fleet been prepared for an immediate start for Phalerus. Miltiades took advantage of these circumstances, and thus easily routed the undisciplined infantry. In this way the almost incredible quickness with which the Persians were defeated is easily explained.

To touch upon another point; one can hardly help feeling that this author ascribes to the ancient Greeks, the Dorians especially, a degree of intellectual, and especially aesthetic, culture beyond what the reality justifies. We may refer, for example, to the opening chapter of the second volume, and particularly to what is there said of the architecture of the ancient Greeks. We read this chapter, we must own, with less satisfaction than was the case with the work in general. We could wish that references to original authorities had been given more liberally.

It cannot be affirmed that the translation of this valuable history is in all respects remarkably well executed. We have now, at the distance of more than a third of a century since we read Mitford's history, a vivid im-

pression of its barbarous and uncouth style. The history before us is not in this respect as much superior to that of Mitford as we think it might very easily have been made.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE STATE
OF CONNECTICUT. 1872.

We notice this volume chiefly for the purpose of making brief extracts from Mr. Secretary Northrop's Report. These refer to the system of compulsory education as pursued in Germany. The Secretary says: "The principle of obligatory instruction was advocated by the people before it was enacted by the government. The address of Luther to the municipal corporations in 1554, contains the earliest defence of it within my knowledge, in which he says: 'Ah, if a State in time of war can oblige its citizens to take up the sword and the musket, has it not still more the power, and is it not its duty, to compel them to instruct their children, since we are all engaged in a most serious warfare waged with the spirit of evil, which rages in our midst, seeking to depopulate the State of its virtuous men? It is my desire, above all things else, that every child should go to school, or be sent there by a magistrate.'

"The germ of this system in Prussia is found in a decree of Frederic II. in 1763, 'We will that all our subjects,—parents, guardians, and masters,—send to school those children for whom they are responsible, boys and girls, from their fifth year to the age of fourteen.' This royal order was revived in 1794, and in the code of 1819 made more stringent." — p. 31.

"Mingling much with plain people in Germany and other countries where attendance at school is compulsory, I sought in every way to learn their sentiments on this question. After the fullest inquiry in Prussia, especially among laborers of all sorts, I nowhere heard a lisp of objection to this law. The masses everywhere favor it. They say education is a necessity for all. They realize that the school is their privilege. They prize it and are proud of it." — p. 29.

"Universal education, more than anything else, has fraternized the great German nation. It has improved her social life, ennobled her homes, promoted private virtue, comfort, and thrift, and secured general prosperity in peace. It has given her unequalled prestige and power in war. 'Whatever you would have appear in a nation's life, that you must put into its schools,' was long since a Prussian motto. The school has there been the prime agent of loyalty. Love of country is the germ it long ago planted in the heart of every child. The fruit now matured gladdens and enriches the whole land." — p. 30.

"In various parts of Prussia and Saxony I inquired of school directors, parents, and others. 'Do you have any difficulty in executing the coercive law?' The answers were all substantially the same. 'Many years ago,' replied one, 'there was some opposition. But the results of the law have

commended it to all, and they obey it without complaint, and almost without exception.' The present generation of parents, having themselves experienced its advantages, are its advocates. Said a resident of Dresden, 'A healthy child of school age can hardly be found in this city who has not attended school. Were the compulsory attendance to be decided tomorrow in Saxony by a plebiscite, it would be sustained by an almost unanimous verdict. Public opinion is now stronger even than the law. The people would sooner increase than relax its rigor.'"— pp. 30, 31.

THE LAST KNIGHT; a Romance Garland. From the German of Anastasius Grün. Translated, with Notes, by John O. Sargent. 12mo. pp. 200. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1871.

Anastasius Grün is a *nom de plume*; the real name of the writer being Count Von Anersburg, who for the last twenty-four years has borne a very conspicuous part in Austrian politics. He has found time, however, for literary pursuits; and before the appearance of *The Last Knight*, had given quite decisive evidence of brilliant powers as a poet; evidence which this latest offspring of his pen will greatly strengthen. Its scene is laid in the latter half of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth century; and it describes, in a vivid and interesting style, many of the incidents in the life of Maximilian I., the grandfather of Charles V., and his immediate predecessor in the German empire. The poem has been, as we learn, very popular in Germany; and, in its present English dress, will be read with no little delight by American readers.

FIFINE AT THE FAIR, and other Poems. By Robert Browning. 12mo. pp. 280. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1872.

It is an accepted canon of criticism that no book ought to be condemned as devoid of merit if it strongly impress on the mind of the reader even one valuable thought, or if its perusal conduce to the reader's intellectual benefit in but one respect. Applying this canon to *Fifine at the Fair*, it must be judged to have merit for illustrating so clearly, in the way of contrast, the absolute necessity of a poem's having some degree of intelligibility in order that it may be read with satisfaction; and also for the intellectual discipline furnished by the effort on the part of the reader to understand it. The book is certainly very beautifully printed; and, to such readers as shall succeed in fathoming its meaning, it will doubtless give pleasure.

OLRIG GRANGE. Edited by Hermann Küntz, Philol. Professor. 12mo. pp. 208. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1872.

Prof. Herman Küntz is, we suppose, a mythical personage. The poetry which he has given to the world in this volume, while not of the highest order, seeming to be the product of the understanding rather than of the

imagination, deserves to be spoken of in altogether commendatory terms. The two principal characters are Thorold and Hester, a brother and sister, living, at the time the poem opens, at Olig Grange, ardently attached to each other, both religious, though in a somewhat vague and dreamy sense, and inclined, we think, to regard somewhat contemptuously all precise and definite religious convictions. The soliloquies of these persons, together with two or three other subordinate characters, make up the contents of the volume. The diction in which they utter themselves is pure and simple; and while, as we have said, the thought is not always altogether unexceptionable, the work as a whole is one of much merit.

SONGS OF THE SIERRAS. By Joaquin Miller. 12mo. pp. 299. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1871.

Joaquin Miller is an author who has but recently come into public notice. The songs of the Sierras, as our readers well know, is a collection of poems, the scene of which is laid among the western mountains of North America. They are narrative poems for the most part. One of them, *Ina*, is in the form of a dialogue. The chief interest of the poems does not attach itself so much to the story as to the reflections and descriptions of scenery and character with which it is accompanied. There is a vigor and freshness and freedom from conventionalism about the whole work which renders it quite entertaining. The freedom from conventionalism sometimes, however, verges on coarseness. Such lines as these ought never to have been allowed to deform pages otherwise so attractive:

"For what the devil could the lightning show
In such a night as this, I should like to know."

THE TWO BROTHERS, AND OTHER POEMS. By Edward Henry Bickersteth, M.A., author of "*Yesterday, To-Day, and Forever.*" 12mo. pp. 324. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1871.

The poems contained in this volume "have been written," as Mr. Bickersteth tells us in the preface, "from time to time during the last twenty-seven years, and have many of them appeared in print before." "Some," as we are informed by Dr. Palmer, in his well-written Introductory Notice, "were prize-pieces, written in the author's university days;" a piece of information which we hope will not prejudice the mind of any reader against them. It is scarcely necessary for us to go into any account of the characteristic features of the poems. That they possess in general a large share of merit, that they are pervaded by an elevated moral tone, that their diction is pure and classical, that their whole influence, alike upon the intellect and the heart, is stimulating and ennobling, no one who has read "*Yesterday, To-Day, and Forever,*" can need to be told by us.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

ST. ELIZABETH.¹

BY PROF. JOHN P. LACROIX, DELAWARE, OHIO.

THE age we live in is not fond of saints. It is too self-conscious for that. It is so bedazzled with the glories of the great present as to be but blear-eyed for the shining places of the past. And it is too intensely democratic to be very apt in perceiving the exceptional worth of any that break in upon the monotony of its own dead-level. It scarcely even believes in saints at all. At least, so far as it believes in them, it is not in saints of the stumbling past, nor of the working present, but only of a certain ill-defined, longed-for future. And the church, in its vital (Protestant) phase, is similarly disposed. It has so vehemently protested against its former (Catholic) self as to have damaged its sense for history — as to have obscured its consciousness of the continuity of its own self-development. Having too largely isolated itself from its past, it is in no slight danger of super-self-exaltation; that is, in view of the unquestionably great work yet before it, and in forgetfulness of the fact that it is itself simply a fruit of its own much-disdained past, — simply a single link in the great chain of divine, world-regenerative influence, handing to the future the good it receives from

¹ Histoire de Sainte Elisabeth de Hongrie Duchesse de Thuringe, par Le Comte de Montalembert. — Die Heilige Elisabeth: Vortrag am 20. März 1868, zu Leipzig gehalten von Dr. K. F. A. Kahnis.

the long past, augmented by the (exceptionally great, it may be) momentum of *one* additional factor, — it is in danger, in each present generation, of exalting its mission above measure, and of losing sight of its simply co-ordinate relation to the generations of the past, into whose accumulative fruit it has in its turn entered. And this tendency involves not merely the danger of a temptation, but also the actuality of injustice and ingratitude. If the extensive Christian activity of the present generation should result in the ushering in of millennial time, it would, in fact, not be simply *we* who should have been instrumental in this great work; but this work would be the composite result of the accumulative Christian development of all the ages of the past *plus* the increment of one generation.

But the whole Protestant church is not guilty of this characteristic sin of inexperienced youth. And the revival of an interest in sound historical criticism, now so extensively prevalent, will do much toward awakening the whole church both to its obligations to, and to the instruction it may derive from, its own past. And precisely here will be one of the happiest results of this form of study, namely, not merely that abstract justice will be done to the past, but also that the church itself will rise out of the sin of historical injustice — that it will be brought to a thorough consciousness of the truth that its own past history and the lives of its long-departed saints can be judged justly, not in the reflected light of our own advanced stand-point, but solely and simply in that of the stand-point to which the church had, in the particular age in question, attained.

The application of this solely just criterion of history leads to some admirable results. It is a wonderful equalizer. The man who by the aid of a press prints a thousand pages in an hour is not necessarily more thorough in the virtue of work than the monk of the past, who with his single pen could prepare but a single page. The virtue is not in the material result, but in the obstacles overcome in accomplishing it. Given an equally sincere conscientiousness in working for

the honor of God, and we cannot less admire the Christian knight of the Middle Ages, who, forsaking home and goods, staked his life for the rescue of the holy sepulchre, than the modern missionary, who, taking wife and money along with him, devotes his life to instructing the heathen. And, in one respect the advantage of sympathy is in favor of the man of the past. The element of the romantic and tragic belongs to those times when the real and the ideal were as yet far apart. And in proportion as humanity is raised to a normal condition, this element seems destined gradually to vanish away. Our heart thrills with pity and admiration, not for him whose harmonious inner nature harmoniously develops itself under harmonious outward conditions, but for him who amid inner chaos and heart-breaks tragically struggles, in the face of outward hostilities and obstacles, toward a but obscurely perceived ideal. We shed our tears not for the angels who kept their first estate, but for the wandering and suffering children of Eve in their obscure and oft-baffled groping after the good which they have not. And these tears and this sympathy are not merely an aesthetic luxury; they are also a fine antidote to narrow-heartedness, and an excellent nurturer of a healthful Christian disposition.

In the light of this historical criterion, we propose here a hasty excursion into the past, into the so-called dark ages, and a brief interview with an eminent daughter of the church — one whose gentle spirit and rich virtues entitle her to a front place among the elect women of the race.

The background of our picture is formed by the first three decades of the thirteenth century — that wonderful age (between the fourth and the fifth crusades) when knight-errantry was at its height; when Jerusalem was the bone of contention between the hordes of the East and the chevaliers of the West, when the magnificent popes Innocent III. and Gregory IX. raised the tiara to its most dreadful glory, when the high-spirited Philip Augustus and the chivalrous St. Louis made France respected and admired, when the

sturdy barons of England extorted the Magna Charta from the treacherous John, when Saracen children still shuddered at the mention of the lion-hearted king Richard,—in a word, when the Catholic church was in its noon-day glory, and when some of the greatest movements of all history were taking place.

The local scene of our narrative is the romantically situated Wartburg castle, in central Germany—the spot which became so celebrated, three centuries later, from having given a hiding-place to the outlawed reformer of Wittenburg. At the period in question, the Wartburg was the fortified seat of power of the powerful landgraves or dukes of Thuringia. Here the widely-related house of Wettin had ruled from time almost immemorial. Here prevailed in the highest degree the spirit of chivalry, the inspiration of the minnesingers, and the enthusiasm for the crusades. Into this age, and into such influences when they were at their very highest, falls the transient, but halo-encircled life of St. Elizabeth.

The sources from which we draw, in the main, are the two works above inscribed. The authors stand at the opposite poles of the Christian world, and their works happily complement and correct each other. The elaborate work of the Count de Montalembert is manifestly a labor of love, and was written at a time when he stood in special need of a more deeply religious heart-life to console him for his partial sacrifice of cherished political principles, the advocacy of which he had given up at the behest of his church. A Catholic by thorough conviction, and an admirer of mediaeval Catholicism as the ideal of the church, he has gone back to this remote age, and after infinite pains has wrought out a life of St. Elizabeth which reads like a very romance, and which has consequently enjoyed immense popularity. The labor bestowed upon his work may be judged of from the fact that he cites as sources actually used in its preparation no less than forty-three printed works (fourteen of them anterior and twenty-nine posterior to the

Reformation, seventeen of which are of Protestant authorship), most of them special biographies of the saint, and sixteen unprinted works, some of them quite ancient. . But the so deeply-rooted Catholic faith of the great Catholic layman has rendered the result of his studies a "splendid compound of truth and poetry." He records unhesitatingly the innumerable miracles which the inventive popular imagination of later times attributed to Elizabeth, and which monkish writers have carefully collected. Indeed, he expressly says: "We confess, without qualification, that we believe, with the best faith in the world, in all the most miraculous incidents that have been related of the saints of God in general, and of St. Elizabeth in particular." In all essentially historical data, however, he coincides with the more judicious Protestant historians.

Our second source — in fact, the one which we have most closely followed — is a careful historical portraiture, which was delivered as a lecture, in Leipzig, in 1868, by the evangelical theologian, Dr. Kahnis. His work is based on a discriminating study of the earliest and best sources. Of the general subject, this author says: "The main facts of the life of Elizabeth rest on data which every capable student of history holds as worthy of confidence. There are three sources, especially, whose contents, with the slight sifting which must be applied to all historical documents, are stamped throughout with the character of credibility. First, the 'Report of Conrad of Marburg,'¹ the confessor of Elizabeth, to Pope Gregory IX. This document relates nothing of her life which is not entirely credible, as is evidenced by the fact that, though the report was prepared in order to induce the pope to canonize her, yet it contains not a single miracle, — which surely would not have been the case had there been any to record. Secondly, we possess the sworn 'Utterances of her four maid-servants,'² who were unquestionably capable of

¹ *Epistola magistri Conradi de Marburch ad Papam, de vita B. Elisabeth.*

² *Libellus de dictis quatuor Ancillarum S. Elisabethae, sive Examen miraculorum et vitae ejus.* — Imprimé dans la collection "des Scriptores rerum Saxonicarum."

telling the truth, and who evidently intended to do so. These utterances were carefully sifted by an ecclesiastical court devoid of prepossessions in favor of Elizabeth. Also, this source of information, though containing much that is wonderful, yet contains no miracles proper. Thirdly, there exists a 'Biography'¹ of her consort, Lewis IV., by Berthold, a monk of Reinhardsbrunn." "All other sources," says Kahnis, "must be used with great caution." We shall, of course, take Dr. Kahnis as the safer guide in all cases where the element of the miraculous presents itself.

At the opening of the thirteenth century, the ruler who swayed his sceptre from the chateau of the Wartburg was the knightly Hermann, Landgrave of Thuringia and Hesse, and Count Palatine of Saxony. He was among the most potent of the minor crowned-heads of Europe, and was widely respected as a generous and high-minded prince. His wife, Sophie of Bavaria, was of kindred spirit, and both were obedient members of the traditional church. Their ardent fondness for poetry induced them to make their chateau a hospitable resort for the minstrels and minnesingers who in that age wandered from court to court in Europe. The greatest of these bards, Walter von der Vogelweide, says of Hermann: "Many other princes are very gracious; but none is so generous as he. He was such in the past, and he is such still. No one suffers from his caprice. The flower of Thuringia blooms in the midst of snow; its summer and its winter glory are gentle and beautiful as its spring-time."

In the year 1206 — so runs a popular tradition — Duke Hermann was visited by six of the most eminent minnesingers. A bitter strife having broken out among them, it was thought necessary to despatch one of them, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, to distant Hungary, in order to beg the great necromancer and astrologer, Klingsohr, to come and

¹ Das Leben des edeln tuginhafthin lantgraven Ludewigis der de was elich gemahel unde wert der heiligin hochgebornen Frouwin Elizabeth. . . . das beschrebin hat er Berlt sin cappellan der yme heymelich gewest ist von joggent bis yn synen tod.

settle it. Now, when said Klingsohr arrived the next year, he not only settled the rivalry of the singers, but also, on being asked by some Thuringians to relate to them something new, suddenly cast a wise look at the stars, and oracularly said: "I see a beautiful star, which, rising in Hungary, beams from thence to Marburg, and from Marburg sheds its light upon the whole world. Know ye that this night there is born to the king of Hungary a daughter, who shall be called Elizabeth, who shall be given in marriage to the prince of this country, who shall be a holy woman, and whose holiness shall delight and console all Christendom." Hermann, hearing of this strange incident, called for Klingsohr and treated him for some days with great munificence, after which he went back to Hungary — "in a single day." As the age was not free from superstition, the Thuringian duke and duchess were awakened to no little curiosity. They made careful inquiry of all travellers who arrived from Hungary, and learning that, in fact, a princess was born to King Andrew II. and Queen Gertrude in the year in question (1207), and that while yet a mere infant she gave evidence of great piety, they conceived a strong desire actually to fulfil the prediction of Klingsohr, and to obtain the promising child in marriage for their young son Lewis.

The myth of Klingsohr seems to have sprung up as a means of explaining how the young Elizabeth came to be brought from so distant a place as Hungary. The most probable supposition is, that it was brought about through Bishop Eckbert of Bamberg, who was both brother to the Hungarian queen and also under close relations to the Thuringian duke. However this may be, a stately embassy of high-born men and women actually arrived from Thuringia at Pressburg, in 1211, begging for the young Elizabeth, as a consort for the eleven-year-old Lewis. The king and queen of Hungary welcomed the embassy, and, after hearing a statement of the potency and virtues of the Thuringian family, consented to affiancé their child, and to send her away with the embassy forthwith. "I confide to thine honor as a knight," said the

king to Varilla, the chief of the embassy, "this my choicest treasure." To which Varilla replied: "I will gladly take her under my protection, and be true to her so long as I live." Thereupon the royal pair delivered to the embassy their four-year-old daughter, "laden with silk and gold, and lying in a golden cradle." And they threw into the bargain manifold goblets, precious crowns, rings, bracelets, and a silver bath-tub, together with an abundance of garments in purple and silk, and a large sum in coin. After a series of gay festivals, the embassy set out with their little treasure, and in due time arrived in Thuringia. Here the betrothment was celebrated with great state, and the little pair placed side by side in a little bed, whereupon a second season of gay banqueting, dancing, and minstrel-singing ensued.

The young Elizabeth was treated with the greatest care. She was confided to Judith, a woman who remained faithful to her through sunshine and sorrow. The utterances of Judith afford us many glances into the earlier life of her mistress. Elizabeth, it appears, had playful ways, like other little girls. She hopped and danced and played hide-and-seek. In all her plays, however, she made religion play a part.¹ Her most preferred hiding-place was near the chapel door. When measuring herself with other children she uttered a sly *Ave* while prostrate on the ground. In dancing she would take her turn only once, "giving up the others for God's sake." All the pawns she won she gave away to poor girls. Her preferred tarrying-places were consecrated spots. Before she could yet read, she loved to kneel at the altar with an open psalm-book before her. At mass she laid aside her ornaments. "From early childhood," says Judith, "she had God before her eyes, calling upon him in all things and considering everything in relation to him." "In every human being," says Kahnis, "there is an innate current

¹ V ans avoit d'aage droit
 Sainte Ysabiaux la Dieu aimée,
 La fille le roi de Hongrie,
 Quant a bien faire commensa.

— Monk Rutebeuf, 14th Century.

toward God, which in Christian children, receives the consecration of the spirit of Christ. Very rarely, however, has the sense for God been so lively in children as in the case of this wonderful maiden." This religious tendency is not explainable from any surroundings of her childhood, whether in Hungary or in Thuringia. "It is simply a mystery of divine grace."

Two circumstances of her experience at the Wartburg, however, served to give deep root to her religious tendency. Two years after her arrival she had to hear that her beloved mother had been cruelly murdered. And the serious impressions wrought upon her by this were rendered doubly deep and permanent by the innumerable petty vexations and persecutions inflicted upon her by the worldly-mindedness of her companions. This unpleasantness was greatly increased after the death of the Landgrave Hermann, in 1216. So long as he lived he had treated the little princess with the greatest tenderness, and allowed no one to embarrass her in her religious practices. But the duchess Sophie, under whose care Elizabeth now fell, was of a different spirit. She was displeased with the excessive devotion of the little girl, and frequently manifested her disapprobation. And her vain little daughter, Agnes, took delight in seconding this disapprobation, not hesitating to tell Elizabeth that she was fit only to be a chamber-maid. In fact, it soon became a settled opinion in the whole court, with one exception, that she had very little resemblance to a princess.

This state of things could but render the condition of Elizabeth uncomfortable. She was, says one of her historians, like a lily among thorns.¹ She felt constrained to seek out new companions: she found them among the humble citizen daughters of Eisenach, and even among the maids set apart to her service. Above all she delighted to see gathered around her the children of the poor, and to distribute little

¹ Velut lilium inter spinas, innocens Elisabeth florens et germinans pungebatur aculeis, sed humilitatis ac patientiae fragrans suavitatis diffundebat odorem. — Monk Theodore, first printed in 1520.

gifts to them. And her humility was not only charitable, but also deeply religious, as a little incident will show. On occasion of a church festival, the duchess and all the ladies of the court repaired to a solemn service in gayest attire. While kneeling before an image of the dying Saviour, Elizabeth was overcome by her emotions, and, laying aside her glittering crown, devoutly prostrated herself on the floor. On seeing this her mother-in-law was deeply chagrined, and addressed her in sharp reproaches. Elizabeth rose up in tears and said to her: "Dear lady, do not blame me. Behold here before my eyes my God and my King, this gentle and merciful Jesus, crowned with piercing thorns; who am I but a vile creature? and should I remain crowned with pearls and gold and precious stones in his presence? My crown would be but a mockery of his." And immediately she gave utterance to her heart in tears.¹

There remained to her but one human consolation,—the love of the young Lewis. All the intrigues of the young princesses and all the wiles of his mother, had not sufficed to check his affection for the little stranger. From the time when they were first brought together, his young heart seems to have found a home in hers. They had constantly associated together, and called each brother and sister. Rarely did he return from even a brief absence without some little pledge of his affection, a chaplet, a crucifix, or purse, or jewel. On one occasion, however, when the present was lacking, the enemies of Elizabeth attempted to make capital of it at her expense. Saddened at this, she improved the first opportunity to open her heart to the sturdy Varilla, to whose protection her royal father had confided her. The good chevalier was deeply touched at this confidence, and took an early occasion to sound the young duke. "Be pleased, my young lord," said he to the duke, "to answer me a single question." "Speak out," said Lewis, "I will give you satisfaction." "What, I pray you, do you think of doing with

¹ *Vulneraverat jam tunc charitas tenerum cor, gladiusque dominicæ passionis pertransierat animam ejus delicatam. — Theod.*

lady Elizabeth, whom I brought for you? Will you make her your wife, or will you violate your word and send her back to her father?" Hereupon Lewis rose up, and, stretching his hand toward the Inselberg, said: "Do you see that mountain standing before us? Now, if it were of solid gold from base to summit, and if all that gold were given to me on condition of sending away my Elizabeth, I would not think of doing it. Let people think and say what they please of her, for my part I love her, and I love nothing on earth but her." On saying this, he drew from his pocket a precious gift, and asked Varilla to bear it to her, as a new pledge of his devotion.

The moment was now approaching when Lewis was to fulfil his promise to Elizabeth, and recompense her for the chagrin she had suffered. In 1218, at the end of his eighteenth year, he had received the solemn consecration of knighthood. Shortly thereafter he successfully drew his sword against the warrior archbishop of Mayence. On returning from this short and brilliant campaign, he expressed his intention of accomplishing the marriage.

The marriage took place in 1220, and was celebrated, according to the custom of the age, with a series of gay festivities, — with song and dancing and knightly sports. Elizabeth was fourteen years old and her husband twenty. They clung to each other with the tenderest and most spiritual love,¹ and still continued to call each other brother and sister. Elizabeth could conceive of no higher bliss than to lead a humble pastoral life in the society of her husband. Once she said to him: "I have thought out a manner of life, how we two might live right happily and pleasing to God." "Very well," answered the duke, "what kind of a life would that be?" "I would wish that we were poor," said she, "and had but one spot of land that could be tilled with one plough, and two hundred sheep; you could do the

¹ Sanctus cum sancta, innocens cum innocente, et non tam carnale quam spirituale connubium sortiti, invicem se in caritate Domini, supra quam credi valeat, dilexerunt. — Theod.

ploughing and I would care for the sheep." "Ay, my sister," answered the duke, "if we had a farm and two hundred sheep we would no longer be poor, but well off." But their quiet home-life suffered many interruptions. As a prince of the empire, Lewis was required to march into North Germany and help bring about peace with Denmark. Then he had to march to Italy and help Frederic II. in his struggle with the confederates of Milan. So that he was frequently long absent. During his absence Elizabeth uniformly demeaned herself as a widow. So soon as he returned she adorned herself anew; not, as she said, from worldly vanity, but in order to please her husband, so that he might love her alone, and that she might receive from the heavenly Author of marriage the prize of eternal life. Whenever it was practicable, she was accustomed to go with him on his journeys. At one time she rode with her husband thirty-three miles in a single day, without partaking of anything but bread and water. Berthold relates that on one occasion, while attending mass, she was so absorbed in the contemplation of the majestic form of her husband, as to forget the presence of Christ, and that thereupon she fell into a paroxysm of uncontrollable penitence.

So beautiful a soul as that of Elizabeth cannot well be conceived of without a beautiful body. According to Ursinus she was very beautiful, though not as the old German painters represent her, of slender form and blond hair, but of medium size and a brunette. Nowhere is she presented as a highly-intellectual woman with talents for ruling. All that she has uttered is significant only as the expression of a deep heart pouring its life out in its words. In fact, heart was her whole being; her life element and her gift from God was love. Though loving her husband above all other creatures, this love was only a reflex of her love to God.¹ Though touched with that mysticism in which the Middle Ages so

¹ Apropos to her wedlock life Montalembert quotes :

'La lor concordia e i lor lieti sembianti,
Amore e maraviglia e dolce sguardo
Faceano esser cagion de' pensier santi."

Dante, Parad., c. xi.

abounded, her religion never degenerated to a mere mystical enjoyment. She is ever conscious that true love to God consists in the breaking of self-will and in virtualizing this love in love to our fellows.

Elizabeth was extremely strict and conscientious in the fulfilment of her duties toward God. She prayed day and night. Not unfrequently she lay kneeling at her bedside until her exhausted powers yielded to sleep. One of her maidens, Ysentrude, who was deep in her confidence, relates that she was required to awaken her to prayer at midnight by pulling her by the toe. Tradition has it that on one occasion the maid-servant pulled, by mistake, the duke's toe, and that the surprised warrior sprang for his armor and was on the point of creating a little tragedy. An explanatory word from Elizabeth, however, sufficed to change the tragedy into a pleasant little comedy.

As an instance of her conscientiousness, it is related that having made a vow to partake of no food that had the least appearance of having been unjustly obtained, and, that at one period, the relations between landlord and serf having become complicated in legal disputes, she was reduced, by this vow, to very great embarrassment. It sometimes so happened that at splendid banquets she could partake of nothing but a little honey or venison, or even of bread and water. On these occasions she felt required to apply the same rule to her own handmaids. She had often to say to them: "To-day we can only eat, or to-day we can only drink." But whenever she could with a good conscience do both, then she said, clapping her hands like a little child: "To-day we will have it nicely, for we can both eat and drink."

With the full consent of her husband, Elizabeth had submitted her own broken will unreservedly to the will of her confessor. This priest was Conrad of Marburg, and "his will was as hard as iron." His principal means of discipline was blows. An example or so will illustrate it. On one occasion, while visited by the duchess of Meissen, Elizabeth received an order from Conrad to attend one of his sermons. She allowed

this visit to prevent her from obeying. Thereupon Conrad sent word to her that he would resign his office. She hastened at once with her maidens into the presence of the stern confessor, and begged upon her knees for forgiveness. Conrad finally yielded, attributing the chief blame to her servants, who then received, on the spot, a sound thrashing. A religion that consisted largely in legal forms and external discipline was so thoroughly characteristic of the Middle Ages, that it is not to be expected that so humbly devout a woman as Elizabeth would rise above it. She was free of all Pharisaic pretense, however, and retained a cheerful spirit in the midst of tears and bitter self-tortures. The beautiful myth, that on one occasion, when bearing a basketful of bread to the poor, she was unexpectedly met by the duke, and somewhat sharply accosted as to what she was there carrying, and that in her embarrassment having answered, "Roses," God intervened in her behalf and made good this untruth of abashed love to the poor, by transforming the bread into roses, expresses finely her own sense, but not that of the duke, who, in fact, conceded to her the fullest liberty in such things.

There is no good evidence that she ever performed real miracles. There is evidence, however, that she believed herself in mysterious communion with a higher world. She believed that deeply significant spiritual manifestations had been made to her. Her deep humility, however, never permitted her to explain them. She carefully avoided attracting to herself the eye of the multitude. When making her ceremonial visit to church after child-birth, she avoided the gaudy display usual on such occasions, and went in woollen dress and bare-footed down the stony declivity of the Wartburg to some humble church in the distance, and thus presented her child to God. Her leisure hours at home she spent with her maidens in spinning wool and in making clothes for the poor. In poor families she often volunteered to be god-mother. She gave special attention to poor women at their confinement, often visiting them at a distance and bearing to them gifts. She delighted to attend the burials

of poor people. Her love to Christ induced her to show the greatest kindness to the most wretched of those for whom he had died. But she always exercised her charity with the least possible publicity. Once her maidens surprised her, washing the sores and dressing the hair of a frightful looking beggar in a secret recess of her garden.¹ Though of delicate health she hesitated not in the hottest weather to enter the pestilential hovels of all manner of sick persons. At the time of taking the eucharist she not only washed the hands and feet of numerous lepers (meaning thereby to do a direct service to Christ), but even "kissed their horrible ulcers."

For the permanent benefit of the sick she founded at the foot of the Wartburg a hospital, and received into it all kinds of sufferers, especially poor and abandoned children. When she descended from the Wartburg and visited them, the little ones gathered about her and called her mother, and rejoiced in her little gifts. In the years of scarcity 1225-26, the Wartburg was visited by swarms of the poor from far and near, and Elizabeth was a very Joseph to the starving. Everything possible was given away. She even gave her royal garments, bidding the receivers to dispose of them in distant markets, and thus help their necessities. To those who could labor she gave, until the next harvest, shoes, shirts, and sickles. One poor woman was so delighted with her gifts as to exclaim that she never before knew such a joy, and to fall dead on the spot.

When her husband, after these years of scarcity, had returned from Italy, the frivolous-minded at his court endeavored to represent to him Elizabeth's charity in a displeasing light. But the duke disregarded their complaints, and said: "Let her continue well-doing, and give away what she pleases for God's sake, so only that she does not give away the Wartburg itself and Neuenburg."

¹ *Mendicum horrendum aspectu capitis infirmitate laborantem, secreta assumpsit, caputque ejus in sinu suo reclinans, horridos capillos ipsius sanctis manibus totondit, etc. . . . Supervenientibus correpta pedissequis ridebat et tacebat. — Theod.*

To all appearance, happy days were now dawning for Elizabeth. Her husband had returned from a long absence. God had already given them two children. Their oldest was a son, the subsequent duke Hermann; the second, a daughter, became the eminent Sophie of Brabant. A third, yet unborn, they dedicated to God in the cloistral life. It became Gertrude, celebrated as abbess at Wetzlar.

But alas for all earthly hopes! As the happy wife one day, in gay, child-like fondling with her beloved, put her hand into his pocket, she drew out thence a crucifix, the badge of a crusader. At this sight she was so overcome with forebodings that she fell breathless to the floor. As a submissive Catholic, however, she could not in sober judgment say anything against this Christian undertaking. She quenched her feelings as a wife, and made the terrible sacrifice.

Lewis collected his warriors at Kreuzburg on the Werra, settled the regency, and on the day appointed took solemn leave of his assembled and afflicted¹ people, and set out upon his last march. His parting with Elizabeth is one of the most affecting scenes in all history. But the gentle wife was unable to take a formal leave once and for all. She rode after him from town to town—from day to day.² Finally, the stout-hearted Rudolph von Vargila manned himself, and suggested to them both that it was time for the final separation. The duke showed his Elizabeth, at the final moment, a ring, as a badge of his love for life or death, and then, invoking the blessing of God upon her, set out for Italy. Here he joined the hosts of Frederick II. But as they were on the point of embarking for Palestine, a violent fever seized upon the duke. He tarried a few days in

¹ *Erat ibi tunc moestitudo maxima, luctus et planctus ingens, voces miserae, larga lacrymarum effusio cum rugitu anxio et clamore.* — Theod.

² *Tunc reversuram vis amoris et separationis dolor retinuit, et ad iter unius diei progredi compulsi; sed nec ista suffecit progressio, processit adhuc discessionis impatiens, diei alterius iter complens. . . . Quis gemitus, quae suspiria, quis singultus, quae lacrymae, quis motus vel strepitus cordis, ubi tam inopportuna et vehemens scissio, etc.* — Theod.

Otranto; but the disease advanced so rapidly that he soon gave up all hope. He then called for the holy eucharist. When in the very hands of death, he opened his eyes from delirium, and said to his attendants: "See you not those white doves?" Then he added: "With these white doves I must soar away."¹

These were his last words. Amid the unutterable grief of his brave knights, an embassy was despatched with the sad tidings to the bereaved duchess. It was thought best to reveal the matter first to her mother-in-law. This woman, on obtaining the control of her own grief at the loss of her favorite son, ventured into the presence of the unsuspecting Elizabeth. "Be strong, my daughter," said the duchess widow, "and give not way at that which Providence has brought upon thy husband, my son." Elizabeth thought of imprisonment. "Well," said she, resignedly, "if my brother is captured, then he can be delivered by the help of God and our friends." But Sophie answered: "He is dead." Elizabeth, dropping her folded hands upon her knees, exclaimed: "Dead! dead, is he! Then is the world and all the glory of the world dead for me!" Then, rising distractedly, she ran in utter bewilderment through all the chambers of the Wartburg, finding no consolation. "But," says the good monk Berthold, "the Comforter of widows and orphans, the Holy Ghost, proved also her Comforter."

But more misfortune came soon upon her. The brothers of her husband, Henry and Conrad, in contempt of her son Hermann, seized the ducal authority. And with them the worldly party came into power on the Wartburg. It was an hour of darkness for Elizabeth. In ruthless defiance of all right, human and divine, duke Henry drove his sister-in-law from the home of her beloved Lewis.

In the cold of mid-winter, in January, 1228, Elizabeth descended from the Wartburg to Eisenach. Strange to say,

¹ Quo dicto, in pace obdormiens, vir christianissimus pro Christi nomine exsul et peregrinus, Christi cruce signatus a peregrinatione vitæ præsentis rediens ad patriam, ad Dominum emigravit. — Theod.

no one was willing to receive her. Fear of offending the new dukes shut all doors against her. Finally, a humble tavern-keeper ventured to allow her to pass the night in a miserable kennel of a room that sometimes served for swine. Early the next morning, before it was yet light, she crept to the Franciscan cloister, and begged that a *Te Deum* be sung in praise to God for having permitted her to suffer for his cause. Now came also her maid-servants from the chateau, with her little fatherless children. While in perplexity whither she should seek refuge from the bitter cold, an order came from the Wartburg that she should repair to the house of a certain officer, an old enemy of hers. This man assigned her in his great house a narrow, damp corner. She could not stay long here, and, bidding the cold walls adieu, she returned to the wretched den where she had passed the first night. In this condition she could not retain charge of her children.¹ She entrusted them to persons, we know not whom. For a short time they are lost sight of.

Now begins for Elizabeth a series of sufferings and persecutions at the very thought of which the blood runs cold. Many of the incidents recorded of this period of her life are doubtless colored and distorted. From their general outlines, however, we can readily infer the spirit of their truth. She remained in Eisenach till spring in circumstances of the deepest abasement. It is related of her here, that when once passing to a church she was met, upon a narrow pathway across a body of muddy water, by an old woman upon whom she had formerly heaped benefits. The thankless hag rushed upon her, thrusting her full into the filthy water. "You would not act like a duchess when you were one. Now, take that for you." But Elizabeth answered her only with gentle words, and cheerfully repaired to a clear brook to wash away the filth—at the same time, says her historian, "washing her patient soul in the blood of the Lamb." A

¹ O stupenda et inscrutabilis Dei compensatio! Quae solebat pauperum parvulos ut mater nutrire et tanquam nutrix reficere, nunc pressa inopia, parvulos uteri sui. . . . compulsa est a se propter alimoniam elongare. — Theod.

column was erected at this spot in eternal advertisement of this act of infamous ingratitude ; and it stood there for five centuries — till 1735.

In the spring Elizabeth repaired to her aunt, the abbess of Kitzingen. From here she went to her uncle's, bishop Eckbert, of Bamberg. This worldly-minded prelate wished to help Elizabeth to a new marriage. She was as yet but twenty years old, and the project was natural enough. But Elizabeth informed him that she had in the days of her prosperity vowed never to belong to any but her adored husband, and that now no amount of sufferings or threats or attractions would tempt her to forget her vow. She threatened to disfigure her face, rather than to marry.¹

The next turn in her life was occasioned by the return of the Thuringian crusaders, bearing the bones of their deceased duke.² The bishop, at the head of his clergy, marched out to meet them. Under the clang of bells and the intonation of the service for the dead, the coffin was borne into the cathedral. On beholding all that remained of her beloved, Elizabeth burst out in Thanksgiving. "I thank thee, my Lord," said she, "that thou hast answered the desire of thy maid-servant to behold the bones of her beloved. Him who offered himself for the protection of the Holy Land I begrudge thee not. Thou knowest, my God, that I would a thousand times have preferred his presence to all the joys of the world. . . . But now I submit entirely to thy good pleasure, and if with a single hair of my head I could call him back to life, I would not do it, against thy will." After thus giving vent to her heart, she turned to the noble knights of Thuringia, and, with the dignity of the daughter of a king, related the outrages that had been heaped upon her. They promised her to stake their life in redressing her wrongs suffered during their absence. They then started for Thuringia, and Elizabeth went with them.

¹ Occulte nasum proprium meis truncarem manibus, ut sic me omnis abhorreret homo turpiter maculatam. — Theod.

² According to the usage of the age, they had boiled the body to separate the flesh from the bones.

Poor and rich, peasant and noble — almost the whole population — went out to welcome their return. Never was prince more sincerely wept for by a whole people. At the grave of the duke Elizabeth came face to face with the brothers who had so outraged her. Here ensued a scene in which the virtues of genuine knighthood stood brightly forth. The sturdy Rudolph von Vargila reproached Duke Henry with his injustice, in ungloved words. The remedy was good. Duke Henry evidenced his repentance in streams of tears, and proffered to Elizabeth a brother's hand. She asked but for her widow's portion, and to be permitted to devote herself in quiet to God.

For a short time she dwelt again upon the Wartburg. But it was not congenial to her there. Henry and his companions remained still of the same spirit. It was, therefore, very welcome to Elizabeth when the town of Marburg was assigned to her as her widow's residence. Having made arrangements to have the rights of her son Hermann respected on his attaining his majority, she retired to Marburg, in the summer of 1229, and, under the direction of her confessor Conrad, set about appointing officers for its administration. With her sojourn in Marburg begins for Elizabeth the evening of life. The chief feature of the rest of her days is her complete dependence, as well spiritually as materially, on the priest Conrad. Hitherto her will had been only conditionally in his hands; but now, with the approbation of Gregory IX. and the free consent of Elizabeth, her will was placed absolutely in the hands of this man; so that he stood henceforth to her in the relation of an absolute representative of God.

“The character of this Conrad,” says Kahnis, “is a historical enigma, which will perhaps never be fully solved.” In the chronicles of the times he is lauded to the skies as the new star of Germany. “He was learned, pure in life, zealous for the Catholic faith, and a persecutor of heresy. For temporal goods and ecclesiastical position he had no ambition. He was content with his office of simple priest,

and was of strict habits and austere appearance." In his relations to Elizabeth there are some favorable phases. As an energetic business man, he successfully directed her worldly affairs. With his consent she entirely renounced the world, though he would not consent that she should enter a cloister. Though wearing the garb of the sisters of St. Francis, she never became a nun. It was with Conrad's approbation that she distributed an immense sum of money, received from the Wartburg, to the poor. But afterwards he forbade her to give at once more than a single coin. When she did this too frequently, he permitted her to give only bread; and when she gave away too much bread, he forbade her to give more than a single piece. Finally, he forbade her to visit and wait upon such as were suffering from infectious diseases. But we are not at liberty to consider the brighter phases of his relation to her, apart from the principle that underlay them. The one central purpose of his spiritual guidance was to break Elizabeth's will. To exercise her in this, he even bade her to do contradictory things. When her lively nature transgressed in the very least, he applied to her rude chastisements. Not unfrequently he smote her on the ears. In the more serious cases he liberally applied the rod. Once he bade her to go to Wetzlar, where the child whom she had borne after the death of her husband was being trained. The governing nuns of the convent begged Conrad that Elizabeth might enter within the cloister. "Let her but enter, if she desires," said Conrad. Mistaking this for consent, Elizabeth went inside. On hearing this, Conrad informed her that she had rendered herself subject to a severe punishment, and would have to suffer it.¹ Her maid-servant, Irmengarde, had, indeed, not gone within, but she had opened the door with a key. Consequently Elizabeth and Irmengarde had to suffer a severe infliction with a long, heavy stick, while Conrad himself stood by and sang the *Miserere*. According to

¹ Ut bene verberaret eas cum quadam virga grossa satis longa. — Dicta Irmengardis.

Irmengarde's testimony, the marks of these strokes remained visible three weeks. To separate Elizabeth more fully still from all earthly delight, Conrad required her to send away her trusted and beloved hand-maidens, Judith and Ysentrude, and to take in their place a coarse girl, and a deaf, irascible old widow, who had the duty of disciplining her in patience.

Such are some of the peculiar features of the spiritual guidance with which this papal nuncio treated this angelic woman. But this was only of a piece with his general conduct toward all. His ruthless measures brought their own remedy. Some time after Elizabeth's death he was murdered by some nobleman whom his conduct had outraged. He has been called, by some, a hypocrite. This, unquestionably, he was not. He was simply a rational fanatic, pursuing a goal set up by the abstract understanding, with an abstract will. This goal was the domination of the mediaeval church, at the sacrifice and on the ruins of every truly human element. His high-handed measures in this early period of the national life of Germany had one good result, — to render the inquisition in Germany impossible.

On first arriving in Marburg, Elizabeth dwelt in the town itself. But soon the people began to show her such honor as to wound her Christian humility. She therefore retired to a mean village, Wehrda, three or four miles distant, and took up her quarters in a dilapidated peasant's hut. Here she erected a hospital and devoted herself entirely to serving the sick. The services which her love here rendered, though perfectly authenticated, are almost incredible. We dare hardly name the filthy and disgusting services which she unhesitatingly rendered to her patients.¹ She herself went about constantly in a grey woollen dress that finally

¹ Circa horridos et foetidos et omnibus abominatos miscros inaudita a sacculis et stupenda ferebatur sancti Spiritus vehementia, et incredibili et miranda commanendi, contractandi, procurandique studiosissima diligentia. . . . Nulla scriptura loquitur sanctorum quemquam tanta sedulitate tantaque familiaritate sordidissimorum infirmorum immunditias obsequiosis manibus contractasse, tamque indefesso corde omnibus misericordiae operibus usque ad mortem insudasse. — Theod.

almost fell to pieces. Once while standing by the fire absorbed in prayer to God, it was seriously damaged by catching fire from the sparks. It was mended so often as finally to lose almost all trace of its former identity.¹ She also took her turn, unskilful as she was, in cooking the miserable food in which she yet indulged her humble household.

“Elizabeth in Marburg, we must confess it,” says Kahnis, “is a less attractive figure than Elizabeth at the Wartburg.” At the Wartburg we saw her in the normal religious relations in which God had placed her, — a playful maiden, a gracious, religious young lady, the devoted wife of a knightly man. In Marburg we meet her as a widow, cut off from all human relations, passively submitting to a heartless bigot who knows no other way to God than that of the mortification of everything that is human. Is it not, however, our secular-mindedness that attracts us more to the former than to the latter picture? That which renders Elizabeth attractive to many is not the element of holiness, but that of the beautifully human. She stands before the eyes of such as a form of matchless beauty surrounded with the drapery of a chivalrous, poetic, and romantic age, whose life of love was simply a bloom of genuine humanity. But such persons fail to comprehend the inner essence of her character. This essence was love to God; a blossom warmed into life not by an earthly but by a heavenly sun. And this blossom came, in Elizabeth, to the fairest maturity that her churchly surroundings admitted of. The defectiveness of her religion, as judged from a modern stand-point, is to be attributed simply and solely to the form under which the only Christian church of which she knew presented itself to her. Her plastic soul-life assumed the shape of the vase² into which it was poured.

¹ *Panniculos viles et abjectos cujusque coloris et undecunque collectos. . . . Propriis manibus, ut poterat, jacturam incendii laris coquinae restaurabat veteresque scissuras. . . . acu imperita. . . .* — Theod.

² In a different sense this figure is applied to her by Gregory IX. : *O vas admirabile ! vas electum ! vas misericordiae ! in quo tyrannis principibus et magnatibus mundi vinum verae compunctionis propinasti.*

It is easy enough for us, on looking back to Elizabeth from to-day, to see her mistakes, — to see that the happy human life of the happy wife and mother and princess, in the midst of all the abundance of earthly good, was the true and proper life of the Christian woman, — that there was no need of loving husband and children and comfortable life less, in order to love God more. We see that there is no antagonism between the two, — that the receiving and enjoying earthly good is normally and properly a reason for, and a stimulus to, a higher life in God.

These higher views, however, were not within reach of Elizabeth. The false spirit of the mediaeval church approached her in the person of Conrad, teaching her that the more she broke away from the relations of this life, the more intimate grew the bond between her and God. And this spirit bore her away captive so soon as she had lost, in Lewis, her greatest earthly good. It was this spirit that wrung from her the expression that she regretted having entered into the marriage state, and that induced her to separate from her children, — that led this over-loving heart that never wearied in rendering the last forms of drudgery to the children of others, to entrust the education of the children of her own body to strangers, — that enabled her to rejoice that she had sacrificed to God her love for her children, so that she could say: "I care for my children just as for any of my neighbors; I have surrendered them to God, let him do with them as he will."¹ So should speak no mother. This holy relation is not to be sacrificed, but to be exalted. No priest can absolve a mother from her duties to her children.

It was also this monkish spirit that led this matchless flower among women to throw aside the dignity of her rank and condition, and surround herself with squalor and rags. The very thought of this profanation of her beautiful young life and refined tastes, stirs the heart with involuntary indig-

¹ *Ipsos etiam uteri mei dilectissimos parvulos, quos tenerrimo amplexu affectabam, jam velut alienos intueor, Deo teste; ipsi eos obtuli et commisi, ipse de eis ordinet, et impleat suae beneplacitum voluntatis. . . . Nullam creaturam, sed solum omnium diligo Creatorem. — Theod.*

nation at the perverted system that occasioned it. But the over-goodness of this intensely womanly heart, led her even beyond the wishes of the monkish church. Even Conrad saw that in her the virtue of giving had almost sunk to a morbid vice. But this coarse-grained priest was a poor guide for so delicate a soul. As far as concerns a correct conception of true religion, Elizabeth was by far his superior. What she chiefly lacked was a knowledge of justification by simple faith. The brightest significance of such a life as hers is the clear light in which it sets the fact, that the church itself must be doctrinally right before it can be a safe physician for souls. Situated as she was, Elizabeth did not and could not find and come to spiritual rest. The mediæval church, whose diademed head could give to Elizabeth such a guide as Conrad of Marburg, only turned into discord the sweet music which the spirit of God had awakened in her heart, and finally crushed to pieces also the outward instrument.

Elizabeth had passed something like a year and a half in and near Marburg. But her delicate life soon fell a prey to its unnatural surroundings. The hour of her release drew rapidly near. After making a thorough round through her hospital, visiting and consoling with gentle words all the poor and sick, and distributing to them such goods as were at her disposal, she invoked the blessing of God upon them, and returned to her humble home in great exhaustion. A violent fever seized upon her and rapidly consumed the feeble remnants of her vitality. She saw herself compelled to take to her bed. Here she languished twelve or fifteen days, in great suffering, but uniformly joyous and cheerful and incessantly engaged in prayer. Finally, one day, as she was lying with her face to the wall seemingly asleep, one of the attendants seated at her bed-side, heard escaping from her lips a sweet and exquisite melody. A moment afterwards Elizabeth changed her position and turning to her companion said: "Where art thou, my dear?" "Here I am," was the answer; "how sweetly you have sung!" "What!" exclaimed Elizabeth, "hast thou heard anything?" On being answered

affirmatively, the fast-sinking woman resumed: "A charming little bird came and stood between me and the wall, and sang so beautifully and gently as to rejoice my heart and soul so much that I could not refrain from singing myself." And she added that she felt assured that she would now soon take her flight homeward. Taking now a final leave of many friends that wished to see her, she henceforth excluded from her presence all persons save her confessor and a few specially intimate sisters. On being asked why she had thus excluded the world, she replied: "I wish to be alone with God, and to meditate upon the terrible day of my judgment." Then she set herself to prayer and weeping and invoking the mercy of God. Her physical sufferings had now entirely ceased. She made a rational disposition of all her effects, and then engaged in the most serious and hopeful conversation on heavenly things, exhorting the friends at her bedside in the most affectionate words. For a moment, once, she felt herself approached by the tempter, and cried out with a loud voice: "Away, away!" Then she resumed: "Let us speak only of God and of his Son." Then, hearing the crowing of a cock, she said: "It is now midnight, the hour when our Saviour was born, and when a new star never seen before was given to our world." Shortly after she said: "Now comes the hour when the Almighty will call those who are his friends," and then adding in a low voice: "Silence, silence!" as if to hearken for the nearing call, she gently passed away.

Her death occurred on the nineteenth of November, 1231, when she was as yet in her twenty-fourth year. Documentary evidence of her life and virtues was almost immediately prepared by the Archbishop of Mayence and Conrad in view of procuring her canonization by the Holy See. The procedure was interrupted, however, by the death of Conrad, and was fully carried out only some four years later, when earnestly taken in hand by her brother-in-law, Conrad, who had now repented and entered upon a religious life, and who sought to make amends for his former injustice to her as a widow by his devotion to her as a saint.

Her canonization was not rashly accomplished by the grave conclave of the nonagenarian, Gregory IX. After a careful examination by the reverend fathers of voluminous sworn evidence, a day for solemn prayer on the subject was set apart, on which occasion the pope begged all present to pray, as he himself would also do, that God might not permit him to be deceived in the matter. After all had thus prayed, the Pontiff intoned the solemn hymn: *Veni, Creator Spiritus*, which was sung by the entire assembly. Thereupon the pope and all the assembly kneeled down and passed a few moments in silent prayer, after which the venerable Gregory arose and declared the name of Elizabeth inscribed in the calender of the saints (May 26, 1235).

One year later, another not less honor was conferred on the memory of the humble Elizabeth. The first of May, 1236, was fixed upon for the translation of her body from a humble chapel to the church of Marburg. It was, so to speak, the official inauguration of her sainthood in Germany. As the day approached, immense multitudes — chroniclers say more than a million — streamed toward Marburg from far and near, even from France, Bohemia, and distant Hungary. Many high dignitaries were there, — besides a multitude of princes and prelates, the venerable archbishops of Mayence and Cologne and Treves and Bremen, and the bishops of Hamburg, Halberstadt, Bamberg, Worms, Speyer, Paderborn, etc. On the second of May, made his appearance the emperor,¹ Frederick II., wearing his imperial crown, but dressed in a grey garb of penance, and marching barefoot. In transporting the body the emperor himself served among the pall-bearers. After the celebration of high-mass, by Monseigneur of Mayence, the emperor advanced and deposited upon the casket containing the now venerated remains a golden crown. Then, turning and taking the little Hermann by the hand, he led him also up to the altar, that he might venerate his mother, and make a votive offering

¹ Ipse gloriosissimus Romanorum imperator, omnibus postpositis negotiis fama sanctitatis B. Elisabeth attractus et illectus. — Ancient Ms.

to her memory. Thereupon came the homage and gifts of princes and prelates, nobles and people — a countless multitude, with inestimable offerings.

“There is something sublime,” exclaims Kahnis, “in this solemn scene, where pope and emperor, princes and bishops, rich and poor, join hands in recognition of the shining virtues of this handmaid of the Lord.”

In the quiet town of Marburg there stands to-day one of the earliest constructed and purest Gothic churches of Europe. It is the church of St. Elizabeth, built in honor of her virtues by the Teutonic knights, and completed in 1283, fifty years after her death. Within the church a magnificent sarcophagus, richly set with gems and precious stones, was prepared for the remains of Elizabeth. Here they reposed until more than two centuries after her death — till 1539 — at which time one of her descendants, Philip the Magnanimous, now become a Protestant, removed them from the sarcophagus, in order to check, as some say, the superstitious veneration of the multitude, and deposited them no one knows where. Under Jerome Bonaparte, the sarcophagus was removed to Cassel, and stood there for some time in the cabinet of a French officer. While here it lost seven hundred of the eight hundred and twenty-four precious stones — some of them of inestimable value — which yet ornamented it in 1810. Since 1814 the sarcophagus stands again in the church of St. Elizabeth, at Marburg.

In 1854, while some repairs were being made, a leaden casket, containing human bones, and inclosed in a stone sarcophagus, was found deeply buried under the crypt. These are thought to be the remains of the saint, but whether justly or not is far from certain. One thing is certain, however, — that, until ardent love to God and self-forgetting devotion to the poor and needy cease to be admired,¹ the memory of Elizabeth of Thuringia will not pass away from among men.

¹ In te misericordia, in te pietate,
In te magnificenza, in te s' aduna,
Quantunque in creatura è di bontate. — Dante Parad., c. xxxiii.

ARTICLE II.

CHRISTIAN ERNEST LUTHARDT ON THE DESIGN OF
ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

TRANSLATED BY CASPAR RENÉ GREGORY, PRINCETON, N.J.

(Continued from p. 29).

THE REAL DESIGN OF ST. JOHN'S GOSPEL.

LET us first gather together the results of the preceding discussions as to the final aim of the book.

The fourth Gospel takes for granted the existence of the other Gospels; but it does not intend to complete them, or to give additions to them. It is no more a collection of remarkable things out of the life of Christ than the first three are. It is a doctrinal treatise. As such it has no thought of bringing forth or preaching a new doctrine, as Reuss implies when he calls it a sermon, nor is it the expression of a newly risen view of the history or of the person of Christ; it does not preach a new doctrine which arose, whether outside or inside of the bounds of the Christian church; nor does it express, as Baumgarten-Crusius thinks,¹ a new view which came out in the church, or which, it may be, sprang up in the person of the writer, and was approved and spread abroad by the apostolic authority. Nor can the book be explained by the development of *πίστις* to *γνῶσις* within the church, or by accommodation to the false *gnosis* outside of it. The point that it has in view is *πίστις*. This is the only point. The Gospel in hand does not teach or develop an idea taken from somewhere else, or thought out independently, or drawn out of the history. It presents to us the person of Christ. And this it does without regard to the distinction between the Gentile Christian element and

¹ Theologische Auslegung der Johanneischen Schriften (Jena, 1843.), Vol. i. p. xvii.

the Jewish Christian element of the church of Christ, and without regard to the different needs growing from this distinction and then present with it. The one whole Christ is made known to the one united church in his fullest essential power and most entire significance.¹

The book itself gives the best confirmation of this. Its whole character shows that it is an historical writing; and the result of our inquiries as to the mode of presentation was that it handles the history as doctrine. The question is, What does it mean to teach? It is a poor thing to stop the search after the final aim of a book at the very beginning of it, if that part does not speak clearly about the aim, and much more, if that is so shaped as to be open to the most manifold interpretations. On the other hand, if the conclusion of the book is clear, it decides and informs us about the whole, and, of course, then, about the beginning. Now, whether we look at the last word of Jesus that is reported in the Gospel, or at the last word of the evangelist, in each case alike we see that belief is its substance. Here, then, is the aim of the book. The instruction of the disciples by Jesus has this in view, and John's preaching has for its design the forming of this belief which brings real salvation. The last word of Jesus fixes belief more exactly, in that it sets belief in contrast with sight. Both also intend to produce belief without sight. And the leading design of the evangelist is to remark the way in which Jesus determined or tried to form this belief. Yet, while he sets forth this proceeding of Jesus, he has no thought of reviving it or adding to its efficacy by his testimony. The way of Jesus, however, is in general the following: The miracles done by him make the first demand for belief. But the importance of these arises from them not in so far as they are miracles, but in so far as they are *σημεῖα*, signs of something hidden which can and should be perceived in them. Here the two paths of belief and unbelief separate. The evangelist has to

¹ The Church in the Apostolic Age. By H. W. J. Thiersch. Translated by T. Carlyle (London, 1852), pp. 247-249.

show how the first general impression of miracles, much alike as it appeared to be when viewed from the outside, contained, according as each man presented himself to the miracles, both belief and unbelief. Even the last, however, often seemed to take on itself the form of belief. It all depended upon whether the beholder received the miracles as a proof of the superhuman in Christ and as the power of God unto salvation, or whether he rested in the wonderful appearance as such—be it that he sought in it a satisfying of national pride, or of curiosity, or any other advantage. A miracle always failed to reach its object, where astonishment at that which was uncommon was the only result, and where the astonished man was not touched or decided to something moral by it. To such a one it was not a *σημεῖον*.

The author has to show how, according as the personality held a moral position or not with respect to the miracles, the first general impression developed in different men either into belief or into unbelief, and that by a certain internal necessity. Hence, throughout his whole book, he treats of single miracles as *σημεῖους*. To him the way in which Jesus saluted a Simon and a Nathanael is no less a *σημεῖον* than the miracle at Cana or the many miracles which followed the cleansing of the Temple at Jerusalem. In like manner, the word to the Samaritan woman (iv. 17, 18) is in every respect similar to the second Galilean, or the healing at the pool of Bethesda. Then, again, the discourse at Capernaum joins the wonderful feeding, as his following entrance into Jerusalem joins the earlier miracle (chap. v.) which had merely served to make the Jews *θαυμάζειν* (vii. 21), but not to make them teachable. The healing of the blind man goes before the accounts in the ninth and tenth chapters, just as the raising of Lazarus leads to the accounts which come next. And so we may well call this book a *βιβλίον τῶν σημείων*. Not that miracles form the contents of the book, but that they have an important position all the way through it. They always serve as a starting-point for whatever the evangelist wishes especially to preach or to teach.

Thus and in this sense, in my opinion, the evangelist names his book. For *σημεία* must necessarily be understood with *ταῦτα* (xx. 31), so that the evangelist himself, and that not indistinctly, marks his book as a *βιβλίον τῶν σημείων*. And just as necessarily we are not to understand by these *σημεῖοις* (in vs. 30) simply the events which took place after the resurrection, as Lücke and Olshausen think. De Wette has objected to Lücke's explanation, that *ποιεῖν* does not suit for *σημεῖα* in the sense of *τεκμηρίοις τῆς ἀναστάσεως*, and further, that the evangelist here at best glances over his whole book and its aim; but these objections are not enough to disprove Lücke's notion. However, after the discussions we have gone through, every doubt must vanish. When Lücke asks¹ why the evangelist, if he understands by this the earlier miracles, did not call them *ἔργα*, as he had done before, we answer, first, that the word *σημεῖον* is quite as convenient for him, and secondly, that he had no right to use *ἔργα* here. For the miracles do not come under consideration at this point in so far as they are of a wonderful nature, but in so far as they are signs of what belongs to Jesus. It is on the latter, and not on the former, side that they stand in causal relation to belief. We need only to mention that those who have tried to free our Gospel critically from miracles have not understood it at all. It is plain that our view agrees with the whole symbolical and typical character of this book. Herder² might well say that in this book all that Jesus did became a sign and a miracle. We see, too, that he who added the conclusion (xxi. 25) did not speak so very exceedingly unintelligently as is commonly charged,³ but that when he wrote this he had in mind the idea of *σημεῖον* in John's sense.

But miracles were a certain sign, of course, only where belief already existed. Before that, morally viewed, they gave merely a general impression of the divinity and of the saving

¹ *Commentar über das Evangelium des Johannes* (3d ed., Bonn, 1840), Vol. ii. p. 802.

² *Vom Sohne Gottes*, § 11.

³ Especially Lücke, in loco.

power in the person of Jesus. This general beginning of belief was led on to certain belief by means of the word of Jesus. Therefore the word almost all through follows upon the miracles. Both according to the design of Jesus, and according to the showing of the evangelist, the word appears to be that which founds and begets the actual and the right belief. The self-witness of Jesus, and the apostolic testimony to him as well, explain that which was veiled in the *σημείους*. Where the impression from these has been of the right moral sort, the word will be received throughout in obedience as working certain belief. Where a man cannot endure the word, that is only an indication that he has not let the miracles serve the purpose which they should have served for him. Thus, in the progress from the sign to the word, unbelief developed itself out of the apparent belief which the former often produced. We see this in numerous examples. This was the case with many Jews, and this, too, was the case with those disciples who left Jesus after his discourse in the synagogue at Capernaum. In others, the belief which was not moral that had been called forth by miracles was overcome and made true belief by the self-witness of Jesus. This, too, we find in the case of single Jews. Nicodemus may be named as an example. With others, again, as with the eleven and the rest of those who stood nearest to Jesus, the right moral beginning of belief was present from the first. It needed afterwards only to be made more perfect from time to time, and this, of course, was effected by many purifications and cleansings in the manner of a progressive education. When, however, it reaches belief by the word of Jesus, that belief frees itself from miracles in so far as they are miracles. They are important to it only as signs, and it now recognizes them as such only through the teaching word. It is all one to a believer whether the sign be of an uncommon kind, or not. That which is apparently altogether unimportant can serve to him for such a sign, if he has once reached the right believing perception by the self-witness of Jesus. It was

only signs in the form of miracles that offered an inducement to belief, and therefore such signs alone make the framework of our Gospel. But the word is that upon which belief rests, and that by which it knows that it was produced and begotten. Hence Jesus strives to lead his disciples and all who draw near to him to such a belief upon the word and in the word. The essential purport of the Gospel is to point out this method of instruction — to show how Jesus sought to free his disciples from miracles and to ground their belief upon the word. Of this the end of the fourth chapter may serve as proof. Our evangelist designs to follow in the track of his Master in this method of producing belief. He shows this clearly, not only by the whole drift of his book, but also by the last account of Thomas and by the conclusion of the Gospel. Such a belief, then, is a right belief, — that is to say, it has the essential blessing of salvation, — it is a belief unto life.

This object is the open aim of the instruction of Jesus, and therefore it will be for us really the final aim of the Gospel. We shall be utterly unable to set all sorts of others, as love and life, by its side or in its place.¹ Besides, the carrying out of this purpose is quite peculiar enough to answer the question of Lücke.² However, it may be made even more certain.

The question arises, namely, What is the substance of this belief? We reply that it is the same as the substance of the *σημεία* and of the word of Jesus. In both Jesus declares himself as the one who is: *ἐγὼ εἰμι* (viii. 24, 28; xiii. 19). But what definition of Jesus marks him completely? The Gospel gives answers from very different points of view. He is the one who should come; he is the one signified by the Old Testament; he is the truth itself, the fulness of all revelation; he is the satisfying of all the essential, saving needs of men; he is the possessor, the impartor, and at the same

¹ J. H. A. Ebrard. *Wissenschaftliche Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte* (2d ed., Erlangen, 1850). pp. 831.

² Vol. i. p. 194.

time the place of all communion with God; he is the one from above, etc. When Jesus and the evangelist wish to put it in one word, they say, the Son of God. It is for this reason that the evangelist names him as such at the end of his Gospel. The question as to the definite meaning of this word may be laid aside for the present. It is enough to know that all that Jesus and his witness could and would say of him is contained in this one word. It is the special designation of the one preached. We take it, also, in its most comprehensive and highest sense. Jesus, in all his self-exhibition and self-witness, sets himself forth as the Son of God, whether he testifies to himself in the *σημείους* as the truth of the Old Testament, or as the life or as the light, or whether he speaks of himself in his word as the one come from heaven, the one who is in real communion with the Father, or whether he shows himself in his departure as the one raised up to God, etc. All that he says, that he does, that he experiences, and that he effects, reveals him as such. This, too, is the substance of the book. The evangelist designs to give testimony to no other than Jesus the Son of God — testimony to him in order to the belief which has him for its substance, and which, in consequence, has real salvation for its possession.

Besides, he does not mean to preach and teach some single thing in and about Jesus, to show this side or that side. He chooses the most comprehensive designation as a sign that Jesus, in the most comprehensive sense and in his essential signification, is the object of the preaching. All that belongs to Jesus is collected in the one *ἐγώ εἰμι*. Jehovah in the Old Testament declares himself clearly with *אֲנִי יְהוָה*; not merely as this or that, but as he who is God so certainly that he emphasizes that he is. In the same manner Jesus declares in the presence of the Jews, by the like sounding *ἐγώ εἰμι*, that he himself is, namely, that he is the one who should be in general, the man of the future, who is such only in that he is the Son of God.¹ At this we may well remark that the

¹ Compare J. C. K. Hofmann, *Der Schriftbeweis* (Nördlingen, 1852), Vol. i.

phrase occurs first of all in the very chapter which contains the sharpest opposition between the Jews and Jesus. It is repeated afterwards (xiii. 19) only as recalling that utterance, repeated on the last evening and at the beginning of the last discourses of Jesus to his disciples.

It thus appears that the discourses of Jesus and all the preachings of the evangelist are exclusively a testimony to Jesus, so that it is perfectly clear that they have him only for their substance as he really is. If this be so, it will be wholly inadmissible and impossible to say that a doctrine which arose or was borrowed somewhere or other is bound up with the person of Jesus, or that some special doctrine is transferred to it. For every special doctrine limits itself in opposition to the one which we have found, namely, the preaching of Jesus in his completeness. However Christian they may suppose the doctrine of the Logos to be, we have seen that there is no room for it as the fundamental thought of the Gospel, as the chief thing, and the like.

But what he is, he is in the *σάρξ*. What he is and his glory are to be revealed in the flesh. To his disciples, everything from the beginning on served for a *σημείον* to make known the glory veiled by the *σάρξ* (i. 14: compare ii. 11). Yet to the Jews the *σάρξ* was a hinderance to belief. The Jews always opposed themselves to Jesus's claims in that they arose from the flesh. They said that he was untaught (vii. 15), or that they knew his origin (vii. 27), or that he was a Galilean (vii. 41). They saw no circumstance in the beginning and course of his life that did not belong to their own (viii. 57). When he presented himself for special claims (vi.), or attributed to himself in distinction from all men a special relation to the Father (v. 18; x. 30, 38), they were offended, because they could not see that his *σάρξ* was in any way distinguished or preferred. It must be acknowledged that even the disciples were surprised at the man when they first knew him (comp. i. 43, 47). They,

however, were helped over that difficulty by the fact that they gave themselves up in sincerity to the impression of the real personality of Jesus, and thus they reached certain belief that eternal life was decreed, and was to be found in him and in his *σάρξ* (vi. 68). He was the Son of God while in the flesh, in that his flesh continually demanded belief, and in that the sight of his glory was only imparted through such belief (comp. xi. 40), not the reverse, as the Jews would have it. Therefore Jesus comes to men at every hand with the claim for belief. If he repelled the Jews by this claim, he did the same to the Galileans. It is on this account that John brings forward quite prominently that event in the synagogue at Capernaum (chap. vi.), in order to show that he spoke in the same way in Galilee as in Jerusalem. In each he demanded decided and strong belief, and by this demand gave offence and thrust back respect. That more Galileans than Judeans followed him did not depend upon him. His behavior and his claims were everywhere the same. The evangelist means to make this especially clear.

Besides, it was quite possible to obtain belief on the ground of his own testimony to himself as the Son of God appearing in the flesh. He shows, by more than one example, that only sincerity and obedience towards God were required. At the very beginning, Jesus promised to the candor of Thomas, as to the others, the sight of his glory. And it will not be hard for the disciples to reach belief, since to their sincere mind everything serves to reveal the glory of Jesus. Jesus must also get from the mouth of the Jews testimony that he has done enough *σημεῖα* to establish his claim (vii. 31; x. 38). If they do not believe now, it is because of their unwillingness and insincerity. How often does Jesus upbraid them with the fact that when they could easily believe on him, they would not (comp. v. 36, 40; x. 25, 26)! In the discourses in which he rises to the highest point of opposition, he refers their unbelief to this. He accuses them with the most cutting keenness, because they were controlled

by an ungodly mind, and not by the truth, since otherwise they would have been forced to believe on him (comp. chap. viii.) From the keenness of this reproof we learn how very possible belief was to them. But even because all rests upon belief, Jesus does not intend so to reveal himself as to make it unnecessary, nor does he mean to compel it in any way. Belief should be a moral act, that is, an act of free self-determination. Where, however, a man once takes it up, we perceive that Jesus ever demands a decided belief. Thus we see both things brought out in the Gospel—not only how much need there was of belief, but also how very possible it was. This is of such moment that even the exaltation of Jesus should bear this character of being an object of belief. With this purpose Jesus speaks to Nicodemus of his exaltation, and from that time on this idea shines clearly. It is repeated in the fact that the judgment upon the refusal to believe appears to be that the demand for belief must be pressed only the more decidedly upon those who do not believe. The unbelief of the Jews caused that the exaltation of Jesus should first take place upon the cross, and that only after that, it rose to heavenly glory; the former openly; the latter, however, concealed from men. When they saw the exaltation of Jesus first fulfilled in the death on the cross, they should have believed on the crucified Son of God. But this belief was then only the harder for them, and yet could in nowise be spared. To the disciples, on the other hand, the death on the cross, was a power which first called forth rightly their believing love,—for now it is that we see Nicodemus come out openly,—and therefore also rewarded their belief with the sight of the glory. At the cross that miracle of life was granted to the disciples to be permitted to behold the corpse of Jesus (xix. 34 sq.). As for others, the unbelief of the Jews had caused that the resurrection-life and ascension of Jesus to glory should be concealed from the world (xiv. 22). And thus it was made doubly hard for them to believe in the glorified and ascended one whom they could not see, and whom they had last seen as a dead man.

Therefore they sought him in vain, and had to die in their sins (viii. 21, 24). His own disciples, on the other hand, received now the fullest certainty of belief and completeness of belief. Soon after, the one to whom both of these would come with the most difficulty, gave the ripest and highest confession of belief (xx. 28). Belief is now so perfected that it can dispense altogether with the preceding sight.

We see that the whole Gospel is taken up to such a degree with belief and its necessity and possibility, that at the bottom all rises from this. The essential design of the evangelist is seen to be the setting forth and proving how both belief and unbelief unfolded themselves from their own yet undecided and apparently poor beginnings. He shows that belief where it once was present became ever easier, and where it once was refused became ever less possible, and yet that the demand upon both for belief stood unchangeable in its necessity. How, then, can they say that this Gospel has especially to do with *γνῶσις*, and let this idea overmaster that of *πίστις*? And is it much better to turn the thing, as Lücke does,¹ and say that the Gospel points out the right *γνῶσις* in the fact that it is one and joined with *πίστις*? Yet, even in this, *πίστις*, much more than *γνῶσις*, is the first idea, and the thing is really reversed; for with *πίστις* everywhere in sight, he shows us that *πίστις* is also a knowing, as well as a loving. The former idea, therefore, and not the latter, is the one he aims at.

We can say in a few words what belief consists in, according to his showing. It is, that a man, led by the signs of his revelation, on the ground of the words of his self-witness, receives and submits to the Son of God in the flesh, and through this, because entering into a personal relation with his person, comes into personal communion with him, and thereby possesses the real blessing of salvation, which is he himself, and which is in him. Standing in such personal communion with him, the man beholds more and more the fulness of his glory, and draws more and more from the

¹ Vol. i. p. 214 sq.

fulness of his grace. We need not dwell on this, as we are not now stating doctrine.

There is no need of further proof that what we have found to be the final aim of this book is likewise peculiar to it in single and definite points. It will be enough to recall how well it agreed with the result of the strife about those opinions which sought the final aim of the book outside of itself in a diversity of ways. We can not only do without other aims, but even, in fact, we have no room for them at all. For partly, as we have learned, the final aim is in itself too decided, and partly it is so essential to the book that this circumstance alone must assure us that the whole book is to be understood by it. The full proof is, of course, to be sought first in particulars.

It is another question whether the evangelist had regard to this or that in the composition of his book. He wrote his book not for himself, but for others; not for solitary study, but for the use of the church. But, as before, we must be careful to say that we cannot admit references of any sort that are not included in the recognized character and final aim of the book. Moreover, we know nothing of references to separate false teachers and false doctrines; for the evangelist does not set forth a particular doctrine, which could perhaps be opposed to other particular doctrines. While he is writing his book he has especially in view neither the doctrine of the Logos, nor the Passover controversy, neither the Nazarenes nor Valentinus's school, neither Montanism nor the heresy of Cerinthus. He certainly does look, however, at unbelief in the world. If he wrote for others, he wrote in order that they should get and keep belief on Jesus the Son of God, and also in order that that belief should be shaped for them, and secured against unbelief and its manifold errors and temptations. And further, if he wrote, then he wrote for the church; not for this or that special part of it and the special needs thereof, but for the church of Jesus Christ in the world. Moreover, he sets his testimony, and therefore, too, the full testimony of Christ, to the Son of

God and belief on him against the unbelief of this world in which the believing church and believers stand, and against the peril which this unbelieving world offers to belief and to the divine communion in the belief on Jesus Christ.

Jesus himself, however, when upon earth, came in contact with the unbelief of the world in the Jews. Therefore the evangelist, in the history of Jesus, cannot speak of belief on him, without opposing to it the unbelief of the Jewish people. Such is the internal necessity of this opposition in which they have tried to find every kind of ideal design and direction of the history. The evangelist, according to the complete method in which we saw that he grasped his task, had necessarily to oppose the belief which Jesus demanded to the unbelief which Jesus experienced. And just as necessarily he had to oppose Jesus to the Jews as the representatives of unbelief. Nor was it essentially otherwise with the church of Christ. Where else, in opposition to the church and its belief, did unbelief stand as a decided power and as an act of free self-determination, except in the Jewish people? Their very existence outside of the church, although the latter had begun in the former, rested on the fact that they had refused, and continued to refuse belief. Many single Jews stood within the church; but that does not matter here. The people as a whole had the characteristic of its then present existence in the fact that it was in opposition to the church of Christ, and that it contested with it the title of Church of God;¹ just as in the days of Jesus, in spite of many single believers out of Israel (xi. 45; xii. 42), the people as a whole steadily refused belief (xii. 37). This was their peculiarity, that they set themselves in opposition to Jesus and his claim, and disputed with him that he was the Son of God, while for their own part they took the position that they were God's people (viii. 41; ix. 28) and Abraham's seed (viii. 33 sq.). Besides, if the church for which the evangelist wrote is the believing, in contrast with

¹ Compare J. C. K. Hofmann. *Weissagung und Erfüllung in alten und im neuen Testamente* (Nördlingen, 1841, 1844); *Zweite Hälfte*, pp. 216-218.

the unbelieving world, then, in the first place, it is in contrast with unbelieving Israel. Moreover, if the evangelist bears witness of belief and for it, in opposition to unbelief, then he does it first of all in opposition to the unbelief of Israel. If there were controversial writing in our Gospel, this would be the first. This, however, is not once contained in it as controversial writing, but only as an opposition lying in the thing itself. How much less, then, can our book contain controversy against the chance forms of unbelief at that time in Docetism, Gnosticism, Ebionism, etc. However different these heresies may be otherwise, they agree in one, and that the chief point. They do not see and believe on Jesus as the Son of God in the flesh. This is the very unbelief which is the characteristic of Israel. The evangelist has opposed his Gospel to these errors just in so far as they belong to that unbelief. In so far as these were unbelief they contained abuse of the belief of the church of Christ, or temptation for it to unbelief, and hence to that extent the evangelist has tried to advance and secure the church against them in her belief. Even if he knew of Gnosticism, Docetism, etc., they existed for him simply as unbelief. Otherwise he paid no attention to them. We should never forget that this holds good for all apostles and New Testament writers. What did the apostles have to do with Eons and the rest of the queer notions of the heretics? None takes notice of any of these, but only of their unbelief, the common possession of them all, the power in the world striving against the church of Christ (comp. Eph. ii. 2). Even in his first Epistle, which, in the nature of the thing, has a much more decided reference than the Gospel to the appearances of anti-Christians in the world, John recognizes them only as unbelief, and uses controversial writing against them only in this, — that he sets in opposition to them the belief on Jesus the Son of God in the flesh. He never troubles himself about their special doctrines. Hence, again, it is altogether impossible to say that he has used controversial writing against gnosticism and the other heresies of the time, since it cannot be said that he

has even once considered them. Even the controversy between classes of Gnostics, — that which separated Docetism and Ebionism from each other, and perhaps from gnosis in general, — even that lay altogether outside of his discussion. In them all he considered only the one thing, unbelief in the world. What belonged under this at that time might belong under it in the future, and hence the testimony of the evangelist was directed against this, according to the word of Jesus to his disciples (xvi. 8–11). This is the polemical and apologetical side of our Gospel.

Do we need, now, any other reason for this complete testimony to Christ? Did not the church, existing in the world and standing in opposition to it with her belief and confession, need such testimony? She needed it at that time, not because Docetism and Ebionism — that is, these special forms of unbelief — threatened her, but because, in general, decided and conscious unbelief stood in opposition to her. She needed it, too, because existing in the world. She needed it, as she always had needed it and continued to need it. And with this thought John bore his comprehensive testimony to Christ, as he would have borne it at all times. It must have seemed to him especially fit that he should bear it, if he knew the earlier Gospels, and saw how they brought to view only particular sides and satisfied particular needs, if he knew himself to be the last of the apostles, and if he was really the one whom we know from our Gospel as the beloved disciple. If we suppose a divine providence in the leading of the church, how could the church be left without such a comprehensive apostolical testimony to Christ? And even if we do not suppose this providence, what was more fit, and how could it be otherwise? In this, it is true, we touch to a certain degree what Clement of Alexandria says about the spiritual gospel. Though that be awkwardly expressed and mixed with errors, yet it is certainly not said without judgment. What Lessing brings out on this point is also related to what we have just said. At the same time, it is perfectly clear that our view differs a great deal from both of these.

As unbelief presented itself to John in many different forms, it is very likely that the form of unbelief which was most clearly marked in his time served for an external occasion and for the strengthening of his design. And, besides, the prayers of the Ephesian presbyters may have reached him. But the former is as little essential to the question as the latter. In the former he refers only to generalities. He does not touch the particulars any more, for example, than, as we know, the apostle John troubled himself with Cerinthus.

Then, too, they may have applied and used the Gospel at a very early date against all sorts of separate heresies. The Gospel, however, is so very general that it seems to us clear that it might have made known its deeper purport and its abundant applicableness only little by little. Does Baumgarten-Crusius mean to declare something like this, when he says¹ that the Gospel was certainly written earlier than it became known?² To me, at least, Thiersch, in his "Critique," appears to have emphasized too strongly the Johannean element of the sub-apostolic times, and, at any rate, that of the apostolic Fathers. I find the Pauline element preponderating in a Polycarp, and in Ignatius, who is the least like the other. But let that be as it will. They have learned with time to use our Gospel more and more against all kinds of special errors; and thus they think it was written against these different ones, and it runs through the catalogue of the opinions combated, till Epiphanius briefly adds, "and many other heresies."³ Where, however, they could not date back the heresies in hand to the apostolic age, they helped themselves characteristically enough by saying that John had written his Gospel foreseeing the blasphemous tenets of the Gnostics.⁴ In fact, it was no more written against these

¹ Vol. i. p. xxv.

² Compare too Brückner, of De Wette (4th ed.), p. xxix.

³ *καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς αἱρέσεις.*

⁴ "Providens has blasphemias regulas, quae dividunt Dominum, quantum ex ipsis attinet, ex altera et altera substantia dicentes eum factum." — Irenaeus cont. Omnes Haereses, III. xvi. 5 (Works, Leipzig, 1853), Vol. i. p. 509.

than against the special forms of unbelief in our day, and no more than against those of the apostolic times. It could and can be applied and used for, and has its value against all of them together.

The exhibition of the method of carrying out of this final aim ought to show that we have been right in holding fast to this decided generality as the intention of our Gospel.

Only one thing could be opposed to what has been said, and that is the doctrine of the Logos. If such a special doctrine be given in the Gospel, then our statement of the design can hardly stand. But we have seen above, that neither the Philoncean doctrine of the Logos, nor in general any doctrine of the Logos, is found in our Gospel. It is much more likely, from the foregoing discussion, that the person of Christ is understood in the one designated as the Logos. The prologue does not speak of anything different from what is declared at the end to be the purport of the preaching and the object of belief. It is Christ, whom the evangelist calls the Son of God in the one place, and the Logos in the other. And, moreover, under the last title he has not told anything in particular about him which is not included in the idea of "Son of God."

ARTICLE III.

MIRACLES.

BY PROF. J. LESLIE PORTER, D.D., LL.D., BELFAST, IRELAND.¹

THE importance of miracles as facts in scripture history, and evidences of the truth of a divine revelation, cannot be too highly estimated. Devout men sometimes treat assaults upon miracles with indifference, regarding it a matter of little moment whether those beyond the circle of strict orthodoxy believe in or deny their reality. They argue that it is wise not to disturb the smooth current of popular faith, by a review of sceptical objections. There would be wisdom in this if the current were smooth. It would be folly to meet objections if those objections were not intruded upon our attention. But objections to miracles meet us, in the present age, at every turn, in books, pamphlets, periodicals, and even newspapers. No thoughtful young man who tries to keep abreast of current popular literature, can possibly be ignorant of the fact that the evidential character of miracles has been denied, and that their historical reality has been called in question of late by men of great learning and influence. Nor can he be ignorant that the tendency of the higher scientific training, and of the most advanced philosophical speculation at the present moment, is to set aside the miraculous and the supernatural altogether; in a word, to banish God as a personal, free, omnipotent, all-controlling Governor from his own universe.

We do not wish to provoke discussion; but we must show that we are not afraid of it, and that we are prepared to meet it. We do not wish to go back and establish again the foundations of our faith; but we are ready, if need be, to

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open them up to the world's eye, and to show, alike to philosopher and artizan, that they are firm as the everlasting hills.

The place which miracles occupy, and the object they were designed to serve, in the scheme of divine revelation, are plainly taught in the New Testament. Whatever may be the views of theologians or philosophers now, there can be no doubt as to the views of our Lord and his apostles. Miracles were professedly the visible or sensible signs and evidences of a divine commission given to, and a divine revelation made through, those who performed them. Miracles were acts of superhuman power performed for the express and declared purpose of enabling ordinary observers to test, and to test with absolute certainty, the claims of men who professed to be inspired and commissioned of God. Miracles were direct appeals to Omnipotence, in proof of doctrines alleged to be taught by the Omnipotent. The case is this: A man declares to his fellow-men that he speaks by God's authority God's word. He cannot show his fellow-men the Divine Spirit communicating the divine truth to his mind. From its very nature this lies outside the region of observation. He cannot, therefore, prove *directly* the truth of his declaration; but he proves it *indirectly*. Thus: he performs an act above human power—an act which any ordinary observer can see, and test, that it must be of God. He performs it, moreover, by a direct appeal to God, and as a palpable evidence that God's power is in him, and that he consequently holds God's commission.

There is a double miracle involved in the case I have here supposed, and which, as I shall show, is the case of every sacred writer. There is, first, the miraculous communication of some truth to the mind of the man. This is revelation. There is, second, the act by which the reality of that hidden and mysterious spiritual or intellectual communication from God to man—that revelation—is evidenced and tested, through the ordinary medium of sense, to the world at large. This is the Bible *miracle*. The scripture doctrine of a

miracle, then, is the confirmation, by an act of divine power, palpable to the senses, and so far within the range of ordinary observation, of a divine commission given to one man to communicate God's word to his fellow-men, and a confirmation, besides, of the infallible truth of the word so communicated.

I wish it to be clearly understood that I speak here of real miracles, not of mere tricks, or feats of legerdemain, like those of the Egyptian magicians, with which real miracles are sometimes confounded. Nor do I speak here of those acts of superhuman power which, it appears, evil spirits were occasionally suffered to perform in past ages. All these were in their nature essentially distinct from the miracles wrought by God; so distinct that any thoughtful, observant man could detect them. The miracles wrought of God had a self-evidencing power. Our Lord indicates this when he ridicules the view propounded by the Jewish rulers, that his power to work miracles emanated from Satan. The idea was absurd; and Jesus knew that it was dishonest as well as absurd. His miracles, and all the miracles wrought by the commissioned servants of God, had a character, a stamp of divinity, which no observant, unprejudiced man could mistake. They had, therefore, a self-evidencing power apart from, and prior to, the message which they were designed to authenticate. This is our Lord's plain teaching in the case of the paralytic (Mark ii. 5) whose sins he forgave; and in his discourse to the apostles in John xiv.; and, indeed, in every part of the Gospels where the subject is discussed or referred to. On this important phase of my subject I can, at present, only enunciate a principle; time will not permit me to elaborate an argument, and to illustrate it, as I could easily do, with instances.

I shall now develop the scriptural view of the evidential character of a miracle. The Evangelist John, in recording the first miracle of our Lord, writes: "This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested forth his glory; and his disciples believed on him." Observe here

how the superhuman, or divine act, of changing water into wine, is set forth as a palpable and irresistible proof of the glory of Godhead indwelling in Christ, and consequently of his alleged divine mission as the world's Saviour. The result of that act was, as any thoughtful man might anticipate, "His disciples believed in him."

Take another example. The Baptist sent two of his disciples to ask Jesus, "Art thou he that should come?" The question was just a demand for evidence of the reality of his alleged divine mission. What was his reply? "Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up" (Matt. xi. 4, 5). Here our Lord points to his miracles—those miracles which two plain men saw performed before their eyes; and he leaves both them and their master to draw their own conclusion from them as to the reality of his divine mission. So also in reasoning with the learned classes in Jerusalem—the leaders of Jewish thought, the sceptical philosophers of those days—he adopted the very same line of proof: "I have greater witness than that of John, for the works which the Father gave me to finish, the very works which I am doing (*αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶ*), bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me" (John v. 36). Here he makes special reference to the miracle he had just wrought on the paralytic, who lay helpless at the Pool of Bethesda.

By miracles, also, the divine commission of the apostles was proved to the various peoples among whom they preached. Thus, of Paul and Barnabas at Iconium, it is said: "Long time abode they, speaking boldly in the Lord, who gave testimony unto the word of his grace, granting *signs* and *wonders* to be done by their hands" (Acts xiv. 3). And Paul, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, writes (ii. 3, 4): "How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation, which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them who heard; God also bearing witness to it (*συνεπιμαρτυροῦντος τοῦ θεοῦ*) with *signs* and *wonders*,

and with various *miracles*." The signs, wonders, and miracles (rather "powers," *δυνάμεις*) were wrought by the power of God, and were the evidences to mankind of the reality of the apostle's commission and the divine authority of his teachings.

I have been careful thus to state clearly and fully the scripture doctrine of miracles, lest any should be misled by the incorrect definitions and teachings of certain philosophers and theologians of the present day.

An important question now meets us—What is a miracle? Wherein does a miracle differ from an ordinary event? A miracle may be defined, or rather described, as an act which, from its intrinsic nature, cannot be the result of ordinary or natural causation, and must consequently be ascribed to the supernatural. In the New Testament three Greek words are used to denote those acts which we now designate by the general term "miracles"; they are, *τεράτα*, *σημεῖα*, and *δυνάμεις*, and may be represented by the English terms "wonders," "signs," "powers," though they are not always so translated in the Authorized Version. It is well to note, regarding these Greek words, that the first never occurs in the New Testament alone, as if to show that miracles were not mere "wonders," or arbitrary displays of omnipotence. Every miracle has a grand design. It was not enough that from its startling and stupendous nature it should excite the astonishment of the crowd. It was also a "sign," and hence the Greek *σημεῖον* is always connected with *τέρας*, to show that the act specified was the sign or evidence of a commission received from God, and of the truth of the message brought by the commissioner. In three remarkable passages, where the object of the sacred writer is to exhibit in fullest force the evidential character of miracles, all the three terms are grouped together. It will be sufficient for my purpose to quote one of the passages. It is the appeal of the apostle Peter to the astonished multitude who witnessed the descent of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost: "Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of

Nazareth, a Man proved by God unto you, by *powers* and *wonders* and *signs* (δυνάμεισιν καὶ τέρασιν καὶ σημείοις) which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know" (Acts ii. 22). The two other passages are, 2 Cor. xii. 12; Heb. ii. 4.

It should be observed, also, that while these three words are not synonymous, they do not denote three distinct kinds of miracles. They are intended rather to describe a miracle in three distinct aspects, so as to bring out its full significancy. Every miracle is a wonder, to awe the beholder, and thus to rouse and rivet attention; it is a sign of a divine power in, and therefore of a divine commission given to, the actor; and it is a power, evidencing of itself the possession and forth-putting of delegated omnipotence. An example will best illustrate this. The healing of the paralytic at Capernaum, recorded in Mark ii. 3-12, was a "wonder," for they that saw it "were all amazed"; it was a "power," for the moment Christ spake to the palsied man "immediately he arose, took up his bed, and went forth before them all"; and it was a "sign," for it showed that he who wrought the miracle was possessed of the attributes of God, and "had power on earth to forgive sins." And the evidential character of the miracle was clear, for all who saw it "glorified God."

There is yet another important and essential element in a miracle. Every miracle contains a prophecy; and it is this prophetic element mainly which, in some cases, shows the presence of Divinity. The actor in a miracle knows beforehand what he is going to do, and the act is of such a kind as to exclude any possibility of natural anticipation. None, for instance, could anticipate the restoration of sight, or the calming of a storm, or the healing of disease by a word. But our Lord did so. Consequently the word by which every such miracle was wrought embodied a prophecy. It implied a previous knowledge of the act to be done—an act which no human eye could foresee, because no human power could do it. When Christ stood before the open tomb at Bethany, and said, "Lazarus, come forth," his

words were prophetic. When he looked over the stormy sea, and said, "Peace, be still," his words were prophetic. No act is, or can be, properly speaking, miraculous which does not contain this prophetic element.

Such, then, is the nature of a miracle — not, it may be, as defined by philosophers, but as described in the word of God. Each miracle recorded there is connected with divine power. It is the result of a divine cause. God is its Author. Man is sometimes the agent; but his commission and his power are alike from God. No Bible miracle is a mere gratuitous display of might; there is always a wise and good object to be served by it. Miracles were professedly the credentials of God's ambassadors; they are the seals which authenticate God's revelation. They were not mysterious events, occurring without a cause, or without any known or sufficient cause. They were produced by the direct operation of the great First Cause. In miracles we see the might and majesty of God transferred for a gracious purpose from heaven to earth. In miracles we see the Creator, in wondrous condescension to the weakness and ignorance of the creature, coming in power to attest the truth of his own message of mercy. In miracles we see the Almighty, by an exercise of his sovereign will, controlling the laws, and suspending for a time the order of his own universe, to advance his own glory and promote the good of his people.

Looking at miracles thus in the light of scripture, all is clear and intelligible. No difficulty is involved in full belief. But determined efforts have been made during the last two centuries to get men to look at miracles from a purely human stand-point, and to judge of their reality and their evidential character in the light of philosophy and science. The tendency, if not the design, of all such efforts is to lead to doubt and infidelity. It is a partial, and therefore a false, view of miracles. It is laid down at the present moment, in many of our schools and colleges, as a fundamental postulate, that no assertion is to be credited which is inconsistent with,

or unsupported by, our experience of the order of nature. It is maintained that the order of nature is fixed; that the inductive philosophy confirms the constancy and invariability of natural causes; that the educated intellect is compelled to disown the recognition of anything in the world of matter at variance with the first principles of the laws of matter; that the material universe, in fact, is under the unalterable reign of law; that, therefore, a miracle is impossible, because it involves a violation of this grand, uniform, and all-pervading law. Such reasoning is plausible chiefly because of the free use of those high-sounding phrases, "order of nature," "constancy of natural causes," "laws of matter," and a host of others. It is dangerous, moreover, because there is an element of truth and sound philosophy in it. Let us, therefore, analyze it, that we may divide truth from error, and clear away, if possible, the clouds of doubt which have enveloped Bible miracles.

It will be readily seen by the thoughtful student that the validity of the principles and arguments cited above depends upon two things: 1st. The nature and range of inductive philosophy, as here used; and 2d, The character of the laws of nature alleged to be founded upon it.

1st. Inductive philosophy, as that name is here used, is just the observation and classification of those facts and sequences which come within the range of human experience, and the deduction from them of certain general conclusions. For example, I have observed in all my experience that the sun has risen at a specified time on each morning; I thence infer, as a necessary sequence, that this observed order will be invariable in future. I have observed in all my experience that death has been followed by the corruption and dissolution of the body, and that no power or agency has been able to restore life; I thence conclude that the same will be the case in future, and that, consequently, life cannot be restored to a dead man. Or, to express it in a general proposition: I have observed in all my experience, and tested with all possible certainty, the regular recurrence of a fact

in nature, in a certain connection ; I consequently infer from that induction that the same fact will universally occur in the same connection. I thus convert the sum of my observations of natural phenomena into a generalization, and I call that generalization a law of nature. This then is induction, or inductive philosophy, so far as applicable to the point at issue.

The first part, therefore, and the basis of induction is observation. It is purely and simply what we see or hear or feel. Its validity depends upon the accuracy of our observation. Its principle depends upon, or is a corollary from, belief in the evidence of our senses. We may apply all manner of scientific tests to the facts we observe, we may extend our observations over a field wide as the world ; but our senses are, after all, the sole agents and instruments by which the results of tests and observations alike are judged.

The second part of induction is the framing of a generalization, or so-called natural law, out of the observed facts, which law, it is affirmed, will, and must be, applicable to all similar facts. It amounts to this : such a thing has occurred in all our past experience in an observed connection ; therefore the same thing will always occur in future in the same connection.

Let us examine this mode of reasoning, — this highly lauded philosophical induction. It is affirmed that because a thing has occurred in times past, it must occur in time to come. But why must it ? Can any man show a necessity for it ? Can any philosopher assign a reason beyond the simple truism, that so it has been ? Is there any physical impossibility involved in the supposition that it will not be so ? We expect that it will be so ; but for this expectation we can assign no rational reason. Our expectation is grounded on an impression, an instinct, an intuition — call it what you will, but you cannot call it a logical deduction ; much less can you call it a mathematical demonstration. We cannot explain or fathom the causes of those uniform sequences in natural objects which we have observed ; and not being able to do

so, we are not warranted in converting the sum of our observations, however large that sum may be, into a positive and unalterable law. There may, for aught we know, be a mysterious and powerful cause behind all—beyond the range of our observation, able to control, to suspend, and entirely to change the ordinary course of events. Such, then, is the real sphere of inductive philosophy, and the uncertainty of its teaching regarding the order of nature.

2d. We can now understand what is meant by those so-called “laws of nature” which are based upon induction. When we hear of laws we are apt to think they are powers, — powers which, in some way, operate by an uncontrollable necessity, which overcome all resistance in the accomplishment of their work. This is a grave mistake; and this mistake has given rise to the most serious and dangerous errors. The laws of nature are simply, as has been seen, the observed modes in which events have occurred, or in which material substances have operated upon, or in relation to, each other, within the experience of men. To say that these will continue uniformly in the future, as they have been observed in the past, is an assumption; it is a pure hypothesis, for which we can assign no reason beyond the expectation of our own minds. The so-called law is based upon a series of observations, independent altogether of the latent and true causes of things, which causes we can neither see nor comprehend; and a single accurate observation at any time, by any person, in any place, of an opposite character would upset all our expectations of necessity, or fixed order, grounded upon induction. It would not invalidate our induction as to the general uniformity of nature; but it would invalidate our hypothesis as to the necessary or universal order and constancy of natural causes. The widest possible induction in the present age might so far establish the fact that no dead man had risen, or had been raised to life; yet a single observed instance of a dead man rising, or being raised, to life would completely set aside the inductive argument, or law, that no dead man could rise, or be raised, from the dead. The

statement, therefore, that a miracle involves a violation of the grand and uniform laws of nature, and is thus impossible, is, when traced to its source, neither more nor less than an assumption.

We may look at this in another aspect, and thereby see the rationale of a miracle. A law of nature which may be regarded as universal and absolute is the law of cause and effect. Every effect must have a sufficient cause. It would be a violation of this law were an event to occur without the operation of any, or of a sufficient cause; if, for instance, a stone should rise from the ground without the action of a force sufficient to overcome gravitation. We can affirm that this is impossible. And if the same can be predicated of miracles — if it can be truly affirmed, as some have ventured to affirm, that they are “isolated, unrelated, uncaused,” then it can be truly affirmed that they are impossible. But it is also a law of nature that when a sufficient cause operates the effect must follow. When a force sufficient to overcome the law of gravitation is applied to a stone, it must rise from the ground. The same is true in regard to a miracle. If a sufficient cause operated, then, no matter what the nature of the cause, no matter what the nature of the event itself, there is no violation of nature’s law. The cause may be of the class we call natural, or of the class we term supernatural, still the effect follows in accordance with law. The question of possibility or impossibility depends, not on the nature of the event, but upon the operation or non-operation of a sufficient cause.

Take the illustration already given. There is a stone upon the ground. Were it to rise into the air without a cause, that would be a violation of the laws of nature, because the law of gravitation keeps it down. Were any man to affirm the occurrence of such a thing, and instance it as a miracle, we might fairly meet him with the assertion, it is impossible. Observe, however, that the assertion is grounded, not on the mere fact of the stone rising, but of its rising *without a cause*. Suppose I lift the stone and throw it into the air; in that

case the law of gravitation is overcome, but the laws of nature are not violated. Why? For this reason, a sufficient cause operated. What was that cause? It was the force of the muscles of my arm. What is the source of that force? It is my will. What is will; is it a physical, or is it a mental force? It is mental. Here, at length, we reach the root of the matter. We have will, or *mind*, operating upon matter, so as temporarily to overcome one of its laws. This bears a remarkable analogy to that latent, powerful, but to human eye unseen cause, which, as stated above, may be beyond the reach of observation, and control, change, and set aside the ordinary course of nature.

Take another example which brings out the point more clearly. My body, being material and subject to the fixed laws of matter, has, in itself, no more power of motion or action than a stone. Yet I can move all its members. I can make them overcome the great law of gravitation by the simple exercise of volition. I can rise when I will; I can walk where I will; I can act on other parts of the material world around me as I will. This is a fact, but an inexplicable fact. We know that mind, or will, acts thus upon the physical organization, and through it upon other objects, arresting, controlling, and overcoming the ordinary laws of nature. But we know not how it acts. The mode is to us a mystery, yet we believe the fact on the testimony of consciousness and observation.

We have now reached the root of the controversy as to the alleged impossibility of miracles. Those who make the allegation seem to forget that there is more in the universe than dead matter. They seem to overlook the noblest part of the universe,—*mind*. The laws of matter may be uniform in their operation; and, when regarded in themselves and by themselves, any alleged violation of them may be open to the charge of impossibility. But mind is an independent power—independent, that is, in so far as regards matter. It can produce effects which the laws of matter could never have produced. It can arrest, regulate, and

temporarily overcome all the laws of matter ; yet such acts cannot be regarded as violations of natural law. We must be careful to distinguish between a violation of law, and an overcoming, or temporary suspension, of a generalization of observations, to which the name law is given. No event, whatever its character, is a violation of law if produced by a sufficient cause. The cause may be physical, as gravitation ; or it may be purely mental, as an exercise of the will ; it may be natural, proceeding from an earthly power ; or it may be supernatural, proceeding from divine power ; but, if the cause be sufficient, the effect produced, however stupendous, is not a violation of natural law. None can deny the power of mind over matter, as a higher law, a personal and free agent. None can deny that it may, and often does, operate freely, arbitrarily, and as an efficient cause, over matter and its law. We are all conscious of this, though unable to explain the mode of it. Can we deny, then, to the mind of God a power which is exercised every day by the mind of man ? We take for granted his existence ; we admit his personality and independence : cannot he, therefore, for his own glory, for the accomplishment of his own purposes, by a simple exercise of his sovereign will, control, suspend, or temporarily overcome, any of nature's laws ? When the mind of man acts in suspending or overcoming any of the laws of matter, the effect is said to be natural ; when the mind of God thus acts, the effect is said to be supernatural, and is called a miracle ; but neither the one effect nor the other is a violation of law. Consequently, when we regard God, as he is always regarded in scripture, as the source of the power which works a miracle, that miracle is not a violation of law ; on the contrary, it is in accordance with one of the greatest of laws, the law of cause and effect. A higher than human power comes within the sphere of human observation, not visibly but potentially, for the accomplishment of wise and mighty purposes. The Almighty himself is seen, as it were, to come to earth, and, by an exercise of his sovereign will, to produce new and

wondrous events; but these, though we may call them "wonders," "signs," "miracles," are no more violations of law than my act when I throw a pebble in the air.

I have already indicated the power of mind over matter — its power as a free agent to control and overcome the laws of matter. There is one aspect of this grand truth which is of paramount importance in connection with, and in its bearing upon the doctrine of miracles, and the existence of a God. Mind is seen to be the sole originator of motion in the world of matter, so far as human observation has traced, or can trace, motion to its source; that is, in fact, so far as the range of induction extends. Matter in itself is inert. It possesses no inherent power, and power is necessary to motion. When at rest, it can be moved only by an impulse from without; and that impulse, wherever given within the sphere of observation, can be traced ultimately to mind. In this busy world of ours, wherever we see matter in motion, we conclude that mind has been, directly or indirectly, the moving principle. Mind planned and formed that complicated mechanism which for days, and even years, goes on marking time and noting epochs, with a precision which would seem to equal the highest achievements of inherent intelligence. Mind launches those noble ships which brave the tempest, and with unerring accuracy plow their way onward through midnight darkness, through ocean's noonday solitude, through storm-tossed billows, till at length out of the bosom of the mighty deep, they emerge like things of life, and glide right into their destined haven. Mind hurls, with a voice of thunder, those terrific missiles, — war's swift messengers — which fly with mathematical precision, high above impregnable battlements, and then, at length, spread death and desolation in the very heart of fortress or city. Mind trains those mysterious wires across mountains, kingdoms, rivers; lays them down in ocean's profound abyss, connecting country with country, continent with continent, until the globe is girt with a pathway for thought. And then, by the touch of a finger, the thoughts of men are

flashed to their fellow-men at the ends of the earth, with the swiftness of thought itself. Mind has thus left the impress of its mighty, independent power over matter and its laws in every part of the inhabited world. The mechanisms, the agencies, the channels, the stupendous engines which mind has devised to carry out these wondrous operations are all extant. Tens of thousands of them are now working. And yet were mind this moment annihilated, a moment more and motion in them all would cease. The stillness of death would reign over the whole world of humanity. The pendulum would cease to beat. The ship would lie in mid-ocean a helpless log. The cannon's mouth would give forth no voice of terror. The wire that carried human thoughts on lightning's wing the world around, would only sing, touched by the winds of heaven, the requiem of dead humanity. Mind is the sole life-principle — the only discoverable motive-power in the world of man. We see in that world the reign, not of material law, but of mind. We recognize the existence of a power capable of acting independently of the normal course of material sequence. We observe mind originating new combinations, giving a new stimulus to inert matter, working too in a way entirely different from the fixed and narrow instincts of the lower animals — in a word, claiming, and exercising a force which is truly creative.

And will not analogy justify us in carrying this reasoning further? Matter, being inert, cannot originate, and of and by itself cannot perpetuate motion. There is no such thing as spontaneousness in matter. When at rest, it must remain so until moved by a force from without. If in motion, the motion will cease, unless sustained by a force from without. Mind is the great originator of motion, the sole possessor of inherent force. But the material universe is in motion. The ocean never rests. The winds never sleep. The earth, on its axis, in its orbit, rolls ceaselessly on. The system of which it is but an atom — the stars in the vast canopy of heaven, which reach away into space further than the telescope of the astronomer can penetrate — are all moving in

sublime concord. A grand design, an all-pervading law, is seen to guide them. This design indicates a designing mind. This motion proclaims a *Mover*. In a word, we are led in the very motion of the spheres to recognize the presence and working of a living, independent, omnipotent God. And this independent, omnipotent God is presented to us in the Bible as the Author of miracles; bringing them about, not without a cause, but as the great First Cause.

The independent power of mind, proved by the indisputable evidence of our own consciousness, and witnessed in our every-day experience, is the real key to all the difficulties connected with miracles in relation to nature and natural law. When the advocates of pure physical science affirm, as some of them do affirm, that no modification can take place in the relations or conditions of any two material atoms, unless through "the invariable operation of a series of eternally impressed consequences," I reply: Has mind no independent power in this respect? Cannot the profound physicist move his hand, or throw a pebble, when he will? Does not his mind arbitrarily prompt and originate interference with matter every day, and almost every moment? Is he not as fully assured of this by his own consciousness and observation as he is of any chain of sequences in the material world? Do we not all perceive mind freely changing the positions and relations of material atoms, modifying too the conditions of material agencies, and that altogether independent of any series of eternally impressed consequences, following in some necessary chain of orderly connection?

Miracles, then, viewed as the results of the direct action of the divine will, in which light they are always set forth in scripture, are no more interferences with nature and law than the acts done by the free-will of man every hour of his existence. They may be far more stupendous in character; but they are the same in kind. It is, after all, only a shallow philosophy which attempts to assail miracles with such an argument as this.

Another plausible objection to miracles I must notice. It is said, *They are incredible, because contrary to all experience.* Let us examine this objection, and see whether it will bear the test of logical analysis.

That only can be contrary to all experience which is contrary to the perceptions of those who were present when it is alleged to have occurred. For example, it is alleged that Lazarus was raised from the dead by our Lord. Philosophers declare the allegation incredible, because it is contrary to all experience that a dead man should rise. Their argument amounts to this: A dead man never came to life, therefore Lazarus was not raised from the dead. Examine it, and you see that it is no argument at all. It is an assumption. The fact that Lazarus was raised cannot be affirmed to be contrary to all experience, except it can be shown that it was contrary to the perceptions of those who were present when the resurrection is said to have taken place. Can this be shown? Is not the very opposite asserted in the Gospel? Was not the miracle seen and attested by a large number of credible and competent witnesses? Did not even the hostile Jewish rulers see and believe it?

The fallacy of the objection lies here. A miracle may be contrary to my experience; but I am not therefore justified in affirming that it is contrary to all experience. A miracle may be contrary to the experience of the whole existing generation of men; but it would be illogical to affirm that it must therefore be contrary to the experience of all those who lived nineteen centuries ago. Unless, in fact, experience could be extended over all creation, unless it could be made to reach to all ages past, unless it could be endowed with the attributes of omniscience and eternity, we could not legitimately affirm that a miracle is contrary to all experience.

It may with truth be affirmed that miracles are contrary to the analogy of ordinary experience. However wide our observation in the present age, we meet with no miracle. I admit it. Were it otherwise, miracles would be no longer miraculous. It is this very characteristic which gives them

their value as evidences, making them signs and proofs of a divine commission specially given to those who wrought them. Miracles are not natural events produced by natural causes. Were they so, they would come within the range of ordinary observation ; but they would, for that very reason, be useless as evidences of the divine origin of Christianity. The miracles of the New Testament were wrought professedly by a power from God, under a solemn appeal to God, in proof of a commission received from him, and of a revelation given by him. God was the Author of those miracles. His sovereign will was cause sufficient for their production. Those miracles are not "isolated, unrelated, uncaused," though they do stand apart from the whole system of natural causes. God is their cause. They are in accordance with the great law of cause and effect ; and they have, as historic events, come within the range of human experience.

Another objection to miracles is, that *they are alleged supernatural events, and thus incapable of proof by testimony*. It is argued that, being supernatural, they do not come within the range of ordinary observation, as no observation can reach to the supernatural.

It is said a miracle does not come within the range of ordinary observation. I maintain that it does. So far as regards the perception of a miracle, there is no difference between it and an ordinary event. When the miracles of the New Testament were wrought, they were wrought before witnesses, in many cases amounting to hundreds, in some to thousands, who saw them as they would have seen any other event. An example will best illustrate my meaning. When the disciples were crossing the Sea of Galilee, a tempest rose suddenly. Our Lord was asleep. They awoke him, with the prayer : "Lord, save us ; we perish." He replied : "Why are ye fearful ?" Then he rebuked the wind, and said to the sea, "Peace, be still." The disciples heard his words, as they would have heard any other words. They had the evidence of the sense of hearing, and under such circumstances that sense could not deceive them. Im-

mediately on the words being spoken, the storm abated ; “there was a great calm.” The disciples saw it. They had the evidence of the senses of seeing, hearing, and feeling as to the reality of the whole occurrence. There could be no more doubt about them, and no more difficulty in observing and testing them, than in regard to any ordinary events. Viewed each by itself, they were ordinary events. Can any man affirm, therefore, that they did not come within the sphere of ordinary observation ?

But now let us inquire what it is which makes this whole event a miracle. It is not the words spoken by our Lord ; nor is it the sudden lulling of the storm. The miraculous element lies in the connection between the two. The miracle consisted in the exercise of divine power, indicated by the prophetic command, and resulting in the “great calm.” But this connection did not place either the command itself or the calming of the sea beyond the range of ordinary observation, or of legitimate and satisfactory proof by testimony. It required no higher faculty to establish the absolute reality of the whole incident than it does to establish the reality of any incident in common life. Observation can establish the outward occurrences, and from these we infer the miracle.

We are now led to examine another dictum — that no testimony can reach to the supernatural. True, our observation, and therefore our testimony, cannot reach to the supernatural ; for there is no supernatural act performed now. Even at the time the miracles of the New Testament were wrought, the observation of the spectators could not reach to the supernatural, because the human eye could not see the working of the supernatural agency producing the event. The supernatural or miraculous character of the event was an inference on the part of the spectators ; but under such circumstances the inference was inevitable. It was as true as the event itself. Testimony based upon it is as trustworthy as that based upon observation. While, therefore, in so far as regards mere spectators, their testimony cannot reach by actual observation to the supernatural, yet by

means of necessary deduction it does reach to it. Thus: when the widow's son was raised from the dead at Nain, the spectators saw the dead body on the bier; they saw the weeping mother; they saw Jesus meeting the funeral procession; they heard his words to the widow: "Weep not"; they heard his command to the dead: "Young man, arise"; they saw the instantaneous effect—"He that was dead sat up, and began to speak." They saw all this, and their senses could not deceive them. Their observation, however, did not reach further. They inferred that a "great prophet" had arisen—that "God had visited his people." But will any man affirm that their inference is at all less certain or less credible than their testimony as to the facts? The facts being known, the inference follows. We can deduce it with as much certainty as could the original spectators.

But I go farther. It is not true in every case that no observation reaches to the supernatural. The observation of those who wrought the miracles must have reached to the supernatural. They felt the power of God working by them. They were as fully cognizant of it as of the operations of their own will. When Peter said to the cripple at the beautiful gate of the temple: "In the name of Jesus of Nazareth, rise up and walk," he was fully conscious that he then possessed, and was exercising, the delegated omnipotence of the Son of God. He was as competent to testify to the fact, as to testify to any exercise of his own will. He could be no more deceived as to the one than as to the other. And his communication of the fact to others was testimony which reached to the supernatural.

We now see that in whatever light we regard miracles, whether as events witnessed by spectators, and which from their nature they necessarily infer to be miraculous; or as exercises of a divine power specially conferred upon the workers, and testified to by them—they are alike capable of proof by testimony, because they are within the sphere of ordinary observation, of sound logical deduction, and of mental consciousness. These are the legitimate sources

of knowledge. All our deductions are founded upon them. All history is founded upon them. If we refuse to accept them in regard to miracles, can we consistently accept them in other cases? If we reject them we sweep away the whole basis of history; we affirm, if consistent and logical, that the evidence of our senses is unworthy of credit, and incapable of establishing the occurrence of any event, or the reality of any phenomenon; and thus we actually sweep away the whole basis of inductive philosophy.

The explanations I have given, and the arguments I have adduced prove, as I believe, that miracles are not impossible, that they are not incredible, and that they are not incapable of proof by testimony; but, on the contrary, that they have been established as facts, and are, therefore, God's own infallible proofs of the divine commission given to his ambassadors, and of the divine message sent by them. Many of the doctrines which the ambassadors proclaimed were new and strange, many beyond the grasp of the human intellect. Something, therefore, which the intellect in its ordinary exercise could apprehend, and the divine origin of which the honest spectator could trace, had to be performed to attest the doctrines. Such was the design of miracles. They were never mere arbitrary displays of power. They had a grand object and that object could be seen. Man saw in them God's own seal set to his truth; he saw in their nature the impress of infinite power and wisdom; he saw in their object the impress of infinite mercy and love. He was compelled to acknowledge in them the working of a present, omnipotent God, and to receive them as irresistible evidences of the truth of God's revelation.

ARTICLE IV.

ST. PATRICK'S PURGATORY, AND THE INFERNO OF DANTE.

BY FREDERIC VINTON, LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON.

THE theology of the Middle Ages was full of gloom. It had no cheerful views of the future. Ever since prayer to saints took the place of prayer to Christ, and wherever forgiveness for his sake is not taught and believed, "a fearful looking for of judgment," shrouds the grave in black. The sermons of the monks strove to fright men from sin by depicting purgatory and hell; and when the preachers turned poets, "Dies irae" was their noblest strain; when they descended to story-telling, their imagination only reproduced the parable of Lazarus. Two thirds of Dante's dread epic hover above "a sunless sea"; and the more cheerful portion is the insipid part. Long before him, inferior geniuses attempted the like voyage "twixt upper, nether, and surrounding fires." Those who grope farthest in mediaeval night, bring back many fragments resembling the underground world which he described.

In the year 1839, Vassal, of Paris, reprinted in forty-two copies, *fac simile*, a curious relic of those days, called "*Le voyage du saint patrix auquel lieu on voit les peines de purgatoire et aussi les ioyes de paradis.*" No authorship was given, nor does the editor appear to have conjectured the origin of what he was restoring to the world of letters. The text copied was printed, "*lyon sur le rosne, mil cinq cens et six.*" The type is Gothic, the orthography quaint, some words obsolete, and the engravings excessively rude. The languid, repetitious manner shows that the narrative is far older than the date of its printing. The rarity of the book appears, from its not being noticed in Mr. Abbot's opulent "*Literature of the Doctrine of a Future Life,*" containing, as

that does, in its chapter on purgatory, nearly two hundred and fifty titles. Haym cites in the fourth volume of his *Biblioteca italiana*, “*Viaggio del pozzo di s. Patrizio, nel qual luogo si vede le pene del purgatorio, ed altresì le gioje del paradiso*,” printed at Milan, “*Napoli, ed altrove*,” about 1530, 8vo. No doubt this is the same legend, in Italian; and in Latin, the “*Purgatorium divi Patricii, Memmingen, 1496*,” is perhaps the same. The phraseology of the little book reprinted by Vassal, may indicate a Latin original; and in the collection of ancient legends, edited by Messingham, and printed in 1624, is this title: “*Super purgatorio s. Patricii, de quodam milite nomine Oweyn, qui deductus fuerat per poenas infernales*.” The author to whom he ascribes it is *Henricus Salteriensis*. Jöcher’s *Allgemeines gelehrten lexikon*, vol. 2, informs us that Henry of Saltrey was an English monk, who lived in the middle of the twelfth century. From other sources we learn that he was born in Huntingdonshire, and flourished about 1150, in the reigns therefore of Stephen, and of Henry II., great grandson of the Conqueror. If we can identify our little French book with his Latin romance, we carry it back at once three hundred and fifty years. The *tractatus de purgatorio s. Patricii*, by *Henricus Salteriensis* is included in the *Patrologia Latina* of the abbé Migne, volume 180; and from this we copy as follows:

“*Miles quidam Oenus nomine, qui multis annis sub rege Stephano militaverat, licentia a rege impetrata, profectus est in Hiberniam ad natale solum, ut parentes visitaret. Qui cum aliquandiu in regione illa demoratus fuisset, coepit ad mentem reducere vitam suam adeo flagitiosam Cum autem episcopus vellet ei injungere poenitentiam, miles respondit, Ut peccatorum meorum merear remissionem accipere, purgatorium sancti Patricii volo intrare.*”

The first sentence of Vassal’s reprint runs thus:

“*Il fut au temps du roy estieñe vng noble cheualier lequel estoit appelle Oben, et estoit natif des parties dalemaigne. Vng iour luy estant en cōtemplation cōsiderant en soymesme que en cestuy monde ne sont q̄ toutes miserabletez, se mist en couraige daller visiter le puy saint patrix, auquel sont veuez les peines de purgatoire et aussi les ioyes de paradis.*”

These sentences, it will be perceived, have such a resemblance, and such differences, as the paraphrastic translators of early times were accustomed to produce in transferring from one language to another. The resemblance will grow much more distinct in comparing the parallel passages below. We propose to copy, in corresponding columns, from the Latin of Henry of Saltrey, as given by Migne, from the French, reprinted by Vassal, and from Roger of Wendover, who copied part of Henry's narrative in his own *Flores historiarum*, as translated by J. A. Giles, London, 1849.

*Henricus Salteriensis.*¹

42. Miles itaque ... per speluncam audacter licet solus, pergit. Ingravescitibus magis tenebris, in brevi totam amisit lucem; tandem ex adverso lux parvula coepit per foveam tenuiter lucere; nec mora ad campum praedictum pervenit et aulam; lux autem ibi non apparuit, nisi qualis hic in hyeme post solis occasum habetur.

Vassal's Reprint.

Le noble cheualier entra hardiement dedans ceste merueilleuse fosse et espouantable, en faisant le signe de la croix deuant soy; et incontinent perdit toute clarte et commença a entrer in obscures tenebres. Et quant il eut vng peu chemine il apperceut vng peu de clarte par une petite fenestre. Et chemina droit a icelle ou tātost il trouua vng chāp, auquel auoit vng sale, en laq̃lle nauoit point de clarte sinon ainsi cōme apparoist en yver apres souleil couchant.

Giles' Roger of Wendover.

The knight passed courageously along the cave, until he was in total darkness: at last the light broke upon him, and he found himself in the plain where was the hall that he had been told of; the light was no more than the twilight of evening.

43. ... Subito circa domum coepit audiri tumultus, ac si totus commoveretur orbis: et enim si omnes homines et animalia terrae, maris et aeris toto conamine pariter strepuissent, maiorem tumultum (ut ei videbatur) non facerent; unde nisi divina virtute protegeretur ... ipso tumultu amenaretur. Et ecce post horribilem sonum sequitur terribilior daemonum visibilis aspectus; coepit

... Incontinent vindrent grās multitude de dyables au tour d'luy q̃ faisoiet grās crys et grans bruys et si grans tormens quil sembloit parfaitement que toutes les villes, cites, chasteaulx, roches, riuieres, et mōtaignes combatissent toutes ensemble, et se le cheualier neust este bien garde de la puissance de dieu, laquelle estoit avec luy incontinent il fust sailly hors de son sens. Et puis entrèrent en la sale grans nombres de

He had no sooner wrought up his soul to courage, than a noise was heard around the building, as if all the men in the world, with all the animals and beasts, were making it. And after this noise came a terrible apparition of ugly demons, of which an immense multitude rushed into the hall, and in derision addressed the knight.

¹ Migne, *Patrologiae cursus latinus*. v. 180.

Henricus Salteriensis.

enim undique innumera multitudo daemonum formarum deformium in aulam irruere cachinnando illum salutare. . . .

Vassal's Reprint.

dyables en diuerses formes lequels auoient tres horribles figures et tres horribles fiers regars que nul ne fust quil les vist quil ne saillist hors du sens. Et pröptement vindrent autour du dit cheualier et luy commencerent en leur mocquans et truffans de luy a dire. . . .

Giles' Roger of Wendover.

44. Daemones igitur, a milite se contemni videntes, horribiliter fremebant in eum, et rogum ingentis incendii in aula succenderent, ligatisque manibus et pedibus, militem in ignem projecerunt, uncisque ferreis huc et illuc per incendium clamantes traxerunt.

Voyant les dyables que lecheualier ne tenoit compte ne de leurs promesses, peines ne tormens incontinent firent saillir au milieu de la sale vne grant flambe de feu, et puis prindrent le cheualier et luy lyerent les pieds et les mains et le getterent au milieu de celluy feu, et le tiroient a grans crocz de fer düg coste et daultre dudict feu.

The demons, indignant at being treated with contempt, kindled a large fire in the hall, and seizing the knight by his legs and arms, threw him into the midst of it, dragging him with iron hooks backwards and forwards through the fire.

The object of these ministers of hell was to compel the knight to go back to the entrance, and mingle again with men, in sign that his old desire of sinful indulgence was yet alive. But, invoking continually the name of Jesus, he passed through all the scenes of torment into which they led him, maintaining inflexibly his resolution to return no more to sin. Through vast and dreary regions, therefore, populous with forms of pain, they dragged him, — subjecting him everywhere to the agonies he saw, — till the cycle was complete, and the power of faith prevailed.

Henricus Salteriensis.

45. Tandem tractu daemonum, in latissimum et longissimum campum peruenit, miseriis ac dolore perplenum cujus fines, prae nimia longitudine non poterant a milite transvideri. Ille autem campus, hominibus utriusque sexus, et aetatis

Vassal's Reprint.

. . . Ilz trouuerent vng aultre champ tresgrät treslarge plain de douleurs et de tristesse, et ne pouuoit veoir le cheualier la fin di celluy champ tout estoit long et large, et estoit plain d'hommes et de femmes tous nudz lesquelz estoient de diuers eages, et estoient

Giles' Roger of Wendover.

. . . At length he was dragged by the demons into a long and wide plain, filled with woe and calamities, and so long that it was impossible to see across it. It was full of persons of both sexes and of every age, naked, and

Henricus Salteriensis.

diversae, nudis et in terra
jacentibus erat plenus, qui
ventribus deorsum versis
clavis ferreis et ignitis per
manus pedesque in terram
usque transfixis misera-
biliter torquebantur. Ali-
quando autem praedoloris
angustia videbantur ter-
ram comedere, clamantes
et ejulantes: Parce, parce,
miserere, miserere, cum
qui parcere aut misereri
nequaquam adesset, dac-
mones vero super miseros
discurrentes durissimis
flagris eos caedebant.

Vassal's Reprint.

couchez a terre, et le ventre
contre ladicte terre. Puis
estoiient clauellez a grandes
lances de fer en terre par la
teste, y celles lances estoiient
toutes embrasces en feu. Et
pour la grant douleur quilz
enduroient il semble quilz
mordissent la terre a gros
morceaulz, tant ilz souffroi-
ent et enduroient grans
peines et trauaulx. Aulcuns
essoys en leur remuant
leuoiet le corps vng peu de
terre, et cryoient et brayoi-
ent en disant. Vucillez
auoir mercy de nous et nous
pardonnez noz mesfaitz.
Nulz des dyables nauoient
de eulz pitie, mais couroient
et sautoient sur eulz comme
chiens enraigez.

Giles' Roger of Wendover.

lying with their bellies
to the ground, for their
bodies and limbs were
horribly fastened to the
ground with hot nails
of iron driven into the
earth. Sometimes, in
the anguish of their
sufferings, they gnawed
the dust, crying and
lamenting, "Spare us,
oh, spare us; have
mercy, have mercy
upon us!" though
there was no one there
to have mercy or to
spare them. The de-
mons coursed over these
wretched beings, strik-
ing them with heavy
blows as they passed.

In these dolorous regions the knight saw men previously known to himself, enduring every extremity of pain — hung up over fires, sunk in baths of boiling metal, roasted on spits and basted by satanic hands, whirled with intense rapidity on the periphery of a vast, red-hot wheel, hurried away on the blast of freezing winds, and plunged in a stinking stream. The final test of his endurance was the passage of a long, lofty, and narrow bridge, built over the burning lake; and as he essayed the slippery surface, legions of yelling demons rushed about him, confounding him by their shouts, and darting their fiery hooks to drag him from his feet. But the same triumphant faith held him firm, and enlarged the way as he proceeded, till he landed at last in the country of the blest beyond.

A prosaic mind, it is true, seems to have brought together most of these commonplace delineations of pain (could we but assure ourselves what *was* commonplace in the twelfth century); and yet, occasionally, where he summons the powers of nature to his aid, in blasts and floods, the author rises toward the poetic.

Henricus Saltreus.

32. . . . *Validissimum
terrorem, et sulphureo
foetore plenam de puteo
quodam ascendentem, et
homines nudos et quasi
igneos, velut scintillas
ignis in aera sursum com-
pellentem, et flammam
vi deficiente, iterum in
puteum et flammam re-
labi.*

Vassal's Reprint.

*La nuit une très grande
flamme de feu et de souffre
fort puant qui sortoit du
puys d'enfer. En ceste
flamme sautoient hommes
et femmes comme escudelles
de feu, et resussitoient dedans
le puys.*

Jos. Roger of Wendover.

*A yel-some flame,
which arose with a
stinking smell out of
a well, over which were
naked men, apparently
red hot, who were shot
forth into the air like
sparks, and again when
the flame subsided, fell
into the pit beneath.*

No sentence of scripture seems anywhere to be cited, or alluded to, excepting St. Paul's description of the Christian panoply.

It is impossible to read the passages we have now extracted, and not be reminded of the *Divina Commedia*. The resemblance was pointed out long ago; it is noticed by many commentators on Dante, and specially is it recognised in the *Bibliografia dantesca* of Colomb de Batines. But Henry of Saltrey lived a hundred years earlier than the great Italian; and his striking legend was soon diffused through Christendom, and even translated into various languages of Europe. Bartholomew Cotton, who died about 1800, in his *Historia Anglicana*, under the date 1152, commemorates the adventure of the knight Owen, and inserts some of the very words of Henry of Saltrey. Henry Knighton, in the next century, in words like those of Cotton, says that "a certain knight of this Stephen [king of England], Oweyn by name, entered the purgatory of St. Patrick." Ralph Higden and, as we have seen, Roger of Wendover do the same thing at great length. In his "*Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland, to the Reign of Henry VII.*" (3 vols. 8vo., London, 1862), Thomas Duffus Hardy describes twelve Latin manuscripts (beside those in French) of Henry of Saltrey's legend, existing in various libraries of Europe. Three versions in French were also made at an early date — one by Marie of France, in language now so quaint as to be intelligible only to the antiquary. Vassal's reprint may be modernized from one of these. In the

British Museum, and in the Advocate's Library at Edinburgh, two different antique English versions are preserved. In some of these forms, the legend must have fallen under the eyes of Dante. This does not subtract from the originality of the *Divina Commedia*. It is in the use made of materials which to other men are but refuse or glittering dust, that the creative power of great poets appears.

Cousin, in his *Introduction to the History of Philosophy*, has said: "None but a rhetorician will insist that the mere scheme of a master-piece must be the work of him who perfects it." In the *Essay of Labitte*, entitled, "*La divina commedia avant Dante*," and published in the "*Revue des deux mondes*," 1842, we find the question: "How is it that the epic of Dante rises suddenly upon us, in the midst of historic night, *prolem sine matre creatam*? Is it the sole exception in the literature of time? Better than that; it is the grand alliance between creative intellect and intellect enriched with the spoils of the past." In nothing does the great Italian epic of heaven and earth so nearly resemble the English one as in being the storehouse where is garnered up all the learning of the world.

It is, indeed, difficult to identify any one passage in the *Inferno* with any in Henry of Saltrey; and yet, some lines in the fourteenth canto, agree precisely with the first line of page 279, above. But, in general, of course, it is hard to trace the splendor of the poet in the prose of the monk. A general accordance, only, of delineation is to be discovered; but a vague feeling of resemblance continually recurs. It must have often recurred to readers of the extracts already made.

The first access of the knight Owen to the sad region of the lost is made through utter darkness and sounds of immeasurable grief: "*Nigra enim erat terra, et regio tenebrosa, nec quidquam nisi daemones qui cum traxerunt vidit in ea. In latissimum et longissimum campum pervenit, miseriis ac dolore perplenum. Coepit miles quasi vulgi totius terrae miserrimos ejulatus et fletus audire, et quo*

“The stormy blast of hell
With restless fury drives the spirits on,
Whirled round and dashed amain with sore annoy.”

Inferno, canto v. 32.

.... “As, in large troops
And multitudinous, when winter reigns,
The starlings on their wings are borne abroad;
So bears the tyrannous gust those evil souls.
On this side and on that, above, below,
It drives them. Hope of rest to solace them
Is none, nor e’en of milder pang.”

Inferno, canto v. 39-46.

The torment of cold is exhibited near the end of the Inferno:

“Blue, pinched, and shrined in ice the spirits stood,
Moving their teeth in shrill note, like the stork.
His face each downward held; their mouth the cold,
Their eyes expressed the dolor of their heart.”

Inferno, canto xxxii. 34-37.

Harsh and gross as are most of the agents employed in both to produce the agonies of hell (consisting, for the most part, only in physical pain), a more refined idea enters into some of these passages, where weariness and despair result from the long-continued sameness of the infliction. Dante has expressed it in the words quoted above, and Henry of Saltrey in those which follow:

“Traxerunt illum versus fines eos, ubi sol oritur in media aestate; cumque illuc venissent tanquam in finem mundi, coeperunt dextrorsum converti, per vallem latissimum tendere versus illam partem, quo sol oritur media hyeme.”

But there is one most terrible passage in Henry of Saltrey, — in which the demons are described as transformed into serpents, dragons, and toads, fastening upon the prostrate sinners and tearing their vitals — which it is easy to identify in thought with a dread description and narrative in the Inferno.

“Dracones autem ignei super quosdam sedentes et quasi comedentes eos, modo miserabili dentibus igneis lacerabant. Aliorum quoque colla, brachia, vel totum corpus, serpentes igniti circumdabant, et capita sua pectoribus miserorum imprimentes, ignitum aculeum oris sui in cordibus eorum infigebant. Bufones etiam mirae magnitudinis, et tanquam ignei, videbantur super quorundam pectora sedere, et rostra sua deformia infi-

gentes quasi eorum corda conarentur extrahere. Daemones praeterea inter et super eos cursitantes, et flagris asperrimis caedentes, miseros graviter cruciabant."

ROGER OF WENDOVER, TRANSLATED BY GILES.

"Fiery dragons were sitting on some of them, and gnawing them with iron teeth; others were the victims of fiery serpents, which, coiling round their necks, arms, and bodies, fixed iron fangs into their hearts. Toads, also, of immense size and terrific to behold, sat upon the breasts of some, and tried to tear out their hearts with their ugly beaks. Demons, also, coursed along over them, lashing them as they passed."

"I saw a crowd within

Of serpents terrible, so strange of shape
And hideous, that remembrance in my veins
Yet shrinks the vital current. Of her sands
Let Lybia vaunt no more;

. . . . plagues so dire

Or in such numbers swarming ne'er she showed.
Amid this dread exuberance of woe
Ran naked spirits, winged with horrid fear,
Nor hope had they of crevice where to hide,
Or heliotrope to charm them out of view.
With serpents were their hands behind them bound,
Which through their veins infixed the tail and head."

Inferno, canto xxiv. 78-94.

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"As I looked, a serpent with six feet
Springs forth on one, and fastens full upon him;
His midmost grasped the belly, a forefoot
Seized on each arm, while deep in either cheek
He fleshed his fangs.

Ivy ne'er clasped

A doddered oak, as round the other's limbs
The hideous monster intertwined his own."

Inferno, canto xxv. 44-53.

The honor of having thus furnished suggestions, or quickened the invention of Dante, and through him of Milton too, may well entitle this forgotten legendary to the notice, if not to the admiration of our times. The fictions of the Middle Ages were the seed-corn of modern literature, ready to germinate in other soils, and bear fruit under better culture. It is only surprising that so striking a legend as ours, should not have blossomed out in later times into

nobler plants than the Italian romance *Guerrino meschino*, and Calderon's drama, *El purgatorio di San Patricio*.

If, now, we regard Henry of Saltrey as the original from which have proceeded a multitude of such representations as these, and especially of those which respect St. Patrick's purgatory, so widely famous, and so fixed and localized in Ireland, it becomes a curious inquiry, on what basis of natural scenery and phenomena the legend first was fastened, and has ever since reposed. The monkish biographers of St. Patrick assert that in order to curb the wild Irish, God revealed to him an entrance to purgatory in a desolate part of their island. Gerald Barry, or, Ap Harry, known as *Giraldus Cambrensis*, writing before the year 1214, says: "There is a lake in Ulster, containing a double island, one portion of which, occupied by a church, is attractive and agreeable, often visited by angels and saints. The other, rough and dreary, is inhabited by demons alone, and continually frequented by crowds of evil spirits. This latter contains nine pits; in any one of which should a person presume to pass the night (as some rash men have ventured to do) he is instantly seized by the malignant spirits, and all night afflicted by so many and so grievous torments of fire and water, that by morning light, scarce a remnant of his life still animates his miserable body." It was a popular belief that whoever sustained this test and escaped alive, would, for the torments suffered there, be spared the purgatory of the other world. The wild and gloomy scenery of Lough Dearg, in Donegal county, in the northwest of Ireland, "the landscape of desolation," contrasted by all travellers with the loveliness around Lough Erne, immediately near, has led to the belief that this was the spot divinely pointed out to St. Patrick. Pilgrimages to the spot were early instituted, and have continued in every age. "On the patent rolls preserved in the Tower of London, under date 1358, and printed by Rymer in the *Foedera*, (vol. iii. part iv. p. 135) is a testimonial given by King Edward III. to two distinguished foreigners, of their having faithfully performed

this pilgrimage." Froissart testifies that he had heard of a descent into this cavern from one who had performed it. His narrative resembles Henry of Saltrey's. The abuses which attended admission to the purgatory at length drew discredit on the place, and in 1497 the reigning pope, Alexander VI. (of all the popes, that *he* should be a reformer!) sent orders for the closing of the purgatorial cave. So profitable an exhibition, however, could not long be suppressed, and the fame of the miracle spread through Europe again. Two other suppressions, by authority of Charles I. and of Queen Anne, had no more enduring result. Even in recent times it has been "an object of bewildering attraction, and the scene of odious orgies." The ignorant even of our own day resort thither from every part of Ireland and of the continent, in crowds numbering not less than ten thousand, sometimes twenty thousand a year. "The time appropriate to this act of devotion extends from the first of June to the fifteenth of August, and a rich revenue is raised from these squalid fanatics, by those who hire the precincts, and charge for admission, as well as for ferriage" to Station Island. This island consists of less than a single acre, surrounded by a lake whose extent is less than four square miles. The purgatory "itself is a cave or hole, no more than sixteen feet long, by two and a half broad. It is believed that whoever spends a night there has all his sins forgiven. But, as it is impossible for such numbers literally to comply with the requirement, it is common to pass the night in the chapel near. The pilgrims, called 'stationers,' enter 'prison' at seven o'clock in the evening, the men ranging themselves on one side of the edifice, the women on the other. Here they remain without food or sleep for twenty-four hours; but they are allowed to drink water, almost boiling hot, which they regard as 'wine.' During the night they must by no means sleep, on peril of being pricked by their neighbors. The rest of the penance consists in the repetition of prayers, and in perambulations, barefoot or on bare knees, on certain rocky paths, called the beds of saints."¹

¹ Chambers' Book of Days, June 1.

ARTICLE V.

THE PROGRESS OF CHRIST'S KINGDOM IN ITS RELATION
TO THE SPIRIT OF THE PRESENT AGE.

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THE present age is scientific, and disinclined to acknowledge the supernatural. It is rationalistic, rather than believing; self-sufficient in the pride of virtue, rather than humble in the sense of sin; philanthropic, rather than spiritual; utilitarian and realistic, rather than sensitive to sentiment and enthusiasm. I propose to consider the progress of Christ's kingdom in relation to the characteristics of this age.

I premise that Christianity comes to every generation as new as to the first generation to which it came. When the mother tells the story of Jesus to her child, the wondrous story is as new to that child as to those to whom it was told in the days of Paul. It comes anew to every generation and to every man, a message fresh from heaven, and every one must consider it and receive or reject it for himself.

I premise, also, that Christianity remains unchanged. It is always God's love redeeming men from sin through the humiliation, death, resurrection, ascension, and continued reign and intercession of Christ, and the abiding presence and work of the Holy Spirit. As such, by the lapse of ages it never grows old. It rises on generation after generation, as day after day the morning rises in dewy freshness on the awakening world, and as night after night the evening reveals the unchanging glory of the starry sky. In these respects, one generation has no advantage over another.

Each generation has peculiarities which present peculiar obstacles to the gospel. We have no reason to believe that the peculiarities of this age are more formidable obstacles

than those of other ages. A careful study of the age of Luther or of Paul would exemplify this.

The general principle underlying the discussion is this: Christianity can prevail in any age, only as it meets the thought and life of that age. It must meet and satisfy the *thinking* of men respecting the problems of human life and destiny, and give repose to their intellects. It must meet the *life* of men, and give light, peace, wisdom, and strength for the work, the suffering, and the wants of the time. To have met and satisfied the thought and life of a previous age avails nothing to meeting and satisfying the thought and life of this generation. The manna which came down from heaven yesterday will nourish no soul to-day. Christianity must meet, help, and save men in the conditions and necessities of the age in which they are.

Two thoughts are involved in this general principle. The first is: It is *Christianity* which is to meet the thought and life of the age, not something substituted for Christianity. The second is: Christianity *must meet the thought and life of the age*. In the first, we have that which is permanent in Christianity; in the second, that which is transient.

The first of these thoughts is important, as meeting an existing danger. Whatever the thought and life of the age which Christianity is to meet, it is not by preaching progress, reform, and civilization that the work is to be done, but by preaching Christianity in its application to these. The "New Timothy" is not a sensationalist preaching to the times, but also preaching the times; he is a Christian preaching to the times, but preaching Christ and him crucified. This is the permanent in Christianity—"Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever." Through the confusion of the time, and all its diversified action and interest, always resounds the grand message of sin and redemption, as at the sea-side, through all the coming and going, the clatter and confusion of frivolity, passion, and business, resounds always the solemn roar of the ocean.

If this thought is allowed to lose its prominence, and the

permanent in Christianity is forgotten, the very attempt to apply Christianity to the times becomes fruitful in error and corruption. Men, in their eagerness to preach to the times, present what is of man and his conditions to save men, till they substitute the ethics and wit of the popular lecture for the gospel of Christ. Or they mistake the transient for the permanent, and insist that the peculiar prominence necessarily given to a particular Christian truth in one age, must be maintained in the next; that the peculiar application of Christianity needed in one age, and perhaps the very errors which incidentally accompanied it, must be carried over to another age when no such application is needed; and that the philosophies and speculations of one age be inculcated as permanent truth in the next; and so the church is compelled to stand dozing and ruminant on the thought and life of the past.

Reform and progress are always by going back to Christ, taking the treasures of wisdom and knowledge hidden in him, and applying them fresh to the existing life. So he commands: "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me." We study the preceding ages only as helps to a better knowledge of Christ, and to a wiser and fuller application of his gospel to the exigencies of our time.

The second thought involved in the principle is as really important. Christianity must *meet the thinking and life of each age*. Christianity must be known experimentally. We must take Christ's yoke, in order to learn of him. We must be willing to do his will, in order to know the doctrine. Every one must both receive the truth as it is in Jesus, and not as it has been in other men, and receive it in his own experience and its adaptation to his own wants, and not in the experience of others and its adaptation to their wants. The food which one has eaten is necessarily excrementitious to another. The conditions and wants of different individuals and successive generations are varying and transient, and the applications of Christian truths to varying and transient conditions are varying and transient, though the

truth remains unchanged. In order to preserve the doctrinal purity of Christianity in the thinking of any age, and its power in the life, it must meet the thinking and life of that age. Christianity must bring the same unchanging Christian truth; but it must bring it not as Athanasius thought it for his day, nor as Augustine thought it for his day, nor as Thomas à Kempis, Calvin, and Edwards thought it respectively for theirs, but in the channels and methods of modern thought, and touching the topics on which modern thought is occupied. The Christian life produced is not the life of the ancient hermits and monks, nor of Calvin at Geneva, nor of the Puritans of the seventeenth century, nor of the Methodists of the eighteenth. It is the life of this age transfigured by Christian faith and love.

I proceed to consider the application of this principle to the thinking and life of this age. Time will permit, however, to consider only some of the characteristics of the age, and how Christianity is to meet them.

I. The Alleged Deficiency of this Age in Religious Susceptibility.

1. There are two types of thought on religious subjects. Paul selects the Jew and the Greek as their respective representatives: "The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom."

In the type of mind of which the Jew is the representative, the intuitive or faith faculty predominates over the logical, and the mind is awed in the presence of the unseen, the incomprehensible, and the infinite; the moral predominates over the speculative and scientific, and the man is awed before the divine law, crushed with the sense of guilt and the expectation of punishment, terrified before the inexorable Judge to whom he must give account of every secret of his life. From these impressions with which his soul trembles, he passes to believe the reality of the infinite and the unseen, as easily as from impressions on the eye and ear he passes to believe the reality of the outward world. The world unseen

is real to him; he expects it to manifest itself supernaturally; he is prepared to hear voices from heaven, to see spirits and visions; miracles occasion no difficulty of belief; he regards them as the legitimate evidences of communications from the world unseen, and demands more. Nature itself he regards as a constant manifestation of the supernatural. It is God who thunders, who sends the wind and the rain.

The Jewish literature in the Old Testament contains little argument or speculative philosophy. It is mainly historical and prophetic pictures of God's action in history, with the legislation for a theocracy, with moral law, an order of worship, and devotional poetry.

In the Greek type of mind, on the contrary, the senses, the faculties of observation, and the logical powers predominate. Nature was so near to the Greek as to exclude the supernatural. His gods were the powers of nature personified. To the Jewish mind man is divine, and nature is for his use. The Hebrew literature opens with the sublime proclamation that man is above nature, appointed to possess and use its resources and powers. The thinking of the Greek scarcely rises to this grand conception. To him nature is divine, and man is its servant and worshipper. His thinking is a philosophy, elaborating by logical processes a system of the universe — starting, sometimes, with fire or water or some material principle. In this type of mind the aesthetic element predominates over the moral; the sense of beauty displaces the sense of obligation; and joy in the present displaces the sense of what ought to be, the consciousness of sin, and the foreboding of judgment. To this type of mind nature is all-sufficient. Miracles, instead of being helps to faith, are themselves its greatest difficulties. Accordingly, in the education of the race, the Greek has contributed philosophical inquiry and scepticism, logic, art, and, if not physical science, the type of thought from which science comes.

2. Christianity is to meet both of these types of thought, and to develop a higher type, in which both co-exist in completeness and harmony.

The characteristics of each type are found in all minds. The type is characterized not by the exclusion of either, but by the predominance of one. Complete culture must take up and develop both in the same age and the same mind.

It is not true that the Jewish type belongs to the earlier stages of progress, and the Greek type to the later. The Jewish type is as high an order of mental culture as the Greek. Comte's hypothesis, that it is an infantile condition which the race necessarily outgrows, is contrary both to philosophy and to fact. The characteristics of the Jewish type are in all ages necessary to the highest development of mind, and to the completeness and harmony of human thought. They rest intellectually on those faculties of intuition and faith which are involved in and underlie all intellectual action, without which thought withers into words and reality fades into phenomenality; without which nothing can be explained in its rational ground, law, and end; the questions which reason necessarily asks it is unscientific to propound; the deepest wants of the human soul remain forever unsatisfied, and their existence without significance or explanation. Christianity offers a culture which takes up and develops both of these types. This is the explicit assertion of Paul—not that Christianity sets aside the demand of the Jew for signs, nor the quest of the Greek for wisdom, but that it meets and satisfies both. We preach Christ crucified, to the Jew a stumbling-block and to the Greek foolishness, so long as they reject him; but to all who receive him, whether Jew or Greek, Christ, the power of God satisfying the Jewish type of thought, and the wisdom of God satisfying the Greek.

3. In this age, which is commonly characterized as rationalistic and scientific, and supposed to belong exclusively to the Greek type of thought, the Jewish type survives, and the power of the world to come is felt. We multiply the evidences of Christianity, as if its continuance depended on logical proof. But it is a significant fact that the other religions of the world have been originated and sustained

without any discussion of their evidences. They address the spiritual capacity and wants of the soul, and they are received, and are believed, till they degenerate, and are superseded by some other religion more completely satisfying the spiritual intuitions and sentiments. As the strings of a viol respond with music to the touch of the bow, the spiritual in man responds to the presentation of spiritual realities. The basis of religious faith is in the constitution of man. When atheism sweeps away religious belief, as in the French Revolution, presently it re-appears, as verdure springs up spontaneously on burnt land.

This susceptibility exists in the nineteenth century, as really as in the first; for it is inseparable from the human soul. To this, in preaching, we safely address ourselves. Mere argument cannot bring men to Christ. By its very processes, dissecting the living body of spiritual truth, it deprives it of its power. It is the presentation of spiritual reality to the soul which moves it. The law of God burning on the conscience, God's redeeming love in Christ, the beauty of Christ's character — these and the like realities constitute the power of the world unseen, which every human soul must feel, if clearly before the mental vision.

In this so-called rationalistic and sceptical age, we find even the very error of the Jewish type of thought, the insatiable demand for sensible manifestations of the spiritual world. The belief in spiritual rappings is proof; meriting the indignant words of Professor Ferrier: "Oh ye miserable mystics, when will ye know that all God's truths and all man's blessings lie in the broad health, in the trodden ways, and in the laughing sunshine of the universe; and that all intellect, all genius is merely the power of seeing wonders in common things."¹

Thus, even in this age, there is occasion for our Saviour's rebuke of those who sought of him a sign: There shall no sign be given them, but the great facts which Jonah typified — the death, the resurrection, and ascension of our Lord.

¹ *Institutes of Metaphysics*, p. 225.

If this age be compared with the first centuries of the Christian era, — with their Epicureanism, Gnosticism, and New Platonism, — it will be apparent that its rationalism and scepticism are at least not more formidable hinderances to faith than the rationalism of those centuries of Christian triumph.

II. This Age is characterized by the Spirit of Free Inquiry, and by Love of the Truth, as distinguished from Religious Faith.

1. In the outset, I must point out the inadequacy of this spirit of free inquiry to realize the highest results. Freedom of inquiry and love of the truth are conditions of thought, not principles of action. The attitude of inquiry is an attitude of weakness. It implies uncertainty, doubt, therefore irresolution, inaction, inefficiency. The action of the soul must be internal to resolve its own doubts and answer its own questions. It wears itself out in inward friction. Such were Sterling and James Blanco White, passing from one belief to another, unable to rest in any ; the whole action of life like that of a man lost in a dismal swamp, leaping from one shaking tussock to another, unable to stay his foot on any, and sinking at last in the smothering quagmire. So Paul describes the Greek as seeking wisdom, rather than finding it — “ever learning, and never able to come to the knowledge of the truth.” On the contrary, action, energy, power come from faith. Men do not go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature, they do not rebuke wickedness nor demand the reform of abuses and the removal of oppression, merely as inquirers after truth. A missionary does not go to the heathen as an inquirer, as ready to receive Brahma as Jesus, and the Vedas as the Bible. The very idea of prophet and apostle, of missionary and reformer, implies intense, overmastering faith. When Lecky and writers of his school exalt the spirit of inquiry above faith, they take a position which would make scepticism universal, as the highest condition of human thought, would make missionaries, reformers,

martyrs, and prophets impossible, and condemn mankind always to inquire and never to believe.

But it is not possible for man to remain a mere inquirer. Scepticism in its primitive and philosophical sense, as the spirit of inquiry and investigation, must either lead to established belief, or else pass over into scepticism in its bad sense, as the spirit of denial. It begins to dogmatize. And when it begins to dogmatize, it ceases to be scepticism in the philosophical sense; it becomes dogmatic and arrogant; it demands that its negations be received as knowledge; it transforms its questions into negations, and then its negations into affirmations, and propounds as positive knowledge the proposition that knowledge is impossible. One of the French Encyclopaedists said: "I am as sure that there is no God in heaven as I am that Homer is a fool." Of such Jacobi said: "They believe that their opinion is reason, and that reason is their opinion."

In its further development, the spirit of inquiry becomes irreverent, revolutionary, and destructive. The anatomist cannot reverence the body which he dissects. The inquirer gradually comes to regard everything as only an object of inquiry, therefore to be questioned, analyzed, dissected. Hence the spirit of inquiry becomes revolutionary and destructive. It accepts nothing as established. It doubts if the old can be true. It becomes arrogant, coarse, and terrible; saying, as did the French Revolutionists: "With the guts of the last priest we will strangle the last king."

2. Free inquiry and the love of the truth presuppose the reality of truth and the possibility of knowing it. They are, therefore, consistent with faith, not destructive of it. It is only when inquiry, which is a condition of the enlargement of knowledge, is exalted into the essence of knowledge, and scepticism becomes dogmatic, that it is in antagonism to faith. After the investigations of ages, it may be assumed that some truths are established, and are no longer open to doubt. The human mind, being in its nature knowing, may be assumed to know something beyond the possibility of

question. It is a total misconception of free inquiry to suppose that it implies an abiding indifference to opinion and an equal readiness to believe every proposition. On the contrary, free inquiry presupposes the possibility of knowledge, and is compatible with belief of a truth so strong as to make the believer willing to die for it.

3. Christianity does not acknowledge the love of the truth as the ruling principle of action. Life does not culminate in thought, but in action. Man's business is not to seek after wisdom, but to do the work of love. The love of truth is a ruling principle of investigation, not the supreme law of action. Christianity presents as the supreme law, love to persons, — to God and man, — not love to truth.

Bacon consecrated scientific investigation to the uses of man. From this consecration naturally followed the adoption of the right methods of investigation and the largest scientific discoveries. This is in accordance with Christianity. The love of truth is subordinate to the love of God and man; and this subordination is essential to insure the right methods of investigation, the largest knowledge of truth, and its most effective application.

Rationalism presents the love of the truth as the pre-eminent and ruling principle of all action. The evils resulting have been indicated. Candor, exalted to independence and supremacy, becomes an equal indifference to all doctrines, degenerates into *persiflage*, and at last into dogmatic denial. If a Christian exalts the love of truth to supremacy, the results, though analogous, are different. By his exaltation of the love of the truth, he accepts the principle of the rationalist; but, since he is a confirmed believer of the truth, his zeal for the truth is exalted above his love to God and man; and his danger is of bigotry and intolerance — of becoming even an inquisitor and a persecutor — of sacrificing the man needing salvation in zeal for the truth, instead of using the truth in the supremacy of love to save the man. There is danger, also, that he gradually substitute zeal for opinion instead of zeal for truth; and thus,

while the exaltation of the love of the truth degenerates in the rationalist into destructive denial, it degenerates in the Christian into persecuting and destructive intolerance. The subordination of the love of truth to the love of Christ and of all for whom Christ died is the security at once against the belief of error and intolerance in zeal for truth. He who most loves like Christ will most think like him.

4. Free inquiry and love of the truth, when acknowledged as conditions of investigation which imply the reality of knowledge and faith, and which are subordinate to love, are accepted by Christianity, and are auxiliary to its progress. The mind is delivered from the enforcement of opinion and the oppression of authority, and aroused to its most vigorous action. Opportunity is given for the detection and removal of errors and abuses, and the ground is prepared to receive new seed and to bear new harvests of Christian truth. Candor and docility prepare for a consideration and acceptance of the claims of the gospel. The critical scrutiny of all arguments demonstrates anew all Christian truth that abides it. The Christian believer himself receives truth not blindly and traditionally, but on conviction; he is better able to defend it; he is more in sympathy with others who find difficulty in believing; he does not denounce doubt as a sin, nor quench the smoking flax. The very process of argument and rationalistic speculation brings the church back to the simplicity that is in Christ, brings anew into prominence the spiritual part of our nature on which Christian faith rests, and enables us to appreciate the meaning of the Saviour's blessing on those who have not seen, and yet have believed.

5. The quest after wisdom which characterizes this age will ultimate in the recognition of the true rationalism which Christianity carries in it. In other words, this type of mind will find its complete satisfaction and rest in Christianity itself.

Christianity teaches that, whatever may be known by reason, that is not sufficient to save man from sin, but that

he also needs the redemption wrought by God through Christ and the Holy Spirit. It finds this fact of redemption to be accordant with reason. It finds in it the rational solution of man's condition and destiny, which without this fact is impossible. It finds in it the only complete and satisfactory philosophy of history. The unbelieving rationalism is irrational in assuming the sufficiency of human reason to save man from sin. It therefore necessarily ceases to be a religion, and degenerates into an unbelieving philosophy. But I affirm that the facts of Christianity are the data for interpreting and vindicating to the reason the phenomena of man's moral and spiritual life. Ultimately this interpretation and vindication will be complete. Ultimately, it may be after long struggles, Christ will become the Saviour from intellectual perplexity and doubt, not less than from sin. He is the rest for the intellect, not less than for the heart.

Christianity, therefore, is to meet the quest for wisdom by satisfying it. Because man is rational, he must interpret and vindicate to his reason the facts of his moral and spiritual being. Rationalism cannot be put out of the way by being suppressed. To suppress inquiries of this sort would be to suppress reason itself. We can meet the rationalistic spirit of the day only as we show that "in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" — that "he is made unto us wisdom," as well as righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.

This process is far from complete; but it has advanced far enough to exemplify its nature. Science, by its speculations on force, admits what necessitates the admission of a First Cause of force; and thus the last word of science is the first word of theology. Christianity, in the doctrine of a personal God whose will is the source of all power, gives the complete reality which science obscurely intimates. Science insists on law, and tends to establish a uniformity of necessity. But Christianity recognizes a moral order, a uniformity of perfect reason and perfect love, as complete as

the uniformity and order of necessity. The action of nature is the power of will expressing evermore the thoughts of reason and the purposes of love. And this alone meets the true scientific idea of order and law; for blind necessity is but another name for chance, and gives no rational principle of order nor basis for either its universality or perpetuity.

The doctrine of the Trinity is acknowledged by some who do not accept it as an article of religious faith, as satisfying as no other doctrine does the necessities of the most profound philosophical thought respecting the being and personality of God.

In the atonement we find the fact which alone can harmonize immutable morality with divine mercy, and set forth as elements of one all-embracing love the mercy that pardons and the justice that condemns.

In the incarnation we have an entrance of God into human history and relations — a union of God and man which all religious thought of the East and of the West has known as necessary to the realization of religion, and in different directions has groped to find.¹

In the fact of Christ's kingdom on the earth, we have the principles which underlie all human progress and the realization of the social well-being and complete civilization of man. Christianity, lovingly studied, reveals within itself the true philosophy on which modern thought must rest, and by which modern civilization must advance.

Thus philosophy itself, rightly understood, becomes the ally of Christianity. In the words of Lord Bacon: "*Philosophia obiter libata abducit a Deo, penitus hausta reducit ad eundem.*" Thus Christianity is at last received as satisfying the reason, as well as renewing the heart, both by philosophy and by faith, as Augustine enthusiastically exclaims: "*Certissima scientia et clamante conscientia.*"

III. This Age is characterized by Positiveness and Vastness of Scientific Knowledge.

There is no antagonism of science to religion, so long as

¹ See Dorner's *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; the Introduction.

science defines its sphere to be the observation of phenomena, their classification by common characteristics, and the determination of their uniform sequences, and does not dogmatically deny the reality of other knowledge. Philosophy is then distinguished from science, as the interpretation and justification of phenomena to the reason by showing their rational grounds, principles, laws, and ends; and philosophy and theology are both acknowledged as legitimate spheres of thought. But when science denies that any knowledge is possible, except of phenomena of nature and their common characteristics and uniform sequences, it becomes dogmatic unbelief, and stands in direct antagonism to Christianity. It must then be opposed as error, and exposed as, in the name of science, denying and repudiating reason itself. In this attitude science is opposed to the Greek quest for wisdom, not less than to the Jewish demand for signs.

It is thought that the vastness of human knowledge overpowers faith. But, in reality, the greatness of the universe is not so much its bigness as its varied manifestations of mind. The three-storied or seven-storied heaven of the Jew, with the throne of God above it and the love of God filling it, and redemption wrought in it, and earth beneath it opening out into the grandeurs of immortality, is a grander universe than the immeasurable masses and spaces of Astronomy, in which no God is, no love reigns, and only unconscious force acts under blind necessity evermore.

And, so long as science remains within its distinct sphere, the enlargement of scientific knowledge does not hinder faith. It was a great enlargement of knowledge when the Copernican system of Astronomy was received; yet it neither magnified nor lessened the creations of mind. The works of Homer and Virgil remained the same. The ideas of God, of sin, of redemption, remained unchanged. The increase of scientific knowledge may even be a help to faith. Faith feeds itself on all knowledge, manifesting in new aspects the wisdom and love of God. It expatiates through the vast distances of the universe in wonder and adoration. At the

same time, innumerable puerilities, which once crept into the place of the true objects of faith, and degraded the soul, instead of elevating it, are swept away. The wonder of knowledge is greater than the wonder of ignorance, and a greater help to faith.

IV. The Age is Realistic and practical, as opposed both to Philosophical Inquiry and to Sentiment and Enthusiasm.

Even this presents advantages to Christianity. Thought for the sole end of seeking truth, with no reference to its uses, is liable to degenerate into verbiage or frivolousness or intolerance. Zeal for truth is never safe, except when vitalized and controlled by love to God and man.

The great objection to the practical character of modern thought is that it concerns itself mainly with material interests. But, even so, it is better than merely speculative inquiry, with no reference to the welfare of man.

It is not true, however, that the age is occupied exclusively with material interests. The great questions which agitate modern society are largely moral and religious. And, however realistic the age may be, it is certain that this century has witnessed as marked instances of the uprising of whole peoples in enthusiasm for ideas as were ever witnessed in the "ages of faith."

We differ, to our advantage, from the primitive churches in this, that they had Christian ideas to create in the midst of heathenish corruption, in which the very ideas of Christian purity, of philanthropy, of human rights and brotherhood were wanting. But now many of the great principles of Christianity are generally accepted and practically applied; they are axioms of reform and of social progress, and powers in civilization. Especially all thinking and all great movements which lay hold of the heart of the people, take on a philanthropic character.

In such an age Christianity has an eminent advantage in its beneficent character, as the redemption of the world from sin. And so far as the age is realistic and practical, it

meets its thinking and its wants by the manifestation of its quickening and saving power. And if each successive age of the Christian era has had some specific doctrine of Christianity to develop, that which is given to this generation to study and unfold is the Christian doctrine of Christ's kingdom as the reign of righteousness and love over all the earth in the life and civilization of men.

V. It remains to consider the Industrial and Social Condition of Christendom in its Relations to the Progress of Christ's Kingdom.

Time permits, however, but a glance at this great subject.

Through the art of printing each age has all the ages past in its presence, and is instructed both by their failures and their successes. The progress of Christ's kingdom, therefore, need no longer be lineal, partial, and one-sided, but rounded and complete. Christianity, instructed by the life of the past, may be expected to become broader and more complete in doctrine, character, and life.

Through commerce and the facilities of intercommunication the existing nations live in the presence of each other, and by travel and emigration the peoples are interfused. The time is past when the nations were in ignorance of each other; when their natural relations were those of enmity; when the thought and life of one nation had no influence on another; and progress in one locality was without effect elsewhere. The earth is practically smaller, its countries nearer together, its nations in constant communication, serving each other by their industry. Whatever effects a change at one point extends its influence to all. For these reasons and by the necessities of industry and commerce, the nations are coming to recognize that they are members of one family. The idea of nations confederated to preserve universal peace and to secure the common welfare has ceased to be chimerical; has become already a possibility, the realization of which, not the enthusiasm of Christian love only, but the wisdom of sound statesmanship predicts. And

the settlement of the great questions which divide the nations is more and more sought and attained by peaceful methods, and made in the interest of the peoples and not of the dynasties.

The Christian nations are characterized by energy, progressiveness, and expansiveness. The close connection of the nations brings this superiority home to the heathen and Mohammedan nations and makes it a constant influence upon them. Idolatry cannot live by the side of steam-engines and telegraphs.

These characteristics also distinguish Protestant nations from Catholic. They seem always to be most marked where Christianity is purest and most effective. The most christianized nations are those which are gaining the preponderating influence in Christendom. Particularly noticeable is the spread of the English speaking race, and the immense extent of the world's surface in which that language is spoken. De Tocqueville, speaking of the spread of the English-speaking people in America, says: "This gradual and continued progress of the race towards the Rocky Mountains has the solemnity of a providential event; it is like a deluge of men rising unabatedly and driven by the hand of God. . . . This is a fact new to the world, a fact fraught with such portentous consequences as to baffle the efforts even of the imagination." To this must now be added other immense regions in which the English language is spoken. A wonderful contrast this to the anticipations cherished not very long ago. Lord Bacon published his great works in Latin, saying that "English would bankrupt all our books." And Alexander Pope in his preface to an edition of his poems, contrasts the limited use of English with the universal use of Greek and Latin: "They writ in languages that became universal and everlasting, while ours are exceedingly limited both in extent and duration. A mighty foundation for our pride! when the utmost we can hope is to be read in one island, and to be thrown aside at the end of one age."

God has always acted by chosen peoples. To the English-speaking people more than to any other the world is now indebted for the propagation of Christian ideas and Christian civilization. It is a remarkable fact in this day that the thinking of the world is done by the Christian nations; that the enterprise and energy of the world are mainly theirs. They alone are colonizing, and by their commerce and enterprise pushing their influence throughout the world. So also the political condition of the Protestant nations is that of constitutional government, popular education, and a growing regard for the rights and welfare of the people.

These are conditions more favorable to the advancement of Christ's kingdom than have ever before existed. And in view of both the thinking and the practical life and character of the age, I believe that no preceding age has presented conditions so favorable to the advancement of Christ's kingdom and so encouraging to faithful Christian effort.

ARTICLE VI.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION.

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IN ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

No. XII.

THE QUOTATIONS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT IN THEIR RELATION TO
THE QUESTION OF INSPIRATION.

IN the series of Articles which we bring to a close with the present number, the relation of the quotations of the New Testament to the question of inspiration has been, of necessity, considered to some extent. It seems desirable, however, to devote a separate Article to the more particular examination of this subject.

No candid reader of the New Testament can doubt the position of Christ and his apostles in respect to the scriptures of the Old Testament. If anything in the compass of sacred literature is indisputable it is that they everywhere regard these books as of divine authority, and appeal to them as the end of controversy. If only one or two among the New Testament writers took this attitude in respect to the Hebrew scriptures, there would be more show of reason in the favorite hypothesis of rationalism, that the disciples *misapprehended* their Lord. But we find not only "the very chiefest apostles," as Peter, John, and Paul, but Christ himself testifying in every possible way to the divine authority of the things written "in the law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms." We need not assume here the inspiration of the evangelists. It is enough to show that they were honest and competent men, and that they have faithfully reported the substance of their Lord's teachings. Had there been, in the discourses, only here and there an incidental allusion to the Hebrew scriptures, the case would have been different. But they constitute, so to speak, the warp into which the Saviour wove the woof of his daily instruction.

The explicit declaration of the apostle Paul, that "All scripture is given by inspiration of God";¹ and of Peter, that "holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost";² — these declarations are but the formal statement of what everywhere appears, as well on the face of the evangelic narratives as in the apostolic epistles. The position that the scriptures of the Old Testament were given by inspiration of God is, to use a military illustration, commanded by the position of the New Testament writers that Jesus is the Son of God, and that he commissioned and qualified in a supernatural way the twelve apostles to preach the doctrines which they received from him, and to lay the foundations of his church. Whoever would successfully assail the former position, must begin by demolishing the latter. Both parts of scripture are so indissolubly connected that they must stand or fall as a whole.³

But when we have admitted, as we must, the *authority* of the New Testament writers, as interpreters of the Old, a very important question remains to be considered; and that is the *manner of their quotations*. As this question has an important bearing upon that of the mode and scope of inspiration, we propose to examine it in respect to both outward form and inward contents.

1. As it respects *outward form* we cannot but notice at once the *free manner* of these quotations. It is manifest that the writers of the New Testament are not anxious about the verbal accuracy of the words cited. The spirit and scope of a passage, which constitute its true life and meaning, are what they have in view, not the exact rendering of the words from the Hebrew into the Greek. It is well known that a large part of their quotations is made from the Greek version of the Seventy, called the Septuagint, which was in current use in their day. No one at the present time will, we think,

¹ 2 Tim. iii. 16.

² 2 Peter i. 21.

³ The reader may see this question further discussed in the seventh Article of the present series, under the head of "Antecedents of the Gospel History." — *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1870, pp. 721-740.

venture to assume that the translators who made the Septuagint were inspired, or that they always succeeded in hitting the true meaning of the Hebrew original. Yet, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the robust good sense of the New Testament writers went straight forward, without stopping to notice or criticise deviations from the Hebrew, provided they did not affect the use which they wished to make of the passages quoted. Of this we have a striking illustration in the narrative of the eunuch's conversion.¹ The eunuch, returning from his visit to Jerusalem, was sitting in his chariot and reading the prophet Isaiah, from the Greek version, as we know from the form of the quotation as given by Luke. The Hebrew and Greek of the passage quoted, when literally translated, read as follows :

He is brought as a sheep to the slaughter ; and as a ewe before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth. He was taken from prison and from judgment ; and who shall declare his generation ? for he was cut off from the land of the living (Isa. liii. 7, 8).

He was brought as a sheep to the slaughter ; and as a lamb before the shearer is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth. In [his] humiliation his judgment was taken away ; and who shall declare his generation ? for his life is taken from the earth (Isa. liii. 7, 8 ; Acts viii. 32, 33).

The evangelist, without pausing to criticise the version, "opened his mouth, and began at the same scripture, and preached unto him Jesus." So far as the use which he wished to make of the passage was concerned, the deviations of the Septuagint from the Hebrew original were of no account. In like manner the Saviour, quoting from Isaiah xxix. 13 : "This people draw near with their mouth, and with their lips they honor me, but they have removed their heart far from me ; and their fear towards me is taught by the precept of men,"² follows very closely the Greek version which reads : "but their heart is far from me ; and in vain do they worship me, teaching the commands and doctrines

¹ Acts viii. 27 sq.

² Matt. xv. 8, 9 ; Mark vii. 6, 7. The words of the Hebrew are : **וְתַחֲתֵי מַלְמָדָה יִרְאָתָם אֵינֶיהֶן מִצִּוֵּת אֲנָשִׁים**, which may perhaps be rendered : *And their fear of me has become the inculcated precept of men.*

of men." So also in quoting from Gen. ii. 24: "and they shall become one flesh," he follows the Septuagint in inserting the words *they two*, which are implied, but not expressed in the original.¹ One of the most remarkable variations of the Greek version from the Hebrew is found in the fortieth Psalm. Here, according to the original text (vs. 7-9) we read: "Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire. Ears hast thou opened (or bored) for me.² Burnt offering and sin-offering thou hast not required. Then said I, Lo I come; in the volume of the book it is written concerning me (or, written for me; that is, laid upon me as a written command): I delight to do thy will, O my God; and thy law is within my heart." For the words: "ears hast thou opened (or, bored) for me," the version of the Seventy puts the clause: "but a body hast thou prepared for me,"³ and in this it is followed by the writer to the Hebrews.⁴ The attempted explanations of this singular variation are not satisfactory, and we will not delay to consider them. More important is it to note the fact that the writer manifestly *uses* this clause in the course of his argument. Commenting on the words he has quoted he proceeds thus: "Saying above, Sacrifices, and offerings, and whole burnt-offerings, and offerings for sin thou wouldest not, neither hadst pleasure in them, which are offered according to the law, — then he said, Lo, I come to do thy will. He taketh away the first [the system of Mosaic sacrifices], that he may establish the second" — the

¹ See Matt. xix. 5; Mark x. 7, 8. We do not mean to be understood as asserting that the Saviour himself, in arguing with the Pharisees, used the Greek version. The evangelists have followed it in inserting the two words above noticed. Whether Jesus did or did not add them to the Hebrew text is a question of no importance. The same general remark holds good in respect to the quotation from Isa. xxix. 13, and other quotations in which the evangelists have followed the Septuagint.

² Heb. אָזְנוֹתַי כָּרַיתָ לִי; *ears hast thou digged for me*. There is no valid ground for assuming a reference to the custom mentioned in Ex. xxi. 6. Whether we understand the words as meaning, Thou hast *made* ears for me, or, Thou hast *opened* ears for me, they express alike an obedient attitude towards the revelations made to him of God's will.

³ σῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι.

⁴ Heb. x. 5.

doing of the Father's will, as explained in the following verse: "In which will [in the accomplishment of which will] we have been sanctified, through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all."¹ It was through the offering once for all of his body—the body which God had prepared for him (vs. 5) that Christ accomplished the will of God in the sanctification of believers. We seem then to come of necessity to the principle that a writer of the New Testament might, under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Ghost, use a clause of the Greek version which varied from the Hebrew so as to give a new shade of thought, provided this clause agreed with the general scope of the passage quoted, and expressed, moreover, the truth concerning Christ's person and offices. This is, for substance, the view taken by Calvin. He explains the meaning of the clause in the original to be that God has given to his servant a docile and obedient spirit, and then adds: "But the apostle, following the Greek translators, said: A body hast thou prepared. For in making quotations they were not so very scrupulous, provided they did not pervert scripture to suit their own convenience. We are always to consider to what end they adduce testimonies [from the Old Testament]. For in regard to the scope itself they are very careful not to change the sense of scripture. But in respect to words and other matters which have not a bearing on the question before them, they allow themselves much freedom."² So also Hengstenberg among the more recent commentators: "The Seventy have rendered the words, *σῶμα δὲ κατηρτίσω μοι*, *a body hast thou prepared for me*; and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has followed them, inasmuch as the thought is not altered by this translation. The antithesis here also is that of thanksgiving manifested in the whole life and actions in contrast with particular purely outward offerings. Thou hast given me a body wherewith I may render to thee obedient service in the accomplishment of thy will."³ Neither of these com-

¹ Heb. x. 8-10.

² Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews in loco.

³ Commentary on Ps. xl. 7.

mentators, however, brings out clearly the fact that the new shade of thought contained in the version is sometimes used in the New Testament under the restrictions above specified. But this is done more explicitly by Alford: "How the word *σῶμα* came into the LXX, we cannot say; but being there, it is now sanctioned for us by the citation here; not as the, or even a proper, rendering of the Hebrew, but as a prophetic utterance, equivalent to, and representing that other."¹ The same general principle must be admitted elsewhere; for example, in the use which the writer to the Hebrews makes of Ps. viii. 6 (Eng. ver. viii. 5), and of Ps. civ. 4, according to the most approved rendering of the original passages.²

But there are passages in which the spirit and scope of the original are lost in the version of the Seventy; and here the New Testament writers quote directly from the Hebrew. Examples are the following: The Hebrew of Hosea xi. 1 reads: "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt." The rendering of the Seventy: "Out of Egypt have I called his children,"³ makes the passage inapplicable; since Israel, as God's first-born son,⁴ was the type of Christ, "the first-born of the whole creation,"⁵ not the individual Israelites. Here, accordingly, the evangelist cites from the original. Again, in citing from Zech. xii. 10, the evangelist John necessarily departs from the

¹ Commentary on Heb. x. 5.

² Calvin renders the first clause of Ps. viii. 5: *Quia minuisti eum paululum a Deo: for thou hast made him a little less than God.* While he concedes the possibility of the rendering *angels*, he prefers that of *God*, as being "the more genuine version, in which almost all the Hebrews agree." And he meets the objection drawn from the use which the apostle, following the version of the Seventy, has made of the words (Heb. ii. 7), by the remark: "We know how much freedom the Apostles allowed themselves in citing scriptural passages; not, indeed, with the design of perverting them to a foreign meaning; but because they regarded it as sufficient to indicate by the finger (*digito monstrare*) that what they taught was sanctioned by the oracles of God." — Commentary on Ps. viii. 6. See, also, his remarks on Ps. civ. 4, in his Commentary on Heb. i. 7.

³ ἐξ Αἰγύπτου μετεκάλεσα τὰ τέκνα αὐτοῦ.

⁴ Ex. iv. 22, 23.

⁵ Col. i. 15..

Greek version, which, as the text now stands, utterly fails to express the true sense of the Hebrew.¹

To sum up, in a single sentence, what relates to the outward form of these quotations: The writers of the New Testament quote very commonly from the Septuagint, but often from the original Hebrew also; using in both cases much freedom, their main design being to give the spirit and scope of the passages cited. "When nothing depended on a rigid adherence to the letter, the practice of the sacred writers not scrupulously to stickle about this, but to give prominence simply to the substance of the revelation, is fraught, also, with an important lesson; since it teaches us that the letter is valuable only for the truth couched in it, and that the one is no further to be prized and contended for than may be required for the exhibition of the other."²

2. We pass now to the consideration of these citations on the side of their *inward contents*. Here it is only necessary to assume (what it has been the scope of this series of Articles to demonstrate) that God has made to men a true supernatural revelation, and that the scriptures of the Old and New Testament contain a faithful and reliable record of this revelation. From this it follows, at once, that all parts of the Bible, as being a history of God's dealings with man, must be connected as an organic whole; since all God's works have unity and progress towards a final end. And, inasmuch as the grand end of the Old Testament dispensation (in subordination to the plan of redemption as a whole) was to prepare the way for the Redeemer's advent, it is manifest that it must contain a perpetual prophecy of Christ. We do not mean that the Old Testament history is all type. It is a veritable record of God's dealings with his ancient people,

¹ Heb. וְהִבִּיטוּ אֵלַי אֶת אֲשֶׁר דָּקְרוּ, and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced; words followed by John (xix. 37), with only a change of person: Ὀψονται εἰς δὲ ἐξεκέντησαν; while the rendering of the Septuagint: καὶ ἐπιβλέψονται πρὸς μὲ ἀνθ' ὧν κατηρχήσαντο, and they shall look to me, because they have mocked me, gives a totally different meaning.

² Fairbairn's Hermeneutical Manual, Part iii. Sec. 1. See also the Seventh Lecture of Lee on the Inspiration of Scripture.

valid for the men of its day, fulfilling its own office in the plan of God's providence, and containing, when we look at it simply as history, its own lessons of instruction. But it had constant reference to the future advent of Christ, and was so ordered and shaped in all its parts as to prefigure his person and offices. This is the view which the writers of the New Testament everywhere take of the Old; and it is as widely removed from the rationalistic principle of *accommodation* as light is from darkness. There is, indeed, a manner in which the authors of the New Testament sometimes employ the language of the Old which may be called accommodation; that is, they use its phraseology, originally applied in a different connection, simply as expressing in an apt and forcible manner the thoughts which they wish to convey. Of this we have a pertinent example in the Epistle to the Romans, where the apostle says, with reference to the proclamation of the gospel: "But I say, Have they not heard? Yes, verily, their sound went into all the earth, and their words unto the ends of the world,"¹ meaning that what the Psalmist says of the silent preaching of the heavens may be aptly applied to the preaching of the gospel; so that none of his countrymen are excusable for their unbelief. See another kindred example in vs. 6-8 of the same chapter. But that the Saviour and his apostles used accommodation in the commonly received sense of the term,—that is, that they quoted, in accommodation to the prejudices of their age, passages from the Old Testament as applicable to the Messiah and his kingdom, which they knew, or ought to have known, could have no such application when fairly and legitimately interpreted,—that, for example, they used the one hundred and tenth Psalm as a prophecy of the Messiah,² simply because this was the current view of their times,—this idea of accommodation is not to be admitted for a moment. That the Saviour dealt prudently with the prejudices of his age is

¹ Rom. x. 18.

² Matt. xxii. 41-46; Mark xii. 35-37; Luke xx. 41-44; Acts ii. 34, 35; Heb. i. 13.

true. But he did not build upon them his claim to be the Messiah. He did not solemnly appeal to the authority of Moses and the prophets, knowing this to be only a dream of fanciful interpreters. He and his apostles often cite the Old Testament *by way of argument*. Thus, the Saviour argues against divorce at the husband's will, "for every cause," by an appeal to the original institution of marriage;¹ and Paul proves that the man is the head of the woman from the order of creation and its accompanying circumstances.² Respecting this class of quotations, it is only necessary to remark that the validity of the argument stands or falls with the historic reality and divine authority of the passages cited. The Saviour and his apostles avowedly build their arguments on the record of the Old Testament. If this is sand,—mythical quicksand,—their house falls, and their arguments perish with it. But if the foundation is rock,—an inspired record of historic realities,—their house stands, and their arguments remain unanswerable.

Far more numerous are the passages which are cited as *prophecies of Christ and his kingdom*. These are introduced by various formulas, such as the following: "That it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet";³ "In them is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias";⁴ "This day is this scripture fulfilled in your ears";⁵ "This scripture must needs have been fulfilled";⁶ "Wherefore, also, it is contained in the scripture";⁷ "For these things were done that the scripture should be fulfilled";⁸ "And again, another scripture saith";⁹ "This that is written must yet be accomplished in me."¹⁰

These varied forms represent the events to which they refer as the fulfilment of predictions contained in the Hebrew scriptures. The common formula, "that it might be fulfilled," means that the event recorded took place, *in order that* the purpose of God announced in the prophecy might

¹ Matt. xix. 3-6; Mark x. 5-9.² Matt. ii. 15. ⁴ Matt. xiii. 14.⁷ 1 Pet. ii. 6. ⁸ John xix. 36.² 1 Cor. xi. 8, 9; 1 Tim. ii. 11-14.⁵ Luke iv. 21. ⁶ Acts i. 16.⁹ John xix. 37. ¹⁰ Luke xxii. 37.

be accomplished. The prophecy was not the main thing, but the purpose of God contained in it. For the accomplishment of this purpose, and thus of the prophecy which revealed it, God's veracity was pledged. So, when the evangelist says of the Jews in our Saviour's day: "Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes,"¹ etc., the hinderance to their belief lay not in the prophecy itself, but in that which the prophecy announced.

Of the class of prophecies now under consideration, to which there is so frequent reference in the New Testament, some refer more specifically to *Christ's person and offices*. Such are those contained in the one hundred and tenth Psalm: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool";² "The Lord sware, and will not repent, Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek."³ So, also, the description of the Messiah's sufferings and exaltation, in Isa. lii. 13 — liii. 12, and numerous other prophecies, which it is not necessary to enumerate.

Others refer more generally to the *progress of God's kingdom*, of which the Messiah is the divinely-constituted Head. These have commonly a *progressive fulfilment* — a fulfilment stretching through many centuries, and coming, so to speak, in successive instalments. The noted prophecy of Isaiah, for example, respecting the blindness and obduracy of his countrymen, had, beyond doubt, a true fulfilment in the case of the generations of Jews who lived before the Babylonish captivity. But this did not preclude a more awful fulfilment in the days of our Saviour and his apostles; and this fulfilment was included in the mind of God, when he gave the prophet his commission: "Go and tell this people, Hear on, but understand not; see on, but perceive not,"⁴ etc.; so that the application made of the passage by Christ and his apostles⁵ is legitimate, and not a mere accommodation. To

¹ John xii. 39, 40. ² Compare Matt. xxii. 42 seq., and the parallel passages.

³ Compare Heb. vii. 21.

⁴ Isa. vi. 9 seq.

⁵ Matt. xiii. 14, 15; Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10; John xii. 40; Acts xxviii. 26, 27.

take another example; the prophecy of Joel: "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh," etc.,¹ had the beginning of its fulfilment on the day of Pentecost. But the promise of Jesus was: "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you forever."² The Comforter, who came with plenary power on the day of Pentecost, abides with the church to the end of time. With that first pentecostal effusion of the Holy Spirit was inaugurated the accomplishment of the prophecy; but its consummation will be in the day of Zion's millennial glory. Peter's application of it: "This is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel," was in the fullest sense legitimate, but not exhaustive.

A numerous class of prophecies, again, refer to Christ *under the veil of types*. The Mosaic institutions, as a whole, are, indeed, a perpetual adumbration of Christ. The writers of the New Testament refer to them as the shadow of which he is the substance; and the legitimacy — nay, more, the necessity — of this view must be admitted by all who believe in the reality and unity of divine revelation. On this point we do not propose to dwell. But we wish to say a few words on the two closely-related questions of *typical transactions* and the so-called *double sense* of scriptural prophecy.

We have an undeniable example of a typical transaction in the direction concerning the paschal lamb, that no bone of it should be broken.³ In noticing the fact that our Saviour's legs were not broken, the evangelist adds: "These things were done that the scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken."⁴ That the apostle, in this citation, made a legitimate use of the passage cannot be denied by any one, till he has first set aside the typical character of the paschal lamb. But, since this is involved in its being a prominent institution in the Mosaic system, it will be further necessary that he set aside the typical character of the Mosaic system as a whole — a hopeless task for one

¹ Acts ii. 17 seq.

² John xiv. 16.

³ Ex. xii. 46; Num. ix. 12.

⁴ John xix. 36.

who truly admits its divine origin. If, now, the paschal lamb was a real type of Christ, it is reasonable to believe that so remarkable a direction, twice given, should have had a prophetic reference to the great Antitype. Christ's natural body represented mystically his spiritual person, which includes in itself as members all believers, and makes them all one body.¹ This body might be pierced, but not mangled. Again, we read in Hosea: "When Israel was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of Egypt";² words which Matthew quotes as fulfilled in Christ.³ It was the purpose of God, namely, that the history of Israel, God's first-born son,⁴ should in his national childhood foreshadow that of Jesus, the only-begotten Son of God. Upon the same principle we may explain the use made by the writer to the Hebrews of David's words in the eighth Psalm: "What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him?"⁵ etc. It seems impossible to deny that the immediate reference of the Psalm is to man's exalted dignity and high prerogatives as the lord of this lower world. But, as the writer argues, the words have no complete fulfilment in man considered as apart from Christ. It is in Christ's person alone that the high destiny of human nature finds its realization. He is "crowned with glory and honor," not for himself alone, but for all his disciples also, who shall in him have all things put under their feet. To take one more example, Melchizedek was a pre-ordained type of Christ, not simply as a priest (as were all true priests), but also in the peculiar character of his priesthood: (1) He united in his person the kingly and priestly offices, as does the Messiah. (2) In official dignity he was higher than Abraham, and thus than any of Abraham's descendants by natural generation. (3) His priesthood was without genealogy, that is, was not held by virtue of his descent from a line of priests — a priesthood without any of the restrictions and

¹ See this idea variously expressed in John xv. 1-7; xvii. 23; 1 John iii. 24; Rom. xii. 5; 1 Cor. x. 17; xii. 12 seq.

² Hosea xi. 1.

³ Matt. ii. 15.

⁴ Ex. iv. 22, 23.

⁵ Heb. ii. 6 seq.

limitations of the Levitical priesthood. In all these respects it was the design of God that his priesthood should shadow forth that of the Saviour.¹

The most striking examples of a primary lower meaning covering one that is higher are furnished by the so-called *Messianic Psalms*. A part of these (as Ps. ii. ; xlv. ; lxxii. ; etc.) describe the victories and universal dominion of a mighty King whom Jehovah establishes on Zion to reign there forever ; another part (as Ps. xxii. ; xl. ; lxix. ; cix., etc.), the deep affliction and humiliation of a mighty Sufferer, and his subsequent deliverance, which has for its result the conversion of all nations to the service of Jehovah. That such Psalms have *somehow* a true reference to Christ's person and work cannot be denied, without imputing either error or fraud to the writers of the New Testament. The second Psalm, for example, is referred expressly to Christ by three of these writers ;² and no less than nine citations can be gathered from the twenty-second and sixty-ninth Psalms, in which the Messiah is recognized as the great Sufferer there described.³ In the interpretation of such Psalms, then, we must assume, as a fundamental principle, that their ultimate reference is to Christ. The only remaining question is, whether they contain a lower reference also ; and if so, in what way. Here evangelical interpreters are divided, as follows :

1. Those of one class deny altogether the lower reference, assuming that the writer speaks wholly in the name of Christ, without reference to himself or any merely human personage. Such is, in general, the view of the church

¹ See the elaboration of this matter in the Epistle to the Hebrews, v. 10, 11 ; vii. The difficult questions involved in it belong to the Commentators. We give only the general outline of the argument.

² Vs. 1, 2 compared with Acts iv. 25, 26 ; vs. 7, with Acts xiii. 33, and Heb. i. 5, and v. 5 ; vs. 9, with Rev. ii. 27, and xii. 5.

³ Ps. xxii. 1 compared with Matt. xxvii. 46, and Mark xv. 34 ; vs. 7, 8, with Matt. xxvii. 39 seq., and parallel passages ; vs. 18, with John xix. 23 ; vs. 22, with Heb. ii. 12 ; Ps. lxix. 4, with John xv. 25 ; vs. 9, with John ii. 17 ; vs. 9, with Rom. xv. 3 ; vs. 21, with John xix. 28 seq. ; vs. 22, 23, with Rom. xi. 9, 10.

Fathers. There are Psalms — the one hundred and tenth, for example — that may be legitimately explained in this way. But in the attempt to carry this principle consistently through all the Messianic Psalms one meets with serious difficulties. They contain, at least some of them, historic allusions of a character so marked and circumstantial that it is hard to believe the writer had not in view his own personal situation. In some of them, moreover, the writer makes confession to God of his sins.¹ Here it becomes necessary that those who apply these Psalms exclusively to Christ should assume that these confessions are made in a *vicarious* way — the Messiah assuming the character of a sinner, because “the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all.” But such an interpretation is inconsistent with the form of these confessions. When the Psalmist says: “Mine iniquities have taken hold upon me”; “O God, thou knowest my foolishness, and my sins are not hid from thee,” we cannot understand such language of anything else but personal sinfulness. It is true that the Messiah bore our iniquities, and that God “made him to be sin for us who knew no sin”; but the Saviour never spoke, or could speak, of “mine iniquities,” “my foolishness,” and “my sins.”

2. According to another class of interpreters, of whom Hengstenberg may be taken as the representative, the subject of certain Messianic Psalms, particularly of those which describe the Messiah as a sufferer, is an *ideal personage*, namely, the congregation of the righteous, considered not separately from Christ, but in Christ their Head; or, which amounts to the same thing, Christ considered not in his simple personality, apart from the church, but Christ with his body, the church. According to this principle of interpretation, David wrote the Psalms of this class on the foundation, indeed, of his own rich and varied experience, but composing them, from the very beginning, expressly for the use of the church. Every particular believer had a right to appropriate their promises to himself, so far as his character answered in

¹ Ps. xl. 12 (Heb. xl. 13); lxix. 5 (Heb. lxix. 6).

reality to the idea of the righteous man which underlies them. So, also, might the congregation of the righteous as a whole use them, under the same limiting condition. In both the individual believer and the congregation of believers, these Psalms had before Christ a partial fulfilment, but in Christ alone was their fulfilment consummated. The contents of these Psalms, then, pertain, *according to their nature*, partly to Christ alone, partly to believers alone, who are his members,—all those parts specifically which contain confessions of sin,—and partly to Christ in the fullest sense and believers in a subordinate sense. Much might be said in favor of this view; yet it labors under the difficulty, already indicated, that one cannot well read the Psalms in question, with their marked historic allusions, without the conviction that the author had in view, not in a general and indirect way the gathered experience of his past life, but immediately his present personal situation.

3. There remains a third, and perhaps preferable view, which may be called the *typical*, maintained, as is well known, by Melancthon, Calvin, and many of the later expositors. This begins with the well-established principle that David (and, more comprehensively, David's royal line, so far as its successive members were true to their office) was a divinely constituted type of the Messiah, not only in his office, as the earthly head of God's kingdom, but in the events of his history also; consequently, that these Psalms, whether they describe the writer's victorious might or his deep suffering at the hand of his enemies, had a true historic origin, and referred immediately to his own situation and the events which befell him; but that, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, he was carried beyond himself to describe the history and offices of the Messiah. These Psalms, consequently, have a lower fulfilment in David (the seventy-second in Solomon) and a higher in Christ the antitype.

The second Psalm, for example, which describes the vain conspiracy of the heathen rulers against the Lord's anointed king, had, according to this view, a true historic occasion.

In the victorious might with which God endowed David, and by which he was enabled to overthrow the leaders of this conspiracy, it had its primary lower fulfilment; and this was, so to speak, the first sheaf of the harvest of victories that was to follow — the earnest and pledge of the higher fulfilment of the Psalm in Christ, in whom alone the promise made to David: "Thine house and thy kingdom shall be established forever before thee; thy throne shall be established forever,"¹ could have its real accomplishment.

The second class of Psalms, of which the twenty-second and sixty-ninth are well known examples, had, in like manner a true historic origin. The exclamation, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me," with which the twenty-second Psalm opens, had immediate reference to the writer's own distressed condition. But since he was the divinely appointed earthly head of God's kingdom, and in this office a type of the Messiah in whom the line of earthly kings was to end, God so ordered the circumstances of his history as to shadow forth in them the future sufferings and triumph of Christ. Writing under the illumination and guidance of the Holy Ghost, he was led to say things which applied to himself only in a lower (sometimes figurative) sense, but which were appointed to have a complete fulfilment in Christ his antitype.²

How far the Psalmist understood this higher reference is a question of difficult determination. With regard to the sixteenth Psalm, the language of the apostle Peter: "He seeing this before, spake of the resurrection of Christ," etc.,³ implies that in penning this Psalm David was conscious of its higher application. And, we may say in general, that the spirit of the New Testament quotations from the Psalms indicates that their authors had a deeper insight into the prophetic meaning of their words than many modern ex-

¹ 2 Sam. vii. 16 compared with Luke i. 32, 33.

² See, for illustrations of this, Ps. xxii. 1, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 18; Ps. lxix. 4, 7-9, 21; Ps. cix. 1-20.

³ Acts. ii. 31.

positors are willing to admit. But, however this may be, the Spirit of inspiration had in view the fulfilment of these Psalms in Christ; and his intention, clearly revealed to us in the New Testament, must be our rule of interpretation.

We add, as a final remark, that in the Epistle to the Hebrews some Psalms are referred to Christ as their subject, in which the authors apparently speak simply of God according to the Old Testament view of him. Such is the hundred and second Psalm, from which are cited, after the Septuagint, and applied to Christ the words: "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the works of thine hands. They shall perish, but thou remainest; and they shall all wax old as doth a garment; and as a mantle shalt thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail."¹ Such also is the ninety-seventh Psalm, if, indeed, the words: "And let all the angels of God worship him,"² are taken from the seventh verse of this Psalm, and not rather from the Greek version of Deut. xxxii. 43.³ But with regard to all such passages the student of scripture should carefully note that they refer to *God's advent* as the Judge and Saviour of his people. Thus, in the hundred and second Psalm the writer says, in joyful anticipation of God's appearance in behalf of Zion: "Thou shalt arise and have mercy upon Zion: for the time to favor her, yea the set time is come. For thy servants take pleasure in her stones, and favor the dust thereof. So the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord,

¹ Heb. i. 10-12.

² Heb. i. 6.

³ Here the Septuagint version reads thus: Εὐφράνθητε οὐρανοὶ ἅμα αὐτῷ, καὶ προσκυνήσατέωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες ἄγγελοι Θεοῦ· εὐφράνθητε ἔθνη μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐνισχυσάτωσαν αὐτῷ πάντες υἱοὶ Θεοῦ· ὅτι τὸ αἷμα τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκδικᾶται, καὶ ἐκδικήσει καὶ ἀνταποδώσει δίκην τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, καὶ τοῖς μισοῦσιν ἀνταποδώσει· καὶ ἐκκαθαριεῖ κύριος τὴν γῆν τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ; Rejoice, O ye heavens, with him; and let all the angels of God worship him; rejoice, ye nations with his people; and let all the sons of God be strong in him: for he shall avenge the blood of his sons, and shall execute vengeance, and recompense justice to his enemies, and shall recompense those who hate him: and the Lord shall cleanse the land of his people.

and all the kings of the earth thy glory. When the Lord shall build up Zion, he shall appear in his glory.”¹ The ninety-seventh Psalm describes also God’s advent as the Judge of his people: “A fire goeth before him, and burneth up his enemies round about. His lightnings enlighten the world; the earth sees and trembles. The hills melt like wax at the presence of Jehovah, at the presence of the Lord of the whole earth. The heavens declare his righteousness, and all the people see his glory.”² Or, if we refer the words: “And let all the angels of God worship him,” to the song of Moses according to the Greek version, there also the theme is the advent of God to render vengeance to his adversaries, and to be merciful to his land, even to his people. Now the advent of God, as a Judge and Deliverer of his people, is a *process* which began when he appeared to Moses with the words: “I have surely seen the affliction of my people in Egypt,” “and I am come down to deliver them”;³ which was continued under the Mosaic dispensation in the form of repeated interpositions, partly miraculous and partly purely providential; but which is consummated in the advent of the Son of God, including his whole administration of the affairs of the church till his second coming in glory. The ultimate fulfilment, then, of all such passages is in the Messiah, and this truth the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews saw through the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

¹ Vs. 13-16 (Heb. vs. 14-17).² Vs. 3-6.³ Exod. iii. 7 seq.

ARTICLE VII.

THE CHRONOLOGICAL VALUE OF THE GENEALOGY IN
GENESIS V.

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THE first impression produced by reading over the genealogy in the fifth chapter of Genesis is, perhaps, that each of the patriarchs mentioned was the first-born of his father. On a moment's reflection, however, it appears a most extraordinary circumstance that in all the long line from the creation to the flood, each first-born should have been a son, and should have lived to become himself a father, and a father, too, whose first child was a son. On a closer examination of the narrative, it is found that this is not at all asserted. On the contrary, the very first name on the list shows that it was not intended. Gen. v. 3 reads, "Adam lived 130 years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, and called his name Seth." But we know, from the previous chapter, that Cain and Abel had been born long before — long enough to have been engaged in manly occupations before the birth of Seth; and it is altogether probable that the unknown daughter of Adam who became the wife of Cain, and perhaps also many sons and daughters of whom no mention at all is made, were born in the long interval between the births of Cain and Abel and that of Seth. The first impression derived from this genealogy is, therefore, certainly wrong. May this be also true of other and more important impressions?

It is stated of each of the patriarchs mentioned in this genealogy, that he lived so many years, and begat a certain son, and that after he had begotten this son, he lived so many years and died. Hence it has been thought possible,

by adding together the number of years in each case before paternity, to determine the whole length of the period embraced in the genealogy, and consequently the time which man existed upon the earth, or, at least, the time during which more than a single pair existed, before the deluge. This determination is one of much interest, both in itself and in its connection with recent scientific investigations. It has been thought to rest upon a secure basis, and has become the foundation of various chronological systems; the only point of uncertainty being whether the numbers as given in the Hebrew, the Samaritan, or the Septuagint were the most to be relied upon. It may seem rash to call such a conclusion in question; and it is obvious that if it should be set aside we are left without any basis for antediluvian chronology, except such as, determined by almost the whole length of the patriarchal lives, would be included only within very wide limits — limits separated by extremes of three or four thousand years.

Let us then see precisely what is the basis on which the present chronological systems rest. It is said, simply and distinctly: "Adam lived 130 years, and begat a son, and called his name Seth." It is added, as if for the very purpose of making the chronology more explicit, "The days of Adam after he had begotten Seth were 800 years, and all the days that Adam lived were 930 years, and he died." Now $930 - 800 = 130$, agreeing exactly with the number before mentioned. The same method of statement is used in each case throughout the genealogy; so that we seem to have in the agreement of the direct and the indirect numbers a very sure basis for chronology. It has already been seen, however, that in this matter first appearances are not necessarily reliable. The text may not, upon closer examination mean that which it was at first supposed to assert. Does it, or does it not, do so in the present instance?

If a theory of an opposite character were to be proposed, it might be expressed something in this way: In the extreme brevity of the early history, it was sought to record two facts

in one — the age in each case of commencing paternity, and the name of the particular son by whom the line was continued. Thus Seth, e.g., might have begun to be a father at 105, but might have actually begotten Enos at any reasonable time during the 807 years which he afterwards lived; so that the true meaning of the text would be shown by a paraphrase running in this wise: "Seth lived 105 years, and begat children, among whom was Enos; and Seth lived after his beginning to beget children 807 years, and begat both sons and daughters; and all the days of Seth were 912 years, and he died."

The very obvious reply to such a theory would be that it is at variance with the explicit statement of the text, and the language used is quite too definite to admit of so free a paraphrase. Such an answer, however, only throws us back upon an examination of the *usus loquendi*. If similar statements are elsewhere made, when we *know* they must be interpreted in accordance with the above theory, then, of course, we are free to apply the same interpretation here. The possibilities of showing this are extremely limited, from the fact that the only genealogies in this form extant are those of the fifth and of the eleventh chapters of Genesis. Of very few of the names therein mentioned is there any other record whatsoever. It is, therefore; remarkable that there should yet be two instances in which it is quite manifest that the apparent chronology of the text is apparent only, not real. One of these instances occurs in connection with the last name in each of the genealogies.

In Gen. v. 32 occurs the statement, "Noah was 500 years old; and Noah begat Shem, Ham, and Japheth." Let us turn aside a moment from the main point, to consider the seniority of these brothers. The natural inference from the order of the names would be that Shem was the eldest, and this supposition gains strength with each repetition of the names in the same order. Such repetitions occur in vii. 13, ix. 18, and x. 1. When their descendants are given, however, in chap. x., the order is reversed; Japheth is put first,

and Shem last; and in x. 21 the whole matter is settled, according to the authorized version, by the express mention of Shem as "the brother of Japheth the elder." It may, indeed, be urged that the Hebrew is equally capable of the translation, "the elder brother of Japheth"; but the ambiguity must have been rightly solved in the authorized version, since Ham (ix. 22, 24) was "the younger son"; and it will presently appear that Shem was not born until two or three years after the time when Noah is said to have begotten Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Here, then, we have another proof that first impressions are not always trustworthy in these genealogical matters. There are many other instances in which the name of the younger brother is put before that of the elder, because of more importance in connection with the purposes of the narrative. Thus Abram is put before Nahor and Haran, although really the younger, Isaac before Ishmael, Jacob before Esau, etc.

To return to the case of Noah. He was (v. 32) 500 years old when he begat Shem, Ham, and Japheth; but which of them? for it is evident they were not all born at one birth. Again, Noah was 600 years old (vii. 6) "when the flood of waters was upon the earth." If, then, we insist upon the exact statement of the genealogy, Shem must have been exactly 100, or at least within a few months of that age; but we learn, from xi. 10, that actually he was not 100 until "two years *after* the flood." The reconciliation of this discrepancy is extremely easy on the foregoing hypothesis: Noah began his paternity at 500 years old; but Shem, although mentioned first, was not actually begotten until at least two years, or —allowing for the duration of the flood— three years later.

It is no valid objection to this instance that the variation in dates is so small. A variation in the definite statement of numbers, whether large or small, needs to be accounted for; and here the same hypothesis which accounts for a small variation is equally good for one much larger, as will be seen in the next instance. Neither is any just inference to

be drawn from the slight change in the form of expression. We read that "Enos *lived* 90 years, and begat Cainan"; but of Noah that he "*was the son of* 500 years, and begat Shem, Ham, and Japheth." The one expression is in this connection the equivalent of the other, nor can the latter be fairly considered as at all more indefinite than the former. And even if any shadow of indefiniteness were to be attached to the expression itself, it is more than removed, in this instance, by the exceedingly distinct statements of the year, the month, and even the day of the month, in the seventh and eighth chapters. One other suggestion may possibly be made, both to this and the following instance, from the mention of three names in each case together, while in the rest of these genealogies only a single name is in each case given. It is sufficiently plain, however, that the omission of other names in the one case, and the insertion of them in the other, is only because of the less or greater importance to the narrative of the persons to whom those names belonged. The instance we have been considering would be precisely paralleled, if, in the case of Enoch, for example, it had been said, "Enoch lived 65 years, and begat Methuselah, Jabal, and Tubal" — provided those names occurred in the family. Had such been the statement, it is already apparent that Tubal might have been the one begotten at 65, Methuselah only some years later. But the recounting of so many names would have confused the narrative, without serving any good purpose, and they were therefore omitted; it still remaining possible, on the theory suggested, that Methuselah was actually born at a later period of Enoch's life.

At the close of the second genealogy (xi. 26) we are told, "Terah lived 70 years, and begat Abram, Nahor, and Haran"; in vs. 32 it is said, "The days of Terah were 205 years; and Terah died in Haran." A very simple arithmetical calculation shows that, if we read the genealogy as it has been customary to read those of the fifth and eleventh chapters, Abram must then have been 135 years old; for $205 - 70 = 135$. Nevertheless, we know that this was not

the fact. We know it from the whole chronology of Abram's life, and especially from his age at the birth of Isaac; and we know it, also, from the statement in the same immediate connection (xii. 4), "Abram was 75 years old when he departed out of Haran"; the narrative implying — what Stephen expressly states (Acts vii. 4) — that Terah was then dead. Making the calculation again, therefore, upon this basis, we derive the age of Terah at Abram's birth by subtracting Abram's age at Terah's death from Terah's whole age: thus, $205 - 75 = 130$. Terah was, then, *at least* 130 at Abram's birth; he may have been still somewhat older, as we do not know how soon after his death Abram left Haran, and the age of 75 is given in reference to this last event. Here is a difference between the two calculations of 60 years. It cannot be supposed that Stephen made a mistake; for, independently of the difficulties attending such a supposition, the narrative in Genesis seems clearly to imply the same thing; and we have, too, precisely the same statement in Philo: "Abraham was, saith the Scripture, 75 years old when he went forth from Haran. . . . No reader of the Scriptures, I suppose, can be ignorant that Abraham, first having emigrated from the land of the Chaldees, dwelt in Haran. Whence also, *his father being then dead*, he departed."¹ It must be supposed that Philo and Stephen were both sufficiently familiar with the history of their nation not to make a blunder of 60 years in a point of such prime importance. When, therefore, it is said that Terah lived 70 years, and begat Abram, Nahor, and Haran, it must be meant that he began to beget them at that age, although one of them at least — Abram — was, in fact, begotten some sixty years subsequently. Thus all difficulty and contradiction is removed. It is evident, from the address of Stephen and from Philo, that this was the common view of

¹ Ἀβραὰμ δὲ τῶν, φησὶν, ἐτῶν ἐβδομήκοντα πέντε, ὅτι ἐξῆλθεν ἐκ Χαρρὰν. . . . οὐδένα τοίνον τῶν ἐντετυχηκότων τοῖς νόμοις ἀγνοεῖν εἰκός, ὅτι πρότερον μὲν ἐκ τῆς Χαλδαϊκῆς ἀναστὰς γῆς Ἀβραὰμ ᾤκησεν εἰς Χαρρὰν· τελευτήσαντος δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκεῖθε, καὶ ἐκ ταύτης μετανίσταται.—Philo de Neigr. Abr. p. 324 F. G. ed. Colon. Allobr. 1613.

the matter among the Jews ; and it is also plain that the same opinion was entertained by Josephus ; for, by making Sarai the *niece* of Abram, while yet she was but ten years his junior (Gen. xvii. 17), he of course makes her father, Haran, a much older brother of Abram.¹ The critics, therefore, who find in this statement of Stephen a “ demonstrable historical inaccuracy ”² are wise above the record.

Applying these results to the genealogy before the flood, we find that in the same way that Terah is said to have begotten Abram at 70, while he actually did so at 130, and that Noah is said to have begotten Shem at 500, while his actual age was 502, any of the patriarchs named may have been begotten at any reasonable time in the life of their fathers subsequent to the date given for the beginning of paternity. Now, the sum total of all the ages of the patriarchs in the line as far as Noah is 7625 years ; the sum total of all the ages before paternity is 1056 ; subtracting the latter sum from the former, we have 6569 years as the total lifetime of all the patriarchs after paternity began. Again, subtracting from this an arbitrary sum of, say 100 years for each of them except Enoch, as an old age in which they were not likely to have had children, we have a remainder of 5769 years. To this add the age of Adam before the birth of Seth (130 years), and the age of Noah at the flood (600 years), and the result is 6499 years, as the extreme possible limit of time between the creation and the deluge, according to the numbers of the Hebrew text. The inferior limit is, of course, that adopted in the common chronology, and obtained by adding to the sum of the ages before paternity the age of Noah at the flood, making, according to the Hebrew text, 1656 years. Between these limits, then, is 4843 years — by which length of time the chronology, on this theory, is uncertain and variable. In the absence of evidence, it might

¹ Josephus Antiq. lib. I. c. vi. § 5, p. 17, ed. Didot.

² Alford's Gr. Test. Proleg. (American ed.), chap. I. § vi. 15, p. 19. Much of the above argument may be found in Lee on the Inspiration of the Scriptures. Appendix H.

be considered probable that the true chronology would be a nearer approach to the smaller than the larger limit. The application of the same principles to the Samaritan text gives limits of 1307 years and 6360 years, with a variation of 5053 years — smaller numbers, but with a greater difference. The Septuagint chronology, which (except a variation of 124 years in the case of Lamech) gives the same total age of the patriarchs, but makes great changes in their age before paternity, admits in the same way of limits of 2242 years, on the one hand, and 5989, on the other; showing a difference of 3747 years. The Vulgate and Peschito-Syriac follow the Hebrew text.

Were the same principles applied also to the genealogy of the eleventh chapter, extending from Shem to Abram, — and we have seen that it actually must be applied here in at least one instance, — there would be a flexibility in the chronology of some 1500 to 2000 years; the inferior limit being, of course, what is called the received chronology.

The preceding observations have been made simply in view of the requirements of the scripture narrative itself, without regard to any external considerations. It may now be worth while to suggest very briefly one or two points in regard to their bearing upon other matters.

It cannot be said that there is yet any distinctly-settled scientific demand for an extension of the received chronology. We may set aside the claims of the school of Sir C. Lyell as at once too extravagant to be entertained, and too palpably contradicted whenever brought into contact with any accurate scientific determinations.¹ Apart from these, there is, un-

¹ For instance, Sir C. Lyell in his work on the *Antiquity of Man* (chap. iii. p. 43, 2d Am. ed.), writes as follows: "I have shown in my *Travels in North America* that the deposits forming the delta and alluvial plain of the Mississippi consist of sedimentary matter, extending over an area of thirty thousand square miles, and known in some parts to be several hundred feet deep. Although we cannot estimate correctly how many years it may have required for the river to bring down from the upper country so large a quantity of earthy matter — the data for such a computation being as yet incomplete — we may still approximate to a minimum of the time which such an operation must have taken, by ascertaining experimentally the annual discharge of water by the Mississippi, and the

questionably a tendency to carry back the existence of the human race to a somewhat more remote period than had hitherto been supposed. As yet, this is only the *tendency* of discovery and investigation. Nothing very definite in regard to chronology can at present be considered as actually established. Yet with the existing tendency and its probable result, the advantage of possessing the chronological latitude here claimed is obvious.

A general survey of the relations of the divine operations to periods of time, however, especially commends the foregoing conclusions to our attention. These relations are the same in nature and in revelation. Alike in the one and the other, it is a marked feature that the earlier and less highly developed occupies the longer period; the later and higher, the shorter time. There seems to be in the Creator's works a sort of equation, into which quality and quantity — the latter represented either by number or by duration — enter as factors. The one is usually in the inverse ratio of the other. In geology, "the Palaeozoic ages were greatly prolonged in comparison with the Mesozoic, and these, again, in comparison with the Cenozoic, and so of their subdivisions.

mean annual amount of solid matter contained in its waters. The lowest estimate of the time required would lead us to assign a high antiquity, *amounting to many tens of thousands of years (probably more than one hundred thousand), to the existing delta.*" Now it happens that this subject has been investigated with great thoroughness and accuracy for utilitarian purposes by the United States Government. In the very valuable and thoroughly scientific report to that Government, Messrs. Humphreys and Abbott say (p. 435): "If it be assumed that the rate of progress has been uniform to the present day — and there are some considerations connected with the manner in which the river pushes the bar into the Gulf each year, which tend to establish the correctness of that opinion — the number of years which have elapsed since the River began to advance into the Gulf can be computed. The present rate of progress of the mouth may be obtained by a careful comparison of the progress of all the mouths of the river, as shown by the Maps of Captain Talcott, United States Engineer, 1838, and of the United States Coast Survey in 1851 — the only maps that admit of such a comparison. They give two hundred and sixty-two feet for the mean yearly advance of all the passes. This mean advance of all the passes represents correctly the advance of the river. . . . Adopting this rate of progress (two hundred and sixty-two feet per annum), four thousand four hundred years have elapsed since the river began to advance into the gulf."

The Lower Silurian era was four or five times as long as the Upper, and the duration of the Silurian era was three or four times that of either the Devonian or the Carboniferous. The earth thus dragged slowly on through its earliest periods.”¹ In astronomy, if the nebulous theory be admitted, the earlier stages in the formation of systems and of planets must have been inconceivably protracted, while subsequent results followed with a constantly accelerated speed of progress. In physiology, the multiplication of genera and species in the lower orders stands in marked contrast with their decreasing numbers as we rise in the scale of life. So marked is this feature of the animal economy as to have furnished a powerful argument for the unity of the human race. In the chemistry of life, the higher the organization, the more unstable the equilibrium; the vitality of the animal is far more easily suspended than of the vegetable; the mollusks and radiates are more tenacious of life than the vertebrates. Illustrations need not be multiplied. The general fact is obvious to the most casual observer of nature, and the profoundest investigations do but add to the assurance of its truth. Like speed and power in mechanics, duration and elevation, persistency and activity, are everywhere seen to be complementary terms. As the one increases, the other decreases.

Even with the received chronology, we trace in the scriptural history the same principle in the ordering of the spiritual world; but it becomes far more marked, and its analogy with nature more apparent, with the proposed extension of the earlier ages. As it is, we have two great periods, the one preceding, the other following the manifestation of the Son of God. In the latter, spiritual knowledge rises far higher, and spiritual life is greatly quickened and concentrated. The minimum endurance of the former was above 4000 years; on this hypothesis it may have been nearer 10,000 years. The latter, at the end of less than 2000, is already, by common consent, approximating its close.

¹ Dana's Manual of Geology, Part III. iv. 1. 4, p. 386.

Again, according to the received chronology, sixteen or seventeen centuries rolled away before the flood, and so slow was the movement then of humanity in its higher developments that the life even of individuals covered half the period; to this 400 years more must be added before the call of Abraham; and then still 400 more to the gathering of the Israelites around Mount Sinai. There is thus a period before the establishment of the old covenant of at least 2500 years in preparation for a dispensation which when established was itself to endure but 1500. But all this becomes far more marked, the law which we even now recognize far more clear, by the extension of the earlier periods. This law might be further illustrated by comparing the periods of prophecy with those of history; of the type with those of the antitype; or, in any other way, those of the less enlightened, less glorious, less spiritual, less elevated, with those of the higher, the nobler, the better. By all we are warned that "the time of our salvation draweth nigh"; "the night is far spent, the day is at hand." Our lot is cast in times when the movement of spirit is quick, active, and vigorous; and our lives, if they are to tell to any good purpose, must be earnest.

ARTICLE VIII.

JOHN McLEOD CAMPBELL'S THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT.

BY PROF. EDWARDS A. PARK.

THERE have somewhat recently passed from earth three men, Thomas Erskine, Frederick Denison Maurice, and John McLeod Campbell, who were not only personal friends, but were also closely allied with each other in many doctrinal views and philanthropic tendencies. Of these three authors Dr. Campbell is the least celebrated in this country. He has been well known in Scotland since the publication of two volumes of his sermons in 1831-32.¹ The work, however, by which he has been made known most extensively is an octavo volume of three hundred and eighty-two pages, entitled, "The Nature of the Atonement, and its Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life."² The same spirit which breathes through this treatise is characteristic of another work which he published on "Christ the Bread of Life."³ This spirit is one of sobriety, candor, mildness, conscientiousness, meekness, and benevolence. Dr. Campbell was a man not of extensive learning, but of profound thoughtfulness. His style is hard and often obscure. He wrote as he con-

¹ Notes of Sermons, by the Rev. J. M. Campbell, Minister of Row, Dunbartonshire. Taken in short-hand. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. 465. London. 1831.

Sermons and Lectures, by the Rev. J. M. Campbell, late Minister of Row, Dunbartonshire. Taken in short-hand. Vol. II. 12mo. pp. 452. R. B. Lusk, Greenock; Waugh and Innes, and J. Lindsay and Co., Edinburgh; W. McComb, Belfast; R. M. Tims, Dublin; J. Nisbet, and Hamilton, Adams, and Co., London. 1832.

² This work was first published at Cambridge, by McMillan and Co., in 1856. A new edition has since been published with an Introduction of 45 pages, and 24 pages of Notes.

³ Christ the Bread of Life; an Attempt to give a profitable Direction to the present Occupation of Thought with Romanism. Second edition. 12mo. pp. 190. London: McMillan and Co. 1869.

versed, slowly and with obvious painstaking. His views of the atonement occasioned an animated discussion in the Presbyterian church of Scotland, and called forth able essays, pamphlets, books, and chapters of other books; and brought down upon him a severe ecclesiastical censure.¹ The present Article is designed not to comment on these views, but to state them. It is not possible, perhaps, to give such an abstract as will fairly and fully represent them. The general character of them, however, may perhaps be apparent in the following irregular compend.

Mr. Campbell opens his discussion with the remark, that the chief questions with regard to the atonement are these three: "1st. For whom was it made? 2d. What was it intended to accomplish? 3d. What has it been in itself?" or, 1st. What is its extent? 2d. What is its designed result? 3d. What is its nature? (pp. 1, 2.) The answer to the first two of these questions depends on the answer to the

¹ In the Bishop of Argyle's Edition of the "Present Day Papers," pp. 16, 17, is the following extract from an article "believed to be from the pen of Principal Shairp of St. Andrews."—"After Mr. Erskine had been known for about ten years as a spiritual teacher, there arose what was known in Scotland as the Row Movement. It was discredited, unfortunately, at the time by its supposed connection with a claim to the revival of miracles, and is known to many now only in this association. But between the claim to miracles and the doctrines taught by Mr. Campbell of Row, there was in reality no real connection, though they both appeared about the same time and near the same place. In his teaching, Mr. Campbell's aim was to remove obstructions which he conceived the dominant systems threw in the way of the reception of divine truth, and to bring home to men what he thought a more direct, more vital, and loving gospel. Scotland has known no other so profound spiritual movement during the present century. But, being purely spiritual, and no ways political, as most religious movements among us have more or less been, it did not excite in the ordinary public nearly so much interest as less important but noisier movements have done. Though starting independently, Mr. Campbell's teaching and spirit were in entire unison with all that Mr. Erskine had enforced in his books; and accordingly the latter threw himself into the Row Movement with characteristic ardor. When in 1830 the General Assembly deposed Mr. Campbell, and along with him the late Alexander Scott, Mr. Erskine felt that a grievous wrong had been done, and that the Church of Scotland, in casting out two of the most spiritual of her ministers, had inflicted on herself irreparable injury. Most candid persons are now of the same opinion."

third. If Christ endured the real punishment of sinners, and performed the exact obedience required of them, then he must have died for the elect alone, and he must have secured for them a title, in strict justice, to eternal life. The most momentous, then, of the questions with regard to the atonement, is: What is its nature?

First. The nature of the atonement is such as commends itself to our moral sense. Some regard it as repugnant to our moral intuitions, and therefore reject the Bible on account of it. Others regard it as mysterious; and believe in it, not because it commends itself to the conscience, but because it is taught in the Scriptures, which are proved true by arguments independent of this doctrine. But it is the self-evidencing light of the atonement which commends the doctrine to our moral sense, and so irradiates the Scriptures as to confirm our faith in them. The doctrine is indeed mysterious, but it is reasonable. It has external evidence in its favor, but its main proof is internal. "I have often felt one tear of Jesus traced by faith up to its fountain in the heart of God would have a power to inspire confidence towards God which the mere reception of the fullest doctrinal conceptions of his atoning sacrifice for sin has not" (p. 394).

Secondly. The atonement is the natural and necessary result of the incarnation. The divine plan of the incarnation did not presuppose the atonement, but "the faith of the atonement presupposes the faith of the incarnation. It may be also said historically that the faith of the incarnation has usually had conjoined with it the faith of the atonement. The great question which has divided men as to these fundamental doctrines of the faith has been the relation in which they stand to each other — *which* was to be regarded as primary, *which* secondary? — was an atonement the great necessity in reference to man's salvation, out of which the necessity for the incarnation arose, because a divine Saviour alone could make an adequate atonement for sin? — or, is the incarnation to be regarded as the primary and highest fact in the history of God's relation to man, in the light of

which God's interest in man and purpose for man can alone be truly seen?—and is the atonement to be contemplated as taking place in order to the fulfilment of the divine purpose for man which the incarnation reveals?

I feel it impossible in any measure to realize what I believe in believing in the incarnation, without giving a preference to the latter view; and accordingly my attempt to understand and illustrate the nature of the atonement has been made in the way of taking the subject to the light of the incarnation. Assuming the incarnation, I have sought to realize the divine mind in Christ as perfect Sonship towards God and perfect Brotherhood towards men, and, doing so, the incarnation has appeared developing itself naturally and necessarily as the atonement" (Introduction, p. xvii).

Thirdly. Presupposing the incarnation, the atonement also presupposes the love and grace of God the Father. Conscience responds to the theory that there is a forgiving disposition in God before the atoning acts of Christ. "The first demand which the gospel makes upon us, in relation to the atonement, is, that we believe that *there is forgiveness with God*. Forgiveness—that is, love to an enemy surviving his enmity, and which notwithstanding his enmity can act towards him for his good; this we must be able to believe to be in God toward us, in order that we may be able to believe in the atonement.

This is a faith which, in the order of things, must precede the faith of an atonement. If we could ourselves make an atonement for our sins, as by sacrifice the heathen attempted to do, and as, in their self-righteous endeavors to make their peace with God, men are, in fact, daily attempting, then such an atonement might be thought of as preceding forgiveness and the cause of it. But if God provides the atonement, then forgiveness must precede atonement" (pp. 17, 18). The Scriptures "do not represent the love of God to man as the effect, and the atonement of Christ as the cause; but—just the contrary—they represent the love of God as the cause, and the atonement as the effect" (p. 20). The atonement

is *necessary* for the full manifestation of Jehovah's love. It exhibits his self-sacrificing grace. It thus persuades transgressors to trust in the mercy of him who might otherwise be regarded as merely and justly repelling them from him. Because it exhibits the Father's character in its most attractive aspect, it commends itself, in its own light, to the conscience: "If we will come to the atonement, not venturing in our darkness to predetermine anything as to its nature, but expecting light to shine upon our spirits from it, even the light of eternal life; if we will suffer it to inform us by its own light why we needed it, and what its true value to us is, the *punishment* of sin will fall into its proper place, as testifying to the existence of an evil greater than itself, even *sin*; from which greater evil it is the *direct* object of the atonement to deliver us — a deliverance from punishment being but a secondary result. And the reward of righteousness will be raised in our conceptions from the character of something that can be ours by the adjudication of the Judge, on arbitrary grounds which mercy may recommend, to its true dignity as that blessedness which is essentially inherent in righteousness, and in that glorifying and enjoying of God of which righteousness alone is the capacity, and which no name nor title nor arbitrary arrangement can confer" (pp. 189, 190).

Fourthly. The atonement involves the fact of Christ's *identifying himself with the human race*. Mr. Campbell's theory of identification has been expressed by others more clearly than by himself.

"Out of the combination, in a highly cultivated moral state of the mind, of its sympathies and antipathies, a third sentiment is capable of being evolved, called also, for want of a distinctive name, 'sympathy,' but at once attractive of the individual and repellent of his crime. The most familiar examples of this are to be found when persons standing to each other in endearing relationships have diverse moral characters. The more endearing the personal relationship, and the more diverse the character, the deeper will be this compound sentiment. Take, for example, the case of a child who has suddenly betrayed evidence of great moral turpitude by the public commission of some shameful crime. To designate

the feelings of the anguish-stricken father by the paltry name of 'pity' would be a miserable misnomer. A worthy father identifies himself with his child's crime, and feels as much shame and distress as if it had been his own. But the depth of this feeling will depend upon two things — the extent of his love for his child, and of his hatred of the crime. If the moral character of the father be no better than that of the offender, his feelings of self-loathing will be no deeper than those of the offender. Exactly in proportion to the superiority of his character will be the profundity of his woe. May we not venture, then, to add, that a sentiment so compound is inadequately expressed by the word 'sympathy'; and that instead of saying 'sympathy with the sins of others,' we should more accurately convey the idea by calling it '*consciousness of the sins of others*?'"¹

"The natural consequence of a love which made Christ identify himself with sinners was, that he should feel the pressure of human sin as a pressure on his own spirit. We know how deeply one human being may suffer in the suffering of another; and those who know what real love is, know that the pain of sympathy with a beloved object is often harder to endure than any suffering merely personal, — the suffering of a mother, for instance, in that of her child. But in spiritual beings, physical suffering must always be regarded as secondary in comparison with mental suffering. To realize the sin of one with whom we are identified by love, is greater suffering than any physical pain we could endure for him; and the intensity of the suffering will be in proportion as the nature of him who endures it is alien from the sin."

"Suppose a son has committed a great crime, and that he meets his father looking worn and sad and emaciated, and is told that the offence he has committed is the cause of it. There are two ways in which the son might understand this: either that his father had literally borne the punishment due to him, — that he had endured the actual confinement and privations of a prison — the chastisement of whatever kind to which he himself had been condemned, — and thus by physical suffering had been reduced to the state in which he was; or, that the intensity of his love, grief, and anxiety had undermined his health and produced the same outward effects. Which of these ways of accounting for the outward manifestations of suffering would most undeniably express love in a moral and spiritual being? In the one case the change in his outward appearance would be incontestable evidence of the intensity of his feelings; in the other case, his feelings may or may not have been in exercise."²

Fifthly. The atonement consisted in Christ's making a penitent confession of human sinfulness. It was a confession made by the human race with which Christ had identified

¹ The Philosophy of Evangelicism, pp. 133 sq. ² Fragments of Truth, pp. 243, 244. — Both of these quotations are cited by Professor Crawford in his volume, entitled "The Doctrine of the Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement," pp. 315, 317, 318.

himself and which he therefore represented. This vicarious, expiatory confession of Jesus was "a perfect amen in humanity to the judgment of God on the sin of man" (p. 134). Christ is a sacrifice for sin, because he responds to the divine wrath against sin, saying: "Thou art righteous, O Lord, who judgest so," and realizes fully the nature and the degree of that wrath, and the enormity of the sin against which the wrath is cherished. He thus receives the divine wrath into his own soul, "into the bosom of the divine humanity, and, so receiving it, he responds to it with a perfect response—a response from the depths of that divine humanity,—and *in that perfect response he absorbs it*. For that response has all the elements of a perfect repentance in humanity for all the sin of man—a perfect sorrow, a perfect contrition—all the elements of such a repentance, and that in absolute perfection, all—excepting the personal consciousness of sin,—and by that perfect response in amen to the mind of God in relation to sin is the wrath of God rightly met, and that is accorded to divine justice which is its due, and could alone satisfy it" (pp. 135, 136). The righteousness of Christ used a weapon in resisting the sin which called for punishment; this weapon was an expiatory and, in one sense, a vicarious confession of our sins. "Without the assumption of an imputation of our guilt, and in perfect harmony with the unbroken consciousness of personal separation from our sins, the Son of God, bearing us and our sins on his heart before the Father, must needs respond to the Father's judgment on our sins, with that confession of their evil and of the righteousness of the wrath of God against them, and holy sorrow because of them, which were due—due in the truth of things—due on our behalf though we could not render it—due from him as in our nature and our true brother—what he must needs feel in himself because of the holiness and love which were in him—what he must needs utter to the Father in expiation of our sins when he would make intercession for us" (pp. 137, 138).

It will be seen at once that Mr. Campbell's theory proceeds

on the assumption that if men could exercise an adequate repentance for their sin, no further expiation would be needed. He says: "That we may fully realize what manner of an equivalent to the dishonor done to the law and name of God by sin an adequate repentance and sorrow for sin must be, and how far more truly than any penal infliction such repentance and confession must satisfy divine justice, let us suppose that all the sin of humanity has been committed by one human spirit, on whom is accumulated this immeasurable amount of guilt; and let us suppose this spirit, loaded with all this guilt, to pass out of sin into holiness, and to become filled with the light of God, becoming perfectly righteous with God's own righteousness, — such a change, were such a change possible, would imply in the spirit so changed a perfect condemnation of the past of its own existence and an absolute and perfect repentance — a confession of its sin commensurate with its evil. If the sense of personal identity remained, it must be so. Now, let us contemplate this repentance with reference to the guilt of such a spirit, and the question of pardon for its past sin and admission now to the light of God's favor. Shall this repentance be accepted as an atonement? and, the past sin being thus confessed, shall the divine favor flow out on that present perfect righteousness which thus condemns the past? or, shall that repentance be declared inadequate? Shall the present perfect righteousness be rejected on account of the past sin, so absolutely and perfectly repented of? And shall divine justice still demand adequate punishment for the past sin, and refuse to the present righteousness adequate acknowledgment — the favor which, in respect of its own nature, belongs to it? It appears to me impossible to give any but one answer to these questions. We feel that such a repentance as we are supposing would, in such a case, be the true and proper satisfaction to offended justice, and that there would be more atoning worth in one tear of the true and perfect sorrow which the memory of the past would awaken in this now holy spirit, than in endless ages of penal

woe. Now, with the difference of personal identity, the case I have supposed is the actual case of Christ, the Holy One of God, bearing the sins of all men on his spirit, — in Luther's words, 'the one sinner,' — and meeting the cry of these sins for judgment, and the wrath due to them, absorbing and exhausting that divine wrath in that adequate confession and perfect response on the part of man which was possible only to the infinite and eternal righteousness in humanity" (pp. 143, 144, 145).

Sixthly. The atonement consisted in the intercession of Christ for man. His expiatory acknowledgment of our guilt prepared the way for his pleading in our behalf. "He bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors." He responded "to the divine love in its yearnings over us sinners," by his prayer that we may be blessed in that love. That prayer was an *offering*, a living sacrifice. "Any father who has ever been privileged to have one child pleading for forgiveness to another child for an offence which has been unkindness to the interceding child himself, has here some help to his faith in his own experience" (p. 232).

Mr. Campbell explains the intercession of Christ in a manner consistent with one chief aim of the volume. This aim is to remove an impression that the atonement has the nature of a drama, a scenic representation — that it is "the mere acting of an assigned part." He says: "We are so much in the way of looking on the work of Christ as the acting out of a pre-arranged plan, that its character as a natural progress and development, in which one thing arises out of another, and is really caused by that other, is with difficulty realized" (p. 228). Having identified himself with men, Christ naturally desired their salvation. Bearing in his own heart the burden of their sin, and intensely longing for their rescue from it, nothing could be more natural than for him to express to his Father the intensity of his longing. This expression of his desire was his intercession for men. "As this intercession seemed a natural form for the love of Christ to take, so did it seem what must be to the Father a

sacrifice of a sweet-smelling savor"; for it was the prayer of his Son in behalf of men who were the enemies of that Son (p. 232).

[The great error of Mr. Campbell lies in supposing that our Saviour's confession of our sin and his prayer for us are in themselves, as a mere confession, as a mere prayer, sufficient to secure our pardon. He repeats the remark that if men could offer a complete repentance for all their sin, they could not be consistently punished. If, then, they offer this repentance in Christ, they are to be pardoned on the ground of Christ's *virtual* repentance for them. Mr. Campbell thus dispenses with all governmental expedients for procuring the remission of our sins, and makes that remission *due* to a perfect acknowledgment of our guilt.]

The atonement has thus its *retrospective* relations—a fitness to meet the wrath of God toward sin, and to arrest this wrath by confession and intercession. It likewise has its *prospective* relations—its fitness to invest us with that holiness which is indispensable to our happiness. The confession and intercession of Christ are of no avail, unless we unite in them. Mr. Campbell therefore proceeds.

Seventhly. The atonement consisted in such a manifestation of the Father, and such a pleading with the Father, by the Son, as tend to secure our participation in Christ's filial feelings. Nothing can secure our salvation but a "response in our own hearts to that which is in God's heart toward us." No artificial arrangement, "nothing that God can give or we can receive," nothing in his outward dealing with us can make us truly blessed, unless we *have* the Saviour's righteousness, his filial spirit, in our own souls. The expiatory confession which Christ made of our sins "is to be shared in by ourselves; to accept it on our behalf was to accept it as that mind in relation to sin in the fellowship of which we are to come to God. The righteous trust in the Father, that following him as a dear child walking in love which we have been contemplating as Christ's righteousness, is to be shared in by us; to accept it on our behalf as the

righteousness of man, was to accept it as what pleases God in man, — therefore as that in the fellowship of which we are to draw near and live that life which is in God's favor" (pp. 176, 177). Thus the atonement was designed to secure our righteousness. "Christ gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity." "We are redeemed from the vain conversation received by tradition from our fathers, by the precious blood of Christ." "Christ suffered for us, the unjust, that he might bring us to God." Mr. Campbell speaks of the atonement as "having been accomplished by the natural working of the life of love in Christ, and having been the result of his doing the Father's will" (p. 153). The sonship of Christ revealed the fatherhood of God. The filial virtues of the one exhibit the parental excellence of the other. "It is the cry of the child that reveals the mother's heart. It is the cry of the sonship in humanity, bearing the burden of humanity, confessing its sin, asking for it the good of which the capacity still remained to it, which, being responded to by the Father, revealed the Father's heart" (p. 234). The Father's heart is revealed for the purpose of making us participate in the filial virtues of Christ. All this is not a scenic representation, a dramatic scene, but the natural outflowing of love from the Father to the Son, and from the Son to the Father. Mr. Campbell, therefore, is very explicit in affirming that the obedience of Christ is not a fulfilment of the law *for us*, but is a disclosure of the very heart of God; the inward trust of the Son proving the infinite trustworthiness of the Father. "Manifested sonship can alone reveal fatherliness" (p. 167). This fatherliness allures to the correlate feeling of sonship. The Father justifies the filial spirit. He loves it. His justifying act is the love of his heart outflowing to the believer, and is "not the mere favorable sentence of a judge and ruler, setting the mind at ease in reference to the law of his moral government." The believer's act is righteousness, and not the mere condition of righteousness. With this righteousness, as consisting in faith, God is, and must be, well pleased.

It is difficult for a man to join "himself and glory in one thought." But the sonship of Christ reveals such an affection in the Father for us, that we can aspire even to the glory of the adoption of sons. "What it is to be a man, what we possess in humanity, we never know, until we see humanity in him who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God" (p. 169). "As the dishonor done to God in humanity cries out against" the race, "so does the honor done to God" by his Son in humanity plead in favor of the race. We must not regard the honor which Christ reflects on us as an offset to the dishonor which is cast on us by sin, the one covering over the other, gilding it over, so that humanity may be regarded with acceptance on the whole, and as a whole. But we must regard the work of Christ "as the revelation of an inestimable preciousness hidden in humanity, hidden from the inheritors of humanity themselves, but not hid from God, and now brought forth into manifestation by the Son of God. For the Revealer of the Father is also the Revealer of man, who was made in God's image" (pp. 158, 159). By thus revealing the character of God and also the worth of man, Christ has secured our participation in his own righteousness. [This theory of our sharing in his virtue has a remote correspondence to the old theory of his having obeyed the law for us, and his virtue being imputed to us.]

In advocating his theory that the atonement was designed to make us righteous, to make us partakers of the holiness of Christ, Mr. Campbell goes so far as to contend that the Jewish sacrifices were designed to fit men for the worship of the temple, that is, for the holy service of God, for true religion; "the participation in that worship being the good set forth; disqualification for that worship the evil; and sacrifices and participation in these sacrifices; the means of deliverance from that evil and participation in that good. Not to deliver from punishment, but to elevate and purify for worship, was the blood of the victim shed. Not the receiving of any manner of reward for righteousness, but the

being holy and accepted worshippers, was the benefit received through being sprinkled with the victim's blood" (p. 179). Our great High Priest disclosed "the nature and the virtue of *his* contemplated sacrifice by the words: 'Lo, I come to do thy will, O God,' so that by this will it is that we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Christ, — the blood shed for the remission of sins being the blood of Christ, who, through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, which *purges the conscience from dead works to serve the living God*" (p. 180).

[Notwithstanding these unqualified assertions of Mr. Campbell, the humblest reader of the English Bible can easily perceive that the Levitical sacrifices were often directly designed to free the transgressor from punishment as well as from sin, to secure his happiness and honor, as well as his liberty to worship in the temple.]

Eighthly. It is involved in the preceding topic that the atonement was primarily designed not to free us from punishment, but to exert a moral influence upon our character. Its nature is such as to make men holy. This is its first and chief aim. Its nature is also such as to make men happy. This is its constant, but secondary aim. Its nature is such as to "bring us to God," and then to secure for us "the adoption of sons." The atonement, according to Mr. Campbell, is not that which comes *directly* between us and the punishment of sin, but it is that which contains "the secret and the power of returning to God." It recognizes "sin and all misery as what are together left behind in returning to God."

The moral influence of the atonement in persuading us to holiness is derived from its *full* exhibition of the divine character. We must receive the Saviour's word: "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God," as "the great key-word on the subject of the atonement." This avowal of his purpose *before* he came into the world coincides with the statement which he made *after* he had partially fulfilled that purpose: "I have declared thy name, and will declare it." His life

of virtue bore witness of the Father. "I have given him for a witness to the people," was the language of prophecy; and this is confirmed by the language of history: "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father." The Redeemer's sufferings were a part of the atonement, because they were "necessary to the perfection of his witness-bearing for the Father." They were "the expression of the divine mind regarding our sins, and a manifestation by the Son of what our sins are to the Father's heart." They were the agonies of "divine love suffering from our sins *according to its nature* — a suffering, therefore, in relation to which the sufferer could say: 'He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.'" It was *natural* that Christ should endure pain. "It has been said: 'If God should appear as a man on this sinful earth, how could it be, but as a man of sorrows?'" It was God in contact with sin who made the atonement. He must experience grief in view of iniquity. All the mental sufferings of Christ were "in sympathy with God and in the strength of the faith of the divine acceptance of that sympathy" (p. 132). Because Christ exhibited the Father to men, they hated him. This hatred gave him the deeper pain, because it originated from such a principle. "His honoring of the Father caused men to dishonor him." "This professed trust in the Father was" reviled, "and the bitter complaint was wrung from him: 'Reproach hath broken my heart'" (pp. 128-130). Still, it was not sorrow alone; it was the Saviour's joy that helped to form the atonement, because *his* joy, *his* peace exhibited the real character of the Father. Christ's exhibition of the real character of the Father is needed in order to make our repentance possible. Repentance is "not impossible to the sinner *absolutely*, but only *apart from* Christ."

It is often thought that the mercy of God alone tends to persuade men to piety. His justice and holiness have the same tendency. "Justice may be contemplated as according to sin its due; and there is in righteousness, as we are conscious to it, what testifies that sin should be miserable. But

justice looking at the sinner, not simply as the fit subject of punishment, but as existing in a moral condition of unrighteousness, and so its own opposite, must desire that the sinner should cease to be in that condition ; should cease to be unrighteous, — should become righteous : righteousness in God craving for righteousness in man, with a craving which the realization of righteousness in man alone can satisfy. So also of holiness. In one view it repels the sinner, and would banish him to outer darkness, because of its repugnance to sin. In another it is pained by the continued existence of sin and unholiness, and must desire that the sinner should cease to be sinful. So that the sinner, conceived of as awakening to the consciousness of his own evil state, and saying to himself, ‘ By sin I have destroyed myself. Is there yet hope for me in God ? ’ should hear an encouraging answer, not only from the love and mercy of God, but also from his very righteousness and holiness. We must not forget, in considering the response that is in conscience to the charge of sin and guilt, that, though the fears which accompany that response are partly the effect of a dawning of light, they also in part arise from remaining darkness. He who is able to interpret the voice of God within him truly, and with full spiritual intelligence, will be found saying, not only, ‘ There is to me cause for fear in the righteousness and holiness of God ’ — but also, ‘ There is room for hope for me in the divine righteousness and holiness.’ And when gathering consolation from the meditation of the name of the Lord, that consolation will be not only, ‘ Surely the divine mercy desires to see me happy rather than miserable ’ — but also, ‘ Surely the divine righteousness desires to see me righteous ; the divine holiness desires to see me holy ; my continuing unrighteous and unholy is as grieving to God’s righteousness and holiness as my misery through sin is to his pity and love.’ ‘ Good and righteous is the Lord ; *therefore* will he teach sinners the way which they should choose.’ ‘ A just God and a Saviour ’ ; not as the harmony of a seeming opposition, but ‘ a Saviour,’ *because* ‘ a just God ’ ” (pp. 129, 130, 131).

Ninthly. In agreement with the preceding statements, Mr. Campbell believes that the atonement did not consist in Christ's pain *as* pain, his agony *as* agony, but in his holiness and love as they take the form of suffering; or in his suffering "as a condition and form of holiness and love under the pressure of our sin and its consequent misery" (p. 117). There is a distinction between an atoning sacrifice for sin and the enduring of the punishment of sin. The feelings of Christ which constituted the atonement were holiness and love, — divine holiness and divine love, such feelings in *humanity* towards man and man's sin and man's misery through sin as had always been in the *Deity*. They were "not penal sufferings endured in meeting a demand of divine justice," but were "themselves the expression of the divine mind regarding our sins, and a manifestation by the Son of what our sins are to the Father's heart" (p. 132). "Surely, the tears of holy sorrow shed over the sins of others — the tears, for example, of a godly parent over a prodigal child, — are not penal," but of this nature were the tears of Christ. "He put away sin by the sacrifice of himself," and not merely by the expressiveness of his human pains. God is revealed in Christ's sufferings, and not merely in *connection* with them. "*By the word of his power all else was accomplished; by himself he purged our sins, by the virtue that is in what he is*; and thus is the atonement not only what was rendered possible by the incarnation, but itself a development of the incarnation" (p. 141). Jesus on the cross developed his love to his Father, his confidence in the divine character, his affection for men, his grief at their sinfulness, and the power of virtue to sustain the soul amid the deepest affliction; and this development of the Saviour's heart is also a manifestation of God. The developed heart of Jesus is the atonement. The pains of the cross were needed for this development; but it is the spirit manifested, and not the agony in which it was manifested, which reconciles us to the Most High. The atonement was not a physical, but a *moral* and *spiritual* sacrifice, to which our Lord's sufferings were

related only as involved in the *fulness* and *perfection* of the inner sacrifice. These sufferings included penitence for our sins, in the *guarded* sense of the phrase.

[After having implied that Christ *repented* of the sins of the race, we do not see why Mr. Campbell need object to the theory that he *was punished* for these sins. The same difficulties are suggested by each form of expression, and the same qualifications are needful for each. The confession and repentance which Mr. Campbell ascribes to Christ correspond to the punishment which the old theologians represent Christ as having endured. Mr. Campbell, however, guards and qualifies his assertion that Christ's sufferings contained "all the elements of a perfect repentance" by adding "all excepting the *personal* consciousness of sin," and by stating that every one who has a living faith in the atonement "will *add* the excepted element" in his own consciousness of his own sin. If the consciousness of a believer be analyzed, it will be found that all the *virtue* of his personal repentance is "an amen to Christ's condemnation of his sin," and has resulted from the fact that the Father has accepted Christ's confession, and has thus revealed his own persuasive love (pp. 397, 398)].

Tenthly. The perfection of the atonement of Christ is, that it satisfies God as a *Father*. Dr. Campbell is especially offended with the method of representing the atonement, as designed to satisfy God merely as the Moral *Governor*, as designed to affect our *legal* relations. He regards this representation as making the atonement too artificial. But God as a *Father* has such an abhorrence of our sin, that he can not save us unless we partake of Christ's filial feeling, unless we have a fellowship with Christ's sufferings, unless we take part in his confession and intercession. The idea of our being blessed by a *parent*, implies that we are his children. "We may say, that without the shedding of the blood of Christ, the Father of spirits could not receive back to the bosom of his love his rebellious children, as well as that without the shedding of the blood of Christ it was morally and

spiritually impossible for them to return" (p. 185). "The Father's heart did demand the shedding of blood in order to the remission of sins, because it demanded blood in which justice would be rendered to the fatherliness which had been sinned against, and which, therefore, would have virtue in it to purge our spirits from their unfilial state, and to purify us in respect of the pollution that attaches to us as rebellious children" (p. 184). Christ "alone could know the exceeding sinfulness of our sins, and feel regarding them in that mind, the fellowship of which would be to us our purgation from them" (p. 184). Had there been only one creature in the universe, and he a sinner, the fatherliness of God could not have forgiven that solitary transgressor unless the unfilial spirit should turn, and become a *son* by participating in the sonship of Christ. "No man cometh to the Father but by the Son." This is a necessity in the nature of things. There is nothing arbitrary in the requisition that Christ should die for us. His blood cleanseth us from sin as a moral pollution, and therefore, being purified, we shall be saved. The requisition for an atonement is not made by the mere justice of God. It is made by the entire goodness, by the benevolence, by the mercy, by the fatherliness, of Jehovah. "One has said: 'It is a profitable, sweet necessity to be forced on the naked arm of Jehovah'" (p. 190). The Moral Governor can not be satisfied, unless the Father be satisfied; and the Father cannot be satisfied, unless the Moral Governor be satisfied. "When the just suffered for the unjust, it was with the direct purpose of bringing the unjust to God, that is, bringing the unjust to the obedience of the just, *leaving the connection between suffering and injustice or sin, undissolved*, the righteousness of that connection being unchanged" (p. 208).

Eleventhly. Dr. Campbell's views of the atonement may be illustrated by his views of justification. He *seems* to regard this as resting on the *ground* of our own holiness, viewed as a participation in the holiness of Christ. He opposes all such distinctions between justification and sanctification as connect the former "with a demand in the mind of our Judge which

may be met in an arbitrary way, as by imputation or imagined transferred fruits of righteousness, while sanctification is recognized as having its necessity in the truth of things, [because] without holiness no man shall see God: as if righteousness in man had no such relation to righteousness in God, as holiness in man has to holiness in God." He objects "to the supposed necessity for God's imputing *righteousness*, that he may see us as *perfectly* righteous," while there is no recognized necessity for his seeing us *perfectly* holy, or *perfectly* wise. It mars the simplicity of the filial spirit for the child to say: "I would cry to my Father,—I see his heart towards me, the Son reveals it,—but I must remember that, to be justified in drawing near with confidence, I must think of myself as clothed by imputation with a perfect righteousness, because the Father of my spirit must see me as so clothed, in order that he may be justified in receiving me to his fatherly heart" (pp. 219, 220).

There is nothing scenic, nothing of a legal or a moral fiction in the doctrine of justification by faith. "Faith is the right attitude of the human spirit toward God—the due response of his revelation of himself to us, in rendering which our hearts are right towards God" (p. 390). Faith in the atonement is, therefore, the due response of the soul to the truths involved in the atonement. The Father has expressed in the law his mind and heart in relation to men; the Son in the atonement has expressed his amen to all which the Father has uttered, has confessed the sinfulness which the Father had charged upon men; our justifying faith is our response to all which the Son has thus expressed; it is "our true amen to that high amen" which Christ has uttered; it is "in truth the amen of our individual spirits to that deep, multiform, all embracing amen of humanity in the person of the Son of God, to the mind and heart of the Father in relation to man—the divine wrath and the divine mercy, which is the atonement. This amen of the individual, in which faith utters itself towards God, gives glory to God according to the glory which he has in Christ, therefore does faith justify" (p. 224).

Professor Crawford, in his Treatise on the Atonement, while opposing the theory of Dr. Campbell, has illustrated it by the following quotation from "The Philosophy of Evangelicism" (pp. 133-140, 232, 233. See Prof. Crawford, pp. 315, 316):

"Now, if there be, in holy beings, this painful consciousness of others' sins, may there not be, in penitent minds, a corresponding pleasurable consciousness of another's perfect righteousness? If Christ can, by means of this general bond of sympathy and common consciousness of humanity, become conscious of human guilt, and suffer and atone for it, what is to prevent us from becoming, in the same way, conscious of his perfect righteousness, and being thereby subjectively justified? . . . The righteousness we speak of is not a righteousness nominally only and artificially imputed. The imputation is real — real, because it has its foundation in our moral constitution, whereby we are made capable of becoming affected in our conscience and moral feelings with the wickedness and righteousness of others, as well as with our own. We arrive, then, at the following conclusion: Christ 'became sin for us,' in the sense we have before described — that is, he, as a man with men, sympathetically entered, on the principle of mankind's corporate responsibility, into the race's guilty consciousness, and yielded in the spirit of penitent submissiveness to the privations and sufferings attendant on a state of guilt, crowned with life's last calamity — death — emphatically 'the wages of sin.' And, as a correlative of Christ's atoning act, we are 'made the righteousness of God in him' — not merely made in ourselves contrite and imperfectly righteous, but invested with the consciousness of his perfect meritorious righteousness. To complete the correlation, he, having 'risen again for our justification' (inasmuch as otherwise our sympathy with the Christ-consciousness could have embraced only the atoning purpose), our sympathy with a risen and living Christ enables us to participate in the triumphant emotion with which he 'sees of the travail of his soul and is satisfied,' and to 'rejoice in hope of the glory of God.' Thus a clear avenue is opened between the Christ consciousness and the human consciousness, and we detect in their intercommunion the accord of the atoning act and the believing act. Our Saviour, conscious of our sins, has taken them upon himself and atoned for them; we, conscious of his righteousness, appear with it in the sight of God and are justified. Our sins are his sins; his righteousness is our righteousness; and this union of Christ and his people in moral consciousness is THE CENTRAL IDEA OF THE GOSPEL."

"Human nature is so constituted as to *implicate* us not only in our own personal moral acts, but also in the moral acts of each other; and, in consequence thereof, conscience in its higher exercises extends beyond the sphere of our individual conduct, and is sympathetically affected by the

conduct of others; filling us with shame and grief at the moral degradation of those we love, and inspiring us with a joyous satisfaction when they are seen to excel in virtue. The extension of these feelings to their utmost degree unfolds the true theory of the sufferings of Christ for our guilt, and of our participation in his perfect righteousness. By virtue of our *union with him in moral consciousness*, he has endured the anguish for sin with which we *ought* to have been affected; and as the counterpart thereof, our consciousness of his righteousness becomes to us, although still consciously ungodly, the counterpoise whereby we are at the same time subjectively justified."

Twelfthly. Dr. Campbell's exposition of the nature of the atonement is illustrated by his comparison of it with the views of other men. It is, of course, antagonistic to the theory of Martin Luther. He quotes the Reformer's words (p. 36): "Because in the self-same person [Christ] who is the highest, the greatest, and the only sinner, there is also an everlasting and invincible righteousness; therefore these two do encounter together: the highest, the greatest and the only sin; and the highest, the greatest and the only righteousness." He regards Luther as teaching that the atonement consisted in Christ's becoming a sinner for us; that is, taking our transgressions upon himself, not by a legal fiction but in reality; not in his being merely treated as a sinner, but in his being really a sinner while at the same time he was perfectly righteous; his sin being literally assumed from us, his righteousness being his own personal attribute. But while dissenting from Luther's exposition, Dr. Campbell regards the Reformer as holding the fundamental truth underneath a picturesque and extravagant phraseology, and indeed as approximating nearer to the biblical standard, and nearer to Dr. Campbell's own theory, than any of the ancient or the modern Calvinists have approached them.

Dr. Campbell is particularly decisive in his condemnation of that form of Calvinism which he ascribes to Dr. Owen and President Edwards. "It seems to me," he says, "that it would have been well" if these divines had followed Luther's example and his rule, and "had used the *life* of Christ more as their *light*." "I feel as if the recorded work of Christ were contemplated in their system in the light of [their]

reasoning; rather than that reasoning engaged in after the due study of the life of Christ" (pp. 52, 53). Their reasonings exalted the justice of God, but depressed his love. They represented his justice as exercised toward all men; his grace only toward the elect. They regarded all the pains of Christ as the legal punishment of the elect, and all his virtue as the real holiness of the elect; in one sense, therefore, the elect are received into heaven "by simple justice." Still, the *origin* of the plan by which they are blessed, is in the grace of God; and therefore grace underlies this scheme of simple justice. Dr. Owen is quoted (p. 55) as affirming: The satisfaction of Christ "was a full, valuable compensation made to the justice of God for all the sins of all those for whom he made satisfaction, by undergoing that same punishment which, by reason of the obligation that was upon them, they themselves were bound to undergo. When I say the same, I mean essentially the same in weight and pressure, though not in all accidents of duration and the like." It is a logical consequence from this theory of the nature of the atonement, that Christ died for the elect only. But "*that cannot be the true conception of the nature of the atonement, which implies that Christ died only for an election from among men*" (p. 58). On this scheme, the atonement is not a revelation of the whole character of God. If it be consistent with, it is not an exhibition of, the truth that God is love. He may be reconciled to it as an arbitrary act, for which there are good reasons altogether undiscoverable by us; but such an act "can never, by any light on it, make the character of him, whose act it is, known to us" (p. 63). The glory of the atonement is, however, that it discloses the whole character of Jehovah, his mercy and grace to all men, as well as his justice.

Dr. Campbell goes so far in opposition to Dr. Owen's theory of limited atonement, as to reason in the following not exactly reverential spirit: "Is it fair to ask men to put their trust in that God of whom we cannot tell them whether he loves them or does not? in that Saviour of whom we

cannot tell them whether he died for them or did not? And when they find their difficulties so treated by those who not only are, as it will naturally appear to them, reconciled to an unconditioned election by having come to believe that that election has included themselves, but who have this strong inducement to limit the atonement, that they believe that to assert that Christ died for all men, is, in effect, to assert that he died for no man in the sense in which his death for themselves is their hope towards God, — is it strange that some degree of irritation, and even indignation, should be manifested? May not the appearance of such a special interest in limiting the atonement excusably recall the words: 'A bribe blinds the eyes of a judge'" (pp. 64, 65).

While retaining his opposition to the old Calvinism, as held by Owen and Edwards, our author makes various exceptions in favor of the American divine. He admits that Edwards indulges in "strong" and "startling" expressions with regard to "the revenges of divine justice" endured by our Saviour; but affirms that when Edwards "explains himself," he resolves all these punitive revenges into Christ's "vivid perception and realization of the hurtfulness of sin, and of the greatness of the wrath to which it has exposed sinners." "It is indeed, a great relief, to see this great and good man [Edwards] while dealing so much in the language of what seems legal fiction in that high region in which fiction can have no place, when he comes to explain the facts of Christ's actual experience, as they were conceived of by him, saying nothing that implied, either that God looked on Christ in wrath, or that Christ felt as if he did" (p. 86). Dr. Campbell represents the theory of President Edwards thus: "Christ being infinitely holy, God was able to cause him to feel the awful weight of the sins of the elect by revealing their sins to him in the spirit — so bringing him under a weight and pressure of these sins to be measured by his holiness, — thus God laid the sins of the elect on Christ. And again, Christ loving the elect with a perfect love, God was able, by bearing in upon Christ's spirit the perfect real-

ization of what these objects of his love were exposed to suffer, to make through his love to them, their conceived-of suffering, real, infinite suffering to him" (p. 115). Dr. Campbell says that it seems impossible to contemplate this "agony of holiness and love in the realization of the evil of sin and of the misery of sinners as penal suffering. Let my reader endeavor to realize the thought: The *sufferer* [Christ] *suffers* what he suffers *just through seeing sin and sinners with God's eyes, and feeling in reference to them with God's heart*. Is *such* suffering a *punishment*? Is God, in causing such a divine experience in humanity, inflicting a punishment? There can be but one answer" (p. 116).

But our author is particularly jubilant over what he regards as an admission by President Edwards, that a certain degree of repentance for sin might be sufficient to free the sinner from punishment. We frequently find such references as the following to our American divine: "In contending 'that sin must be punished with an infinite punishment,' President Edwards says (Satisfaction for Sin, Ch. II. 1-3) that 'God could not be just to himself without this vindication, unless there could be such a thing as a repentance, humiliation, and sorrow for this [viz. sin], proportionable to the greatness of the majesty despised,'—for that there must needs be 'either an equivalent punishment, or an equivalent sorrow and repentance'—'so,' he proceeds, 'sin must be punished with an infinite punishment,' thus assuming that the equivalent sorrow and repentance was out of the question" (p. 136). Dr. Campbell contends that Christ *has* exercised the equivalent sorrow and repentance, and therefore, on the principle of President Edwards, sinners may be received into heaven without any punishment inflicted on themselves or their substitute.¹

¹ It is interesting to notice the manner in which the writings of President Edwards have planted the germs of thought in thinkers who have differed from him radically. Dr. Campbell says in a Note (pp. 398, 399, 400): "It is about forty years since the moral and spiritual nature of the atonement first dawned on my mind"; not a *physical*, but "a moral and spiritual atonement, and which was such in itself, not simply accepted as such because of the moral excellence

Besides the objection that the old Calvinistic view of the nature of the atonement makes it necessary to believe that Christ died for the elect only, Dr. Campbell urges the objection that this view substitutes a *legal* standing for a *filial* standing of the elect before God. They have obeyed all the legal commands in Christ; they have endured their eternal punishment in Christ; they stand legally perfect before their Judge. But the Bible does not represent the elect as having this *legal* right to the promises. It emphatically declares: "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, *that we might receive the adoption of sons*" (Gal. iv. 4, 5).

And again, the old Calvinistic view of the atonement, according to Dr. Campbell, overlooks the fact that we are to have a fellowship in Christ's pains; that we shall "be baptized with the baptism" that he is baptized with; that we shall "suffer with him," in order to reign with him. But if these sufferings of Christ be our punishment, then we must, in order to be saved, share in our own punishment. "Were we to see one professing trust in Christ suffering with this consciousness, we should feel that he was therein denying Christ, and making his death for sin of none effect." (p. 322). "For this character can only belong to an atonement whose nature admits of its reproduction in us, so that its elements become matter of consciousness to ourselves" (p. 333).

While, however, our author opposes the theory of Luther, and also that of Owen, in regard to the atonement, he is not at all satisfied with the theory of Dr. John Pye Smith, Dr. Payne, Dr. Jenkyn, and Dr. Wardlaw. "I name these writers only," he says, in enumerating the advocates

manifested in Christ in making it." In my study on the theme "the words of President Edwards 'either an equivalent punishment, or an equivalent sorrow and repentance' suggested to me that that earnest and deep thinker had really been on the verge of that conception of a moral and spiritual atonement which was occupying my own thoughts. Hence the use I have made of the thought of the alternative of repentance as it passed before the mind of Edwards," etc.

of the "modified Calvinism," "while I am aware that there are others, because my knowledge of the system is derived from them" (p. 49). "The teachers of this modified Calvinism have seemed to themselves to have found a solution of the difficulty in their conception of rectoral or public justice as what called for an atonement for sin. But, surely, rectoral or public justice, if it is to have any moral basis — any basis other than expedience — must rest upon and refer to distributive or absolute justice. In other words, unless there be a rightness in connecting sin with misery, and righteousness with blessedness, looking at individual cases simply in themselves, I cannot see that there is a rightness in connecting them as a rule of moral government. 'An English judge once said to a criminal before him, "You are condemned to be transported, not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen"' (Jenkyn, 175, 176). This is quoted in illustration of the position that 'the death of Christ is an honorable ground for remitting punishment,' because 'his sufferings answer the same ends as the punishment of the sinner.' I do not recognize any harmony between this sentiment of the English judge and the voice of an awakened conscience on the subject of sin. It is just because he has sinned and deserved punishment, and not because he says to himself that God is a moral Governor, and must punish him to deter others, that the wrath of God against sin seems so terrible — and as just as terrible" (p. 79).

The radical objection, however, which Dr. Campbell feels to the "modified Calvinism" of John Pye Smith, Jenkyn, Wardlaw, and Payne is, that it insists on the "*legal* obstacle" to the sinner's pardon, and on the necessity of an atonement as a provision for surmounting this governmental impediment. It thus involves "the *substance* of the doctrine" which distinguishes the old Calvinism. He acknowledges that the new form is freed from the absurdity of supposing a real oneness of the elect with their Redeemer, and from the "legal fiction" of imputing to moral agents what does not

really belong to them; but he complains of it as making the atonement consist in the agonies of Christ, which were rendered equivalent to our eternal punishment by their being the agonies of a man exalted into a union with God. He objects to this theory as containing the same fundamental error with that of supposing that the divinity of Christ gave him strength to endure an infinite penal suffering.

He insists that the "modified Calvinism" is as really inconsistent as the old form with the doctrine of a general atonement; for he says, if the sufferings of Christ "were penal,¹ then that those for whom he suffered should be punished themselves must still suggest the idea sought to be avoided, of sin twice punished" (p. 80).

¹ Dr. Campbell is correct in asserting that some advocates of the "modified Calvinism" do apply the epithet, penal, to the sufferings of Christ. But many do not so apply it; and those who retain the term, use it in a qualified and not in the literal sense. It is somewhat remarkable that the only books which are quoted in the entire volume of Dr. Campbell are Luther's Commentary on Galatians, Owen's Works, the Works of the elder President Edwards, Dr. John Pye Smith's Four Discourses on the Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ, Dr. George Payne's Lectures on Divine Sovereignty," etc.; Jenkyn and Wardlaw on the Atonement, Dr. Stroud on the Physical Cause of the Sufferings of Christ, Chalmer's Institutes, and Thomson on the Atoning Work of Christ. No American work on the subject seems to have been read by him at the time of writing his volume. He afterwards read and admired the treatise of Dr. Bushnell.

ARTICLE IX

CULMANN'S CHRISTIAN ETHICS.¹

BY PROF. JOHN P. LACROIX, DELAWARE, OHIO.

This work has been before the German public some time. But it deserves the attention of American scholars also, partly because of its unquestionable excellences, and partly because of the ability with which it advocates certain extravagant theosophic views. In spirit it is reverent and evangelical. But it blames all precedent works on ethics with stopping at half-ways; and it assumes to possess the key to higher constructions of Christianity than are found in ordinary orthodoxy. In a word, it claims to be more orthodox than the orthodox themselves.

The author was a speculative theosoph of the school of Schelling as transformed by the evangelical thinking of Baader and Schaden. Though a faithful pastor, he was more a theologian than a preacher. Of his chief work, *Ethics*, he completed only the first volume. The second, which is posthumous, is but an outline, and is supplemented by five very able theological essays. Dr. Culmann died as Protestant pastor at Spires, October, 1863, at the early age of thirty-eight. His name is still fragrant in the memory of his flock and of his colleagues. One of the latter prefaces the posthumous volume with a beautiful appreciation of his character, showing, among other things, how that, with every added day of his life, he rose to a more deeply-rooted and a more joyous conviction that in Christ lie hidden all the choicest treasures of wisdom.

The spirit and characteristics of Culmann's ethics may be pretty fairly judged of from the following uninterrupted presentation of his chief positions:

Christian ethics is based on the inter-relations of God and man. These relations are generally conceived of too outwardly, after the analogy of a human parent to his son, or of an educator to his pupil. This view of these relations is only rationalistico-theistic, but it is far higher than the pantheistic. In Schleiermacher's pantheistic theology God has not even so much objectivity as an educator to a pupil; instead of a living God we have here only the human God-consciousness from which to construct religion. The inter-relation of God and man is much deeper. The scriptures imply this by designating it as a *bridal* relation, and by calling us members of Christ's body, and branches upon the vine, Christ. Here the

¹ Die Christliche Ethik von Ph. Theodor Culmann. 2 Bände. Stuttgart Vol. XXX. No. 118.

love is no longer a matter of mere consciousness, but it rises to a reciprocal *essence-interchange*. It is not Platonic but marital. Man does not here love God merely from a dread distance; but God enters into him with his own divine essence. The bond of communion is kept up on the part of God, not merely by revelations in word, idea, and example, but by an impartation of the divine essence to man. It is a *vinculum substantiale* of two organically inter-connected existences. This view alone expresses the full objective sense of the scriptures. Though extant in contemporary dogmatics, its scientific establishment is a task of the future.

Man being made for such a relation, it is the task of ethics to show how he is to remain in it when already there, as in the case of Adam, and what is the goal to be reached. In respect to fallen man, its task is the same, with the addition of showing how the broken relation is to be re-established by repentance and faith. It is also to show that man's capability for appropriating the divine essence lies in his innate God-likeness. This God-likeness is much more than mere personal consciousness and freedom. God, the other factor of the relation, is to be conceived of as imparting his substantiality to man. And then are to be shown what changes are hereby wrought in man, and how he is thus brought to his God-set goal. Any system of ethics, therefore, which claims to be more than merely rationalistico-theistic must (1) show man to be more than a mere free, conscious ego, (2) utilize the central idea of a divine essence-impartation to man, and (3) describe this divine essence, and show how its organic union with the individual is affected by appropriation.

But to enter into details. God may be related to man in three ascending stages, (1) as permeating man, (2) as by-dwelling with man, (3) as indwelling in man. It is at the third stage only that the central relation of essence-impartation between God and man takes place. At the lowest stage, God is as external to man as a tree or an animal. But man is called to seek after God, if haply he may find him. If he does truly seek him, then God may exist in him in a specifically higher manner than hitherto. At first he knows God, ideally, as permeating his thoughts; he now knows God as everywhere meeting and helping him, as dwelling with him. If he remains faithful here, he will then rise to the full indwelling of God in him, that is, to an essence-communion with God. Then is verified the word of John: "He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him." This is a specifically higher indwelling of God in man and of man in God than the natural indwelling, as expressed in the words: "In him we live and move and have our being." To illustrate: A man may dive under the water and live and move there a longer or shorter while; the water surrounds and encloses him. But he does not live in the water in as high a degree as the fish, which can disport itself in it as in its own life-element. God's substantial being is man's life-element.

The prevalent ethical view, that happiness, bliss, joy, spring from a felt

harmony of our being with God and the universe, is far from adequate. Bliss arises solely where the Spirit of God streams *realiter* over into man as a divine gift, and thus awakens enthusiasm. It is only when enthusiasm enters that real joy results, as was illustrated at Pentecost. Here alone are delight and blessedness, and that *raptus* of divine love which joins the enraptured one with the Enrapturer, and constantly heightens and intensifies the union, thus accomplishing that essence-interchange which alone deserves to be called love. Ordinary rationalistico-theistic ethics is thus far below the truth in making love spring from a felt harmony of subject and object. This harmony is more than ideal. To illustrate: The drinker feels himself in harmony with the wine when he sees it before him, but in a still higher degree when he drinks it, and in a yet higher degree still when he feels its exhilarating effects; for here only does the wine really dwell in him. So in the relation of God to man. It is only when the divine substantiality *realiter* indwells in man that the joy of real love springs up.

The more prevalent ethical view of the body, that it is merely an organ of the spirit, is utterly defective. The body is not only the organ of the spirit, but also its *nourishing substantial basis*, from which it feeds itself, as the light from the oil.¹ For every spirit, says Böhme, eats of its mother (*mater, materia*). This view gives the body a real essence-communion with the spirit, and thus makes the relation much deeper. The body is not a mere instrument of the spirit; it is *essential* to the spirit. In fact the spirit cannot exist at all without a corporeality. Hence the necessity of its perpetuated existence. The spirit can be immortal only in that it either retains its present corporeal substratum, or receives another in its stead. That the latter takes place, every Christian knows very well, seeing that by baptism and the eucharist and by the faith-life which follows them, he is incorporated into the church, the mystical body of the Resuscitated. When his present body falls away in death, then he straightway stands as a blooming branch on the vine, Christ, and obtains here a full compensation. But if any one neglects his opportunity and does not lay hold upon the corporeality of Christ, then when his present body is, as it were, snatched from beneath his feet by death, his spirit plunges at once into the abyss and finds here, in the lake of fire and

¹ Materialists will applaud this sentiment with both hands, and say that it is precisely what they teach, save that they are consequent in going on to the farther inference that when the body falls away, then the soul also ceases to be. And in fact this would be the case were it not that there is both a heavenly and a hellish corporeality, beyond the present one. The former was realized once and for all by Christ at his resurrection, and may be appropriated by whosoever will; the latter is the lake of fire. Every soul, on throwing off its flesh-body, finds itself with inner necessity forthwith clothed upon with one or the other of these hypercarnate corporealities.

brimstone, the corporeality suited to its nature. This view alone accounts for the necessity of the holy eucharist. For if the body is merely an organ for the communication of the spirit with the outer world, why need we to partake of the body and blood of the Resuscitated, and thereby appropriate to ourselves a transfigured corporeality, seeing that we have no need of such a body for this as yet untransfigured world? But if the body is not a mere instrument, but that above-mentioned *plus*, then follows as a natural sequence that, for the regenerated spirit-life of the Christian, there must be prepared also as its nourishing basis, the corresponding death-proof corporeality of the Resuscitated.

Ordinary ethics is also erroneous in treating of men as normally and originally existing in the two sexes and in diverse nationalities. The fact is Adam did not come into existence in a child-state, but as a matured and perfected creature. This alone was to be his normal condition. The original plan did not contemplate the creation of woman. Eve was created only in anticipation of the fact that sin was about to enter the world. It was simply in view of the impending fall into sin, that it was "not good" for the man to be alone. And national diversities are due to the criminal *attentat* at Babel.

Ordinary ethics is too indefinite as to the nature of the perfection which is the goal of the moral life. This perfection is no other than the above-mentioned realistic organic union of the person with the substantiality of God. At Pentecost God stood no longer as the mere lawgiver of Sinai, nor as the mere teacher of the Mount, but as in fact ready to pour out the realistic essence-fulness of his Spirit into the disciples. He caused, — to make use of a pregnant expression — the imponderable *fluidum* of his Spirit to stream over into the disciples, — which was something unspeakably higher than all his precedent revelations in word, law, idea, and moral example. With this climax-act he reached at last that to which everything precedent had pointed. In the eucharist he set the disciples into organic bodily communion with himself, and then on the basis of this somatic union, raised them at Pentecost into spiritual communion, so that they constituted now not merely one body, but also one spirit with the Lord.

The usual ethical view of the central moral motive is neither clear nor adequate. A thorough analysis of man as the divine image, shows that man is made *to live in God*, with as obvious a necessity as the structure of a fish shows that it is made to live in the water, and that, in the structure of this God-likeness, he has the impelling force, the motive, to this life in God. The motive to the moral is, consequently, not merely an indefinite consciousness of a lack, but a definite consciousness of a need, of realistic union with God.

The common ethical view conceives of man's dominion over nature very crudely. A higher Christian philosophy teaches that previously to the

creation of man — either before or during the six creative days — there took place the fall of Satan, and consequently that man entered into life *le lendemain d'une bataille* (on the heels of a catastrophe) as St. Martin says; and furthermore that, though the world at its creation was good, yet it was not complete and perfected, and that man's dominating over nature involved the colossal task of transforming this crude natural cosmos into a transfigured spiritual cosmos.

In regard to the moral goal, it is the task of true ethics to show, (1) that the effect of the overflowing of the divine substantiality into man, is to fill him with all joy and bliss, and to initiate him into a knowledge of the thoughts and plans of God long before they are objectively realized, so that he becomes in fact a *prophet* in the fullest sense of the word; (2) that the realistic presence of God in man and the progressive transformation of the human into the divine eventuates in an inner freedom and boundlessness of power in man, so that he becomes not merely figuratively but truly a *king*; and (3) that this presence of God in man is founded and intensified solely in virtue of the constantly renewed renunciation and sacrifice of the selfhood of the creature to God, and hence is conditioned upon the central act of all *priesthood*.

The traditional treatment of virtue is far from clear. Virtue in its most general sense is a preparedness for something. God wills that certain things be realized by his creatures. Man's inborn and acquired preparedness for this work, is his virtue. But as God is an inexhaustibly fresh-flowing spring of thoughts and purposes, hence he has capacitated his creatures for a correspondingly variable manner of obedience. The usually-given virtues do not exhaust the whole of man's capability. It would therefore be better for ethics to develop with all possible fulness the one central virtue-principle — active, loving co-operation with the divine will — and let the anatomizing of it into a greater or smaller number of particular virtues fall into the background.

The prevalent ethical view of sin is far from adequate. Sin is not simply a formal disobedience, but also the eating of a forbidden fruit. The eating of this wisely prohibited substance laid the ground for a satanic by-dwelling with man. But this by-dwelling is by no means as yet an indwelling. Hence the redeemableness of man. Man is able to resist the development of the implanted satanic principle, though he cannot himself eliminate it from his nature. He may yield to its sway, and thus let the satanic by-dwelling become an indwelling, so that he ends in being at one with the devil. But if he resist the implanted evil and lay hold on proffered redemption, he will then rise to oneness with God. As by the eating of a satanic substance a satanic enthusiasm was generated, so by the eating of the divine substance of the *corpus Christi*, is generated a divine enthusiasm. Herein lies the significance of the eucharist.

The ethical view of the fall into sin needs careful revision. This fall

was not merely a perversion of the will, but also an ungodly in-birth of man into the present order of things. This condition can be reversed only by what the scriptures call a re-birth. This re-birth commences in a divine spirit-impartation. This spirit-impartation is not final, but is to be followed by ever renewed higher impartations. This spirit is not a merely qualitative magnitude that needs only, as a germ, to be developed, but also a quantitative one, which may be communicated in different degrees. The significance of this thought for ethics is very great. The usual view locates the chief event, regeneration, at the very beginning of the new life, and gives it too much the character of a finality, thus depriving the subsequent life of its greatest stimulus to growth — the faith-hunger for fresh impartations of the Spirit. The ultimate goal is actually reached when man by successive receptions of the divine principle is so transformed that the Spirit which at first merely breathed in him as an impulse, now dwells in him as a second personality, making him into an oracle of God and a brother of the holy prophets. Here man becomes a "possessed" of the Holy Ghost, as at the opposite pole of development he becomes a "possessed" of the devil.

Such is a brief and rather bluntly put synopsis of the chief points at which Dr. Culmann's work takes issue with the more generally prevalent positions in Christian ethics. Their bare statement will be to most readers their sufficient conviction of unsoundness and crudity. But so hasty a conclusion would do the work real injustice. In the ethereal atmosphere of theosophy, ordinary distinctions become wavering, and the commonest words acquire an elasticity of meaning which renders their measurement by ordinary notions very unsatisfactory, if not unsafe. Not unfrequently we here find that in overthrowing what seems to us a palpable absurdity, we have simply overthrown a straw-man of our own constructing. Our author did not mean it in such a sense. The absurdity was not so much in the position itself as in our hasty understanding of it. This is especially the case with the work of Dr. Culmann. It needs to be studied as a whole, before finally sentenced. And in this case no one will regret the pains taken. For whatever be its fundamental errors, it is admitted on all hands to abound in brilliant speculations, and to be redolent of a very earnest Christian mysticism.

ARTICLE X.

STRAUSS'S SUPERFICIALITY.¹

BY JOSEPH COOK, M.A., BERLIN, GERMANY.

IN this interesting but weak book, which has importance chiefly as a summary of its predecessors by the same author, Strauss, who is now sixty-four years of age, subjects the results of his life to the crucial, but undeniably fatal, test of an attempt to exhibit as one harmonious system his views not only of theology, but of science, art, literature, and politics as well.

Admitting (pp. 5, 7, 179) that his Mythical Theory, put forth when he was a young man, and now for twenty years marked as juvenile by the best scholarship of Germany, has not had force enough to drive from the world the belief in the supernatural, he adopts here, as hopeful instruments to the same end, the new weapons of physiology, the nebular hypothesis, and Darwinism. Upon all these he lays an emphasis that is eager to the degree of being incautious. Although he adopts Darwinism with a few reservations, he expresses an unqualified confidence that if this system ultimately proves to be correct, belief in the supernatural will become impossible: an opinion precisely the opposite of Mr. Darwin's. Even Mr. Tyndall maintains that if a right-hand spiral movement of the particles of the brain could be proved to produce love, and a left-hand spiral movement hate, we should still be as far as ever from knowing the causes of the movements themselves; while profounder minds, like Sir John Herschell, W. B. Carpenter, and Professor Agassiz, accustomed to clear definitions, understand by the vague phrase "natural law," nothing other than the omnipresent fixed method of action of the divine will, so that no matter by what process of natural development man and the universe may have been produced, there remain, according to these naturalists themselves, and as theology has for centuries taught, two undeniable instances of mind acting upon matter in the universe, namely, the beginning and the continuance of that process. Strauss' discussions, however, greatly lack clearness in definitions; indeed, his definition of a myth has been subjected to most important modifications between the edition of his principal work published in 1835, and the form in which his theory appeared in 1864, and now reappears in 1872.

¹ Der Alte und der neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntniss von David Friedrich Strauss. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig. 1872.

That there are higher and lower natural laws; that, on all sides, as in the power of the vital principle over chemical affinities, or of the human will over gravitation, we find examples of the subordination of the lower to the higher; that a miracle may be only the exhibition of the power of a higher over a lower law, and that the supernatural, therefore, is not necessarily the unnatural, were positions familiar in the theology of Schleiermacher, and even in the philosophy of Hegel, before Strauss began his historical criticism; but of which, to judge by the constant misrepresentation of the doctrine of miracles which abounds in this last book by Strauss as well as in his first, the author has not yet heard, although Schleiermacher and Hegel were once his teachers. Demanding, as always heretofore, a criticism of Christianity which shall be free from presuppositions, Strauss here, as always heretofore, himself writes with the determined presupposition that the supernatural is the unnatural, the impossible, and therefore the unhistorical. On account of this presupposition, and for no other reason which the most careful reader can discover, must the first three Gospels as well as the fourth, be regarded as by no means productions of the date to which scholarship assigns them, nor, indeed, of eye-witnesses at all. Accounts of miracles have been interpolated in them by the mythical process, and by the partisan needs of the Pauline and the Petrine factions. German criticism and the discovery of manuscripts, have within the last fifty years carried back the earliest undeniable date of the New Testament literature, thirty years, and narrowed by so much the previously too narrow room for the time which Strauss requires for his myths to grow up in; but of this new aspect of the case he takes no notice.

As specimens of the curiously unsound or unfair statements to which Strauss commits himself, and which prove that this, his latest and perhaps ripest book, is by no means true to the scientific method, one may instance the propositions:

1. That the Bible is untrustworthy because it teaches that the sun was created on the fourth day of creation, while night and day had previously existed (pp. 17, 18).

2. That Christianity is undeniably an institution in defence of poverty and beggary, and that the begging monks of the Middle Ages, as well as the begging system now adopted at Rome, are "genuine Christian institutions" (p. 63).

3. That the Gospels "do not contain a word for the peaceful political virtues, for love of country, and worthiness as a citizen" (p. 65).

4. That the household and family virtues have no sufficient teaching in the example or doctrine of Christ (p. 65).

5. That the New Testament, which represents Dives as "sure of hell, only on account of the fact that he fared sumptuously every day, without our learning anything else wrong of him," denies that there can be a right personal use of wealth and is opposed to the industrial virtues (pp. 62-64).

6. That, by these peculiarities, Christianity becomes "a principle at enmity with culture" (p. 64).

7. That the ideas of brotherly love and philanthropy owe more to the philosophy of infidelity than to Christianity (p. 85).

8. That the Christian doctrine of heaven and hell is so connected with the idea of a place for each, that modern astronomy has destroyed the possibility of maintaining the one doctrine or the other (pp. 132-134).

9. That "the continued existence of the soul without its bodily organ is inconceivable" (p. 132).

10. That divorce should be made far easier than the Christian sentiment of the world at present permits (pp. 255, 256).

11. That in respect to the relations of the sexes Jesus and Paul held extravagantly ascetic notions (pp. 252, 253, 256).

12. That the Founder of Christianity teaches that whoever looks on a woman to lust after her has committed adultery in his heart, and that, if this is so, every marriage that is not one merely of convenience or reason is preceded by sensuality. (p. 253. "Jesus aber lehrte in der Bergrede, wer ein weib ansehe, ihrer zu begehren, habe schon mit ihr die Ehe gebrochen in seinem Herzen. Wenn dieses richtig ist, so geht jeder Ehe, die nicht Convenienz- oder sogenannte Vernunfttheirath ist, innerliche Unzucht voran. Was haben wir an einem Spruche, der, ohne an der Natureinrichtung, gegen die er anläuft, das mindeste ändern zu können, ein mit ihr gegebenes Gebiet menschlicher Empfindungen brandmarkt?")

Germany has suffered so much from the contagion of French coarseness; the court morals of her petty states and uneducated nobility, imitated from the pattern of Paris and Versailles, have received since the war of liberation from Napoleon the First, so many terrible political and social rebukes from the sound portion of the nation, that when materialism, as here in Strauss, exhibits leprosy, the shudder of even continental tastes, which the results at Sedan have done something to correct, is perceptible. Although Strauss would make music, art, and poetry the only substitute for the church (pp. 298-300), one doubts, as the eye falls upon such amazing passages as those just cited, whether such a person as Aurora Leigh or Evangeline, or Mrs. Browning's Sir Walter's wife would be intelligible to him. In spite, however, of Strauss' own experience of speedy separation from the actress to whom he was married in 1840, it must by no means be supposed that his general tone of soul is low enough to meet the demands of those who consider Voltaire's personal character admirable, and who, from this German, would meet only moral rebuke. In contrast with recent French theological sceptics, Strauss has a considerable degree of religious and aesthetic culture, the want of which has in the last century destroyed the value of so much sceptical German criticism, although not enough, as has just been shown, to make visible to him that moral beauty of the New Testament which Goethe in his maturity used to speak of as

unsurpassable, and as if, in the Weimar court, where French tastes had by no means been expelled from morals, it had just begun to be visible to him. It is too late now, however, even on the continent, for that style of infidelity which the learned German histories classify as *Rationalismus vulgaris*, and describe by the epithet *philisterhaft*, to recover the ground it has lost in the last fifty years. A serious man must rejoice to have Christianity tested philosophically, historically, and in every great way, but not in a certain small, light, and inwardly coarse way, of which the world has had enough, and is tired. Although the moral insight of Strauss's book is superior to the average standard of French scepticism, yet were the volume written with French vivacity instead of with German steadiness of tone, its reasoning would appear, as a whole, quite as weak as that of Renan's imaginative life of Christ, of which no German scholar of position speaks with intellectual respect. As in the astonishingly unfair reasoning just quoted, the reader has a painful sense that the discussion is thoroughly uncritical, so throughout the book, in spite of bright hints here and there, and the transcendent importance of the historical and scientific themes discussed, one may search in vain for a page where the more vital parts of the argument will bear the test of being thrown into the syllogistic form.

Strauss expressly admits in this work that the minority for which he has spoken for forty years is in Germany exceedingly small (pp. 5, 7), and that all attempts to form into organizations those who hold these views, have been failures so perfect as to be ludicrous. (p. 7. "Wir sollten mithin, so scheint es, den alt- und neukirchlichen Vereinen gegenüber einen unkirchlichen, einen rein humanitären und rationellen, gründen. Aber es geschieht nicht, und wo es einige versuchen, machen sie sich lächerlich.")

Among the sound fragments of the book are the doctrines that conscience is the rightful law of the soul, even although there be no immortality or personal God (pp. 142, 146); that the feeling of unconditional dependence upon a higher order of things, is the ground of a religion, although we cannot any longer call ourselves Christians (pp. 141, 94); and that, whether we name this higher order God or the universe, we must seek harmony with it, as revealed by experience and conscience (pp. 142, 146, 374). "We demand," is the express claim of this latest statement of infidelity, "for our universe the same piety as the pious man of the old style demanded for his God." Schopenhauer's Pessimism, even Strauss finds revolting.

ARTICLE XI.

DR. HODGE AND THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

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IT has long been understood that the Princeton theology differs somewhat from the standard orthodox theology of New England. These points of difference appear in the volumes which Dr. Hodge has recently published,¹ and will be carefully noted by New England readers. On some few points, we are sorry to say, the author has misapprehended the views generally prevalent in New England, and (of course without intending it) has misrepresented them. He will be glad to be set right on these points; and a principal object of this Article — which is not intended as a review — will be to expose some of these misrepresentations.

Dr. Hodge speaks of President Edwards, Dr. Hopkins, and Dr. Emmons, as leaders in those explanations which he deems erroneous. But he goes on to say that “for many years their systems of theology had great influence in this country.”² Now, it is true that their systems have a great influence, more especially in New England. Their theology, modified more or less to meet the views of individuals — is what is currently known as the New England theology. In speaking of misrepresentations, therefore, I shall not confine myself to the three great leaders whose names have been given; but shall include with them those, in general, over whom, as Dr. Hodge says, their writings have had “great influence” — those who would be willing to be regarded as Edwardians. I premise this remark, and hope it may be remembered.

1. Dr. Hodge imputes to his New England brethren his own definition of the word “benevolence,” which definition to us appears imperfect and unsatisfactory. “By benevolence,” he says, “is meant the disposition to promote happiness.”³ To this definition he constantly adheres, and assumes that we do the same. And his mistake, in this respect, is the source of much misapprehension as to the views prevalent in New England. We do not limit our idea of benevolence to the simple desire to promote happiness, nor do we see any good reason why he should. According to its etymology, the word signifies a *wishing well* (*bene volo*) to its object; a desire for its *good* — its *highest good*. This is the sense given to the word by lexicographers. In this sense the word is constantly used by the most respectable New England theologians. If the object of benevolence is a

¹ Systematic Theology, Vols. i. and ii. ² Vol. i. p. 433. ³ Vol. i. p. 427.

merely sentient being, it may not look beyond its happiness; because happiness is the only good of which such a being is capable. But if the object is an intelligent being, a moral being, benevolence seeks above all its moral good, its highest good, and not merely its happiness. This, we insist, is the full meaning of the noble word, "benevolence"; and we regret that Dr. Hodge should use it in a lower sense, and especially that he should impute that sense to us, and then charge upon us conclusions, drawn from his restricted sense of the term, which are as abhorrent to our principles as they can be to his own.

2. One of these conclusions is, that we "regard happiness as the greatest good, and hence that the desire to promote happiness is the sum of all virtue." On this ground, he says, "we confound the right with the expedient, and make expediency the ground of moral obligation." "The principle on which this theory is founded," Dr. Hodge goes on to say, "was propounded in a posthumous treatise of President Edwards, in which he taught that virtue consists in the love of being. This principle was adopted and carried out by Drs. Hopkins and Emmons in their systems of theology, which for many years had great influence in this country."¹

How far President Edwards was from holding the sentiments here imputed to him will appear in the following extract from his treatise on the "Nature of Virtue"; the very treatise to which Dr. Hodge refers: "A truly virtuous mind, being under the sovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things seek the glory of God, and makes this his supreme, governing, and ultimate end; consisting in the expression of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifestation of God's glory to created understandings, and the communication of the infinite fulness of God to the creature; in the creature's highest esteem of God, love to him, and joy in him, and in the proper exercise of expression of these. And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting," not in its highest happiness, but "in its knowledge or view of God's glory or beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him. And that temper or disposition of heart—that consent, union, or propensity of mind to being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue truly so called, or in other words, is true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue."

In another Treatise, Edwards not only says, but argues at great length, that "the great and last end of God's works is but one, and this one end is most properly and comprehensively called the glory of God."²

As before remarked, Dr. Hodge was led into the misapprehension above stated as to the sentiments of Edwards and his followers concerning the last end of God, and the chief end of man, by imputing to them a false

¹ See Vol. i. pp. 419, 422, 433; Vol. ii. pp. 144, 157, 580.

² Works (Worcester ed.), Vol. ii. p. 412; Vol. vi. p. 119.

and restricted sense of the word benevolence. We do hold that benevolence, in the full sense of the term, — universal, impartial, disinterested benevolence, — enters into and constitutes the root and basis of all holiness. This is the love which is said to comprise the entire character of the Supreme Being: “God is love.” This is the love which the Scriptures represent as “the bond of perfectness,” “the fulfilling of the law,” and on which “hang all the law and the prophets.” The divine law, in the most summary expression of it, requires nothing but love. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind, and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” The love here spoken of as constituting the essence of all holy obedience must be a spiritual and not a natural affection; and what form of love is it? The love of our neighbor cannot always be the love of gratitude; for this is exercised only towards a benefactor. Neither can it be always the love of complacency; for this is exercised only towards holy beings. We cannot, should not, love complacently a totally sinful being. The love about which we inquire can be no other than love of benevolence — universal, impartial, disinterested — fixing upon God supremely, complacently, as infinitely the greatest and best of beings, and running out impartially towards all other beings, according to perceived worthiness. This is the love with which “God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life.” This is the *ἀγάπη*, the love spoken of by Paul in 1 Cor. xiii., without which all religious pretensions and performances would be vain. “Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of prophecy, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge; and though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing. And though I give all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not love, it profiteth me nothing.”

Believing, as we do, that benevolence enters into and constitutes the essence of all holiness, if we accepted Dr Hodge’s definition of benevolence, we should say — what he insists we do say — that happiness is the greatest good, and the desire of happiness the sum of all virtue. But rejecting his definition, and adopting one as much above it as the heavens are higher than the earth, we avoid his conclusions about expediency and utility — conclusions which we detest as sincerely as himself, and which we have labored all our lives to refute.

3. Dr. Hodge further misrepresents the New England theologians, in charging upon them the belief that “sin, and the present amount of sin, is the necessary means of the greatest good; and that good, in this connection, does not mean moral good, but happiness.”¹ This misapprehen-

¹ Vol. i. p. 433; Vol. ii. 147.

sion, like the last, results from his imputing to us his restricted definition of benevolence. He reasons for us in this wise: "As God is infinitely benevolent, so he governs the world to promote the greatest possible amount of happiness. But a vast amount of sin actually exists and is tolerated under his government. This, therefore, must, in some way, tend to happiness, and is to be regarded as the necessary means of the greatest good."

Now we will not say that no New England theologian ever made use of the expression here imputed to us. But we do say that, to the best of our knowledge, neither President Edwards, nor Dr. Hopkins, nor Dr. Emmons, ever used it. It is not a current phraseology with us. It is not an admissible phraseology. Sin is not a necessary *means* of the greatest happiness, or of the greatest good in any sense. It is not a *means* of good at all. The word "means," is relative. It stands related to some end, and must have a tendency to promote that end; else it is not, in any proper sense of the term, a means. But sin has no tendency to promote the highest good of the universe, or its highest happiness. All its tendencies are in the opposite direction. How then can it be a means of the highest good, or of any good?

New England divines, in general, do say that, in the wonder-working providence and grace of God, he may cause sin to become the *occasion*, in opposition to all its tendencies, of greater glory to himself, and of a greater good to the universe, than would otherwise be possible. And Dr. Hodge says the same. "The Scriptures teach," says he, 1. That the glory of God is the end to which the promotion of holiness, and the production of happiness, and all other ends are subordinate. 2. That, therefore, the self-manifestation of God, the revelation of his infinite perfection, being the highest conceivable or possible good, is the ultimate end of all his works in creation, providence, and redemption. 3. As sentient creatures are necessary for the manifestation of God's benevolence, so there could be no manifestation of his mercy without misery, or of his grace and justice, if there were no sin. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so he has devised the plan of redemption, "to the intent that now, unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known, by the church, the manifold wisdom of God" (Eph. iii. 10). The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is for creatures the highest good. And the promotion of that knowledge, the manifestation of the manifold perfections of the infinite God, is the highest end of all his works. This is declared by the apostle to be the end contemplated, both in the punishment of sinners, and, in the salvation of believers. It is an end to which no man can rationally object. "What if God, willing to show his wrath (or justice), and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory" (Rom. ix.

22, 23). Sin, therefore, according to the Scriptures, is permitted, that the justice of God may be known in its punishment, and his grace in its forgiveness. And the universe, without the knowledge of these attributes, would be like the earth without the light of the sun."¹

Now this is sound, scriptural doctrine. This is just as we hold and teach in New England in reference to the mysterious fact of sin's permitted existence. Redemption we hold to be the noblest and best of all God's works, because it makes the fullest and brightest display of his perfections and glories. His justice shines forth in redemption as it does nowhere else; and without redemption, there could have been no display of those winning, amiable, glorious traits of God's character, — his forbearance, long-suffering, mercy, and grace. But it is obvious that there could have been no redemption, had there been no *sinner*s to be redeemed. Hence we see a reason for the permitted existence of sin, and for its connection with the highest glory of God, without supposing it to be a necessary *means* of the greatest good, or of any good. Creatures in heaven, it is likely, know now a hundred times more of God, and love and enjoy him a hundred times better, than they could have done had there been no redemption, and no sinners to be redeemed.

4. Dr. Hodge represents the New England theologians as denying, in any proper sense of the term, the *justice* of God, — resolving it all into considerations of expediency. "It is on this false principle," he says, "that the governmental theory of the atonement is founded. It admits of no ground of punishment but the benefit of others. If that benefit can be secured, all necessity of punishment ceases, and all objection to the dispensing of pardon is removed. If the fundamental principle of a theory be false, the theory itself must be unsound."² Now it may relieve Dr. Hodge to know that we do believe in such a thing as *justice*, — justice commutative, distributive, and general; justice in the abstract, and justice as an attribute of personal character. We believe the justice of God to be one of his most essential and glorious attributes. "Justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne."

"But you hold," it is said, "that the justice of God is grounded in benevolence, and benevolence is the desire to promote happiness." To this we answer, that justice, in the abstract, is not grounded in benevolence more than truth or right in the abstract is. It is a fixed quantity — the exact measure of desert, whether of good or evil. Justice, as an attribute of personal character, which is no other than a disposition to be just, *is* a form of benevolence; but not in the low, restricted sense of Dr. Hodge. The justice of God, considered as one of his moral attributes, is that which determines him to seek his own highest glory and the greatest possible good, by laying judgment to the line, and righteousness to the plummet, and meting out to his intelligent creatures reward or punishment, ac-

¹ Vol. i. p. 435.

² Vol. ii. p. 579.

ording to their deserts. And this is benevolence in the largest and best signification of the term.

5. Dr. Hodge represents his New England brethren as "ignoring, or explaining away," all those scriptures which speak of "Christ as a priest, as a sacrifice, as a propitiation, as an expiation, as the substitute and representative of sinners; as assuming their place, and sustaining the curse and penalty of the law in their stead."¹ Now, strange as it may seem, we are not conscious of "ignoring or explaining away" one of these scriptural representations. Certainly, we do not ignore them; for they are almost constantly on our lips,—constituting the staple of our sermons, our theological discussions, and our prayers. Nor do we desire or attempt to explain them away. We may not explain them in precisely the same manner as Dr. Hodge; but we use the terms, without shrinking or flinching, in their full and proper sense, as employed by the sacred writers. They are the pabulum on which we feed, and by which we live. They set forth our only foundation of hope. We accept of Christ as the great High Priest of our profession, who has offered himself as a sacrifice, a propitiation, an expiation, for our sins. We accept of him, as having assumed our place, and borne the curse of the law in our stead. In the sense of Dr. Hodge,—though we do not accept his definition,—we believe that he endured the *penalty* of the law for us. What is the penalty of the law, as Dr. Hodge describes it? "By the words *penal* and *penalty*, we express nothing concerning the nature of the sufferings endured, but only the design of their infliction. Suffering, without any reference to the reason of its occurrence, is a calamity; if suffered for the benefit of the sufferer, it is a chastisement; if for the satisfaction of justice, it is punishment. When, therefore, we say that Christ's sufferings were penal, or that he suffered the penalty of the law, we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of the pains he endured. We only say that they were designed for the satisfaction of justice. He died, in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly."² Now we trustfully and joyfully accept all this. We believe that Christ suffered and died for the satisfaction of justice. He died that God might be just in justifying the ungodly. Still, we prefer to regard his sufferings as a *substitute*, a *full equivalent* for the penalty of the law, rather than as the penalty itself. The penalty of the law is not anything, everything, that may be endured because of sin, but is a definite sentence or denunciation—"The soul that sinneth, it shall die." "The wages of sin is death," eternal death, a death standing in immediate contrast with eternal life. It is the punishment inflicted on the rebel angels when they sinned in heaven, and will be inflicted on the finally lost in the great judgment-day. It is that from which Christ delivers his own people. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us" (Gal. iii. 13). Christ does not redeem

¹ Vol. ii. p. 580.

² Vol. ii. p. 474.

his people from all suffering because of sin, in this life, nor from temporal dissolution, but from spiritual and eternal death, which is the proper curse and penalty of the law.

The proper penalty of the law, too, as it seems to us, can be suffered only by the transgressor. It fastens upon him, and him only. "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die." A substitute may suffer a full equivalent for the penalty — one that shall satisfy the claims of justice as well; but not the penalty itself. Such are some of the reasons which lead us to regard the sufferings of Christ as a full equivalent for the penalty of the law, but not the proper literal penalty. Still, according to Dr. Hodge's description of the penalty, we have no objection to the thing intended. Our objection is only to the name.

6. Dr. Hodge, like other theologians of his class, represents us as holding that the moral affections are under the direct control of the will, — which he denies. "It is universally admitted," he says, "because a universal fact of consciousness, that the feelings and affections are not under the control of the will. No man can love what is hateful to him, or hate what he delights in, by any exercise of his self-determining power."² In other words, no man can call up an internal exercise or affection, by a simple act of the will. Now, strange as it may seem to Dr. Hodge and his friends, we believe this as fully as he does. These internal affections are themselves exercises of the will, and cannot be called forth by a previous exercise of will. This is not the way in which any of the exercises of the will are produced. We cannot call up one executive volition by another, more than we can produce love or hatred in this way. Our voluntary exercises of every class, whether external or internal, transient or permanent, are put forth in view of motives, and under their influence, and not willed into existence one by another. A man concludes to change his business, or his course of life. Now this change, though voluntary, is not produced without thought and inquiry, by a single self-determination. But the individual supposed considers the subject for a time, looks at it in all its bearings, weighs the motives one way and the other, and at length comes to a decision. There is another man whose mind is exercised on the subject of religion; he knows that he is not a friend of God; that he has no delight in his character and service; but he is dissatisfied with his present position, and is led by the Spirit to think more deeply and truly of God. He thinks better of him, gets new views of his character and ways, and begins to love him. In the language of the Psalmist, he "thinks upon his ways, and turns his feet unto God's testimonies." Now this change is voluntary,² as really so as that of the man who changed his

¹ Vol. ii. p. 272.

² Dr. Hodge defines conversion as "a *voluntary* turning of the soul from sin to God." — Vol. iii. p. 14.

business; but in neither case was the new exercise or volition called up by a previous one. In both cases, it was put forth under the influence of motives. And in both cases, the change itself may have been instantaneous; although a preparation for it may have been going on in the mind for a considerable time.

We wish our friends, who seem to differ from us with regard to the voluntary nature of our moral affections, could understand us more correctly. They persist in saying that a change in the affections cannot be voluntary, because the new affection is not produced by a direct exercise of will. But no one supposes it is so produced. No voluntary exercise is, or can be, produced in this way. We merely say that our moral affections are put forth voluntarily, under the influence of motives or moral considerations, in the same way as all other exercises of will.

7. We only add, under the head of misrepresentations, that Dr. Hodge misapprehends, and of course misrepresents, the views of Dr. Emmons. "With Dr. Emmons," he tells us, "God is the only cause. Second causes, so called, whether material or mental, have no efficiency. God creates everything at every moment; all volitions and mental states, as well as everything external."¹ Dr. Emmons is here represented as holding that "God creates everything at every moment," and consequently that the works of preservation and creation are identical. Now, we know that Dr. Emmons did not thus teach; for we once heard him deny the statement in the strongest terms. If President Edwards *did* make such a statement and say that "God's preserving created things in being is perfectly equivalent to a continued creation, or to his creating things out of nothing at each moment of their existence;"² still Dr. Emmons uses no such language, but condemned it in decisive words. He once remarked to the writer of this Article: "President Edwards here makes me think of a strong horse in the mud. He thrashes about at a great rate; but with every move sinks deeper in the mire."

In another passage, Dr. Hodge represents Emmons as teaching that "the soul is a series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as the soul — no self, but only certain perceptions, which succeed each other with amazing rapidity."³ Other writers have ascribed to Emmons the same doctrine. Dr. Dwight, in particular, has devoted a whole sermon to the refutation of this theory — referring, undoubtedly, to Emmons as the author of it.⁴

In regard to this, I remark, that in all the writings of Dr. Emmons, published and unpublished, I have never found the sentiment here imputed to him. And, in all my personal intercourse with him for many years, I never heard him express it, or anything which implied it, but very much which implied the contrary. And hundreds of his personal friends and

¹ Vol. ii. p. 732.

² Works (Worcester ed.), Vol. vi. p. 451.

³ Vol. ii. p. 282.

⁴ Dwight's Theology, Sermon. 24.

pupils would unite with me in this testimony. The Rev. Dr. Ide, his son-in-law, and the editor of his works, says: "Whatever may be thought of the philosophy of Emmons, or the propriety of the phraseology which he has occasionally used on this subject, his own language itself—even that which is used in connection with the passages thought to indicate the opinion in question—is sufficient to prove that he intended no such thing. When he speaks of perception, reason, memory, conscience, and volition, as properties of the soul, does not his language irresistibly imply that there is a soul to perceive, to reason, to remember, to feel moral obligation, and to will either right or wrong? Can any one seriously think that such a man as Emmons ever believed that perception is a possibility, without a soul to perceive? That there is, or can be, any such thing as reasoning or reason, without a soul possessing the faculty of reason, or carrying on the process? That there is such a thing as moral sensibility, without a soul actually discerning between good and evil? Is such a thing as memory conceivable, without a soul capable of recalling what it has previously seen, heard, or known? What is volition? What did Emmons believe the volition of man to be, but his soul loving or hating, choosing or refusing? Those who, in view of all the facts in the case, can persuade themselves that Emmons denied the proper being of a soul, while he spoke thus of its properties and acts, must either believe that he was destitute of common sense, or show that they themselves are wanting in this important instinct.¹

Dr. Emmons may have said (though we never heard him say as much as this) that we are *conscious* of nothing but ideas and exercises, or the operations of our own minds—that whatever we know as to the substance of the soul we gather from other sources besides that of consciousness. And many others have said the same. But that Dr. Emmons ever taught that "there is no such thing as the soul, no self, but only a series of ideas and exercises which succeed each other with amazing rapidity," we believe to be a totally unfounded representation. And we hope that, from a regard to the ninth commandment, good men will no longer say it, or believe it, until they can find some positive proof in the acknowledged writings of Dr. Emmons that it is true.

It follows, from what has been said as to Dr. Hodge's misapprehensions and consequent misrepresentations of the New England theology, that he really differs from us of New England much less than he thinks he does. The difference between us is chiefly in words. Dr. Hodge believes that "holiness, or moral excellence, is a greater good than happiness, . . . as much higher as heaven is higher than the earth." And so do we. Dr. Hodge has the following excellent remarks respecting the last end of God in all his works, to which every theologian of the genuine New England stamp will say, "Amen": "In the Scriptures we are explicitly taught that the glory of

¹ Emmons's Works, Vol. i. p. 417.

God, the manifestation of his perfections, is the last end of all his works. This is the highest possible end. The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is the source of all holiness and all blessedness to rational creatures. In the Bible this is declared to be the end of the universe as a whole; of the external world, or works of nature; of the plan of redemption; of the whole course of history; of the mode in which God administers his providence and dispenses his grace; and of particular events, such as the choice of the Israelites, and all the dealings of God with them as a nation.”¹

Dr. Hodge holds, with us, that sin is not the necessary means of the greatest good; while we both agree that, in opposition to all its tendencies, sin becomes, in the providence of God, an occasion of greater glory to himself and of good to his creatures than would otherwise be possible. Dr. Hodge believes in the *justice* of God — that there is such a thing as justice, as distinct from expediency, and that God is just. And so do we. Dr. Hodge regards Christ, in his priestly work, as “a sacrifice, a propitiation, an expiation, the substitute and representative of sinners; as assuming their place, and sustaining the curse or penalty of the law in their stead.” And with all our hearts we accept the same. In Dr. Hodge’s sense of the word “penalty,” we believe that Christ suffered the penalty of the law for us; although, for reasons before assigned, we prefer a stricter sense of the word “penalty,” and regard Christ as having borne a full equivalent for the penalty, rather than the penalty itself.

Dr. Hodge does not believe that our internal affections are under the direct control of the will, so that we can will up the affection of love by a simple exercise of self-determination; and neither do we. No exercise of the will can be willed up by a previous exercise. This is not the way in which voluntary exercises are produced.

Dr. Hodge teaches that the sinner’s inability to love God “does not arise from the loss of any faculty of the soul, or of any original, essential attribute of nature. He retains his reason, will, and conscience. He has the intellectual power of cognition, the power of self-determination, and the faculty of discerning between moral good and evil.”² Now this, again, is just what we believe; and this we call the sinner’s natural ability to turn to God and do his duty. Natural ability has respect to faculties; moral ability, to dispositions and inclinations. On this point, as on many others, Dr. Hodge agrees with us in all but the name.

On supposed differences of opinion and theological controversies growing out of the different meaning and use of words, Dr. Hodge has the following excellent remarks: “The same statement often appears true to one mind, and false to another, because it is understood differently. This ambiguity arises partly from the inherent imperfection of human language. Words have, and must have, more than one sense; and, though we may define our terms, and state in which of its several senses we use a given word,

¹ Vol. i. p. 567.

² Vol. ii. p. 260.

yet the exigencies of language, or inattention, almost invariably lead to its being employed in some other of its legitimate meanings. Besides, the states of mind which these words are employed to designate are themselves so complex that no words can accurately represent them. We have terms to express the operations of the intellect, others to designate the feelings, and others, again, for acts of the will; but thousands of our acts include the exercise of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will, and it is absolutely impossible to find words for all these complex and varying states of mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that men should misunderstand each other, and fail in their most strenuous efforts to express what they mean, so that others shall attach precisely the same sense to the words which they use."¹ Admirable hints and suggestions these. By duly heeding and observing them, how often would good men find that their differences and disputes were more about names than things—a strife about the meaning of words!

ARTICLE XII.

RECENT WORKS ON PREHISTORIC ARCHAEOLOGY.²

BY REV. G. F. WRIGHT, ANDOVER, MASS.

THE subject of Prehistoric Archaeology still suffers from two embarrassments; first, from the reckless haste with which many of the uniformitarian school in geology jump to extreme conclusions concerning the early date of man's introduction upon the earth; secondly, the too reverent pertinacity with which some Christian scholars hold to the current schemes of biblical chronology.

The two works mentioned below represent the latest phases of the inquiries relating to man's antiquity, and are in the main moderate and judicious in their tone, especially the work of Mr. Evans. Since the publication of Lyell's *Antiquity of Man* much progress has been made, both in adding new facts and in sifting the evidence on which previously discovered facts had been accepted. The human bones found in the cave at Aurignac, in France, and those from the caves of Engis and the Neanderthal, in Belgium, are spoken of now with far less confidence than

¹ Vol. ii. p. 279.

² "Prehistoric Times as illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages. By Sir John Lubbock, Bart., M.P. 8vo. pp. 640. New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1872.

The *Ancient Stone Implements, Weapons, and Ornaments of Great Britain*. By John Evans, F.R.S., F.S.A. 8vo. pp. 640. London: Longmans. 1872.

formerly as to their very great antiquity, and will probably disappear wholly from future works on the age of our race. Less stress is laid, also, than formerly, upon the relics of the iron, the bronze, and the polished-stone periods in Europe as evidence of great antiquity.

But between the polished-stone period (or Neolithic, according to Lubbock's classification) and the Palaeolithic period, or the period in which flint implements show no signs of having been ground, there is a wide separation, which no student of the subject can fail to recognize as of great significance. It is the evidence of the great antiquity of the Palaeolithic period that now attracts the principal attention of students of this subject. And in this department of investigation it must be confessed that the accumulating evidence is mainly in one direction, viz. that of lengthening the antiquity of man.

The further explorations by a committee of scientific men — of whom Mr. Evans and Sir John Lubbock are members — of, among others, Kent's cavern, in Torquay, England, fully substantiate the evidence that had been before adduced in proof of the fact that the cave was inhabited by men of the Palaeolithic period at a time when the mammoth (*elephas primigenius*), the woolly rhinoceros, the cave bear, the cave hyaena, the reindeer, and many other extinct gigantic mammalia, abounded in England. These remains are separated from later species and more recent marks of man's presence above them by a continuous layer of stalagmite, from one to three feet thick; and bones of existing species are "conspicuous for their absence" from the lower deposit.

But the main facts for estimating the antiquity of the period are to be found in the Post-pliocene or Quaternary river gravels in England and France. Situated in terraces along the streams of southern England and northern France, from ten to one hundred and fifty feet above the present high-water mark, the same evidences alluded to above are found of the co-existence of men of the Palaeolithic age with the extinct gigantic mammalia just enumerated, to which may be added the hippopotamus. Everything turns now on the means at hand of computing the age of these terraces. These river valleys run, in the lower course of their progress, through the extensive chalk-formation of that region. They are also of great width; that of the Somme, in France, being a mile or more in width, and the height of the terrace in which flint implements are found being ninety feet above the bottom of the valley.

An important point to be noted is, that "the constituent parts of the gravels of the beds of drift containing Palaeolithic implements are always, petrologically, such as are to be found in the existing river-basins Unless a river traverses a granite or slate country, no granite or slate is found in the quaternary gravels of its valleys; unless it passes over Oolite, Purbeck, or Greensand, no blocks or pebbles of these rocks occur. This fact suffices to prove that the gravels are due to some local cause,

such as river action, and not to any general submergence or "wave of translation," which of necessity bring in materials not to be found in the existing basins."¹ It remains, then, to determine how long a period would suffice for the excavation of these river channels through the beds of chalk in which they lie.

As being the most perfect of these valleys that remains, that of the Somme affords the best gauge. Mr. Evans, however, supposes that there is sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a river of this period whose course was through the channel that separates the Isle of Wight from the main land, and ran some way to the east of Spithead before it debouched into the sea. What are now cliffs of the sea represent the inland terraces of the stream, in which were deposited flint implements.

The time required for producing these changes in the river-levels and coast-lines will be variously estimated, according as we suppose the rainfall to have been the same in past ages as now, or greater, or less; and also according as we suppose the climate to have corresponded to that of the present time, or to have been more or less severe. A greater rainfall or a severer climate would, either of them, greatly accelerate the erosion of the valleys. Of the greater contrast then, between the summers and winters in that region than is now seen there, the mingling of gigantic arctic and tropical fauna is conclusive evidence. And a much larger rainfall than at present is not at all improbable.

We have not space, in a short notice like this, to pursue this subject farther. We will only say, that, as the evidence now stands, no probable acceleration of the action of these natural forces in the past would bring the phenomena presented in these river-channels within the limits of the longest accepted biblical chronology. A study of the recent works upon this subject will also convince one that the mass of scientific observers are sufficiently conservative in their tendencies of mind. This has been pre-eminently so with the French Academy, and with the larger part of English observers. Indeed the conservative influence of Cuvier in France, and of Dr. Buckland in England has been such as to delay a proper investigation of the river-drift and bone-caverns for a quarter of a century. Biblical scholars need have no jealousy of geologists and archaeologists. The whole class should not be made to suffer from the individual idiosyncrasies of a few.

And now a word about systems of biblical chronology. It is a principle which we should keep more prominently in view than we do, that the integrity of the divine revelation should not be made to depend upon the interpretation of a few isolated and doubtful passages. The integrity of the Bible depends only upon the truth of those doctrines and interpretations which are woven into the very woof and warp of the book. The genealogies of Scripture sustain no such relation of importance to the book

¹ Evans, p. 594.

itself. In such a brief and rapid epitome of long periods of early history as is given in Genesis, the words "beget" and "son of" cannot be so unequivocal in their meaning and limitations, that the Bible must stand or fall with the strictest and most limited interpretation of them. There will be little difficulty in adjusting the Bible history to any facts of chronology that archæologists may fairly establish. Biblical criticism is not in their way.

But, on the contrary, there is much truth in the remarks of the Duke of Argyll,¹ that "no one moral or religious truth depends on a short estimate of man's antiquity. On the contrary, a high estimate of that antiquity is of great value in its bearing upon another question, much more important than the question of time can ever be, viz. the question of the unity of the human race. . . . Unquestionably, the unity of the human race, in respect to origin, is not easily separated from some principles which are of high value in our understanding both of moral duty and religious truth. And precisely in proportion as we value our belief in that unity, ought we to be ready and willing to accept any evidence on the question of man's antiquity. The older the human family can be proved to be, the more possible and probable it is that it has descended from a single pair. My own firm belief is that all scientific evidence is in favor of this conclusion; and I regard all new proofs of the antiquity of man as tending to establish it on a firmer basis."

That feeling of uneasiness which many students of the Bible have, arising from fear that the book of divine revelation is in a state of unstable equilibrium, apex downwards, and resting on Archbishop Usher's interpretation of equivocal words occurring in a rapid historical epitome of little logical importance to the rest of the book, is not more unpleasant than it is unfortunate.

ARTICLE XIII.

WHICHCOTE'S APHORISMS.

THIS volume, now a hundred and twenty years old, contains two parts, both of which are thus designated on the title-page:

"Moral and Religious Aphorisms. Collected from the Manuscript Papers of the Reverend and Learned Doctor Whichcote; and published in 1703, by Dr. Jeffery. Now republished, with very large additions, from the Transcripts of the latter, By Samuel Salter, D.D., Prebendary of Norwich, and Curate of Great Yarmouth in Norfolk. To which are added, Eight Letters: which passed between Dr. Whichcote, Provost of

¹ Primeval Man, p. 127 f.

King's College; and Dr. Payne Tuckney, Master of Emmanuel College, in Cambridge; on several very interesting Subjects. Now first published. London: Printed for J. Payne, at Pope's-Head, in Pater-Noster-Row. 1753. 12mo."

The First Part of this volume is devoted to the Aphorisms of Whichcote, and contains a Preface by Dr. Salter. The Second is devoted to the Letters, and contains also a Preface by the same editor. From these two Prefaces we gather the following items:

Dr. Benjamin Whichcote was born at Whichcote Hall, in the Parish of Stoke, March 11, 1609; was sent to Emmanuel College, Cambridge, in 1626; took his degree of B.A. in 1629, of M.A. in 1633, of B.D. in 1640; was ordained, March 5, 1636 both deacon and priest by Bishop Williams of Lincoln; was presented by his college to the living of North Cadbury in Somersetshire, in 1643; was recalled to Cambridge as Provost of King's College in 1644; was rector of Milton, Cambridgeshire, in 1649; was deprived of his provostship, quite unnecessarily, at the Restoration; was minister of St. Anne's, Blackfriar's, London, in 1662; was vicar of St. Lawrence, Jewry, in 1668; died at the house of "his ancient and learned friend, Dr. Cudworth," in Cambridge, in 1683; was buried in the chancel of his own church, in London, Dr. Tillotson preaching his funeral sermon. In this sermon, Tillotson describes Whichcote as excelling "in the virtues of conversation, humanity, and gentleness and humility, a prudent and peaceable and reconciling temper"; as "extremely careful not to provoke any man," and not to be provoked by any; using to say: 'If I provoke a man, he is the worse for *my* company; and if I suffer myself to be provoked by him, I shall be the worse for *his*.' Dr. Salter says of Whichcote: "I cannot find that he published anything before the Restoration, or in any part of his life." "In 1685, two years after his death, a small octavo of eight sheets appeared," consisting of "Notes on Five Texts of Scripture, which take up one hundred pages, and of twenty-eight pages more of what this editor calls Apostolical Apothegms." This volume was a collation from Dr. Whichcote's writings. The next work of his was printed in 1697, and entitled, "A Treatise of Devotion; with Morning and Evening Prayers for all the days in the week." In 1698 appeared "Select Sermons of Dr. Whichcote, in Two Parts. Printed for Churchill." The Preface to this volume "is generally supposed to have been written by the celebrated Earl of Shaftesbury, Author of the Characteristics." This one fact intimates the character of Whichcote's writings. The volume was reprinted at Edinburgh, in 1742. In the first three years of the eighteenth century, Dr. Jeffery edited three volumes of Whichcote's sermons; Dr. Samuel Clarke prepared for the press a fourth volume. Dr. G. Campbell and Dr. A. Gerard edited four volumes of the sermons in 1751. They were published at Aberdeen. In 1703, Dr. Jeffery had published an edition of Whichcote's Aphorisms; the present edition of Dr.

Salter is a revision and enlargement of that. Dr. Wishart, William Penn, Bishop Burnet, John Locke, and many other eminent scholars unite with the Earl of Shaftesbury and Archbishop Tillotson in expressing high admiration of Whichcote's character and influence.

The following estimate of him is given by Dr. Tulloch, in the second volume of his "Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century": "Whichcote not only possessed great credit with the most eminent statesmen of the Commonwealth; but he was probably during this important period the teacher who, more than any other at Cambridge, impressed his own mode of thought both upon his colleagues in the university and the rising generation of students. . . . In a true sense, he may be said to have founded the new school of philosophical theology, although it is chiefly known by the more elaborate writings of others. Like many eminent teachers, his personality and the general force of his mental character were obviously greater than his intellectual productiveness. A few volumes of sermons are nearly all that survive of his labors to help us to understand them. Yet his sermons, comparatively neglected as they have been, are amongst the most thoughtful in the English language, pregnant with meaning, not only for his own, but for all time. It is strange that he should have been so little known and studied; but the obscurity which has overtaken him is not without some relation to his very greatness, and the silent way in which he passed out of sight at the Restoration after he had done his work at Cambridge. There are some kinds of influence which perish in their very fruitfulness, as the seed dies and wastes away at the root of the ripening grain. Whichcote's influence was of this kind. He was careless of his own name, providing the higher thoughts for which he cared were found bearing fruit. He possessed that highest magnanimity of all—a magnanimity extremely rare—of forgetting himself in the cause which he loved, and rejoicing that others entered into the results for which he labored" (pp. 45, 46).

"All the enthusiasm of young Cambridge was evidently turned in a liberal direction by the eloquent Provost of King's, and 'so young ones in the university tainted.' It is difficult to say what peculiar combination of qualities sometimes gives a man the position of leader of thought in a university. The greatest ability and the most profound learning may fail in securing it; distinction as a writer has often no effect. In the case of Whichcote there were none of these qualities prominently present. But there was that which was more than all—a certain attractiveness and glow of feeling, a persuasive enthusiasm, an 'aptness to teach,' which goes right to the hearts of the young, and constitutes a power far more effective than any mere literary or intellectual capacity" (pp. 83, 84).

"The great instrument of Whichcote's influence was evidently the pulpit. He possessed great powers as a preacher, and his regular Sunday afternoon lecture in Trinity Church drew crowds, Tillotson

tells us, 'not only of the young scholars, but of those of greater standing and best repute for learning in the university.' He contributed thus, according to the same authority, 'more to the forming of the students of that university in a sober sense of religion than any man in that age.' He was the great university preacher of the Commonwealth; and to his afternoon sermons, probably more than to any single means of influence, is the progress of the new [liberal] movement to be attributed" (84, 85).

"In trying to estimate the value of his living eloquence, we must remember the very imperfect form in which these discourses have been preserved. Like Frederick Robertson's sermons, in our own day, they seem to have been printed merely from notes—his own or others'. We are told that in the pulpit he used 'no other than very short notes, not very legible,'—specimens of which he has himself presented in his letters to Dr. Tuckney, and which are evidently the mere bones which he clothed with a living shape in the course of delivery. He had the temperament of the orator, which yields, like a flexible, glowing medium, to the inspiration of the moment. For when Tuckney accuses him of using, in one of his sermons, in reference to certain views, the very strong expression, 'divinity taught in hell,' he answers: 'The phrase "divinity minted or taught in hell" I find not in my notes; but it was suddenly spoken.' It can be easily imagined, therefore, that, animated and vigorous as many of Whichcote's sermons are in comparison with most of the sermons of his age, they give us only an imperfect idea of the life and impulse of thought which moved him in the pulpit, and which made him such a power as afternoon lecturer in Trinity Church. All the more was he likely to be such a power that his whole activity was apparently given to his university work. He had no worldly ambition; no schemes of authorship, like More and Cudworth. He was a born teacher—one whose highest qualities were stimulated by contact with young minds, and that play of speech which seems to be necessary to the finest development of certain intellectual natures, from Socrates downwards. Such men are teachers divinely called. Their proper place is in the academic chair or the pulpit. Surrounded by questioning spirits and eager looks, there they are great, as the life of thought grows warm within them and overflows in copious and impressive utterance. It by no means follows that they will be equally great as writers. Often they are not. Oftener still they want the impulse to authorship. Their thoughts only rise freely—their words only come fitly—in the face of a listening audience. Whichcote appears to have been a man of this stamp. And hence his peculiar position and fate. He stood at the head of the Cambridge thought of his time; he moved the university youth with a force which Tuckney and Hill and others failed to imitate. He inspired and formed the highest intellect which it was destined to produce for thirty years. Men like Smith and Cudworth, and More and Tillotson, looked back to him as

their intellectual master. Yet he himself never appeared as an author. His sermons were only published some time after his death. They have been prized by all who have fallen in with them; they cannot be prized too highly; but they have not served, as they scarcely could, to preserve his name from partial oblivion. He was infinitely greater in life than he appears in history" (pp. 85-87).

A large class of Dr. Whichcote's Aphorisms illustrate his

Theory of the Will.

Some of these are: 21. An intelligent voluntary agent in right constitution, doth, in due and convenient circumstances, as certainly produce noble and generous effects, in use of his liberty, as any natural agent, which is determined to one thing, doth its proper effects, in matter prepared and disposed; else the way of voluntary motion would be inferior to natural motion, and more imperfect than it. 157. There is nothing in perfection, nothing natural, but where the reason of things directs the reason of our minds, and that guides and determines the will: we are intelligent by the first, and voluntary by the second. 179. It is far from being true, that man hath nothing to do, upon supposition that God doth all. 326. We are as sure of necessary nature, as can be: we should be as sure of rational nature, as to virtue, reason, and right. 327. We should not have been voluntary, in the second place, if we had not been intelligent in the first place. The right order is, when things, in respect of operation, do imitate the constitution of nature; and nature's order is, that men should first understand, and be informed, and find out the reason of things, and after that determine and resolve accordingly, in the use of their liberty. 333. Will cannot be the first rule, because will is changeable, and, if you change will, good and evil would change. If there were no difference in things, there could be no inconsistencies. There is a difference in things themselves, antecedent to all use of power and will. This is fundamental to religion and conscience. 393. I have always found that such preaching of others hath most commanded my heart which hath most illuminated my head. 404. The mind of man is not reformed, by infusing anything into it, but by offering reason, argument, and truth, that produces goodness. 451. Neither God nor man doth alter any one's mind, otherwise than by reason, persuasion, and satisfaction; for intellectual nature is commanded by nothing but by reason and consideration. 532. If sin were necessary, it could not be avoided; if duty were impossible, it could not be done; this would be an answer to God himself; an answer to the indictment, that might be brought against us at the last day. 397. What is morally filthy, should be equivalent to what is naturally impossible; we should not, is morally, we cannot.

In entire consistency with the preceding statements, Dr. Whichcote makes frequent allusion to

Real as distinct from Formal Freedom.

13. *Liberum arbitrium*, which men so brag of, as it includes *Posse male agere*, is an imperfection; for such liberty or power is not in God. To do amiss, is not power, but deficiency and deformity; and infinite power includes not in it a possibility of evil. 239. Man parts with his freedom, and enslaves himself, when he subjects himself to that which is not sovereign in him, as reason is. 294. Good men, under the power of reason and religion, are free, in the worst condition; bad men, under the power of lust and vice, are slaves, in the best condition. 416. It is the chiefest of good things, for a man to be himself. 444. The truths of God are connatural to the soul of man, and the soul of man makes no more resistance to them than the air does to light. 455. There is a reason for what we do from the things themselves; truth and falsehood, good and evil, are first in things, and then in persons.

The similarity between many of Bishop Butler's statements in regard to the excellence of the human constitution as God made it, and the statements of Dr. Whichcote, is seen in the following apothegms on

The Human Constitution as such.

24. There is a natural propension in everything to return to its true state, if by violence it has been disturbed; should it not be so in grace, in the divine life? Virtue is the health, true state, natural complexion of the soul; he that is vicious in his practice, is diseased in his mind. 42. Man, as man, is averse to what is evil and wicked; for evil is unnatural, and good is connatural to man. 154. A sinner is a person of violent practice, and one who doth unnatural acts; and consequently, the more a sinner knows himself, the less he is satisfied with himself. 211. It is as natural for a man, in respect to the principles of God's creation in him, to do that towards God, his neighbor, and himself, which right reason doth demand, as it is for a beast to be guided by his senses and instinct; or as it is for the sun to give light. 212. Vice is contrary to the nature of man, as man; for it is contrary to the order of reason, the peculiar and highest principle in man; nor is anything in itself more unnatural or of greater deformity in the whole world, than that an intelligent agent should have the truth of things in his mind, and that it should not give law and rule to his temper, life, and actions. 228. *A monstro non disputatur contra naturam*, is a rule in moral philosophy. A vicious man is a moral monster. We are to declare the nature of man, not from what it is, by defection and apostacy, but from what God made it, what it was, and what it should be. 233. Complain not of nature; for nature (to them that use it well, possess it with its right temper) is sovereign to man, inclinable to virtue, and conservative thereof. 551. By sin, we do ourselves harm, for evil is against the nature of man, is a thing that mars his nature, and spoils his principle.

The following apothegms illustrate Dr. Whichcote's

Ethical Principles.

3. Right is the rule of law ; and law is declaratory of right. 5. Knowledge alone doth not amount to virtue ; but certainly there is no virtue without knowledge. Knowledge is the first step to virtue and goodness ; but goodness is not without delight and choice. 15. What is morally good is so suitable to the nature of man, that motion in religion cannot but be with pleasantness. 89. Religion consists in things that are good in themselves, or that are for the recovery in us of what are good in themselves. 116. Good and evil are not by positive institution, are not things arbitrary, or during any pleasure whatsoever ; but just, right, and holy, wicked, impious, and profane, are so by their own nature and quality. If we understand this, as we ought, we abide in the truth ; if not, we are self-flatterers, and live in a lie. Things are as they are, whether we think so or not ; and we shall be judged by things as they be, not by our own presumptuous imaginations. 150. Though the reason of the subject be prejudiced and corrupted by apostacy and ill use, yet the reason of the thing continues sacred and unchanged. 242. He that has no government of himself has no enjoyment of himself. 251. The mind's sense (inward sentiments, *φρονήματα*) may have malignity in it, as well as words and actions. What any one means is rather his action than what he does ; for in what he means he hath absolute power, it is wholly his own ; in what a man doth, he may be liable to engagements and force. Therefore we say the mind of a good man is the best part of him, and the mind of a bad man is the worst part of him ; because the one hath more good in his heart than he can perform ; the other more evil in his heart than he can execute. 257. Right and just is determined, not by the arbitrary pleasure of him that has power over us ; but by the nature and reason of things. 258. The greater rights of the world that govern above and below, are determined by the relation things have to each other ; and these rights can never yield, or be controlled ; for these are a law with God, and according to his nature, and are as unchangeable and unalterable as God himself. 379. None are known to be good till they have opportunity to be bad. 342. In scripture none are called sinners, but those that sin against knowledge and conscience. 454. We are none of us at all better than we mean. 587. Morals are enforced by scripture, but were before scripture ; they were according to the nature of God. 602. A guilty mind can be eased by nothing but repentance, by which what was ill done is revoked, and morally voided and undone. 638. The principle in intelligent agents is, apprehension of the reason of things, which is eternal, subject to no power, cannot be practised upon. It is our wisdom to discern this, and it is our goodness to comply with it. 682. Sin is an attempt to control the immutable and unalterable laws of everlasting righteousness, goodness, and truth, upon which the universe depends. 603. There was a testimony given

against sin, and an acknowledgement of right made, by the death of Christ, to the condemnation of sin, to the vindication of right, to the justification and honor of God.

The following apothegms illustrate his

High Regard for Human Reason and Human Nature.

8. God made man intelligent and voluntary; and the law of his nature and the reason of his mind, God intended for the great rule of his life; to take place in all particulars where God did not think good farther to express his will and declare his pleasure. 33. The rule of right is the reason of things, the judgment of right is the reason of our minds, perceiving the reason of things. 129. For contradiction to his reason, a man is challenged now, and will be condemned at the great day of judgment. It is the reason of things and of our minds, not the power of God only, which condemns. Fear thyself; for thou art in more danger of being condemned by the reason of thy mind, than of any power whatsoever of God or man. 58. Those that differ upon reason may come together by reason. 60. He that gives reason for what he saith, has done what is fit to be done, and the most that can be done. He that gives not reason speaks nothing, though he saith never so much. 71. There is nothing proper and peculiar to man but the use of reason and the exercise of virtue. 76. To go against reason is to go against God; it is the self-same thing to do that which the reason of the case doth require, and that which God himself doth appoint. Reason is the divine governor of man's life; it is the very voice of God. 253. Whosoever doth commit sin departeth from the natural use of himself, his powers, and faculties; he sinks below his own nature; for there is no natural action so mean as every sinful action is. Sin is below any man. Sin is every man's dishonor. 255. He that hath no reverence for himself and his own nature, (so as to abuse it and disorder it), hath no reverence for God. 291. Religion doth not destroy nature, but is built upon it. 295. He that useth his reason doth acknowledge God. 351. None loves himself too little. 352. There is no natural desire of what is unnatural. 99. Reason discovers what is natural, and reason receives what is supernatural. 386. Conscience will put a man into a kind of hell; if that be not governed by a right judgment, and he be not governed by that. 418. Understanding should go first and find out the way; then passion should be as wings to carry us on in it. 460. Reason is not a shallow thing; it is the first participation from God: therefore he that observes reason observes God. 620. There is no such antidote and remedy against any malignity in the world as the reason of the thing, and the consideration of the mind following in conjunction; there is an unknown virtue and force in this. 523. Nothing is more unnatural to men than wickedness; for wickedness is contrary to the reason of the mind, and to the reason of things; contrary to the reason of the mind, which is

our governor, and contrary to the reason of things, which is our law. 457. There is nothing so intrinsically rational as religion is; nothing that can so justify itself; nothing that hath so pure reason to recommend itself as religion hath.

Dr. Whichcote has numerous apothegms on

The Character, as distinct from the Sovereignty, of God.

26. The whole world is governed by the perfection of truth, righteousness, and goodness, in conjunction with the perfections of wisdom, and power; and nothing is done by God but what these perfections do. 70. To believe there is a God, is to believe the existence of all possible good and perfection — and it is to be resolved upon this, that things either are, or finally shall be, as they should be. 705. Whatsoever there is good reason for the doing of, is warranted of God. 707. It is hard to be subject to will; it is natural to be subject to reason. 851. The laws of God are not impositions of will, or power and pleasure, but the resolutions of truth, reason, and justice. 85. God imposeth no law of righteousness upon us which he doth not observe himself. 322. God doth all to his own honor; he doth take care to spread his own nature, and communicate his own qualities and perfections; and, in his government of the world, aims at this, that his goodness, righteousness, and truth, may prevail everywhere, and have an univereal empire and sovereignty, in the lives of angels and men. 383. True liberty, as well as power, is always in conjunction with right and good. It is licentiousness and weakness that are separated from it. It is not power to be arbitrary in the use of power; nor liberty to be irregular (without rule and law) in the use of liberty. 388. Those who are crafty think, the wisdom of God warrants him to deceive; those who are revengeful think, the goodness of God permits him to be cruel; those who are arbitrary think, the sovereignty of God is the account of his actions. Every one attributes to God what he finds in himself; but that cannot be a perfection in God which is a dishonesty in man. 414. Unchangeableness in God's counsels is, because the resolutions of his choice are always made by the infallibility of his understanding, and that understanding is in certain conjunction with the reason of things. 417. God does not, because of his omnipotency, deal arbitrarily with us, but according to right and reason; and whatever he does, is therefore accountable, because reasonable. 439. God will destroy none but what must of necessity be destroyed; he will save every one that can be saved. 446. It is not fit God should 1. Neglect the rule of right; 2. Overlook his own due; 3. Slight the disobedience of his creatures. 486. Those things which we call sinful have an intrinsic malignity in them; and therefore are forbidden by God because of their malignity. 487. I know nothing forbidden by the gospel which one of true reason would desire to have liberty to do. 555. That is done out of respect to God which is done because it is just,

fit, and right, because it is good, and ought to be done. We must do our duty out of a sense of the goodness of the thing itself; and we must forsake our sin out of a sense and judgment of the vileness and badness of it. 685. Notwithstanding the fulness of liberty, and fulness of power in God, we are surer of him, in all cases of righteousness and equity, than of the effects of any natural cause.

A large part of Whichcote's labors was devoted to the encouragement of

Union and Toleration in the Church.

77. Men's apprehensions are often nearer than their expressions; they may mean the same thing, when they seem not to say the same thing. 499. The more false any one is in his religion, the more fierce and furious in maintaining it; the more mistaken, the more imposing; the more any man's religion is his own, the more he is concerned for it, but cool and indifferent enough for that which is God's. 507. In many cases it is very hard to fix the bounds of good and evil, because these part, as day and night, which are separated by twilight. 570. Let him that is assured he errs in nothing, take upon him to condemn every man that errs in anything. 1008. Truth lies in a little compass and narrow room. Vitals in religion are few.

In a succeeding Article will be given other Aphorisms of Dr. Whichcote, and also an account of the correspondence between him and his colleague Dr. Antony Tuckney, the eminent Professor at Cambridge, and prominent Member of the Westminster Assembly of Divines.

ARTICLE XIV.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

HENGSTENBERG'S POSTHUMOUS WORK. — History of the Kingdom of God under the Old Testament. Translated from the German of E. W. Hengstenberg, late Doctor and Professor of Theology in Berlin 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 469, 407. Edingburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong.

This History exhibits the usual characteristics of its author. This is to say that it cannot be studied without profit. We have only space to give a brief epitome of the "Essay on the Life and Writings of Hengstenberg," written by Rev. W. B. Pope, Principal of the Wesleyan College, Didsbury, Manchester. We cannot say that all the following remarks are derived from Mr. Pope's excellent Essay. Some of them have been suggested by a long personal acquaintance with Professor Hengstenberg and his interesting family. In a brief notice, like the present, it is difficult to

speak of a man whose virtues were so solid and whose faults so prominent as those of the lamented Professor.

Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg was born at Trönden^{berg} in Westphalia, October 20, 1802. His father was a clergyman, and his ancestors, from at least the fourteenth century, have had a local eminence in both church and state. On account of his feeble health he was not permitted to read until he was seven years of age; and on his death-bed he said: "I have scarcely during life known for a single day the feeling of perfect health; and have done what I have done simply through having been obliged to keep my body under stern discipline." He pursued his university studies at Bonn, where, before his twentieth year, he made a translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. His "Testimonial Essay" for the Doctorship of Laws was a Latin translation of an Arabic author, Amrulkeisi Moallakah. His Oriental studies under Professor Freytag qualified him peculiarly for his investigations in the literature of the Old Testament. After his highly successful career at the university, he was recommended, by the celebrated Sylvester de Sacy, to the Missionary College at Basle, as a teacher of the Oriental languages. From Basle he was called to the University of Berlin as Professor Extraordinary in Theology; and in the year 1828, when only twenty-six years of age, he became Ordinary Professor in the same Institution. Among his more eminent pupils were Hävern^{ick}, Keil, Caspari, Philippi, Schultze, Kahn^{is}.

Having married a lady of noble parentage, he at once obtained access to the highest society in Berlin. He was intimate with many dignitaries both of church and state. His wife and five children he followed to the grave. They were distinguished for their personal beauty and bright talents. In the dedication of his third volume of his *Commenary on John*, are the simple words, "To the pious memory of my son Immanuel, born 30th September, 1830; slept in the Lord 4th October, 1863. He was deeply engaged with me in this work, which occupied him shortly before his departure." This son was in early life a brilliant scholar, and gave great promise of usefulness. A sixth child died a few weeks before Professor Hengstenberg's own death; "and then his only grandson was laid in the grave: 'My God, this also,' he cried, and, folding his hands, looked steadily before him in amazement of heart." "In March, 1869, he was attacked by inflammation, which was followed by nearly three months of dropsy and great physical distress." Not long before his death, he said: "My soul is like a deep ocean, full of the voice of God's praise and honor." His friends wished him to make use of narcotics, but he resolutely refused them, saying, "with perfect clearness of soul I would go into eternity."

The published writings of Prof. Hengstenberg are: Contributions towards the Introduction to the Old Testament; The Christology of the Old Testament; Commentary on the Psalms; A Monograph on Balaam and his Prophecies; Commentary on Canticles and Ecclesiastes; Commentaries on

the Apocalypse and St. John's Gospel; Exposition of Ezekiel; The History of the Kingdom of God in the Old Testament. He was the editor of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* for about forty years. This was a bi-weekly paper, and excited marked attention, if it did not exert a permanent influence. In the first number of every year he published a Preface, which often occasioned much discussion. In these Prefaces he was apt to be severe, sarcastic, domineering. When any new subject of interest engaged the attention of the community, the common question was: "What will Hengstenberg say?" It has been commonly supposed that he delighted in contention, and found his true glory in a storm. Mr Pope, however, remarks, that Hengstenberg was not only phlegmatic in his temperament (we doubt whether a physiologist would sanction this classification), but that he was fond of peace. On his death-bed he remarked to his brother, "They thought me a kind of Hercules, always in my element when in wars and difficulties. How little they knew my nature! How often have I longed for rest, as the servant for the shade, or the hireling for the end of the day! But it was my calling to oppose the weak and accommodating spirit of the time." Referring to his bi-weekly Journal, he said, among his last death-bed words: "One of the benefits of heaven is this, that I shall have no more Prefaces to write."

The great excellence of Hengstenberg's writings are his extensive learning in relation to the Old Testament, his firmness and boldness in the expression of his opinions, and his profound religious spirit. The great defects of his writings are the want of comprehensiveness and of logical power, the vehemence and apparent roughness of his animadversions on other men, and his not very infrequent inconsistency with himself. His life was one of no inconsiderable mutations of theological belief. He gave great offence to the Rationalists: to the friends of Schleiermacher, such as Neander, Twesten, Julius Müller, and Tholuck; to the Pietists, the Calvinists, the high Lutherans, and the Unionists. He made many extreme statements; some of them he was obliged to qualify, others to recall. Of course he sometimes coincided with one party or school, and sometimes with its opposite. All parties, however, unite in commending his signal industry and his chivalrous spirit. He was certainly honest and true-hearted, resolute, and acute, and, on the whole, a powerful defender of the evangelical system. His influence will be long continued; his writings, however, will not retain so permanent a place in the literature of theology. They might have retained a greater permanence if he had abridged and systematized them. For the present generation, however, his works are of inestimable value. Of all his volumes the two now under notice are not the least unexceptionable. They are a noble monument to his memory.

Among the most characteristic passages in this History are Vol. i. pp. 91-96, 186-190, 207-214, 325-344. The last sentence on p. 93, suggests one marked trait of Prof. Hengstenberg's character.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. By Dr. Adolf Wuttke, late Professor of Theology at Halle. Translated by John P. Lacroix. 2 Vols. 12mo. pp. 378, 348. New York: Nelson and Phillips; Cincinnati: Hitchcock and Walden. 1873.

The first of these volumes is devoted to the History of Ethics, and contains a Special Preface by Dr. Edward Riehm, Professor in ordinary of Theology at Halle, and Editor of the *Studien und Kritiken*. The second volume is devoted to Pure Ethics, and contains an Introduction by Rev. Dr. W. F. Warren, of the Boston University. Dr. Wuttke was born in Breslau, Nov. 10, 1819. In 1840 he entered the University of Breslau. In 1848 he was *privat docent* of philosophy. In 1852-53 he published his History of Heathenism in respect to religion, knowledge, art, morals, and politics. In 1853 he took the degree of Licentiate in Theology, and in 1854 he became Professor Extraordinary of Theology in the University of Berlin. In the autumn of 1861 he became Ordinary Professor of Systematic Theology in Halle. On the 12th of April 1870, after a brief illness, he died. He was the author of various articles in Hengstenberg's *Evangelical Church Journal*. In 1860 he published the "German Popular Superstition of the Present." In 1861-62 he published his *Christian Ethics*. A new edition of this work revised and enlarged appeared in 1864-65. Dr. Riehm, to whom we are indebted for the preceding facts considers the ethical treatises which had previously appeared in Germany as imperfect and unsatisfactory. He says: "Although Christian ethics, after the precedent of Danaeus on the Calvinistic side, had been raised by Calixtus to the dignity of an independent theological science, nevertheless the prevalent one-sidedly dogmatic interest hindered and prevented its thorough development. And when finally, since the last decade of the last century, a more lively scientific interest was turned to the subject, then, unfortunately, Christian ethics became involved in an almost slavish dependence upon the philosophical system of a Kant, a Fichte, a Fries, a Hegel, and a Herbart, as they successively rose and followed each other. From this cramping pupilage, ethics was indeed emancipated by the Reconstructor of the collective body of German theology, Schleiermacher, and also radically renovated from the basis of the *specifically Christianly-ethical principle*. But in Schleiermacher, as well as in Rothe, Christian ethics appeared rather in the garb of theologico-philosophical speculation; it was not based directly upon the Holy Scriptures; on the contrary, these highly deserving men endeavored to be just to the positive Biblical basis of evangelical Protestantism by undertaking to reconstruct the contents of the Holy Scriptures directly out of the Christian consciousness; in a word, these ethical systems stood in no manner of close connection with ecclesiastical dogmatics. On the other hand, Harless had produced an ethics based directly upon, and derived from, the Scriptures; but in his method he had disdained the learned structure and the dialectical procedure of

modern science. Wuttke was the *first* theologian who made the attempt, upon the foundation of the Lutheran dogmatical ground-views as enriched and vitalized by personal self-immersion in the study of the Scriptures, to carry out, by means of the dialectical method (which theology had assumed at the time of the supremacy of philosophy), a strictly scientific, organic structure of Christian ethics, which should embody in itself the fruits of precedent labors upon this field, and also polemically elucidate its relation to the various other ethical systems. In this work, however, he makes no other use of this dialectical method than simply to purify theological ethics from all elements foreign or hostile to the Biblico-ecclesiastical ground-thoughts, and to bring these ground-thoughts to more complete expression by process of inner self-development. Hence the great majority of churchly-minded theologians could, with great reason, welcome in Wuttke the, until then, lacking scientific standard-bearer upon the field of ethics; and consequently his work met with an astonishingly rapid circulation and a thankful reception" (Vol. i. pp. xii, xiii).

In his first volume Dr. Wuttke notices the ethics of the Chinese; of the Indians, the Egyptians and the Semitic nations, the Persians, the Greeks; Socrates, the Cynics and the Cyreniads, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Stoics, the Sceptics and the Neo-Platonists; the Romans. He then notices the old Testament and the Jewish Ethics; next the Christian Ethics; the Ethics of the Ancient Church, of the Middle Ages, of the Scholastics and the Casuistics, of the Mystics and the Proto-Reformers, the Evangelical Ethics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Romish Ethics, Philosophical Ethics before Kant, the Ethics of Kant, Schelling, Fichte, Jacobi, Hegel and his school, the most recent Philosophy, the Evangelical Ethics of the nineteenth century, and the Romish Ethics. It is rather remarkable that a writer so learned in his department as Wuttke should pay so little attention to the Ethics of the English speaking world. Dr. Warren in his Introduction very aptly quotes the remarks of Jouffroy: "How has it happened, you may ask, that all these moral systems, which we have been considering were of English origin? The explanation of the fact is this very simple one, that moral philosophy, properly so called, has been infinitely more cultivated in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than in any other part of Europe. In France, for example, the Cartesian era produced only one eminent moralist, Malebranche; and Malebranche belonged neither to the class of selfish philosophers, nor to that of the sentimental philosophers. Cartesianism was followed in France, in the middle of the eighteenth century, by a new philosophy, but this was the system of materialism in metaphysics and of selfishness in morals; and called to choose between Helvetius and Hobbes, I could not but prefer Hobbes. Much the same might be said of the philosophy of Germany, which has always been more metaphysical than moral, and has never exhibited any forms of the selfish or instinctive

systems which have obtained such a European celebrity as those of Hobbes, of Smith, and of Hume" (pp. v, vi.) The ethical writers of America are certainly deserving of attention, and we believe that the moral philosophers of England regard these writers as having made some advance in their science.

In the second volume, Dr. Wuttke considers Pure Ethics, and here discusses the Nature of Man as a Spirit, and Man as to his Sensuously Corporeal Life; the Unity of Spirit and Body; God as the Ground and Prototype of the Moral Life, and as the Author of the Moral Law; the Nature and the Various Objects of the Moral Activity; the Moral Nature; the Fruit of the Moral Life as Moral End.

It is interesting to notice the coincidence of Professor Wuttke with some of our best English writers on ethics. For example, these writers have discussed the question whether conscience be a merely intellectual faculty, or merely emotional, or both combined. Apparently without any knowledge of these English discussions, Dr. Wuttke says: "The manners of conceiving of the conscience differ very widely; it is, in turn, regarded either as a cognizing consciousness, or as a feeling, or as an instinctive impulse; and consequently it is sought for in all the different spheres of the soul-life. It is indeed true that the conscience cannot be real without embracing in itself all three of these spheres; and hence the word may be used in all three significations. In the expression: 'Conscience says to me,' or 'it approves this and rejects that,' it is conceived of as a cognizing, judging consciousness; but we also speak of a joyous, or a chastising conscience; and again we say: 'Conscience compels me to this act or deters me from it. The question, however, is: Which of the three phases is the *primitive*, the *fundamental* one? which constitutes the *essence* of the conscience? According to what we have previously said as to the relation of feeling and willing to the cognizing consciousness, it follows very plainly that the essence of the conscience is to be found in that which its name directly expresses in various languages, namely, a *being-certain*, hence a certain *knowing*, a cognizing consciousness; in the New Testament, the term *συνείδησις* — (from *σύνειδα*, *consciū sum*, strictly: 'I am a fellower-knower,' and in a higher sense: 'I know with God,' in whom all knowledge centres), — an *associate knowing* with God, in virtue of his indwelling in rational creatures, is used of the conscience, both in so far as it leads to the good (*αγαθή συνείδησις*, or *καλή* or *καθαρά*), and in so far as, by reproving, it punishes evil (John viii. 9); and the same word is used also directly in the sense of religious consciousness, presenting the conscience as a consciousness of the divine will (1 Peter ii. 19; Rom. xiii. 5; Heb. ix. 9). The conscience, as differing from the enlightening influence of the Holy Spirit (Rom. ix. 1) is a power inherent in the essence of man *per se*, see Rom. ii. 14, 15; in this passage the *λογισμοί* are not the conscience, but the reflections that spring from the conscience,

which itself is the 'work of the law written in the hearts,' that is, the consciousness of the contents, of the requirements of the moral law; Paul is not speaking here of the true and perfect conscience, but of the natural conscience of sinful man; the essential features of the true conscience, however, still lurk in the disordered one; and this essential character appears here evidently as a consciousness of the moral" (vol. ii. pp. 100, 101).

Again, on the nature of love, Dr. Wuttke writes: "Love is the fulfilling of the law" (πλήρωμα, Rom. xiii. 10). In this formula, the Christian idea of the moral motive is very definitely expressed; love leads to the fulfilment of the law; it is the rich fulness in which all the law is included. Without love there is no morality; and where love is, there morality is truly free, for love develops itself into all forms of the moral. Hence Christ, after the example of the Old Testament (Deut. vi. 5; x. 12; xi. 13), sums up the whole law in the one precept of love to God and to our neighbor (Matt. xxii. 37; Luke x. 27); 'This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments' (1 John v. 3). Love is not, and cannot be, a mere inert feeling; but it is by its very nature active; it produces that which its subject loves — brings about the full and free harmony of the person and his life with God. Whoever assigns any other motive for morality than love, knows nothing of the moral" (vol. ii. p. 162).

How far Dr. Wuttke would agree with our best English and American moralists, we cannot precisely determine. His terminology is so different from theirs that he often appears to differ from them when in fact he coincides with them, and sometimes appears to coincide when in fact he differs. His system is in *form* more Christian than theirs, though not in substance. There are many advantages connected with shaping our ethics according to the biblical style; Dr. Wuttke has happily illustrated these advantages. We think, however, that our best English and American systems, although not professedly, are yet really admirable interpreters and defences of the Old and New Testaments.

The style of the translation would be improved by reducing the number of compound words, and by the less frequent use of certain terms to which the English ear is not wonted; such, for example, as "moral sparing," "moral forming," "moral appropriating," "volitionating," "negating." As a whole, however, the translation is a good one, and reflects honor on the translator, who will, we hope continue the kind of labor which he has so auspiciously begun. Would it be possible for him to produce a readable English version of Rothe's Ethics?

ORIENTAL LANGUAGES, and their Relation to Universal Religion. By Samuel Johnson. 8vo. pp. 802. Boston: J. R. Osgood and Co.

The author of this work introduces a sufficient number of citations from German, French, and English translations to prove that the Orientals, in their sacred books on law and religion, had a variety of contradictory

beliefs with regard to man, his after life, its rewards and punishments; the gods, their incarnations and atonements. They had also creeds, rituals, commentators, reformers, metaphysical systems wonderful for acuteness, and sects determined to make their beliefs universal.

Mr. Johnson has done a good work in classifying the Oriental beliefs, such as they were; but, unfortunately, his pantheistic philosophy makes him incompetent to speak with candor when he touches upon the Christian faith. He undervalues the geography, history, and ethics of the Bible. Its various doctrines are alluded to contemptuously. He cannot speak peaceably of Christ and his apostles when they come into comparison with the founders of Brahmanism and Buddhism. Such charms have nihilism and atheism for him that he would re-instate the fables of India in their ancient authority.

The times are out of joint. The pope and his council would restore the beliefs of the Middle Ages. Should our author succeed in his more difficult task, and bring back Buddhism, with its lotus and bubble and prayer-wheel, we must have a new set of commentators to explain the obscure and self-contradictory Indian Bibles, a new set of scientists to discuss the question of Indian miracles, a new set of moralists to examine the internal evidence and the moral character of the Indian religions; and the result will be that all the objections now raised against the Christian system will be raised against the Indian, and numberless objections will be added; and these will be met by none of the arguments which are now urged in favor of the Christian system, and, while they "change the place, but keep the pain," will intensify the pain and bring no relief. We believe that we have read every word in Mr. Johnson's volume, and we can truly say that in *some* respects it is worth reading.

THE REFORMATION. By George P. Fisher, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale College. 8vo. pp. 620. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1873.

Professor Fisher writes in a style both easy and precise, both flowing and accurate. There is often a "*curiosa felicitas*" in his choice of words. He has an "historical imagination" which is admirable. He sets his figures in the right perspective and groups them with rare skill. He has studied the subject of the Reformation with care, and we are not acquainted with any work which compresses into so small a space so large an amount of information. He has described the political character of the Reformation with more judgment and candor than have been exhibited by other writers, and has thus suggested numerous topics for the reader's own investigation. The volume is well fitted for the class-room, and is eminently attractive to the general scholar as well as to the theologian. In the Appendix is a chronological table, and a list of works on the Reformation, both of great value.

THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

CALVIN AND CALVINISM.

BY REV. GRANVILLE S. ABBOTT, WATERTOWN, MASS.

LOVE and hatred alike, usually adhere to positiveness of character. Hence it is an equivocal compliment to say of a man, "He has no enemies"; for such an one may have no friends, proved and true. Men, however, of thoroughly settled convictions; the men of one idea; the founders of philosophy, the Aristotles, the Bacons, the Hegels; the discoverers in science, the Jenners and Mesmers, the Newtons and Watts; the agitators in philanthropy, the Clarksons and Garrisons; the aggressors upon spiritual darkness, the Wesleys and Careys; the fathers of distinctive theologies, the Pelagiuses and Augustines, entitle themselves to a harvest of differing human judgment. But for men careless of immediate applause, positiveness of conviction would have been lost in time-serving. As a caution, therefore, against mere negativeness of character, of such neutral tints as to be neither friendly nor hostile to truth, Jesus said to his disciples, "Woe, when all men shall speak well of you."¹ He guarded them against that thought of great place in the world that could be secured only by a sacrifice of steadfastness in the faith. He was himself the object of the warmest affection, and of the bitterest malice. When the Magi laid

¹ Luke vi. 26. S. V. A. omit "unto you" of E. V.

their offerings at his infant feet, Herod was planning to number him among his slaughtered dead. When Roman soldiers watched his sepulchre, holy women, with love living on, went out early in the day to visit his place of burial. Unexceptionable honor, therefore, cannot be looked for by the followers of Jesus. "It is enough for the disciple that he be as his Master."

Of all men since the day of Christ few, if any, have earned for themselves more praise and blame than John Calvin; born in Noyon, near Paris, July 10, 1509; died in Geneva, May 27th, 1564. It has ever been Calvin's fortune to stand between contraries held in antipathy. The blessings of Gerizim and the curses of Ebal flow in counter currents across his reputation. M. Guizot cites him with St. Louis, as one of the "Two great Christians of France." Montesquieu counsels Geneva to hold his coming to her in perpetual festival. Bishop Horsley holds his memory in veneration. Arminius differs from him in doctrine, but values his writings more highly than all the writings of the Christian Fathers. Bancroft speaks of him as more self-denying than Lysurgus, and as achieving an immortality of fame. Others regard him as a kind of theological Laocoon, deservedly exposed to the coils of hate and the fangs of calumny. Not a few of these are sons of Calvinistic ancestry; graduates of colleges that were founded by Calvinism; heirs of the civil and religious liberty Calvin largely bestowed on the world; sufficiently ungrateful and uncivil to file by their illustrious progenitor and benefactor, without so much as lifting their hat; rejoicing rather when all the dogs of monarchy and of unbelief — irony, satire, misrepresentation, and caricature — bay at his heels. Others, having no preference to bias their judgment, prescribe for themselves an even justice between hasty encomium and equally hasty censure; and this without being mere eclectics, or calculators. James Anthony Froude is of this class, sensitive even to keen criticism where Calvinism opposes the feelings, but philosophically frank in admitting that it lies nearer than Arminianism to facts,

"however harsh and forbidding those facts may seem."¹ Rev. Joseph Jones of England, in a finely written work on "Human Responsibility" follows this *via media* also. By the greater number of opposers, however, Calvin and Calvinism are summarily dispatched. With much fine writing, seasoned with levity, they say: "Far, far hence, O ye profane." Hardly allowing to Calvin a hearing, they hold him responsible for not being in every respect superior to his age; forgetting that the sun still shines, though with spots on his face. They accuse him of an intolerance and narrowness that at most are exceptional to his spirit and his power. They trace to him every unchristian theory of religion. They father upon him all the "Pharisaical stuff" of denominational restrictiveness. They assume that Arminianism in its crusade against error has commanded silence in Calvinistic pulpits, an assumption that is chiefly remarkable for being untrue; since, however much Calvinism has been modified in recent times, its essentials are to be found in the writings of Robert Hall and of Thomas Chalmers, of Andrew Fuller and of Samuel Hopkins.² Whatever the individuality and novelty of their doctrinal statement may be, our oldest Calvinistic theological schools teach most robust Calvinism still. Whatever smoothness and seeming accommodation of faith may characterize the utterances of a few commanding pulpits, Calvinism is far from having become a Niobe, voiceless in her woe. For the proclamation of its distinctive truths, against the old Pelagianism of a self-righteous world, that will hear nothing of God's grace to impotent men, is both outspoken and earnest. The wish for Calvinistic silence is possibly interpreted as a fact. But to particulars.

The blame of John Calvin touches his spirit and his opinions.

I. *His spirit*. — He is accused of hardness and of severity; of vehemence and of impatience; of gloominess and of melancholy; of vindictiveness and of intolerance. Fortunately

¹ Address delivered at St. Andrews, March 17, 1871, p. 6.

² The writings of the latter Dr. Channing eulogized.

this many-headed Hydra is a creation of malice ; and still it is created ; for, " O sin," says one, " thou hast spent and emptied thyself in John Calvin." ¹ To be sure Calvin had faults by right of natural weakness, serious faults too, when judged by the benign spirit of the Gospel. Luther had faults also. So have all the greatest and the best of men had faults, as a kind of necessity of greatness. Nevertheless we are the last to extenuate wrong-doing, and hold the burning of Servetus to be a crime against the sacredness of human life. This, however, appears to be all, or about all, that many know of Calvin. Let his name be mentioned, and the shade of Servetus, like Banquo's ghost, rises to their eyes. Ask them for their estimate of Calvin, and they will say, with expressive indignation, " He burnt Servetus." It is not at all to their purpose to know whether the act has any historic palliation. They fully understand the beliefs, the habits, the modes of thought, the motives to action, the principles of judgment, the limitations of vision, of the sixteenth century. They have the clearest sight into errors common to Catholics and Protestants alike in those days. The world would have had fewer Lady Macbeth fingers, with the smell of blood lingering still, had they but lived in the dyed-red past. Strange errors would then have been avoided ; not a single scale of blindness would then have hindered human vision ; not a single forefather would have forgotten his manners. Pity 'tis they could not have turned three centuries earlier in their cradles ! Thus, to Thomas De Quincey, there appears in Calvin's case with Servetus no oblivious antidote. He can give to Judas Iscariot a volunteered defence, but for Calvin, notwithstanding Melancthon's and Ecolampadius' and Bullinger's and Beza's and Bucer's approval of his act, he offers no apology. He ridicules Calvin's known clemency in desiring for Servetus decapitation, instead of the torture of slow fire, as though that little amputation were indispensable.² He alleges of Judas that his crime, though great, has probably been exaggerated. It was the crime of signal and earthly

¹ Llewellyn's Tracts, p. 292.

² Theological Essays, Vol. i. p. 65.

presumption; an attempt to forward the purpose of God.¹ "If Judas erred" he says, "all the disciples erred." Then appealing to that charity, "that unique charity which belongs to Christianity, which hopeth all things," he asks men to suspend their verdict. He forgets to make this plea of possible exaggeration and of common blindness in behalf of him who "amiably hunts," as he says, "Servetus to death."² His charity certainly is unique, but hardly consistent; a curiosity of literature for some D'Israeli to register; a charity too short for Calvin, but long enough for Judas! Happy Judas, thus to be recalled within the fold of Christian forgiveness! Unhappy Calvin, sequestered from human affection, tenanted a parish grave! There have been, however, quite respectable apologists for Calvin in his relation to Servetus. M. Guizot says of it, "It is my profound conviction that Calvin's cause was the good one, the cause of social order and of civilization. Calvin acted conscientiously toward what he believed to be truth and duty."³ Andrew Fuller says of the matter in question, "It ought to be acknowledged that persecution for religious principle was not at that time peculiar to any party of Christians, but common to all, when they were invested with civil power. It was an error, and a detestable one, but it was the error of the age. They looked upon heresy in the same light as we look upon those crimes that are inimical to the state, and accordingly proceeded to punish heretics by the sword of the civil magistrate."⁴ In proof of which he shows that Socinus himself was accessory to the imprisonment and death of one Francis Davides, in consequence of difference of religious opinion. This little item is often conveniently overlooked. But for the sake of fair play it should never be; for if it please any one to say, "How was it with Servetus?" the gratification should not be denied to another to say, "And how was it with Francis

¹ Theological Essays, Vol. i. p. 155.

² "During the period of the Reformation," says Hallam, "tolerance in religion was seldom considered practicable." — Constitutional History of England, p. 63.

³ St. Louis and Calvin, p. 326.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 165.

Davides?" Upon a search for the sufferers by religious intolerance, it would violate honor to break so brotherly a fellowship.

We would be the last to exalt Calvin above his faults. He was human, and his unvarying humility, that leading grace of his character, shows how sensibly he was aware of his weaknesses. He was severe; but to none did he apply such rigor of discipline as he did to himself. He was sometimes hard, but he had to be, for there were men on all sides, anxious for a gird at him. "Hard men," says Froude, "for hard times, and intellects that can pierce to the roots where truth and lies part company." He was firm in principle; otherwise he would have lost persistence and power; often impatient in temper, while yet he held the wild beast in iron bars; sober and thoughtful, and how could he be otherwise, with great thoughts of God on his mind? For "Divinity," as Lord Bacon says, "is the Sabbath and port of all men's labors and peregrinations." He was a giant clad in mail; capable of untold powers of resistance; with neither effeminacy nor insipidity about him. He never indulged in poetry to the extent that Luther did, never analyzed the beautiful as did Burke, and yet he lived in the midst of surrounding Alps, encircled with stars. He did not have Luther's genial and sunny humor; and yet it does not follow that he lived like Epimenides, so long in a cave as to find something unnatural in daylight ever after. He was an iron man; of inflexible purpose; "able to inspire and sustain the bravest efforts ever made by man to break the yoke of unjust authority." He was second in the field, and for this reason the Reformation takes less account of his spiritual energy. He was, however, "a necessary antithesis to Luther in the Protestant system."¹ For deep spirituality and profound intellectuality he was greatly Luther's superior. None surpassed him, in unquestioned probity or in spotless moral integrity. He was never frolicsome, as was Luther, yet equally happy and impassioned in "the task of glory and of

¹ Henry's Life of Calvin, p. 319.

good." From his activity in the service of God and of man, no love of ease, nor promise of gain, nor Papal bribe, could turn him away. For fervid and enduring love of the myriads in Europe, who were either in blindness or groping to light, he was unexcelled. For personal interest and outlay in behalf of the imprisoned and the oppressed he will ever be honored as foremost in his time. In true benevolence he was the modern Solon. With all his severity of nature and intensity of labor he was loving and affectionate. "Many a time," Melanethon said, "he wished he could lay his weary head on Calvin's faithful heart, and die there."¹ Taken all in all we may safely say, that few men of Calvin's prominence have left such a record of purity of spirit as he.

II. *His opinions.*—Opposers have greatly questioned these, especially his secular and dogmatic ideas. His theories of church government, for example, have been sharply assailed. Dr. Robert South, with characteristic causticity, is unwilling to consider Geneva the mother church of the world;² does not regard Master Calvin and Master Beza fit correctors of antiquity or prescribers to posterity. He reads of Christ giving "some apostles and some evangelists," but he finds in this catalogue of ecclesiastical dignities, "no lay-elders, no church-aldermen, no spiritual furs." He does not know of a puritan or dissenter in England who would not march to Calvin's anti-monarchical assertions; nor a single traitorous design set on foot in Christendom, not traceable in corresponding virulence to his epistles.³ Dr. South predicted that Puritanism, in time, would show its monstrosity to the world, but the sequel declares Saul not to be among the prophets; while the ideas for which Calvin contended, the independence of church and state and the authority of the Bible over traditional Rome, have been largely endorsed by the progressive nations. Not that Calvin always built on sure foundations; nor that all of his finished work is perfect and right, since this can be affirmed of God alone; but that in the main

¹ "Calvin." — American Cyclopaedia, p. 287.

² Sermons (Bohn's ed.), Vol. ii. p. 87.

³ Ibid. Vol. i. pp. 470, 471.

he championed those ideas of civil and of religious freedom, which needed evolution only to be as they exist to-day.

As a teacher of theological dogmas Calvin is the victim of fierce sarcasm and contemptuous railery. He has been called the pope of Protestantism ; but where an insult was intended he has been honored. He has been called the exponent of the horrible decrees ; but the Genevan Doctor did not coin for human speech the word "predestinated." He found it minted and stamped in the Epistles of Paul. Renan concedes that the dark theology of Calvin, so called, is a shadow cast by the great apostle. "The writings of Paul," he says, "have been a dangerous and a hidden rock ; the causes of the principal defects of Christian theology. Paul is the father of the subtle Augustine, of the unfruitful Thomas Aquinas, of the gloomy Calvinist, of the peevish Jansenist, of the fierce theology which damns and predestinates to damnation."¹ Now whatever service Renan proposed to render to unbelief in this measurement of Paul, he certainly has aided truth unwittingly in philosophically tracing the lineaments of Calvinism to Pauline parentage. We thank him for his genealogical table. If the Apostle to the Gentiles be allowed to speak and write as he is moved by the Holy Ghost, therefore, it is not Calvin who speaks in Calvinism, but God sending forth his lightnings and thunderings by Calvin's mouth. We have long believed this to be true, and feared lest men in heaping odium on the Genevan theology should ignorantly fight against God.

The opposition to Calvinism is an alliance of Socinian and of Arminian forces. With the former Calvinism has little, and with the latter much, in common. The result is, that strife between Calvinism and Arminianism is usually profitless, "ending in a drawn battle." For God's truth is a lyre of many strings, answering to both Calvinistic and Arminian touch ; and certain types of mind play certain wires more sharply than others, when all should be played, if played at all, with trembling hand and agreeing chord. This is, however, a dif-

¹ Renan's *Apostle Paul*.

ficult task—to blend divine sovereignty with human volition, God's determinate counsel with the free offers of salvation. Between this Scylla and Charybdis it is difficult to steer.¹ Calvinism and Arminianism are, doubtless, under divine appointment, to subserve, each in its way, the interests of truth. If one passes judgment upon the other, the result will be a tangle; for, while “the advocate of free-will is appealing to conscience and instinct, to an *a priori* sense of what in equity ought to be, the necessitarian will fall back on the experienced reality of facts.”² Thus Wesley and Whitefield fell out, and made up with each other at a time when the Arminianism of the one was successfully appealing to men to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and the Calvinism of the other was magnifying the sovereignty of the Spirit of God in his gift of a simultaneous revival to two hemispheres—to martyr-like Moravia in Germany, to the slumbering Kirk of Scotland, to England under Wesley, to Wales under Howell Harris, and to America under Jonathan Edwards and Whitefield. The biographer deservedly honors the founder of Arminian Methodism, while yet his volumes are not wanting in facts supporting Calvinism.³ It is thus that God's purpose and man's accountability, seen at different angles of light, become the golden and silver faces of the same heraldic shield. Difficult as is the task of reconciling each to each, it is quite evident that most men attend to personal religion on one or the other of these two sides. On whichever side, it ought to matter little to us, so that Christ the atoning Saviour is received by faith. What if there be an unbridged chasm between the two theologies? What if there are mysteries in God's truth? They are not greater mysteries than the union of body and of soul, or than the action of thought and will. The Bible would not commend itself as it now does, had it no hard things to be understood. Were there no difficulties in our divine Christianity, “the heart,” as Vinet says,⁴ “would leave all to be done by the

¹ Robert Hall, Vol. iv. p. 456.

² Froude's Address on Calvinism, p. 5.

³ Tyerman's Wesley, Vol. i. p. 223.

⁴ Outlines of Theology, p. 512.

mind." Let us not forget, therefore, that the Bible will not submit itself to any system, however real it may be. It will not be made to go on all fours. Calvinism and Arminianism cannot exclude each other, on speculative grounds, from the word of God. Both are in it, in close association, as in the words of Jesus to Judas, "The Son of Man goeth as it is written of him, but woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed." He swings the pendulum between the extremes of Calvinism and of Arminianism, but is silent at the point of mean distance ;

"This lesson teaching, which our souls may strike,
That harmonies may be in things unlike." — Coleridge.

Calvinism has been called a fear theology, and not wholly without reason ; for there is a place for fear in the eternal framework of things, a place for the well-poised balance of passionless justice, a place for the "beautiful, bold brow" of law, but for which everything would be mutinous in divine and human government. Calvinism is a proclamation of a loving, as also of a just God ; but we will take no exception to the charge. It proclaims a righteousness which is not of the law, and ever reminds the world that it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God. Calvinism has been called a letter theology, paying undue honors to Bibliolatry, as the Pontificii do to Mariolatry ; opposed to the deductions of geology and astronomy, because the letter says of the one, "In six days God made heaven and earth," and of the other, "Thou hast established the earth, and it abideth." Had we not heard this charge made with our own ears, we should have doubted it. As we have, we call it frivolous. We have never understood that the Bible is to be regarded as a scientific text-book ; a perfect scientific text-book does not exist. Nor did Calvin assume to have adjusted his theology to all the changing generalizations of scientific progress. Possibly some over-anxious Calvinists have been slow in admitting science as a harbinger of good. Possibly they have been tenacious of traditional interpretations, when nothing was to be lost by concession. If they have carried

their reverence too far for tables and texts, they certainly have never been guilty of vandalism and of sacrilege. Their deference to every "Thus saith the Lord" has been their glory, and continues to be. Calvinism has been called an innovator, unknown to the spirit of Christianity. Dr. William Ellery Channing thus impeached it. Were Calvinism, said he, judged by the spirit of Christianity, and by such a modification of texts as that spirit warrants, it would have no more place in Christianity than popery and heathenism.¹ Channing was a believer in the supernatural. He held the Gospels to be true records, and Jesus to be a character wholly remote from human conception. He confidently expected to see the glorified Saviour, face to face.² He was one of earth's canonized philanthropists. He knew the joy of doing good.

" And thus the common tongue and pen,
Which world-wide echo Channing's fame
As one of Heaven's anointed men,
Have sanctified his name." — Whittier.

But Channing's logic was not always the soundest; for, given the truth of his premise, namely, that the spirit of Christianity is opposed to Calvinism, and his "modification of texts" might be demanded. But, supposing his assumption to be false, what then? Why, his modification of texts becomes the worst kind of exegetical jugglery; reminding one of the student of divinity, who, when asked in his examination how he would reconcile such a text to his theory, replied: "Oh, that is easily got round." We are thinking now of a text that will have to be "got round," and of many others like it, before Calvinism is proved to be an interloper: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honor, and another unto dishonor?"³

There is much to be said in Calvin's praise.

I. *As a Theologian.* — Luther in Germany, and Zwingli in Switzerland, had preceded him; but he was the greatest

¹ Channing's Works, Vol. i. p. 238.

² Ibid. Vol. iv. pp. 1-29.

³ Rom. ix. 21 sq

of the trio. He distanced Luther by many lengths in the unfolding of a purely spiritual church. He was a more perfect freeman in Christ. He broke more completely from the pope and the prelacy. Augustine had given to the world a true theology in the mass, but not until Calvin's time was it reduced to a science. "He brought the *disjecta membra* of the reformed opinions into one body of divinity, which at once commanded the attention and shook the thrones of Europe."¹ Scaliger called him "Solus Calvinus Theologus." Hooker disliked his ecclesiastical discipline, but admitted that "the skilfulest and perfectest divines of his time were of Genevan instruction." All conceded Calvin to be a grand Colossus of Rhodes, standing head and shoulders above all other theologians of his age, stretching over many men who gladly passed beneath his form. Had it been his life-work to have perfected the Institutes only, he would still have been called the master spirit of the Reformation. For simplicity of method, for closeness and exhaustiveness of argument, for perspicuity of interpretation, for purity and solid Latinity of style, these Institutes are deserving of a homage to greatness, to which few uninspired books can ever be entitled. The sovereignty of God is their ruling idea, and about this all other ideas crystallize. There can be no loftier conception than this by the human mind. Its altitudes who can scale; its depths who can fathom; its lengths and breadths who can estimate? The theology of Calvin was Bible-born. If asked for explanation, he would lay his hand upon the text, and add: "That is my authority." With Neander, and all devout souls, he accepted truths he did not fully apprehend. A reasonable religion to everybody would never have been a true religion to him. He wanted a God who would hide himself. He submitted to the necessity of ignorance. Knowing only in part, he lived in expectancy of knowing as he was known. His theology may have been over-freighted on the side of God's eternal purposes, treating too lightly the responsibility of every soul before God; but it was just

¹ Article on "Calvin," by Dr. Henry B. Smith, in *American Cyclopaedia*, p. 283.

the theology to get behind the papal supremacy and the divine right of kings; to lead forth priest-ridden millions from the house of bondage with songs of freedom on their lips; to overthrow sacraments and rituals and monastic vows, and, in fine, the whole system of ecclesiastical charlatanry; to shame corruption, and hurl wicked men from high places; to inspire revolt against all illusion and mendacity; and to flash upon the conscience sincerity, integrity, and truth. It was a theology that attracted to its ranks almost every man, as Froude says, that "hated a lie." It put God before man, and the word of God before tradition. It put personal regeneration before sacraments. Because of Sin ravaging human life more terribly than the desperate hordes of Attila or Timour, it cried, "Woe to the inhabitants of the earth," and because of Redemption following in the track of Ruin, it cried, "Behold the Lamb of God, who taketh away the sin of the world." The effect of this theology was wonderful. It made a pious and heroic life its uniform fruit, as will fully appear in considering Calvin's claim to praise,

II. *As a Moralist.*—We speak of this here, because we have so often heard Calvinism accused of immoral tendencies. From insinuations dropped, one would suppose Calvin to be quite as destitute of practical goodness as Shakspeare's male tiger was of milk. We believe, however, that the theology of John Calvin, when truthfully interpreted, will be seen to have flowered into the most healthful public and private moralities of modern times. We take decided issue with those who regard it as impoverished of sin-restraining power. For, account for it as we may, Geneva became under it, in its best periods, the most moral town in Europe; and for three centuries it has been producing, in the nations that have welcomed it, transformations in moral character unknown to former times. So far from being a bird of ill-omen, it has been a dove, bearing the olive-branch of social and domestic peace everywhere. It has been a mighty propagandism of truth, morality, and civilization. The theology of hope is said to be a better lever to society than it, because hope

appeals to the conviction of the reason and the encouragement of the heart. But the facts look the other way. The moral outlook of reigning Socinianism was never so attractive and ennobling as the outlook of Calvinism. The water-lines of morality were never so high as where Calvinism had truest expression. For robust and sterling morality Switzerland and Holland and Scotland and early New England were never surpassed. Calvinism never tended to human degradation. Huguenots, Puritans, Dissenters, and Covenanters are not to be classified as vicious men. Socinianism talks much of its practical moralities; but where are its anointed kings and priests? Where are its Halls, its Franks, its Eliots, and Brainerds; its Thorntons and Howards; its Saurins, Edwardses, and Chalmers; its Owens and Claudes and Whitefields? Where are the trophies of ungovernable Augustines, of blasphemous Bunyans, of slave-trading Newtons, among its converts? Where are the Sandwich Islands and Karen districts, redeemed and civilized by the coming of its beautiful feet? Where are the sign-boards and figure-heads, pointing to dark places enlightened by its presence? *Where has it shown power in levelling up from beneath itself?* Where has it stiffened, and not relaxed, scriptural authority and religious obligation? Where has its vaunted liberalism been as sweet and unlimited on the side of faith, as it has been on the side of doubt? In what sporadic and occasional benevolence has it shown the kindliness of Calvinism to humanity, whose yearly contributions take the girth of the globe? Calvinism of immoral tendencies? compared with whose generosity of substance and of life Socinianism hardly ever paid a feather's dip of oil in the running expenses of evangelical Christendom? Never! The inaccuracy of this representation of Calvinistic immorality is seen in the results of the life-work of great Calvinistic preachers and theologians.

“In the church of the wilderness Edwards wrought,
Shaping his creed at the forge of thought,
Yet faithful still, in his daily round,
To the weak and the poor and the sin-sick found.”

Men still living have served our colored people nobly ; but, as a matter of fact, Samuel Hopkins started the whole system of charity to the slave.¹ Chalmers was not only the preacher of astronomical discourses rivalling the Waverley Novels in popularity, but the inspirer of ecclesiastical and social reforms that are felt to this day. Dr. Saunderson was chaplain to Charles I. Of him King Charles was wont to say that he carried his ears to other preachers, but his conscience to Dr. Saunderson's Calvinism.² These, and other testimonies like them, confirm us in the belief that to Calvinism is intrusted the power of successful appeal to the hearts and consciences of men. We add to this point one other confirmation : " If we look at those nations," says Rev. Andrew Fuller, " where Calvinism has been most prevalent, it will be found that they have *not been distinguished for their immorality, but the reverse.*"³ The expounder of original sin was the most determined opponent of actual transgression.⁴ He interdicted vice and crime. He was no Antinomian, but insisted rigidly on obedience to the law of God. So far from being impractical, his theology took powerful hold of man's temporal, as also of his eternal interests ; having the promise of the best things in the life that is, as well as in that which is to be. Not to admit the moral effects of Calvinism, is to read modern history blindfolded. Take the influences of the theology and polity of John Calvin away from the earth to-day, and the hands would go back on the dial of progress. There are no factors having the promise of the future as Calvin's doctrines of sin and salvation. These are the two wheels that bear humanity on to better days. But Calvin is praised :

III. *As a Republican.* — He leads the dynasty of republicanism in modern times. He was not a man of kings and priests, but a man of the people. He believed in, and labored incessantly for, a government by the people. Hence it is that Calvinism has been so often called the seed-plot of democracy,

¹ Memoir of Dr. Hopkins, pp. 112-169.

² Calvin's Institutes, Vol. i. p. 9.

³ Vol. ii. p. 150.

⁴ American Cyclopaedia, Vol. iv. p. 285.

the impregnable fortress of popular liberty. Calvin knew of no patent of nobility but the seals of the Invisible. Great as were his labors in theology, his labors in civil law were greater still. These gave him higher title to renown than his Institutes. God overruled his early studies for the legal profession in the fitness he thus acquired for heading the movement of civil and religious freedom. He was a master legislator, a skilful diplomatist. As a ruler, he was respected everywhere. "The wisest of his time," says Hooker, "could not have bettered his system." With plastic hand he moulded the republic of Geneva into the model republic of his time. The polity which revolutionized Scotland was imported there by John Knox, direct from Calvin's instruction. Calvin gave advice to Moravia, to Hungary, and to Poland. He prepared the Dutch for the heroic defence of their national rights. He nerved the French Huguenots. Coligni and Du Bourg hailed him as chief. He anticipated Cromwell in relief for the Waldenses,

"Slain by the bloody Piedmontese, that rolled
Mother and infant down the rocks."

He saved the Genevese from the Roman Catholic Sadolet. He founded English Puritanism. He impressed New England's early character. His own dearly-purchased civil and religious rights were the precious freight conveyed in the Mayflower to the Western world. His own system enwrapped truths as so many capsules, needing development and expansion only to form continental and insular Europe anew, and to shape the bill of rights for every State and Territory in the American Union. "In the reign of Mary," says Rufus Choate, "from 1553 to 1558, a thousand learned Englishmen fled from the stake at home to the happier states of continental Protestantism. Of these, great numbers, I know not how many, came to Geneva. . . . I ascribe to that five years in Geneva an influence which has changed the history of the world. I seem to myself to trace to it as an influence on the English character, a new theology, new politics, another tone of character, the opening of another era of time and of liberty. I seem to myself to trace to it

the great civil war in England, the republican constitution framed in the cabin of the Mayflower, the divinity of Jonathan Edwards, the battle of Bunker Hill, the independence of America.”¹ George Bancroft says: “He that will not honor the memory and respect the influence of Calvin, knows but little of the origin of American liberty.” The watch-words of Calvin summoned millions to break away from ages of misery. To advocates of priestcraft Geneva seemed full of German, French, English, and Scotch heretics. Rome would gladly have burned this asylum of heresy to ashes; but this little Sparta with its mighty chieftain held out, and the postulates of its freedom entered into the preface of the immortal Declaration of 1776. Because of Calvin, the world had a pure reformation and a true republicanism in all ecclesiastical and secular affairs. Greater honor could not be credited to him.

Notwithstanding which, Calvinism is said to be prosaic and unpoetical. “What poem,” it is asked, “has it written?” Our reply is ready. We know not that those Calvinists who fled to their homes and from their homes, across river and meadow and mountain boundaries, across channels and oceans, on wintry days, had any fairy-land pleasure at all, or “one ray of fancy, or one emotion of dainty, poetical taste.” Their hats were steeple-crowned; their beards were unshaven; their trousers were patched. They had membership not at St. Paul’s, nor at Notre Dame, but in the churches of the desert. Their preachers were “preachers of the tub and of the barn.” Their sermons and prayers were “linked sweetness, long drawn out.” They were seldom, if ever, sentimental, and as far removed as possible from dapper *dilettanteism*. Nevertheless, they were *conditores imperiorum* — the “most remarkable body of men, perhaps, which the world has ever produced.”² Pollok, we believe, wrote “The Course of Time”; Bunyan, the “Pilgrim’s Progress”; Cowper, “The Task”; Watts, the fore-

¹ Works of Rufus Choate, Vol. i. p. 378

² Essay of Macaulay on Milton, p. 48.

most of English sacred lyrics; Milton, "Paradise Lost" (said by some to be brilliant). But, letting these pass, what poem have Calvinists written? Oh, ye bones blanched on Alpine cliffs and French fields; ye shades of the Bastile, and of St. Bartholomew's day; ye cool and valorous Ironsides, winning victory for Cromwell at Marston Moor; ye daring companions of Knox and Melville, chiding fearlessly kings and queens; ye satirized, but immortalized body of Puritans, "crushing and trampling down oppression, pierced by no weapons and withstood by no barriers; charmed by no pleasures, and terrified by no deaths"; pursued, and yet pursuing freedom to worship God — your judgment has come, — what poem have you written? We listen as the answer comes: Seen in all our toils and sorrows, separations, and sacrifices, journeyings, voyagings, and fastings from famine and fear; our cells and caves, our stocks and martyr-fires, our enforced expatriations and colonial plantings, you have "a whole Iliad in action," and an epic of heroism more sweet and grand than ever Virgil conceived. We show you deeds of valor of which Achilles and Aeneas never dreamed. We offer you bolder and braver knights than any ever dubbed by St. Michael or St. George. For chivalrous daring and high undertaking we yield not to the crusaders at the gates of the holy city. For lofty enterprises we claim never to have been excelled. For brilliant achievement and sublime self-sacrifice and invincible faith, we challenge the world of romance to excel the reality of our history. What poem has Calvinism written? It has written on the sublime and the beautiful, on the self-denying and the grand, on the tender and the emotional, on the picturesque and the lovely, in a large book of ancestral recollections and inspirations such as the world had never before possessed. Its poetry is its thrilling history and "the mighty visions passing there. The world praises Calvin,

IV. *As an Educator.* Calvin well knew that the best of his principles were insufficient in themselves to stand alone, without a firm basis upon wide-spread intelligence. He was

therefore friendly to the fullest learning. Valuable as are the two principles of civil and of religious liberty, the Goliath either of ignorance or of superstition often strives to come between the mighty columns to pull them over his head. Calvinism is the parent, however, of popular education. Its hero was too far-sighted to neglect the culture of the people. He inaugurated schools in Geneva. He furnished textbooks, as Hallam says, for a long time to English universities. His children were heirs of his spirit in founding Harvard College. *Pro Christo et ecclesia*. He established chairs of Hebrew, of Philology, of Philosophy, and of Theology. Institutions of learning sprang up wherever Calvinism spread. To Calvin, Bancroft credits the invention of the system of free-schools. He was a scholar of great erudition and exegetical power. His influence in substituting general intelligence in the room of the ignorance and superstition of the Roman Catholic masses cannot be too highly estimated. Hundreds upon hundreds, from all parts of Europe, sat at his feet, and drank in his mind-ennobling ideas. He was more than a match for the sophistries of the Sorbonne. The preface to his Institutes takes rank as one of the three immortal prefaces of literature; those of President De Thou and of Casaubon being the other two.¹ He invoked intelligence, as he had invoked religion and liberty, for the masses and the children of the masses. By no other clarion voice has general intelligence been summoned to being as by Calvinism. We hold that it is adapted to awaken the intellect, and to send it forth upon great inquiries, as no other theology is able to do. The greatness and majesty of its doctrines engenders what Bacon calls "large learning." It strikes a fuller music in the soul. The Arminianism of England, for example, "is a greatly less awakening system of doctrine than the Calvinism of Scotland. It does not lead the earnest mind into those abstruse recesses of thought to which the peculiar Calvinistic doctrines form so inevitable a vestibule. Hence it is that Calvinism proves the best

¹ "Calvin." — American Cyclopaedia.

possible of all schoolmasters for teaching a religious people to think. I found," adds Hugh Miller, "no such *peasant metaphysicians* in England as those I have so often met in my own country — men who, under the influence of earnest belief, had wrought their way, all unassisted by the philosophers, into some of the abstrusest questions of the schools."¹ Calvinism in national and individual life has often aroused the deep sleep of the faculties, reasoning and imaginative, which otherwise might have been forever unbroken. It honors intellectuality, therefore, and greatly distances Arminianism, and especially Socinianism, as an awakener of great thought. It strives

"To grasp, in its mighty span,
The purpose of God and the fate of man."

As a theologian, therefore, as a moralist, a republican, and an educator, Calvin is entitled to the praise of mankind. He was progressive in spirit, with little lingering attachment in him, as there was in Luther, to the past. His theology was revolutionary. It may have loudly proclaimed the holiness of God, but it did not the self-righteousness of man. There may have been retrogressions since his day in his own beloved Geneva. A king may have come to the throne knowing not Joseph. The Reformed Church of France, until of late, may have been in retreat. The theology of Hopkins may hold Calvinism in greater harmony than it was held by its founder. The times may be smoother and more delicate than in the days of Bellamy and of the elder Edwards. The need of sermons on "Sinners in the Hands of an angry God" may have passed away, and a theology of rose-water and of sweet-smelling herbs have come into demand. Preachers may find it to their taste to be unto their congregations as a very lovely song of one who has a pleasant voice. But, if priestcraft is ever again to be rebuked, if Pelagianism is ever again to be vanquished, if pious men are to be perpetuated by a belief in the deity and atonement of Christ, if the consciences of men are ever again

¹ First Impressions of England, p. 399.

to be shaken out of their leaden apathy, — in a word, if sin is ever again to be challenged in the name of a holy God, the hope-theology of fairy-land must be made to surrender (as it always surrenders in the revivals of Christendom), and the fear-theology must be heralded — treating of God's "wrath, as revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness." Calvinism can never be at a discount, without threatening ill. Let it never be lightly esteemed; for it has been associated with all the religious and social and intellectual emancipations of the last three hundred years. It has been the key-note to which almost every great soul in all this period has vibrated. It still continues to brand the fear of doing wrong upon the consciences of men. *Its end is not yet*; for it appears and reappears, of necessity, in history; teaching that God is strict to mark and to punish all iniquity and wrong. Modify it or impugn it as we may, it lies on an enduring basis of apostolic thought, on foundations deeper than the Alpine mountains, and firm as the throne of God.

The traveller searches in vain in the Genevan cemetery for the place where Calvin was laid. No man knoweth the place of his sepulchre. He has no monument in marble, in granite, or bronze; nor has he a stone-cut epitaph. He has, however, a monument of great proportions in the work he achieved for man; in the deliverance he secured from tyrannical states and prelates for his body and his soul; in the heroism and high daring he inspired; in the achievements he won for the cause of universal liberty, education, and religion; in the world-wide expansiveness of his republican institutions; in the self-devotions of his brave souled children; in the unswerving fidelity with which he honored and obeyed the word of God. He has an epitaph, also, in five pregnant words of his master Paul's speech, and accepted with great humility and thankfulness as the *dictum* of his theology and the inspiring motive of his life:

"BY GRACE YE ARE SAVED."

ARTICLE II.

THE MEANING OF $\aleph\psi$.BY REV. WILLIAM HENRY COBB, CHILTONVILLE, MASS.¹

ON any Christian theory of inspiration, regard must be paid to the *words* of the sacred record. Though few at the present day would care to defend the old mechanical view, yet the least we can say is that under a divine illumination the writers of the Bible selected their language; and when we find particular words and phrases often recurring, we are authorized to believe that they reveal the mind of the Spirit. We must candidly and patiently inquire: What saith the Scripture? or we shall gain no reliable knowledge of its doctrines. Exegesis is only a preliminary science, it is true. It hews from the quarry the stones with which theology is to build. But the bane of theology has been its hasty architects, who have had their predetermined spaces to fill, and have been ready to accept of any stones that would fill them. Let exegesis decide what the Bible has to say, before the makers of systems tell us what it ought to say.

If this position is correct in general, it is all the more obvious when applied to those truths for which we are ultimately dependent on the Bible; chief among which stands the doctrine of the atonement. When we say that the discussion of the atonement is, in the last analysis, a ques-

¹ About fifteen years ago Professor Park commenced, and brought towards completion, a treatise on this subject, which the state of his eyes has prevented him from finishing. In the autumn of 1871 I was requested to revise his manuscript for publication; but after reading it carefully, I shrank from the great labor requisite to put an inferior piece of cloth on a good, though unfinished garment. I then proposed, and was encouraged, to undertake a fresh investigation on a new plan (described hereafter); and during this search Prof. Park's manuscript was not consulted, until the main results of this Article were reached. I am under the greatest obligations to Prof. Park for the original idea, and for the use of his treatise, which I hope may yet be published; but he is not to be held responsible for any opinion or argument here advanced.

tion of words, we do not disparage, but rather exalt it; for in some just sense those words came from God.

The argument from the Old Testament hinges mainly upon certain verbs, some of the principal of which are הָשִׁיב, סָבַל, נָשָׂא, כָּסַר. By far the most frequently used is נָשָׂא. With its derivatives it occurs eight hundred and ninety-five times, or about once to every chapter.¹ This use is distributed very evenly among the different books. The word must be studied carefully in the original, on account of the great diversity of terms by which our version translates it; fifty-seven words and phrases being used for the *Kal* form alone.

It is necessary to proceed, also, with a reverent desire to find the exact truth, and with a judicial freedom from solicitude about results. As has been well said by a recent writer,² in alluding to the vicarious and sacrificial language of the Bible: "The *usus loquendi* of the words can be determined only by a careful analysis and comparison of *all* the passages in which they severally occur in the original Hebrew, in the Septuagint, and in the New Testament itself."

Whether Dr. Hodge has adopted the plan he recommends may appear questionable, in view of the statement on the previous page, that נָשָׂא, "when construed with sin, always plainly means 'to bear sin,' in the sense of 'being penally responsible' for it."

The present writer ventures to claim for himself an impartial spirit. Having been successively attracted by the moral, the legal, and the governmental theories of the atonement, he came to this study with no views to defend, hoping only to help, by a single word, towards the better understanding of that Book which the whole church in all ages are interpreting.

It is proposed to give an orderly arrangement of the various meanings of נָשָׂא, and the writer has thought it best to adopt

¹ This enumeration excludes two or three passages in Nehemiah, where the better reading seems to be נָשָׂא, but includes the three cases in which the Chaldean נָשָׂא occurs. Dan. ii. 35; Ezra iv. 19; v. 15.

² Dr. A. A. Hodge. "The Atonement," p. 177.

an order of logical dependence, proceeding from the simple to the more complex significations.

The *idea* expressed by the verb before us must have been one of the very earliest which the human mind conceived. When Adam had learned to separate himself in thought from the objects around him, curiosity would soon lead him to try and possess himself of those objects. A beautiful flower is before him ; he puts out his hand and plucks it. If Moses had had this act to describe, he might have said, נָשָׂא, *he took it*.¹

Soon, however, an object is found which resists the effort of our first parent. The heavy stone cannot be picked up like the flower. But Adam applies both hands, and, with an instinctive knowledge of natural philosophy, raises the weight to his shoulders ; and now a new meaning is developed ; for Moses can say, with perfect propriety, נָשָׂא, *he lifted it up*. A few moments of pause, while the man recovers breath, are still characterized by the word נָשָׂא, *he held it up* ; and when Adam finally marches off with his burden, his chronicler writes, נָשָׂא, *he carried it*. If he would describe this latter act relatively to another position, he might say, נָשָׂא, *he brought it* ; or נָשָׂא, *he carried it away*.

This schedule of meanings is at present, of course, only a proposition, which must now be proved by the actual use of the word. We are to bear in mind an advantage of the pictorial language we are handling — that figurative expressions retain the stamp of their original force, and can be so stated as to make that force readily apparent. Phrases in which נָשָׂא occurs with words for *sin* are reserved for a separate treatment.

I. TO TAKE.

Not necessarily to take *up*, though, as a matter of fact, we far more frequently take objects up than down. *To take to one's self* is the general conception.

A. *Literal Applications.*

It is used of a great variety of objects, from a lump of

¹ לָקַח is more usual in this sense, but נָשָׂא the more vivid. — Gesenius.

figs (Isa. xxxviii. 21) to the timber for Solomon's temple (1 Kings v. 9). We give under this division, as under those following, a few specimens only, referring to the table at the close of this Article for further particulars.

Neh. ii. 1, And I took up the wine; Gen. xxvii. 3, Esau takes his weapons, in this case quite as likely taking *down* as *up*; Gen. xliii. 34, the portions of food from Joseph's table; Num. xvi. 15; Job xxiv. 10; Cant. v. 7, to take to one's self what is another's;¹ 1 Sam. xvii. 34, A lion and a bear *took* a lamb. In these last passages there is no emphasis on either up or down.

2 Sam. xix. 43, a gift; Micah ii. 2, houses. Not take them away, but take to themselves.

When applied to heavy burdens, we translate *take*, if the meaning is to obtain possession or take charge of. Not so specific as *lift up*, e.g. 1 Kings v. 9, already quoted. So Deut. xii. 26, votive offerings; 1 Sam. xvii. 20, provision. Ezra v. 15; 2 Chron. xiv. 13. Of persons, 2 Kings ix. 25, 26; Gen. xlv. 19; 2 Kings iv. 20, 36, 37; Jonah i. 12.

B. *Figurative Applications.*

1. To take the face, accept with favor or with partiality, Gen. xix. 21; Lev. xix. 15.

2. To take the name, Exod. xx. 7 (*bis*); Ps. xvi. 4. The name of God should be hallowed; do not *take* it from its sacred shrine, and put it in contact with a lie. Here *take* is used for *put*, by *constructio pregnans*. So Ps. cxxxix. 20.

3. A report of falsehood, Exod. xxiii. 1. Like a ball that is taken up, and passed from hand to hand.

4. Reproach, Ps. xv. 3; Zeph. iii. 18. *Cons. preg.* A takes up reproach and puts it on B; then B has to *bear* it. נָשָׂא expresses this also; Ezek. xxxvi. 6, etc., considered hereafter.

5. The sum. A material object moved into the mind, Num. i. 2; iv. 2, etc.

6. A parable, Num. xxiii. 7; Job xxvii. 1.

7. An oath, 1 Kings viii. 31. *Cons. preg.* — to *take* an obligation, and *lay* it on him, so that he feels it.

¹ See remark on "take away," at the close of the Analysis.

8. Favor, Esth. ii. 9. A peculiar construction = נָשָׂא. To take favor in one's face or eyes is to take favor with one. Esther *took* with Ahasuerus. Bertheau *in loco*; nicht bloss sie erhielt Gunst, sondern sie gewann sich Gunst.

9. A wife, Judg. xxi. 23; 1 Chron. xxiii. 22.

II. TO LIFT UP.

The same general idea as to take, but implying either more painful effort, or more definiteness.

A. *Literal.*

Applied to the eyes, Gen. xiii. 10, 14; xviii. 2, etc., *saepe*; the hand, Lev. ix. 22; the whole person, 2 Kings ii. 16; Ezek. iii. 14.

Of irrational and inanimate objects, for example, locusts, Exod. x. 19; leviathan, Job xli. 17; waves, Ps. lxxxix. 9; High hills are *lifted up*, Isa. ii. 14; lvii. 7. In Deut. iv. 48, *Sion* is perhaps an epithet. A signal, Isa. v. 26; Jer. vi. 1; a throne, Isa. vi. 1.

B. *Figurative.*

1. To lift up the voice (raise it). Often used with other verbs, as Gen. xxi. 16; Judg. ix. 7. Poetically of the floods, Ps. xciii. 3.

2. To lift up the head; pride or honor, Gen. xl. 13; Ps. xxiv. 7, 9; Judg. viii. 28; Ps. lxxxiii. 2. By a pun, to decapitate, Gen. xl. 19.

3. To lift up the face upon one; to favor him. Not drop the head in unconcern, but lift up the countenance and smile, Num. vi. 26. So Ps. iv. 6, the light of thy countenance. To lift up one's own face in prayer, Job xxii. 26.

4. The heart or soul; eager desire, Ps. xxv. 1; Lam. iii. 41.¹ *Cons. preg.*, Deut. xxiv. 15; Ps. xxiv. 4, to lift up the soul and direct it towards the object.

5. To lift up one's self. *a.* To move or stir with zeal,

¹ Prov. xix. 18 should be rescued from our translators. How many parents have steeled their hearts at the command, "let not thy soul spare for his crying," not knowing that Solomon said: "do not be eager to kill him." Perhaps the text is a useful one as it stands.

Exod. xxxv. 21. *b.* With pride (= 2), Num. xvi. 3. *c.* To rouse one's self for deliverance, conquest, or judgment, Ps. vii. 6. *d.* To be great, or increase in greatness, Num. xxiv. 7.

6. To lift up another, to honor him, 2 Kings v. 1; 2 Chron. xxxii. 23 (passive). Also, to help him, give him a *lift*, 1 Kings ix. 11; Ezra i. 4; viii. 36. A *gift* is called נְשִׂיאָה, because it helps one, 2 Sam. xi. 8.

7. Princes, chiefs are *eminent* ones (נְשִׂיאִים). The officers of Israel before the kingdom, and also the heads of the rude tribes around, I have called *chiefs*; those of royal rank, *princes*, Gen. xvii. 20; Numbers and Ezekiel *saepe*.

8. An oracle (נְשִׂיאָה), *lifted up* by the voice (corresponds to 1). Isa. xiii. 1, etc. Many retain the signification *burden*, but the word seems to be a generic one, applied to prophecies of good, as well as of evil.

III. TO HOLD UP.

This phrase is used in the analysis, rather than *bear*, the latter being ambiguous, in meaning to *carry* as well as *hold up*. But in the translation, *bear* is often retained, as more familiar. Most of the figurative significations occur under the words for sin.

A. *Literal.*

Applied to either persons or things. Ps. xci. 12, God's servant, upheld by angels. Isa. xl. 11, lambs. A tree *holds up*, *bears*, its fruit, and its branches, Ezek. xvii. 8, 23; Joel ii. 22. Mountains bear food, Job xl. 20. Sacks hold up their contents, Gen. xlv. 1, so Ezek. xlv. 11. One who *wears* a garment or a jewel holds it up, Exod. xxviii. 12, 29, 30. No special importance is attached to his *carrying* them, but he *holds them up*, as he stands before the Lord, 1 Sam. ii. 28; xiv. 3.

That which is held up is a *load* (נְשִׂאָה) Exod. xxiii. 5. Num. iv. *saepe*. Isa. xlvi. 1 (*bis*), 2.

B. *Figurative.*

1. To hold up the face, head. Conscious rectitude, Gen. iv. 7 (cf. vs. 6) 2 Sam. ii. 22; Job x. 15; xi. 15.

2. To hold up a person, to endure, sustain him, Num. xi. 14; Job xxi. 3; Isa. xlvi. 3, 4; Ps. lxxxix. 51. So when an inanimate object is personified, Gen. xiii. 6; xxxvi. 7. They ravaged the land, so that the land could n't *stand* it. Cf. נָשָׂא in Amos vii. 10. Sodom is put by metonymy for its inhabitants Gen. xviii. 24, 26, where נָשָׂא is used with לָ; hold up respecting the place. So of Israel, Num. xiv. 19; Isa. ii. 9.

3. To hold up, endure, various objects considered as burdensome. *a.* Government, Deut. i. 12; Exod. xviii. 22; Num. xi. 17 (with אֵל, giving a partitive sense, *share in*; also in the same verse, with direct object). *b.* A debt, 2 Kings xviii. 14. He would stand up under whatever Sennacherib laid on. Our cant phrase "to stand the pressure" fits this exactly.¹ *c.* Grief,² Jer. x. 19. *d.* Reproach, shame, Ps. lv. 12; Jer. xv. 15; Ezek. xxxix. 26.

IV. TO CARRY.

Easily derived from the previous by *constructio pregnans*. To hold up, and move.

A. *Literal.*

Persons, Gen. xlv. 27; 1. 13; 1 Kings xviii. 12. Sacred things, Exod. xxv. 14; xxxvii. 14; 1 Kings xiv. 28. Spices, Gen. xxxvii. 25. Tithes, Deut. xiv. 24. Weapons, Judg. ix. 54, so often in the phrase armor-bearer (one carrying weapons). Idols, Jer. x. 5 (*bis*). The word is applied to a great variety of objects. See table.

B. *Figurative.*

From the nature of the word there is no need of placing metaphorical expressions under this head, rather than (III.), unless there is some emphasis on the idea of motion. This seems to be the case in Num. xi. 12; Deut. i. 31 (*bis*); Exod. xix. 4; Isa. lxiii. 9, and with a few of the words for sin.

The renderings "bring" and "carry away" require

¹ The graver readers of the Bibliotheca Sacra may need to be told that the boys use this expression of pecuniary affairs.

² Isa. liii. 4 really belongs here, in my judgment, but is examined with the words for sin.

scarcely any comment beyond what is supplied by a glance at the table.

Take is used rather than *bring* when the verb of motion is added, e.g. Gen. xlv. 19; 1 Chron. xvi. 29.

Take away is ambiguous, meaning either to take what is another's, as in some texts under I. A., or to carry away, as in Hosea i. 6. Also used of God's taking away the life, as taking it to himself, 2 Sam. xiv. 14; Job xxxii. 22.¹ It should not be confounded with *remove*, *put away*.

נָשָׂא IN RELATION TO SIN.

Gen. iv. 13; xviii. 24, 26; l. 17 (*bis*); Exod. x. 17; xxiii. 21; xxviii. 38, 43; xxxii. 32; xxxiv. 7; Lev. v. 1, 17; vii. 18; x. 17; xvi. 22; xvii. 16; xix. 8, 17; xx. 17, 19, 20; xxii. 9, 16; xxiv. 15; Num. v. 31; ix. 13; xiv. 18, 19, 33, 34; xviii. 1 (*bis*), 22, 23, 32; xxx. 16; Josh. xxiv. 19; 1 Sam. xv. 25; xxv. 28; Job vii. 21; Ps. xxv. 18; xxxii. 1, 5; lxxxv. 3; xcix. 8; Isa. ii. 9; xxxiii. 24; liii. 4, 12; Jer. xlv. 22; Ezek. iv. 4, 5, 6; xiv. 10; xvi. 58; xviii. 19, 20 (*bis*); xxiii. 49; xlv. 10, 12; Hosea xiv. 3; Micah vii. 18.

It will be seen by a glance at these passages that in the great majority of instances the meaning *hold up*, *bear*, is the only suitable one. Sin is conceived of as a heavy load, the *burden* of the Pilgrim's Progress, not punishment nor liability to punishment, but sin itself. The metaphor is sufficiently familiar in all languages. "Sin hangs heavy on my soul." The awakened sinner feels his guilt pressing him down into despair. The murderer cannot stand up erect among his fellow-men, because the weight of his "guilty secret" overwhelms him. It is often claimed that in the Bible, as in the old classic poetry,² sin and its punishment are not carefully distinguished in idea; sin itself being the punishment of sin. It is true that where the word *punishment* occurs in the English version, it is almost always נָשָׂא or חָטָא (חַטָּא) in the

¹ The thought seems to be: "Why should I give flattering titles? Soon my Maker will take me where all are on a common level."

² Tyler's "Theology of the Greek Poets," p. 178.

original; but this can hardly be due to the want of a word for expressing positive infliction apart from the crime; the Hebrew has several such, as נָקַם, deriv. נָקַם and נָקַם, generally rendered *avenge* and *vengeance*, and of very frequent use. May it not be, then, that our version is at fault in incorporating into the words for sin an idea suggested only by the connection in which they are used? But let us not anticipate results which will appear plainer when we have examined the texts in question.

Though, as has been said, נָשָׂא in these passages commonly has the sense of *bear*, yet there are not wanting cases in which the meaning is to *take* or *lift up* upon one's self, e.g. Lev. xix. 17: "Thou shalt in any wise rebuke thy neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him," Eng. vers.; "οὐ λήψῃ δι' αὐτὸν ἁμαρτίαν," Sept.; "Sünde auf dich ladest," Van Ess. By failure to rebuke a neighbor, one draws sin upon himself, contracts it. Keil and Delitzsch on this verse: "The phrase means not to have to bear or atone for a sin on his account, but to bring sin on one's self, which one has then to atone for; from which the meaning *to bear*, i.e. atone for sin, or suffer its consequences, was first derived."

I have transcribed the whole remark, so as not to seem to garble the quotation; though we have to do at present neither with the exegetical nor the theologic inferences, but with the fact that the phrase here means to bring sin upon one's self. The same commentators say on Num. xviii. 32: "They would load no sin upon themselves in so doing = Lev. xix. 17." Luther's version reads here "Sünde auf euch laden." Let us notice now the analogy between the sin of ceremonial defilement and disease. One who approaches a contagious person *contracts* the disease, *takes* it, as we say. So one who approaches a dead body, for instance, or a leper, contracted defilement; took upon himself, according to one method of speech, a stain, which must be washed away, or, according to another, a load, which must be somehow lifted off, or he would have to bear it. The same consequence followed on contact with a holy place or thing by an improper

person, or one unfitly prepared. In general, when one walked in the way of transgression, he found attached to him this burden of sin. Of course God put it on him by his providence, just as he would put on him disease; but the human agency is the same in either case. In Num. xviii. 22 the children of Israel are forbidden to come near the tabernacle, "to incur sin, to die." The result of their coming would be the contracting of sin; the result of that contraction, death. The Sept. has it exactly: λαβεῖν ἁμαρτίαν θανατηφόρον, to take a death-bearing sin. (See Jas. i. 15.) So the Vulgate: "nec committant peccatum mortiferum"; Luther: "Sünde auf sich zu laden, und sterben"; DeWette: "eine Schuld aufladen." Exod. xxviii. 43. The linen breeches for Aaron and his sons were to cover them when they stood at the tabernacle or the altar; "And they shall not incur iniquity and die." Death was the punishment of this sin, but if נָשָׂא צָרָה means to bear punishment, God says they shall not die and die. Such an emphatic repetition would give a possible sense, but one far less simple than the one we have employed, not to urge that we have no reason yet to suppose the phrase can mean "to bear punishment." The Sept. is again peculiarly instructive: οὐκ ἐπάξονται πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἁμαρτίαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνωσι; they shall not bring iniquity upon themselves, in order that they die not.

Lev. xxii. 9. The first half of this chapter relates to the provisions for the priests; "the holy things," which could not be approached by one who was unclean. By all these ceremonies, God was patiently engraving the idea of holiness upon the hearts of his people.¹ "And they shall keep my ordinance, and shall not incur sin on account of it, and die thereby." Sept. ἵνα μὴ λάβωσι δι' αὐτὰ ἁμαρτίαν, καὶ ἀποθάνωσι δι' αὐτά; the German versions, auf sich laden. The transgressor loads sin upon himself, therein becoming *subject* to it (*subjaceant peccato*, Vulgate here.)

Vs. 16: "And cause them to incur a wrong of transgression"; bring upon themselves, ἐπάξουσιν ἐφ' ἑαυτούς, Sept.

¹ Walker's "Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation," chap. v.

Gesenius in his Thesaurus says under נָשָׂא : “ Sq. עָל, pregn., *sustulit* et posuit *super* al. Sic נָשָׂא עָלַיךְ הָטָא, imposuit sibi ipsi culpam, i.e. contraxit culpam (er lud eine Sünde auf sich) Lev. xxii. 9; Num. xviii. 32, quoniam peccatum oneri comparari potest.”

Perhaps we should bring under this head Lev. v. 1. Many commentators make the first four verses of this chapter the protasis; the apodosis only coming in at vs. 5. The meaning of נָשָׂא would be the same in either case. The special sin spoken of is that of refusing to testify. By so doing, the soul draws iniquity upon himself, the suffix being the objective genitive, if we take this rendering. The phrase may also mean, “Then he shall bear his iniquity,” answering to passages considered hereafter. The phrase evidently corresponds to אָשָׂא in the following verses, and the Hebrew fits equally well the rendering in the preterite “and hath borne,” or the future, “then he shall bear.” Authorities differ on the verse, and are sometimes inconsistent with themselves. Calvin says: “He should be unclean until he had offered a propitiation; for this is to bear his iniquity; as if Moses had said that he contracts guilt,” etc. Gesenius in his Lexicon, under אָשָׂא, says of Lev. iv. 22: “*Then he is guilty*, has contracted guilt; here נָשָׂא צִוּוֹ = אָשָׂא in Lev. v. 1, 17.” But under נָשָׂא 4, (d) we read, “נָשָׂא צִוּוֹ, to bear one’s own sin, i.e. to suffer its punishment, Lev. v. 1, 17.” To contract guilt and to suffer punishment can hardly be the same thing. Keil and Delitzsch interpret verses 2, 3, 4, and 5 as referring to the contraction of guilt (אָשָׂא), but make vs. 1 refer to enduring punishment. But the *or* at the beginning of each verse (וְ) seems to place all these statements on a common footing: in these several ways the sinner draws upon himself guilt which is lifted off by the process described in verses 5 and 6. I would not insist on the meaning *take*, in vss. 1 and 17, though it seems quite as natural as *bear*.

When one has contracted sin, taken it or lifted it up upon himself, he has then to hold it up, to bear it.

Lev. xxiv. 15. Each man when he shall curse his God,

then he shall bear his sin. His iniquity rested upon him, and the punishment of it is set forth in the following verse.

Num. ix. 13. A man who does not keep the passover incurs guilt in disobeying the ordinance of God; he has to hold up the weight of this guilt: "That man shall bear his sin," which in this case is punished by excommunication. So of the unfaithful woman in Num. v. 31: "This woman shall bear her iniquity," which was punished by dreadful temporal judgments. Parallel passages are Lev. xx. 17, 19, 20.

Lev. vii. 18. The peace-offering was a symbol of fellowship with God; through free grace God admitted the sinner to this feast with himself. But it must be in his own appointed way. If the sinner is careless about the ordinance, he is excluded from pardon, he must still *bear* the iniquity which would have been lifted from him. So Lev. xix. 18.

Lev. xvii. 16. One who has eaten forbidden meats has contracted defilement; it is prescribed that he shall wash his clothes, and bathe himself in water. Even then he has a stigma upon him till the evening. But if he neglects the washing, he cannot be justified; his sin is fastened on him as a heavy load, and he must bear it.

Num. xiv. 34. The transgressors were to wander in the wilderness forty years, and bear their iniquities. Coupled with this is the threat: "In the wilderness shall they be consumed, and there shall they die." The weight of their guilt is so great that they stagger under it in crooked ways for many years, till they sink exhausted with the weary load. The transition is very easy, as this passage suggests, from the idea of bearing sin to that of bearing punishment. As Professor Park expresses it: "Sin presses the sinner down *in* punishment and *into* punishment." But a class of passages in Ezekiel will show us that it is perfectly in accordance with the usage of the verb to retain the natural meaning of sin in this figure.

Ezek. xxxiv. 29. In the blessed time when God shall gather his flock and appoint the Messiah their Shepherd, "they shall not bear the shame of the heathen any more."

The conception is certainly very facile of shame as a material thrust upon the chosen people until it becomes a heavy burden. We speak of "heaping reproaches" upon one, who is thus "laden with obloquy." The image is a frequent one, see xxxvi. 6, 7, 15; xliv. 13; especially the striking figures in xxxii. 24, 25, 30, where the dead foes of Israel are personified as having to bear the insults cast upon them. The phrase is applied to Israel under the image of a harlot, xvi. 52 (*bis*), 54.

Observe, now, the transition to "bearing sin." In xvi. 52, 54, it is bearing shame; in vs. 58, it is bearing lewdness and abominations; in xxiii. 35, lewdness and whoredoms; vs. 49, they shall recompense your lewdness upon you, and ye shall bear the sins of your idols. In xliv. 10, 12, the priests bear their iniquity; vs. 13, they bear their shame, *and* their abominations which they have committed. In xxxix. 26 it is said of the house of Israel, "after that they have borne their shame, *and* all their trespasses whereby they have trespassed against me."

Is it not perfectly clear that the sin and the shame are borne in the same way? To bear sin is not, by a fiction of law, to become penally responsible for it, any more than to bear shame is. We have all felt the load of shame; have we not also felt the load of sin? David is but the spokesman of every awakened conscience, when he exclaims (Ps. xxxviii. 4), "Mine iniquities are gone over mine head; as a heavy burden (מִשָּׂא) they are too heavy for me." Just what Cain had said centuries before: "My iniquity is too great to bear."

It is worth noticing that in these passages in which the bearing of shame and iniquity are coupled, it is moral discipline that is described, resulting in the benefit of the sufferers. See Ezek. xvi. 60-63; xxxiv. 29, 30; xxxvi.; xxxix. 25-29; xliv. 10-14; comp. also Micah vii. 9. But in Ezek. xiv. 10 נָשָׂא עֲוֹנָם is rendered, "They shall bear the *punishment of their iniquity*"; while to the עֲוֹנָם following the sense of *punishment* is twice given. Our translators should have refrained from giving a commentary here, should have rendered

the words faithfully; and yet the idea of punishment is plainly suggested, while it is not expressed, by the original. That which was a chastisement, resulting in good, to the house of Israel (vs. 11, 22, 23), became a punishment, resulting in ruin, to the false prophets and their deluded followers (vs. 7-9). The same burden which pressed penitent David down upon his knees overwhelmed obstinate Cain and Judas in the gulf of despair.

We have seen that one may take upon himself, and hold up or sink under his own sin; it is also true that the sin of one person is said to be taken and borne by another person or thing.

Num. xiv. 33. Not only were the Israelites to bear their own iniquities (vs. 34), but their children were involved in the common evil. They shall "bear your whoredoms." Here is the doctrine of social liability. God *visits* (by his *providence*) the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, Exod. xx. 5. The latter are not made sinners, are not said in these passages even to be held as sinners. But they are in the same boat with the sinners, and share, in some degree, their fate. I can suffer keenly in bearing the shame of another, without any consciousness of meriting shame. So I may have his sins laid upon me, in the providence of God, and be compelled to endure some of their consequences. The father bears the iniquity of a wicked son quite as truly as the son receives his load by natural generation.

Ezek. xviii. 19, 20. "The condition of solidarity" must not be pushed too far. It is not true that God *punishes* men for the sins of others, and this chapter thoroughly refutes that belief. Notice the form of the construction in these two verses. נָשָׂא is used with בָּ, to bear *in* the iniquity, partake of it. Even a share in this guilt is denied. Here, as elsewhere, נָשָׂא בְּיָדָא is "to bear iniquity," and it is the context which determines that the burden would sink its victim into spiritual death. No portion of such a load is rolled upon the innocent, and in attestation of this God himself makes the appeal: "Are not my ways equal?" (vs. 29).

Two points are clear thus far :

(1) One cannot bear the sin of another in the same sense in which he bears his own sin, by suffering its punishment.

(2) One may bear the sin of another by suffering in consequence of it. To proceed :

(3) One may bear the sin of another, aimed against himself, by withholding his displeasure, and treating the offender graciously. Here come in the texts in which נָשָׂא is rendered *forgive*. It has been usual to explain these from the signification, "take away." God forgives our sins, it is said, by putting them behind his back, by sinking them in the depths of the sea. But the fatal objection to this view is that נָשָׂא allows one to take an object away only by taking it to himself. Had writers always distinguished between "*take away*" and "*put away*," we should have been spared some shallow reasoning on the atonement from the supporters of the moral theory.¹ It may be safely asserted that, if we had no previous opinion as to what these texts ought to mean, we should explain them by conceiving the forgiving party to take upon himself and hold up the sin of the other.

And does not this give us a deeper insight into the meaning of forgiveness? It is much to overlook an offence, and let it pass out of the memory. Men think it most magnanimous to forgive and *forget*. But is it not a grander thing, even among us, when one who is smarting under a sense of remembered injuries yet *bears* with the wrong, and *endures* the wrong-doer? We need not resort to any "Hebraism" to comprehend one of our commonest phrases. "I can't *bear* you," we say. "I will bear from that man what I would not from another."

Joseph's brethren had heaped many wrongs upon him, and they feared that after their father's death he would no longer endure these injuries. So they sent a messenger in that father's name, praying: "*Bear* now the trespass." (Gen. l. 17, the phrase is repeated with ב, "hold up respecting

¹ See note on "take away" at the close of the analysis.

the trespass)." Pharaoh prays Moses and Aaron: "*Bear* now my sin only this once," Exod. x. 17. So Saul to Samuel (1 Sam. xv. 25), and Abigail to David (xxv. 28).

Human feelings and actions are transferred to our language about God. Every sin is an insult cast upon our Maker, and he is represented as bearing up under the weight of these wrongs. He is long-suffering; his mercy endureth forever. The burden of hypocritical feasts fatigues him (Isa. i. 14, "They are a trouble unto me; I am weary to *bear*," almost = "I can't bear them"). This bearing has a twofold aspect: it is subjectively, enduring wounded feelings, thus coming under (2), and objectively, holding back the retributive sentiment from inflicting merited judgment.

Sometimes forbearance ceases to be a virtue: Jer. xlv. 22, "Jehovah could no longer hold out before the evil of your works." Isa. ii. 9, "So do not thou *bear* with them." Exod. xxiii. 21, spoken of the Angel guide: "Provoke him not; for he will not bear with your trespasses." So Joshua xxiv. 19.

Exod. xxxii. 32, Moses prays, "If thou wilt bear their sin!" But God visits their sin upon them (vs. 34), recompenses it, makes them bear it themselves; he plagues the people (vs. 35). Still, the general picture of himself which the Lord reveals is of one gracious and forgiving. So he declares to Moses (Exod. xxxiv. 7), "Bearing iniquity and trespass and sin." In Num. xiv. 18, 19, the great leader reverently recalls this description, as also the fact that it had been verified: "As thou hast borne with this people from Egypt even till now."

The sin of Sodom and Gomorrah was very grievous, כְּבִדָּה, *heavy exceedingly*; but Abraham appeals to God's well-known character to *bear* with the place (Gen. xviii. 24), and God would have done so (vs. 26) had the facts agreed with the "peradventure," thus lightening the load.

Micah vii. 18. "Who is a God like unto thee, *bearing* iniquity?" The Psalmist declares (xxxii. 5): "Thou didst bear the wrong of my sin"; (lxxxv. 2) "Thou hast borne the iniquity of thy people"; (xcix. 8) "A God enduring thou

wert to them"; and so is encouraged to pray (xxv. 18), "Bear with all my sins." So Job (vii. 21), "Why wilt thou not bear my trespass?" and in Hosea xiv. 2, the Lord dictates the petition: "Thou wilt bear [we pray] all iniquity."

The Bible clearly teaches, then, that *God bears sin*. The Infinite One cannot forget; it is literally true that all our past sins are present to him, and that every blessing descends upon us from a heart that is grieved at this cruel treatment, and is keeping our deserts from rolling upon us. Let us be careful how, in our zeal for half the truth, we deny that there is something answering to Gethsemane and the cross in the bosom of the eternal Father—something in nowise interfering with his blessedness; for what can be more blessed than mercy and grace?

But God bears not only sin, but sinners. He holds them up from the destruction into which their guilt would sink them; even as David describeth this free grace (Ps. xxxii. 1), "Blessedness! *borne* as to trespass, covered as to sin"; and Isaiah (xxxiii. 24), "The people that dwell therein shall be *borne* as to iniquity."¹ We might, perhaps, place here the passages just quoted, in which נָשָׂא occurs with the dative of the person. Num. xiv. 19; Isa. ii. 9; Gen. xviii. 24, 26; Ps. xcix. 8. But "to bear up respecting" a person seems rather to suggest the image of bearing the sin than of holding up the individual.

(4) One may bear the sin of another as a representative. Ezek. iv. 4, 5, 6. The prophet was to lie upon his side, and bear the iniquity of Israel three hundred and ninety days; after which the iniquity of Judah was to rest on him for forty days. Meanwhile the siege of Jerusalem, pictured out on a tile, was before him. His strange attitude and occupation must have arrested the attention of all, and they learned from his prophecy the distress which was to come

¹ This latter text, to be sure, might be so rendered as to teach that the *sin* is borne: "As to the people, iniquity borne," following the construction of the Vulgate. But in Ps. xxxii. 1, *sin* and *covered* cannot agree in gender, and the participles must be in the construct state before their secondary objects.

upon their nation — a calamity vividly impressed upon them by this object-lesson. It is expressly said (vs. 3): "This shall be a sign to the house of Israel." God had laid these sins on Ezekiel symbolically, and he was set before the people as a representative of Israel; his sufferings being a type of what the nation would endure when they should have to bear their own iniquity. He was no more "penally responsible" for that iniquity than Forrest was for the sins of Macbeth. His *typical* relation was precisely that of the actor; while there is to be added, of course, the fact that the prophet was one of the nation he represented, and felt keenly the burden of the woes he foretold; thus bearing their sins in the sense noticed under (2).

Num. xxx. 15. In those ancient times the husband was head of the family, and stood for his wife in matters civil and ecclesiastical. The latter might make a vow; but her husband could establish it or make it void (vs. 13). To illustrate the principles laid down in this chapter, the woman solemnly declares: "I will give to the Lord an ephah of wheat." "No," replies the husband; "that is my wheat, and I forbid it." No guilt is incurred by either party; for the offering would have been voluntary; "the Lord shall forgive her" (vs. 8, 12). If the husband says nothing at the time of the vow, then, by the silent consent of the responsible agent, a burden rests upon the wife, which she must discharge or incur guilt (vs. 11). Suppose, however, the man *afterwards* desires to keep his wheat, and prevents the execution of the vow (vs. 15); then he transfers the guilt to his own shoulders; he is her representative, and must bear her iniquity. Here is the first, and perhaps we shall find the only, instance where נָשָׂא, with a word for sin, means what we were told it "always plainly" means, penal responsibility. But let us carefully notice that there is here a *real*, not a declarative, transfer of sin. The husband is *held* guilty, because he *is* guilty; while the wife is wholly innocent.

Num. xviii. 1, 23. The plague had swept away its thousands, and the people cried: "Behold, we die, we perish;

we all perish." According to that wonderful ritual which cannot be too much studied, a holy rite or a holy person was needful to purify the unclean, to make atonement for sin. The people contracted iniquity by drawing near the manifested presence of God (vs. 22, already explained); they must be taught, at whatever cost, the difference between holy and unholy. Hence the anger of the Lord consumed the presumptuous; they could not hold up their sins before him. But Aaron and his tribe had been specially consecrated. Endued with this ceremonial sacredness, they could draw near the tabernacle, as the representatives of Israel, taking upon themselves and bearing the iniquity of the congregation (vs. 23). But he before whom the heavens are not clean beheld iniquity in the sanctuary, in the chosen tribe themselves. From among the children of Levi, therefore, the priests, the family of Aaron, were to bear this iniquity (vs. 1); while the iniquity of the priesthood itself was to be assumed by the most august representatives in the nation — the high-priest and his sons.

Exod. xxviii. 38. A special case of the preceding, where Aaron himself bore the sins of the people. Even "the holy gifts" of the children of Israel were defiled by sin. The high-priest wore upon his forehead a plate of pure gold, on which was engraved, "Holiness to the Lord." God, so to speak, beheld this symbol rather than the sin-stained offerings, and was reminded that the representative was separate from sinners. The holy sanctified the unholy; the pure was an antidote, or antiseptic, to the impure; so Aaron could "bear the iniquity of the holy things" when he went in before the Lord.

Lev. x. 17. This singular episode between Moses and Aaron sheds an interesting light upon the sacrifices. Cf. vi. 24-30 with x. 16-20. The goat of the sin-offering was most holy, whatsoever touched it was holy; hence the priests were to eat it in the holy place, and thus the sins of the people, for which the goat was offered, having been transferred through the animal to the sacred priests, were rep-

resentatively borne. Moses was angry that the goat had not been eaten, but Aaron reminded him of the judgment from heaven which had fallen that day upon the priestly family. They were all, in a sense, unclean, even though the anointing oil of the Lord was upon them (vs. 7). They might eat the meat-offering which was their due (vss. 12, 13), but could not make atonement for the sins of the people.

Lev. xvi. 22. The great scheme of symbol-worship culminated on the day of atonement. How far the people understood and profited by the *spiritual* lessons of the day, it may be impossible to say. But *ceremonially* their sins were all pardoned, and no pains were spared to assure them of the fact. The goat of the sin-offering was again introduced, but this time there were two. One was slain, and his blood sprinkled upon the mercy-seat, the tabernacle, and the altar. Even these holy places needed cleansing, because they were in the midst of the polluted congregation (vss. 16, 19). The blood of the goat answered the double purpose of covering the sins of the people, and purifying the sanctuary (vss. 16, 17). But a further evidence was to be afforded of the enormity of sin and the fact of its pardon. Upon the head of the live goat the iniquities of the people were laid, in a figure. As Ezekiel, though innocent, had to bear the burden of his nation's guilt, so the sacred goat held up and carried (for both meanings are included here) the iniquities of the congregation. It represented the people, and stood in their stead, a warning sign to them of the burden of sin which they would have to bear if they persisted in it, but also, and especially, a gracious sign of God's pardon, for the sin was for this time carried away, and need burden them no more.

Isa. liii. 4. *Our diseases he hath borne.* It is perhaps the common opinion that this refers to Christ's bearing our sins. The opposite view, which would understand it according to the literal rendering, is held, it may be well enough to remark, by many able and orthodox expositors. We are concerned much more, however, with the manner in

which the sacred writers use the word, than with the views of commentators.

נִשָּׂא is never rendered *sin* in our version. It is translated sickness, disease, grief. Dr. Magee in his work on the atonement has endeavored to show that it refers to maladies of the body, while the corresponding word נִכְאָב in the same clause, relates to mental pains. So Kennicott. So far as I know, the word here has never been *translated* "sins," except by the LXX. But it is said the phrase *relates* to bearing sin, (1) because the entire chapter describes Christ's vicarious suffering for our sins; (2) because Peter quotes and explains it 1 Pet. ii. 24, where the whole context is drawn from this chapter. The authority of the Sept. would strengthen these arguments, and also the apparent fact that Peter quotes from its rendering of this verse. The last, though often assumed, seems to be a mistake; Peter is quoting vs. 12, where the words *αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας ἀνήνεγκεν* are identical in the Sept. and in Peter. The fourth verse reads in the Sept. *τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν φέρει*. We do not question, rather we insist upon, the fact, that נִשָּׂא is used of Christ's bearing sin; (see remarks on Isa. liii. 12;) but what we object to is the rendering of this passage so.

As to the first point, that the whole chapter relates to Christ's vicarious sufferings for our sins, we need not deny that his bearing our diseases was an important part of his atonement; thus the passage is in complete harmony with its context. But it is the context and not the text which teaches that Christ suffered for our sins, for (1) There is no reason for departing from the obvious meaning of the words, "our diseases he hath borne;" (2) for this rendering we have the inspired authority of the apostle Matthew (viii. 16, 17).

This latter passage has caused great trouble to those theologians who have seen in it an apparent contradiction between the evangelist and the evangelical prophet. Dr. Hodge says in explanation of it (Atonement p. 178); "It is a notorious fact, admitted by all scholars, that the New

Testament writers quote the Old Testament freely, accommodating the sense to a present purpose." But it is a fact just as well known that the passage before us is an exact literal translation by Matthew from the original Hebrew. A glance at the two versions suffices to show that it is the LXX who have quoted freely.

As to the authority of the Sept., it is the opinion of some scholars that its original text read *ἀσθενίας*. I admit that this looks like a later change, but if we accept the reading as it stands, with the infrequent *φέρει* for חָבֵר, and the unheard-of *ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν* for חַטֹּאתֵינוּ, we can only say that the LXX have inserted an unauthorized idea into their translation; a fact abundantly paralleled in that venerable version.¹

¹ It may not be amiss here to present a list of the Septuagint renderings of חַטָּא with the words for sin. They are arranged in the order of their first occurrence.

ἀποτίθημι,	Gen. iv. 13.
ἀνίημι,	Gen. xviii. 24; Josh. xxiv. 19; Isa. ii. 9.
ἀφίημι,	Gen. xviii. 26; l. 17; Ex. xxxii. 32; Ps. xxv. 18; xxxii. 1, 5; lxxxv. 3; Isa. xxxiii. 24.
δέχομαι,	Gen. l. 17.
προσδέχομαι,	Ex. x. 17.
ὑποστέλλω,	Ex. xxiii. 21.
ἐξαίρω,	Ex. xxviii. 38; Mic. vii. 18.
ἐπάγω,	Ex. xxviii. 43; Lev. xxii. 16.
ἀφαιρέω,	Ex. xxxiv. 7; Lev. x. 17; Num. xiv. 18.
λαμβάνω,	Lev. v. 1, 17; vii. 18; xvi. 22; xvii. 16; xix. 8, 17; xx. 17, 20; xxii. 9; xxiv. 15; Num. v. 31; ix. 13; xiv. 34; xviii. 1 (<i>bis</i>), 22, 23, 32; xxx. 16; Ezek. iv. 4, 5, 6; xiv. 10; xviii. 19, 20 (<i>bis</i>); xxiii. 35, 49; xlv. 10, 12, 13; Hos. xiv. 3.
ἀποφέρω,	Lev. xx. 19.
ἵλεως γίνομαι,	Num. xiv. 19 (<i>εὐίλατος</i> Ps. xcix. 8).
ἀναφέρω,	Num. xiv. 33; Isa. liii. 12.
αἴρω,	1 Sam. xv. 25; xxv. 28.
λήθην ποιέω,	Job vii. 21.
φέρω,	Isa. liii. 4; Jer. xlv. 22.
κομίζω,	Ezek. xvi. 58.

This table may serve to correct the loose statements frequently made on this subject. To go no further than the work on the atonement already cited, we read (Hodge, p. 177): "The authors of the Septuagint translation render these words (חָבֵר and חַטָּא) sometimes with *αἴρω*, to *bear*—to bear away; but

To resume the discussion of Isa. liii. 4, the question arises, "How could Matthew say that Christ bore our diseases when he healed them?"

We are to think of a pure and sensitive soul, brought into contact with forms of suffering, and beholding in them but a specimen of the miseries of a groaning world. For a faint image of this feeling in Jesus, we might refer to Mrs. Stowe's beautiful picture of the child Eva, listening to the sickening stories of cruelty that came to her ears. "These things sink into my heart," she said. To the heart of Jesus, all our woes and pains were present, and they pierced him through with many sorrows. Many have thought that in some way he entered physically into the sufferings of those whom he healed. See Lange on Matt. viii. 17. Whether this be true or not, we have a sufficient explanation of the language of Matthew in that he "bore them on his feeling." At the close of a long and wearing day he is besieged by a multitude of fresh demands upon his healing ministry. With patient love the good Physician *takes up* these new cases, bears the burden of manifold diseases, and sustains the assaults of evil spirits, "that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, "Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses." So bearing, he bears

often also with φέρω and ἀναφέρω which can only mean to *bear* in the sense of *bearing on one's self* in order to *bear away*."

Upon this I remark (1) נָשָׂא, with its derivatives, occurs twenty-six times in the Bible, twenty-three of which refer to bearing burdens, three only to bearing sin, even including the passage under discussion, Isa. liii. 4, where the Sept. has περι ἡμῶν ὀδυνᾷται; the two others are Isa. liii. 11 (ἀναφέρω), and Lam. v. 7 (ὑπέχω). Dr. Hodge was certainly within bounds therefore in saying on the previous page that נָשָׂא "has a more diversified usage than סָבַל."

(2) The implication in the contrasted "sometimes" and "often" needs to be set right. Αἶρω is the regular verb for translating נָשָׂא when it means "to lift up"; it occurs oftener than any other word. With the words for sin, however, neither αἶρω, φέρω, nor ἀναφέρω, occurs "often"; but each twice, as above.

(3) The writer has omitted altogether the word most frequently used with the expressions for sin; viz. λαμβάνω, which occurs in just half of the sixty-six passages cited. This word has no expiatory look. The single sentence quoted from Dr. Hodge (quot verba, tot errores), is on the same page with a notice of Bushnell's "amazing conclusions," entitled in the table of contents: "Bushnell's extravagant assertions exposed."

them away by his mighty power. We are not to suppose that Isaiah's prophecy was *completely* fulfilled on this occasion. Matthew has given a single instance of that burden-bearing which was the law of Christ's life (Gal. vi. 2).

Besides, he bore our diseases as affecting himself personally. He had entered into our estate of evil; the hunger and cold, the weary marching, the pinching poverty, brought real suffering to our Saviour. And in both these ways he bore our diseases most intensely when he suffered on the cross.

Isa. liii. 12. Here נָשָׂא distinctly declares that Christ hath borne the sin of many, just as סָבַל declares the same thing prophetically in the eleventh verse. There can be no question among Christians that this relates to the Messiah's suffering on the cross. The immediate context reads: "He hath poured out his soul unto death; and he was numbered with the transgressors"—fulfilled Mark xv. 28. Of verse 12, as of verse 4, we have the interpretation of an apostle: 1 Pet. ii. 24, "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." Not that he did not bear them in his soul, but the *body* is mentioned, because Christ is described as a sacrifice, cf. Rom. xii. 1, "present your bodies [i.e. yourselves] a living sacrifice."

Can we learn now from our examination of נָשָׂא in what sense Christ is said to have borne our sins?

1. Christ bore our sins by enduring their consequences. Our sins nailed him to the tree. They brought him down to a suffering life, crowned with this shameful death. Even temptation came to him in all points like ours, and who can imagine that conflict with all the powers of hell while Jesus hung bleeding on the cross? As the children of the rebels in the wilderness were made to suffer for their fathers' sins, so Christ was made to suffer for a 'guilty world. "He crushed the serpent's head; but its fang entered his heel." God in his providence laid this burden upon him, and he bore it without complaint, saying: "The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?"

2. Christ bore our sins upon his sympathetic heart. It

was not our diseases, but the cause of all evil, that pained him most keenly. In that shuddering horror at the grave of Lazarus, in the bloody sweat of Gethsemane, we may get a glimpse of our sin as it affected the Saviour. The former burden (1) was laid upon Jesus by Him that sent him into the world, and he bore it passively; but this load he took upon himself by reason of the fineness and purity of his soul, into which every sin entered like a sharp sword. He bore in his bosom all the many peoples Ps. lxxxix. 50. How does a father feel who is yearning to reclaim a vicious, dissipated son? That suggests but dimly the anguish which Jesus felt upon the cross for every sinful soul.

3. Christ bore our sins by forgiving them. We have been speaking of his humanity. But he was also God and bore with infinite patience the sins which deserved his wrath. He was no mere philanthropist, anxious to alleviate woe; not simply a great reformer, feeling keenly the sins of his fellow men, while sharing their consequences; but each sin noted by his omniscient mind was the personal thrust of a rebel. Before we complain at the final sentence against sin from the judgment-seat of Christ, let us try to conceive what Christ had to bear from sin. How patiently, too, he bore it all. He who taught us "Love your enemies" gave us a glorious pattern. They mocked and scourged and crucified him; they dared him to come down from the cross, while at his single word "I am he" they would have gone backward and fallen into eternal ruin. But he held them up, and sustained the load of this shameful reproach, and held back the thunders of heaven, forgiving his murderers with his parting breath. Who can doubt now that his mercy endureth forever?

4. Christ bore our sins as a representative. The grand *cultus* of the Jews answered until the fulness of time was come. But it was not possible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin. The ceremonial ritual was a kind of "make-believe," the shadow of which Christ was the substance. The priests (Num. xviii.) were unclean in the

sight of God, and as truly deserving of punishment as the people for whom they stood. But it is by no stretch of clemency that Christ is looked upon as holy and permitted to approach the excellent glory. With him to represent us, we need not fear lest we perish. The plate of gold on Aaron's head gave him a *quasi* sacredness; but the head of Jesus is more precious than fine gold, and if he is willing to carry our sin-stained gifts, they will be accepted "for Jesus' sake." It was apparently an arbitrary constitution when God said: "This goat shall die, and therefore I will forgive you; that goat shall be supposed to carry off your sins and therefore I will not impute them." But the sacrifice of Jesus declares God's righteousness for the remission of sins that are passed by. The sanction of the law is eternal punishment, whereby God expresses the enormity of sin. But Christ was willing to become our representative, and endure pains that typify eternal punishment, and no one can now doubt the dreadful nature of that sin which could bring the Son of God to this. He not only suffers under the power of sin, but voluntarily undertakes to suffer in the stead of mankind. As Ezekiel was a sign to Israel, so the cross of Christ is a sign to all nations, warning every sinner of what a fearful thing it must be to bear his own iniquity. But the cross is especially a symbol of peace, the antitype to both the goats of the day of atonement. God points the world to the slain victim, testifying that the way of pardon is open to all; and when *my* faith lays her hand on that dear head, he becomes the scape-goat, and bears away *my* sins.

5. Christ did not bear our sins by being punished for them. נָשָׂא not merely does not favor this theory; it positively contradicts it. The eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel is a standing witness against such a belief.

NOTE. The preceeding discussion may very possibly be founded in error, and hinder, rather than promote, an understanding of the word before us. But the list which follows cannot but assist future students of the meaning of נָשָׂא, as it is believed to be a perfect enumeration of the

passages in which the word and its derivatives occur. The writer commenced his study of this word by taking from the concordance the texts in question, and endeavoring to ascertain from the Bible and lexicon alone the natural meaning of each passage. The grammatical arrangement of the concordance was then exchanged for the order which appears, and which gives consecutively the actual use of the word in our Bible. It was thought best to adopt the order of the English Bible, and in the few instances in which the numbering of the verses differs in the English and the Hebrew, the former is enclosed in brackets.

Much of this labor might have been saved, had the writer become sooner acquainted with the Englishman's Hebrew Concordance, a marvel of accuracy, which ought to be far more widely circulated among students of the Old Testament than it has been. As to the translation which follows here, the aim has been to express from the original the exact thought, without regard to elegance of form.

- GEN. iv. 7 If thou doest well, is there not *holding up* (the face)?
 iv. 13 My iniquity is too great to *bear*.
 vii. 17 And the waters increased, and *lifted up* the ark.
 xiii. 6 The land did not *bear* them to dwell together.
 xiii. 10 And Lot *lifted up* his eyes.
 xiii. 14 *Lift up*, now, thine eyes.
 xvii. 20 Twelve *chiefs* shall he beget.
 xviii. 2 And he *lifted up* his eyes.
 xviii. 24 Wilt thou also destroy, and not *bear* with the place?
 xviii. 26 Then I will *bear* with all the place.
 xix. 21 Lo, I have *taken* (with favor) thy face.
 xxi. 16 And *lifted up* her voice and wept.
 xxi. 18 Rise, *take up* the boy.
 xxii. 4, 13 Abraham *lifted up* his eyes.
 xxiii. 6 *Prince* of God art thou among us.
 xxiv. 63 And he *lifted up* his eyes.
 xxiv. 64 And Rebecca *lifted up* her eyes.
 xxv. 14 *Massa* (son of Ishmael).
 xxv. 16 Twelve *chiefs* to their nations.
 xxvii. 3 *Take* now thy weapons.
 xxvii. 38 And Esau *lifted up* his voice and wept.
 xxix. 1 And Jacob *took up* his feet and went.
 xxix. 11 And *lifted up* his voice and wept.
 xxxi. 10 And I *lifted up* mine eyes.
 xxxi. 12 *Lift up*, now, thine eyes.
 xxxi. 17 And *put* his sons and his wives upon camels.

- GEN. xxxii. 21 [20] Perhaps he will *take* my face (with favor).
 xxxiii. 1 And Jacob *lifted up* his eyes
 xxxiii. 5 And he *lifted up* his eyes.
 xxxiv. 2 *Prince* of the land.
 xxxvi. 7 And the land of their sojourning could not *hold* them *up*.
 xxxvii. 25 And *lifted up* their eyes.
 xxxvii. 25 Camels *carrying* spices.
 xxxix. 7 His master's wife *lifted up* her eyes to Joseph.
 xl. 13 Pharaoh will *lift up* thy head (exalt thee).
 xl. 19 Pharaoh will *lift up* thy head from off thee.
 xl. 20 And he *lifted up* the head of the chief butler.
 xlii. 26 And they *put* their grain upon their asses.
 xliii. 29 And he *lifted up* his eyes.
 xliii. 34 And they (lit. one) *took* presents (of food).
 xliii. 34 And they took *presents*.
 xliii. 34 But Benjamin's *present*
 xliii. 34 exceeded all their *presents*.
 xlv. 1 According to what they can *hold*.
 xlv. 19 Ye shall *take* your father.
 xlv. 23 Asses *carrying* of the good of Egypt.
 xlv. 23 She-asses *carrying* grain.
 xlv. 27 Wagons which Joseph sent to *carry* him.
 xlvi. 5 And the sons of Israel *carried* Jacob.
 xlvi. 5 Wagons which Pharaoh sent to *carry* him.
 xlvii. 30 Thou shalt *carry* me *up* from Egypt.
 xlix. 3 Excellence of *dignity* (lifting up).
 l. 13 And his sons *carried* him to the land of Canaan.
 l. 17 *Bear* now the trespass.
 l. 17 *Bear* now with the trespass.
 EXOD. vi. 8 I *lifted up* my hand to give it.
 x. 13 East wind *brought* locusts.
 x. 17 *Bear* now my sin only this time.
 x. 19 And it *lifted up* the locusts.
 xii. 34 And the people *took* their dough.
 xiv. 10 And the children of Israel *lifted up* their eyes.
 xvi. 22 And all the *chiefs* of the congregation came.
 xviii. 22 And they shall *bear* with thee.
 xix. 4 And I *bore* you on eagles' wings.
 xx. 7 Thou shalt not *put* the name of Jehovah thy God to a vanity.
 xx. 7 Who will *put* his name to a vanity.
 xxii. 27 [28] And the *chief* among thy people thou shalt not curse.
 xxiii. 1 Thou shalt not *take up* a report of falsehood.
 xxiii. 5 Lying under his *load*.
 xxiii. 21 He will not *bear* with your trespasses.

- EXOD. xxv. 14 To *carry* the ark with them.
 xxv. 27 To *carry* the table.
 xxv. 28 And by these shall the table be *carried*.
 xxvii. 7 In *carrying* it.
 xxviii. 12 Aaron shall *bear* their names before Jehovah.
 xxviii. 29 Aaron shall *bear* the names in the breast-plate.
 xxviii. 30 Aaron shall *bear* the judgment of the sons of Israel.
 xxviii. 38 Aaron shall *bear* the iniquity of the holy things.
 xxviii. 43 And they shall not *incur* iniquity and die.
 xxx. 4 To *carry* it with these.
 xxx. 12 When thou shalt *take* the sum of the sons of Israel.
 xxxii. 32 If thou wilt *bear* their sin.
 xxxiv. 7 *Bearing* iniquity and trespass and sin.
 xxxiv. 31 And all the *chiefs* in the congregation.
 xxxv. 21 Whose heart *lifted* him up.
 xxxv. 26 Whose heart *lifted* them up in respect to skill.
 xxxv. 27 And the *chiefs* brought onyx-stones.
 xxxvi. 2 Whose heart *lifted* him up.
 xxxvii. 5 To *carry* the ark.
 xxxvii. 14 To *carry* the table.
 xxxvii. 15 To *carry* the table.
 xxxvii. 27 To *carry* it with them.
 xxxviii. 7 To *carry* it with them.
 LEV. iv. 22 (Let it be) that a ruler shall sin.
 v. 1, 17 And hath *drawn* iniquity upon himself.
 (Or, then he shall *bear* his iniquity.)
 vii. 18 The soul that eateth it shall *bear* his iniquity.
 ix. 22 And Aaron *lifted up* his hand.
 x. 4 *Carry* your brethren outside the camp.
 x. 5 And *carried* them in their coats.
 x. 17 To *bear* the iniquity of the congregation.
 xi. 25 Every man *carrying* (anything).
 xi. 28 The one *carrying* their carcass.
 xi. 40 The one *carrying* their carcass.
 xiii. 2 A *rising* (leprosy, etc.). So 10 (*bis*), 19, 28, 43; xiv. 56.
 xv. 10 The one *carrying* them.
 xvi. 22. And the goat shall *bear* upon him all their iniquities.
 xvii. 16 Then he shall *bear* his iniquity.
 xix. 8 And he that eateth it shall *bear* his iniquity.
 xix. 15 Thou shalt not *take* (with partiality) the person of the weak.
 xix. 17 And not *incur* sin on his account.
 xx. 17 He shall *bear* his iniquity.
 xx. 19 Their iniquity they shall *bear*.
 xx. 20 Their sin they shall *bear*.

- LEV. xxii. 9 And they shall not *incur* sin on account of it.
 xxii. 16 And cause them to *incur* a wrong of transgression.
 xxiv. 15 Each man when he shall curse his God, then he shall
 bear his sin.
- NUM. i. 2 *Take* the sum of all the congregation.
 i. 16 *Chiefs* of the tribes of their fathers.
 i. 44 Moses and Aaron and the *chiefs*.
 i. 49 And their sum thou shalt not *take*.
 i. 50 They shall *carry* the tabernacle.
 ii. 3 And the *chief* of the children of Judah. So of the other
 tribes, vs. 5, 7, 10, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 25, 27, 29.
 iii. 24 And *chief* of his father's house for the Gershonites.
 iii. 30 And *chief* of his father's house for the families of the
 Kohathites.
 iii. 32, 32 And *chief* of the *chiefs* of the Levites.
 iii. 35 And *chief* of his father's house for the families of Merari.
 iii. 40 And *take* the number of their names.
 iv. 2 *Take* the number of the sons of Kohath.
 iv. 15 The sons of Kohath shall come to *carry* it.
 iv. 15 These things are the *burden* of the sons of Kohath.
 iv. 19 Upon his service and unto his *burden*.
 iv. 22 *Take* the number of the sons of Gershon.
 iv. 24 To serve and for *bearing*.
 iv. 25 And they shall *bear* the curtains.
 iv. 27 To all their *burdens*.
 iv. 27 And ye shall appoint their *burdens*.
 iv. 31, 32 The charge of their *burden*.
 iv. 34, 46 Moses and Aaron and the *chiefs*.
 iv. 47 And a service of *bearing* in the tabernacle.
 iv. 49 To his service and to his *burden*.
 v. 31 And this woman shall *bear* her iniquity.
 vi. 26 May Jehovah *lift up* his countenance upon thee.
 vii. 2 And the *chiefs* of Israel brought.
 vii. 2 These *chiefs* of the tribes.
 vii. 3 A wagon for two *chiefs*.
 vii. 9 On their shoulder they shall *carry*.
 vii. 10 And the *chiefs* brought for dedicating the altar.
 vii. 10 Yea the *chiefs* brought their gifts.
 vii. 11 One *chief* a day shall offer his offering.
 [The Hebrew idiom is, one *chief*; one *chief*.]
 vii. 18 *Chief* of Issachar. So of the other tribes, 24, 30, 36, 42,
 48, 54, 60, 66, 72, 78. [84, the *chiefs* of Israel.]
 ix. 13 That man shall *bear* his sin.
 x. 4 The *chiefs* shall gather to thee.

- NUM. x. 17, 21 *Carrying* the tabernacle, sanctuary.
 xi. 11 To put the *load* of all this people on me.
 xi. 12, 12 *Bear* them in thy bosom as the nursing-father will *bear* the suckling ?
 xi. 14 I am not able by myself to *bear* all this people.
 xi. 17, 17, 17 And they shall *bear* with thee in the *burden* of the people, and thou shalt not *bear* it alone.
 xiii. 2 Every one a *chief* among them.
 xiii. 23 And they *carried* it on a pole.
 xiv. 1 All the congregation *lifted up* and gave forth their voice.
 xiv. 18 *Bearing* iniquity and trespass.
 xiv. 19 As thou hast *borne* with this people.
 xiv. 30 I *lifted up* my hand.
 xiv. 33 And they shall *bear* your whoredoms.
 xiv. 34 Ye shall *bear* your iniquities.
 xvi. 2 Two hundred and fifty *chiefs* of the congregation.
 xvi. 3 And wherefore will ye *lift up* yourselves ?
 xvi. 15 Not one ass have I *taken* from them.
 xvii. 17 [2] From all their *chiefs* of the house of their fathers.
 xvii. 21, 21, 21 [6] And all their *chiefs* gave to him one rod for *each chief*.
 xviii. 1, 1 Shall *bear* the iniquity of the sanctuary ; of your priesthood.
 xviii. 22 To *incur* sin, to die.
 xviii. 23 And they shall *bear* their iniquity.
 xviii. 32 And ye shall not *incur* sin on its account.
 xxiii. 7, 18 And he *took up* his parable.
 xxiii. 24 And as a young lion he shall *lift up* himself.
 xxiv. 2 And Balaam *lifted up* his eyes.
 xxiv. 3, 15, 20, 21, 23 And he *took up* his parable.
 xxiv. 7 And his kingdom shall *lift up* itself.
 xxv. 14 *Chief* of his father's house.
 xxv. 18 Daughter of a *chief* of Midian.
 xxvi. 2 *Take* the sum of all the congregation.
 xxvii. 2 And before the *chiefs*.
 xxx. 16 [15] Then he shall *bear* her iniquity.
 xxxi. 13 And all the *chiefs* of the congregation.
 xxxi. 26 *Take* the amount of the spoil.
 xxxi. 49 Thy servants have *taken* the heads.
 xxxii. 2 And to the *chiefs* of the congregation.
 xxxiv. 18, 18 And one *chief* *each* from a tribe.
 xxxiv. 22-28 [Some of the tribes are named.]
 xxxvi. 1 And before the *chiefs*.
 DEUT. i. 9 I cannot *bear* you.

DEUT. i. 12, 12 How shall I alone *bear* the trouble of you and the *burden* of you ?

i. 31, 31 Jehovah thy God *carried* thee as a man will *carry* his son.

iii. 27 *Lift up* thine eyes westward.

iv. 19 And lest thou shalt *lift up* thine eyes.

iv. 48 Even unto Mount *Sion*.

v. 11 Thou shalt not *put* the name of Jehovah thy God to a vanity.

v. 11 Who will *put* his name to a vanity.

x. 8 To *carry* the ark of the covenant.

x. 17 He will not *take* faces (with partiality).

xii. 26 And thy votive-offerings thou shalt *take*.

xiv. 24 (Let it be) that thou art not able to *carry* it.

xxiv. 15 He *setteth* his heart upon it.

xxviii. 49 Jehovah will *bring* on thee a nation.

xxviii. 50 Which will not *take* (with honor) the face of the old.

xxxi. 9, 25 The ones *carrying* the ark.

xxxii. 11 Will *bear* them upon his wing.

xxxii. 40 For I will *lift up* to heaven my hand.

xxxiii. 3 One shall *take* of thy words.

JOSH. iii. 3 The priests, the Levites, *carrying* it.

iii. 6, 6 *Lift up* the ark. And they *lifted up* the ark.

iii. 8, 13, 14, 15 (*bis*), 17 *Carrying* the ark. So iv. 9, 10, 16, 18; viii. 33.

iv. 3 *Take* to you from this spot.

iv. 8 And they *took* twelve stones.

v. 13 And he *lifted up* his eyes.

vi. 4, 6 And seven priests shall *bear* seven trumpets.

vi. 6 *Lift up* the ark of the covenant.

vi. 8, 13 Seven priests *carrying* seven trumpets.

vi. 12 And the priests *lifted up* the ark.

ix. 15 And the *chiefs* of the assembly. [*Chiefs* occurs 18 (*bis*), 19, 21 (*bis*); xiii. 21; xvii. 4; xxii. 14 (*ter*), 30; xxii. 32.]

xxiv. 19 He will not *bear* with your trespass.

JUDG. ii. 4 And the people *lifted up* their voice.

iii. 18 The people *bringing* the present.

viii. 28 And they did not add to *lift up* their head.

ix. 7 And he *lifted up* his voice.

ix. 48 And he *took* it (a bough).

ix. 54 The young man *carrying* his weapons.

xvi. 31 And they *took* him up and brought him.

xix. 17 And he *lifted up* his eyes.

xx. 38 To cause a *flame* of smoke to ascend.

xx. 40 And the *flame* began to rise up.

xxi. 2 And they *lifted up* their voice.

- JUDG. xxi. 23 And *took* wives.
- RUTH i. 4 And they *took* to them wives.
 i. 9, 14 And they *lifted up* their voice.
 ii. 18 And she *lifted it up* and went.
- 1 SAM. ii. 28 To *wear* an ephod before me?
 iv. 4 And they *brought* thence the ark.
 vi. 13 And they *lifted up* their eyes.
 x. 3, 3, 3 One *carrying* three kids, three loaves of bread, a bottle of wine.
 xi. 4 And all the people *lifted up* their voice.
 xiv. 1 The young man *carrying* his weapons. 6, 7, 12 (*bis*), 13 (*bis*), 14, 17; xvi. 21; xxxi. 4 (*bis*), 5, 6 The same.
 xiv. 3 *Wearing* the ephod.
 xv. 25 *Bear* now my sin.
 xvii. 7 The one *carrying* the shield.
 xvii. 20 And he *took* (it) and went.
 xvii. 34 And *took* a lamb from the flock.
 xvii. 41 The man *carrying* the shield.
 xxii. 18 Men *wearing* a linen ephod.
 xxiv. 16 And Saul *lifted up* his voice.
 xxv. 28 *Bear* now with the trespass.
 xxv. 35 And I have *taken* thy face (with favor).
 xxx. 4 David and the people *lifted up* their voice.
- 2 SAM. ii. 22 How then shall I *hold up* my face?
 ii. 32 And they *took up* Asahel.
 iii. 32 And the king *lifted up* his voice.
 iv. 4 And his nurse *took* him up and fled.
 v. 12 And that he greatly *lifted up* his kingdom.
 v. 21 And David and his men *took* them.
 vi. 3, 4 And they *brought* it from the house of Abinadab.
 vi. 13 Those *carrying* the ark of Jehovah.
 viii. 2, 6 Servants, *bringing* gifts (tribute).
 xi. 8 There went after him the *gift* of the king.
 xiii. 34 And the young man *lifted up* his eyes.
 xiii. 36 And *lifted up* their voice.
 xiv. 14 God will not *take away* a soul.
 xv. 24 *Carrying* the ark of the covenant.
 xv. 33 Thou shalt be upon me for a *burden*.
 xvii. 13 All Israel shall *put* ropes upon that city.
 xviii. 15 *Carrying* the weapons of Joab.
 xviii. 24 And *lifted up* his eyes.
 xviii. 28 Who *lifted* their hand against my lord.
 xix. 36 [35] Why shall thy servant still be for a *burden*?
 xix. 43, 43 [42] Or hath a *gift* to us been *taken*?

- 2 SAM. xx. 21 *Lifted* his hand against the king.
 xxiii. 16 And they *took* and brought it to David.
 xxiii. 37 *Carrying* the weapons of Joab.
- 1 KINGS i. 5 Adonijah *lifted* himself up.
 ii. 26 For thou didst *carry* the ark.
 v. 23 [9] And thou shalt *take* them.
 v. 29 [15] Seventy thousand *bearing*-porters.
 viii. 1 *Chiefs* of the fathers.
 viii. 3 And the priests *lifted up* the ark.
 viii. 31 And (if) one shall *put* on him an oath.
 ix. 11 Hiram greatly *helped* Solomon in cedar-trees.
 x. 2 Camels *carrying* spices.
 x. 11 Navy of Hiram which *brought* gold.
 x. 22 Navy of Tarshish, *bringing* gold.
 xi. 34 As a *prince* I will set him.
 xiii. 29 And the prophet *took up* the corpse.
 xiv. 28 The guard *carried* them.
 xv. 22 And they *took away* the stones of Ramah.
 xviii. 12 The Spirit of Jehovah shall *carry* thee.
- 2 KINGS ii. 16 Perhaps the Spirit of Jehovah *lifted* him up.
 iii. 14 I am *taking* (with favor) the face of Jehoshaphat.
 iv. 19 *Carry* him to his mother.
 iv. 20 And he *took* him up.
 iv. 36 *Take* thy son.
 iv. 37 And she *took* her son.
 v. 1 *Lifted up* in countenance.
 v. 17 A *load* of earth for a yoke of mules?
 v. 23 And they *carried* them before him.
 vii. 8, 8 And *took* thence silver and gold.
 viii. 9 A *load* for forty camels.
 ix. 25, 25 Jehovah *took up* upon him this prophecy.
 ix. 25, 26 *Take*, cast him into the portion.
 ix. 32 And he *lifted up* his face to the window.
 xiv. 10 And thy heart will *lift* thee up.
 xiv. 20 And they *carried* him on horses.
 xviii. 14 That which thou shalt lay on me I will *bear*.
 xix. 4 So shalt thou *lift up* prayer.
 xix. 22 And hast *lifted up* thine eyes on high?
 xx. 17 And all that is in thy house shall be *carried away*.
 xxiii. 4 And *carried* their ashes to Bethel.
 xxv. 13 And they *carried* the brass of them to Babylon.
 xxv. 27 *Lifted up* the head.
- 1 CHRON. i. 30 Massa (son of Ishmael).
 ii. 10 *Chief* of the sons of Judah.

1CHRON. iv. 38 *Chiefs* in their families.

- v. 6 He was *chief* of the Reubenites.
- v. 18 Men *carrying* shields.
- vii. 40 Head *chiefs*.
- x. 4 (*bis*), 5 The one *carrying* his weapons.
- x. 9 And *took* his head.
- x. 12 And *took* the body of Saul.
- xi. 18 And *took* and brought it to David.
- xi. 39 *Carrying* the weapons of Joab.
- xii. 24 *Carrying* bucklers.
- xiv. 2 *Lifted up* on high was his kingdom.
- xv. 2 (*bis*) To *carry* the ark of God.
- xv. 15 And the sons of the Levites *carried* the ark.
- xv. 22, 22 Leader in *singing*; instructing in *singing*.
- xv. 26, 27 *Carrying* the ark.
- xv. 27 Chenaniah the leader of the *singing*.
- xvi. 29 *Take* an offering and come before him.
- xviii. 2, 6 Servants to David, *bringing* gifts (tribute).
- xviii. 11 Which he *took away* from all the nations.
- xxi. 16 And David *lifted up* his eyes.
- xxi. 24 I will not *take* what is thine for Jehovah.
- xxiii. 22 And the sons of Kish *took* them (in marriage).
- xxiii. 26 There is no *carrying* the tabernacle.
- xxvii. 23 David did not *take* their sum.
- xxix. 11 To thee is the *lifting* thyself up.

2CHRON. i. 2 To every *chief* throughout all Israel.

- v. 2 *Chiefs* of the fathers.
- v. 4 And the Levites *lifted up* the ark.
- vi. 22 And one shall *put* an oath on him.
- ix. 1 Camels *carrying* spices.
- ix. 21 The navy of Tarshish, *bringing* gold.
- xi. 21 He *took* eighteen wives.
- xii. 11 The guard came and *took* them.
- xiii. 21 And *took* to him fourteen wives.
- xiv. 7 [8] (*bis*) *Carrying* bucklers, shields.
- xiv. 12 And they *took* very much spoil.
- xvi. 6 And they *took away* the stones of Ramah.
- xvii. 11 Money of *gift* (tribute).
- xix. 7 Or *taking* of faces (partiality).
- xx. 25 Till there was no *carrying* it.
- xxiv. 3 And Jehoida *took* for him two wives.
- xxiv. 6, 9 The *collection* of Moses.
- xxiv. 11 And *took* it and carried it to its place.
- xxiv. 27 The greatness of the *burden* upon him.

- 2CHRON. xxv, 19 And thy heart will *lift* thee up.
 xxv, 28 And they *carried* him upon horses.
 xxxii, 23 And he was *lifted up* before the eyes of all nations.
 xxxv, 3 It shall not be a *burden*.
- EZRA
 i, 4 The men of his place shall greatly *lift* him up.
 i, 8 Sheshbazzar, the *prince* of Judah.
 iv, 19 Against kings it hath *lifted* itself up.
 v, 15 *Take* these vessels.
 viii, 36 They greatly *lifted up* (helped) the people.
 ix, 2 For they have *taken* from their daughters.
 ix, 12 And do not *take* their daughters.
 x, 44 All these had *taken* strange wives.
- NEH.
 ii, 1 And I *took up* the wine.
 iv, 10 [17] And those *bearing* in the burdens.
 ix, 15 Which thou didst *lift up* thy hand to give them.
 xiii, 15 And (bringing in) all *burdens*.
 xiii, 19 One shall not bring a *burden*.
 xiii, 25 And if ye shall *take* from their daughters.
- ESTHER
 ii, 9 She *won* favor before him.
 ii, 15 Esther was *winning* favor in the eyes of all.
 ii, 17 She *won* favor and kindness in his sight.
 ii, 18 And he gave *gifts*.
 iii, 1 And greatly *lifted* him up.
 v, 2 She *won* favor in his eyes.
 v, 11 And how he greatly *lifted* him up.
 ix, 3 Were greatly *lifting up* the Jews.
- JOB
 ii, 12, 12 And they *lifted up* their eyes, voice.
 vi, 2 And they would *lift up* my calamity into the scales.
 vii, 13 My couch will *bear* in my complaint.
 vii, 20 And I am upon myself for a *burden*?
 vii, 21 And why wilt thou not *bear* my trespass?
 x, 15 I will not *hold up* my head.
 xi, 15 Thou shalt *hold up* thy face without spot.
 xiii, 8 Will ye *take* his face?
 xiii, 10 If ye *take* faces (partiality).
 xiii, 11 Will not his *lifting up* make you afraid?
 xiii, 14 Why am I to *take* my flesh in my teeth?
 xx, 6 If his *elevation* shall ascend to the heavens.
 xxi, 3 *Bear* me, and I will speak.
 xxi, 12 They will *take* timbrel and harp.
 xxii, 8 The one *lifted up* (honor).
 xxii, 26 Thou shalt *lift up* thy face unto God.
 xxiv, 10 From the hungry they *take away* the sheaf.
 xxvii, 1; xxix, 1 Job proceeded to *take up* his parable.

- JOB xxvii. 21 The east wind *carrieth him away*.
xxx. 22 Thou wilt *lift me up* to the wind.
xxxi. 23 From his *lifting up* (majesty).
xxxi. 36 (See) if I will not *take* it upon my shoulder.
xxxii. 21 Let me not *take* the face of man.
xxxii. 22 Soon my Maker will *take me away*.
xxxiv. 19 Who doth not *take* the face of princes?
xxxiv. 31 I have *exalted* myself; I will not be perverse.
xxxvi. 3 I will *bring* my knowledge from far.
xl. 20 For the mountains will *bear* food for him.
xli. 17 [25] From his *lifting up* the mighty ones are afraid.
xlii. 8 For his face I will *take*.
xlii. 9 And the Lord *took* the face of Job.
- PSALMS iv. 7 [6] *Lift up* upon us the light of thy face.
vii. 7 [6] Be thou *lifted up*.
x. 12 O God, *lift up* thy hand.
xv. 3 A reproach he hath not *taken up*.
xvi. 4 And I will not *take* their names upon my lips.
xxiv. 4 Hath not *lifted up* his soul to a vanity.
xxiv. 5 He shall *take* a blessing from Jehovah's presence.
xxiv. 7, 7 *Lift up*, O gates, your heads, and be ye *lifted up*, O doors of old!
xxiv. 9, 9 *Lift up*, O gates, your heads, and *lift up*, ye doors of old!
xxv. 1 Unto thee, Jehovah, I will *lift up* my soul.
xxv. 18 *Bear* with all my sins.
xxviii. 2 In my *lifting up* my hands.
xxviii. 9 And greatly *lift* them *up* forever.
xxxii. 1 Blessedness! *borne* as to trespass, covered as to sin.
xxxii. 5 Thou didst *bear* the wrong of my sin.
xxxviii. 5 [4] As a heavy *burden*.
l. 16 And wilt thou *take* my covenant.
lv. 13 [12] Not an enemy is wont to reproach me; then I *bear* (it).
lxii. 5 [4] To cast him down from his *exaltation*.
lxiii. 5 [4] In thy name I will *lift up* my hands.
lxix. 8 [7] On account of thee I *bore* reproach.
lxxii. 3 The mountains shall *bear* peace.
lxxxi. 3 [2] *Take* music (vocal).
lxxxii. 2 And *take* faces of wicked ones.
lxxxiii. 3 [2] They that hate thee have *lifted up* the head.
lxxxv. 3 [2] Thou hast *borne* the iniquity of thy people.
lxxxvi. 4 Unto thee, Lord, I will *lift up* my soul.
lxxxviii. 16 [15] I have *borne* thy terrors.
lxxxix. 10 [9] In the *lifting up* of its waves.

- PSALMS lxxxix. 51 [50] My *bearing* in my bosom all the many peoples.
 xci. 12 Upon (their) hands they shall *bear* thee.
 xciii. 3 (*ter*) The floods have *lifted up*, Jehovah,
 The floods have *lifted up* their voice;
 The floods will *lift up* their waves.
 xciv. 2 Be *lifted up*, thou Judge of the earth.
 xevi. 8 *Take* an offering and come.
 xcix. 8 A God *enduring* thou wert to them.
 cii. 11 [10] Thou hast *lifted me up*, and cast me down.
 cvi. 26 And he *lifted up* his hand to them.
 cxvi. 13 I will *take* the cup of deliverances.
 cxix. 48 And I will *lift up* my hands to thy commands.
 cxxi. 1 I will *lift up* my eyes to the hills.
 cxxiii. 1 Unto thee I have *lifted up* my eyes.
 cxxvi. 6 (*bis*) *Bearing* precious seed, sheaves.
 cxxxiv. 2 *Lift up* your hands in the sanctuary.
 cxxxv. 7 That bringeth up *clouds*.
 cxxxix. 9 I will *take* the wings of the morning.
 cxxxix. 20 Thy enemies *put* (thy name) to a vanity.
 cxli. 2 The *lifting up* of my hands as the evening sacrifice.
 cxliii. 8 To thee I have *lifted up* my soul.
 PROV. vi. 35 He will not *take* the face of any expiation.
 ix. 12 If thou scornest, thou alone shalt *bear* it.
 xviii. 5 To *take* the face of a wicked man.
 xviii. 14 But a wounded spirit who will *bear* it?
 xix. 18 But do not *lift up* thy soul to cause him to die.
 xix. 19 A man of great wrath is *bearing* a fine.
 xxv. 14 *Clouds* and wind; and rain there is not.
 xxx. 1 The words of Agur the son of Jakeh; the *prophecy*.
 (Or, son of the princess of *Massa*.)
 xxx. 13 And their eyelids are *lifted up*.
 xxx. 21 The land cannot *bear up* under four things.
 xxx. 32 If thou hast been foolish in *lifting up* thyself.
 xxxi. 1 The *prophecy* which his mother taught him.
 ECCL. v. 14 [15] And nothing shall he *take away* of his labor.
 v. 18 [19] To *take* his portion.
 CANT. v. 7 They *took away* my veil from me.
 ISAIAH i. 14 I am weary to *bear*.
 ii. 2 And it shall be *lifted up* (higher) than the hills.
 ii. 4 Nation shall not *take up* sword against nation.
 ii. 9 So do not thou *bear* with them.
 ii. 12 Upon every one who is *lifted up*.
 ii. 13 Cedars of Lebanon, high and *lifted up*.
 ii. 14 Hills (that are) *lifted up*.

- ISAIAH** iii. 3 And the one *lifted up* in countenance.
 iii. 7 He shall *lift up* (the voice) in that day.
 v. 26 And he shall *lift up* a signal.
 vi. 1 A throne high and *lifted up*.
 viii. 4 One shall *take away* the riches of Damascus.
 ix. 14 [15] The one *lifted up* in countenance.
 x. 24, 26 He shall *lift up* his staff, rod.
 xi. 12 And he shall *lift up* a signal.
 xiii. 1; xv. 1; xvii. 1; xix. 1; xxi. 1, 11, 13; xxii. 1; xxiii. 1;
 xxx. 6 The *oracle* of Babylon, of Moab, Damascus, Egypt,
 the desert of the sea, Dumah, Arabia, the valley of vision,
 Tyre, the beasts of the south.
 xiii. 2 Upon the barren mountains *lift up* a standard.
 xiv. 4 Thou shalt *take up* this song.
 xiv. 28 Was this *oracle*.
 xv. 7 To the brook of the willows they shall *carry* them.
 xviii. 3 (Upon) *lifting up* a standard.
 xxii. 6 And Elam *carried* a quiver.
 xxii. 25 And the *load* that was on it shall be cut off.
 xxiv. 14 These shall *lift up* their voice.
 xxx. 6 They will *carry* their riches.
 xxx. 25 And upon every hill (that is) *lifted up*.
 xxx. 27 And the *burden* is heavy.
 xxxiii. 10 Now will I be *lifted up*.
 xxxiii. 24 The people shall be *borne* as to iniquity.
 xxxvii. 4 So thou shalt *lift up* prayer.
 xxxvii. 23 And hast *lifted up* thine eyes on high?
 xxxviii. 21 They shall *take* a lump of figs.
 xxxix. 6 And everything in thy house shall be *carried away*.
 xl. 4 Every valley shall be *lifted up*.
 xl. 11 And in his bosom he shall *hold* them.
 xl. 24 And the whirlwind shall *take* them away.
 xl. 26 *Lift up* your eyes on high.
 xli. 16 And the wind shall *take* them away.
 xlii. 2 And he shall not *lift up* (his voice).
 xlii. 11 The wilderness and its cities shall *lift up* (their voice).
 xlv. 20 The ones *carrying* the wood of their carved image.
 xlvi. 1, 1 Your *carried* things are borne; a *load* for the weary
 beast.
 xlvi. 2 They could not deliver the *load*.
 xlvi. 3 Those *carried* from the womb.
 xlvi. 4 I have made, and I will *bear*.
 xlvi. 7 They will *lift* him up upon the shoulder.
 xlix. 18 *Lift up* thine eyes round about.

- LAM. ii. 19 *Lift up* to him thy hands.
 iii. 27 That he shall *bear* a yoke.
 iii. 41 We will *lift up* our heart to God.
 iv. 16 They did not *take* the faces of the priests.
 v. 13 The first-born they *took* to the mill.
- EZEK. i. 19 (*bis*), 20, 21 (*bis*) And in the being *lifted up* of the living creatures, the wheels were *lifted up*.
 iii. 12, 14 And the Spirit *lifted me up*.
 iv. 4, 5, 6 Thou shalt *bear* their iniquity (Israel and Judah).
 vii. 27 The *prince* shall put on astonishment.
 viii. 3; xi. 1, 24 And the Spirit *lifted me up*.
 viii. 5 *Lift up*, now, thine eyes.
 viii. 5 And I *lifted up* mine eyes.
 x. 7 And *took* and gave into the hands.
 x. 16, 19; xi. 22 Cherubim's *lifting up* their wings.
 xii. 6 Thou shalt *take* it upon thy shoulder.
 xii. 7 Upon my shoulder I *carried* it
 xii. 10, 10 The *prince* hath this *oracle*.
 xii. 12, 12 And the *prince* shall *take* upon his shoulder.
 xiv. 10 And they shall *bear* their iniquity.
 xvi. 52, 52 Also thou, *bear* thy shame.
 xvi. 54 That thou shalt *bear* thine own shame.
 xvi. 58 Thine abominations thou hast *borne*.
 xvii. 8 For *bearing* fruit.
 xvii. 9 To *pluck it up* by its roots.
 xvii. 14 In order to its not *lifting* itself up.
 xvii. 23 It shall *bring forth* a branch.
 xviii. 6, 12, 15 His eyes he hath not, hath, *lifted up* to the idols.
 xviii. 19, 20, 20 The son *partake* in the iniquity of the father
 (and *vice versa*).
 xix. 1, 1 *Take up* a lamentation for the *princes*.
 xx. 5 (*bis*), 6, 15, 23, 28, 42 I *lifted up* my hand.
 xx. 31, 40 Your *gifts*.
 xxi. 17 [12] Upon all the *princes* of Israel.
 xxi. 30 [25] *Prince* of Israel, whose day is come.
 xxii. 6 The *princes* of Israel, each up to his arm [power], were
 in thee.
 xxiii. 27 And thou shalt not *lift up* thine eyes.
 xxiii. 35 Also thou, *bear* thy lewdness.
 xxiii. 49 And the sins of your idols ye shall *bear*.
 xxiv. 25 The *lifting up* of their soul.
 xxvi. 16 All the *princes* of the sea.
 xxvi. 17; xxvii. 32 They shall *take up* a lamentation.
 xxvii. 2 *Take up* a lamentation upon Tyre.

- EZEK. xxvii. 21 All the *princes* of Kedar.
 xxviii. 12; xxxii. 2 *Take up* a lamentation upon the king of Tyre, upon Pharaoh.
 xxix. 15 It shall not *lift up* itself.
 xxix. 19 He shall *take* her multitude.
 xxx. 13 A *prince* of the land of Egypt.
 xxxii. 24, 25, 30; xxxiv. 29; xxxvi. 6, 7, 15 *Bear* reproach.
 xxxii. 29 All her *princes*.
 xxxiii. 25 And your eyes ye will *lift up* to your idols.
 xxxiv. 24; xxxvii. 25 And my servant David a *prince*.
 xxxvi. 7 I have *lifted up* my hand.
 xxxvi. 8 And your fruit ye shall *bear* for my people.
 xxxviii. 2, 3; xxxix. 1 Chief *prince* of Mesech and Tubal.
 xxxviii. 13 To *carry away* silver and gold.
 xxxix. 10 *Bring* wood from the field.
 xxxix. 18 The blood of the *princes*.
 xxxix. 26; xlv. 13 And they shall *bear* their shame.
 xliii. 5 And the Spirit *lifted* me *up*.
 xlv. 10, 12 And they shall *bear* their iniquity.
 xlv. 12; xlvii. 14 I *lifted up* my hand.
 xlv. 11 The ephah and bath shall be one measure to *hold*.
 xlv. 3 (*bis*); xlv. 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 22; xlv. 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 18; xlviii. 21 (*bis*), 22 (*bis*) The *prince, princes*.
 DANIEL i. 16 Melzar was *taking away* their dainties.
 ii. 35 And the wind *carried* it *away*.
 viii. 3; x. 5 And I *lifted up* mine eyes.
 xi. 12 And he shall *take* the multitude.
 xi. 14 And the sons of the robbers of thy people shall *lift up* themselves.
 HOSEA i. 6, 6 *Carrying* I will *carry* them *away*.
 iv. 8 And unto their iniquity they will *lift up* their hearts.
 v. 14 I will *take away* and there shall be no delivering.
 viii. 10 For the *burden* of the king of princes.
 xiii. 1 When Ephraim spoke there was terror; he *lifted up* in Israel.
 xiv. 3 [2] Thou wilt *bear* (we pray) all iniquity.
 JOEL ii. 22 The tree has *borne* its fruit.
 AMOS iv. 2 And he shall utterly *take* you *away* with hooks,
 v. 1 This word which I am *taking up* against you.
 v. 11 And a *gift* of corn (bribe. Or a *tribute*).
 v. 26 But ye have *carried* the tabernacle.
 vi. 10 And one's uncle shall *take* him *up*.
 JONAH i. 12 *Take* me, and cast me to the sea.
 i. 15 And they *took up* Jonah.

- MICAH ii. 2 And *take* them (houses).
 ii. 4 He shall *take up* against you a parable.
 iv. 1 And shall be *lifted up* (higher) than the hills.
 iv. 3 They shall not *take up*, nation against nation, the sword.
 vi. 16 And ye shall *bear* the reproach of my people.
 vii. 9 The wrath of Jehovah I will *bear*.
 vii. 18 A God *bearing* iniquity.
- NAHUM i. 1 The *oracle* concerning Nineveh.
 i. 5 The earth *lifted up* (quaked) from before him.
- HABAK. i. 1 The *oracle* which Habakkuk saw.
 i. 3 One will *lift up* (excite) strife.
 i. 7 His judgment and his *honor* (lifting up).
 ii. 6 All these *take up* a parable?
 iii. 10 High it *lifted up* its hands.
- ZEPH. iii. 18 A *taking up* upon her of reproach.
- HAGGAI ii. 12 If a man will *bear* holy flesh.
 ii. 19 Even to the oil-olive it has not *borne*.
- ZECH. ii. 1 [i. 18]; ii. 5 [1]; v. 1, 9; vi. 1 And I *lifted up* mine eyes.
 ii. 4 [i. 21] So that a man did not *lift up* his head.
 ii. 4 The ones *lifting up* the horn.
 v. 5 *Lift up*, now, thine eyes.
 v. 7 There was *lifted up* a talent of lead.
 v. 9 And they *bore* the ephah.
 vi. 13 He shall *bear* the glory.
 ix. 1; xii. 1 The *oracle* of the word of Jehovah.
- MAL. i. 1 The *oracle* of the word of Jehovah.
 i. 8, 9 Will he *take* thy face? faces among you?
 ii. 3 And one will *take* you away.
 ii. 9 But *taking* faces in respect to the law.

ARTICLE III.

THE NATION.¹

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OUR obligations to a good book are so great, that it seems an ungrateful office to criticise it. Our first acknowledgments of excellence are lost sight of, when we come to dwell on an error, or point out a deficiency. Yet it seems to be the proper duty of a critic, with brief and candid reference to the strong points of a work, to pass to the consideration of such portions of the topic as he hopes to correct or enlarge in their presentation. While justice is a cardinal quality of criticism, the critique is not written for the author, but for the theme; and should bring to it some farther light. The Nation, by Mr. Mulford, has excited very considerable attention, and received highly commendatory notices. The ground of this appreciation lies in a very central and substantial merit: we wish in the outset to attach the highest importance to it, as we may seem later to overlook it. Mr. Mulford regards the nation as an organic force to be understood and explained in its own nature and growth. He is everywhere at war with a formal and mechanical conception of the state. Every theory is instantly brushed aside that refers its origin, form, or rights to outside, external conditions, things subservient to it; and the eye is directed to the forces of social, national life wrapped up in the nation itself. His presentation, therefore, has great unity and vigor, and rests on the cardinal and ultimate features of the case. His nation is spherical, knit together by one sufficient and central force. This is the aspect it bears, as concentrated, through every layer of right, duty, and sovereignty, in the

¹ The Nation. The Foundations of Civil Order and Political Life in the United States. By S. Mulford. Published by Hurd and Houghton.

spiritual nature and conjoint growth of those who compose it. Yet, while thus ensphered in itself, it is united in a living way. It is not a single force, but a multitude of spiritual forces, organized in one consistent and complete life, that lie at the heart of the nation, taking its growth in an historic way under that control. The work, then, is one of a thorough and philosophic spirit, and follows its own bent without deviation or compromise. It would be strange if so radical and decided a method did not at once disclose many important truths, and also fail sufficiently to qualify and complement them. This, we think, is the fact. The theory, in substance correct, is too rigid and inflexible; is pushed beyond its true limits; does not accept sufficiently the modifying effects of external causes. While no living product can be understood without a full recognition of the wonderful powers of life, it also seeks explanation in the external circumstances which condition these powers, and sets up with them a complicated system of actions and reactions. A nation is the product of a protracted struggle between an inner organic force and external conditions, which accelerate or thwart it; and thus the state, as an existing fact, requires for its comprehension a recognition not less of formal than of substantial elements. While the life works outward, its conditions work inward, and the interior and the exterior mutually restrain and limit each other. We shall proceed to point out instances of this excessive emphasis of one element, and of its effects.

In the first chapter, he says of the nation, in successive sections, that it is founded in the nature of man; is a relationship; is a continuity; is an organism; is a conscious organism; is a moral organism; is a moral personality. These assertions should rest in the fourth proposition — society is an organism. All beyond this is an unwarrantable strain put upon language with no answering advantage. It is only in a modified, reduced meaning that we can say of the state, that it is organic; but when we speak of it as a conscious person, our language entirely overleaps the facts, and the

deductions from such a principle must be very insecure. There are various degrees of organic force. In the strongest, most typical, and definite use of the word, an organic being is one which, by interior living forces, builds up a body composed of organs mutually dependent and conjointly constituting a single and complete life. In this strict sense, the nation is not an organism. Its members mutually modify each other, are interdependent, and, in fulfilling their individual ends, necessarily unite in the common success of the state. But this organic junction, if we so call it, is affected by forces which spring from, and centre in, the members. There is no power above them all, and pervasive of them all, which necessitates the exact position and office of each, unites them in one integral body, that cannot be diminished without mutilation, or enlarged without disease; and which knows and defines its members only in their ministrations to itself. This central, formative power, which does not spring from the members, nor is lodged in them; which works them up to a definite office, and combines them under a distinct and definite type, has no analogon in the nation. We do not object to calling the state an organic product, nor to making this the initial idea in its study; if, however, we suppose this language to carry with it such force, that the nation, like the human body, can be regarded as an independent, complete, necessary and self-sufficient organism, ruled by one constructive power, expressed under the word life, we push the language beyond the facts, and lay ourselves open to the entrance of many subtle errors.

The state is organized by the coalescence and mutual modification of its members. It has no fixed, invariable type, no given dimensions, no exact product; but will reach variable, and more or less defective, results with each new set of conditions, and will combine a thousand, ten thousand, ten thousand thousand, as may fit the exigency. Of this lower organic force there are abundant manifestations. Physical things, as rocks, when grouped, modify each other. Temperature, pressure, exposure, are affected by their mutual

relations. A forest combines and modifies the trees and plants which compose it. Flocks in a pasture instantly alter the conditions of life for each other. Scholars in a school establish a feeble organism by their mutual influence. The inhabitants of a city coalesce in tastes, arrange in reference to each other their pursuits, and establish municipal regulations, the necessary result of their relationship. The nation with more varied and urgent interdependencies compacts itself in character and spirit, frames itself together in political and civil institutions which arise in a voluntary involuntary way under the powers and conditions from time to time dominant. Civilized nations, as higher units, are organized among themselves in a like way by the necessary action of inevitable relationships. In each of these cases, there is organic force, but very different in degree, while in all of them it falls below that which we find in the living body. When this interaction is so feeble as to produce very slight and inconspicuous results, we are slow to term it organic. No one would call a pile of stones an organic product, because they modify each other, and undergo changes due to their relative position. If we were to be rigid in the use of the word "organic," we should be compelled to confine it to cases in which interior, supervisory, common power wrought under and for itself a definite product. In this sense the state is not organic. It is divisible, indefinite, variable forces that unite under external conditions to constitute it.

Much more evident is it that the nation is not a conscious, moral personality. It has no consciousness but that of the persons who compose it; no morality but their morality; no personality but their personality. We may as well call an Arctic expedition a conscious moral person, as thus to speak of a nation; since its actions, like those of a nation, are of a conjoint, organic character. To use language in this fashion is to force down words, not to carry up ideas. The word will finally sink and imbed itself in the thoughts according to the gravity of the idea we have laid upon it. Call the nation a person, and we shall shortly require a new word for the true persons who compose it.

This tendency to extreme statements runs all through the work ; its excellences and faults are both found in connection with it. Because of this constant unscrupulous thoroughness of the method, this railroad engineering of ideas, we shall be compelled to confine our attention to scattered illustrations, leaving the general remark that there are everywhere kindred instances. A second example of this extreme tendency of thought is found in the author's view of the origin of the nation, treated of in the fourth chapter. This view springs from the initial idea already presented, and partakes of its ultra character. "The nation has a divine foundation, and has for its end the fulfilment of the divine end in history. There is no human ground on which it can rest. They who are intrusted with it, hold it as the representatives of the nation, and as the ministers of the divine purpose in the nation. The President and the Congress, as the Crown and the Parliament, rule by the grace of God. The elements which are manifest in the government of the nation, in its moral being, can have only a divine ground. The power, which is in the people, forming the nation, is over the people, and while the individual acts in the government of the nation, it is over the individual, and he is subject to it; and this is a power which is and can be in the nation only as it is a moral person, and is derivative from God." This statement seems to be needlessly objectionable in form. If it does not involve the divine right of kings, it does that of rulers. As a final reference, the devout mind will indeed look to the constructive and permissive will of God ; but a statement of the origin of the authority of government more explicit, instructive, and generally acceptable is that which refers it to the constitution of man, and the conditions under which that nature finds development. There is involved in this reference no theological opinion : hence men of the most diverse religious views can meet upon it. Moreover, a point of much greater importance, it directs attention to that by which, and by which only, God expresses his will as regards any specific nation. To say of any state that its excellence

and authority are the gift of God tells us very little. It does not distinguish between those governments that rule by force, and those resting in the choice of the people ; between those in the last stages of decay, and those in the freshness of youth. On the other hand, to affirm that the authority of the nation springs by the necessary energy of natural and moral forces, from the circumstances which constitute it, turns the eye at once to a scrutiny of these conditions, and to a determination of the harmony of the nation with them. That government, that state, and that only, be it an empire, a monarchy, or a republic, has a right to be, which stands in the best attainable harmony with the conditions under which it exists ; with the interests of its subjects, and the possibilities then and there open to them. To talk about the will of God with no knowledge of those conditions which alone contain and express it, is a sort of dogmatism that can give no guidance whatever. Nor can we anywhere refer to some ultimate ideal government or nation as a standard. We must divine the times, and in that divination our success lies. A given government is a growth from a given soil, and finds its authority, its justification, in the exigencies of the case ; in its relative power to do a good work. The ability to do good is always a sufficient reason for doing good, since it is grounded in the inmost nature of things.

Again, in the sixth chapter, speaking of the right of property, the author says : " The right to property and the possession is therefore in personality, and the existence of property is of the gift of God. The ground of the right in the existence of property, and of the right to property, is in the vocation from God in the world, of the individual and of the nation." These and kindred assertions settle nothing. How property should be held is not defined by them ; whether real estate shall be open to indefinite acquisition ; whether one individual shall hold absolutely against all other individuals ; whether the ownership of land shall be exclusively vested in the nation and individuals enjoy it in common, or in rental from it. These and like questions must be settled, and that

not absolutely, but for each time and nation, by an inquiry into individual and common interests; and that settlement is the best which gives the surest, fullest conditions of growth. That which settles the forms under which property is to be held, settles also the right of holding it, and this guiding principle is the highest attainable good. The individual, that is the representative, typical individual, will, under the best, and therefore the most just, ownership of property, have given to him the largest opportunities of development; and this fact is its own sufficient justification, and the sufficient justification of all that is involved in it. Nor can we excuse ourselves from the labor of searching out, in an experimental, tentative way, what that form of ownership is, and then establishing it. Ownership in any given nation is right or wrong as it meets or falls short of the possibilities then and there open to the individual. The excessive and exclusive landed possessions of a few in Scotland and England are wrong, and increasingly wrong, because they more and more obviously interfere with the well-being of the many. To speak of the will of God in this connection conveys no clear idea, till we are farther told, that the expression and guarantee of that will are found in the prosperity of the masses. We are thus thrown back on the inquiry already indicated.

We refer to a single other example of extreme statement. Mulford denies freedom to any action which does not lie in the line of its right use. It is not in a momentary choice, in an alternative between right and wrong, it is the realization in man, through his own self-determination, of his true being. We see no gain but much loss in thus giving words a new meaning in the face of common use. The ethical discussion would require to be remodelled to be suited to this nomenclature. Nor is freedom, in this sense, any more consonant with politics than with ethics. The new meaning casts no new light upon the subject, but merely embarrasses and trips language. A nation is free in common speech whose people, in questions of government, have the alternative of right and wrong before them.

This tendency to a radical, unqualified idea, which pervades every portion of the work, and which we cannot sufficiently set forth by these few examples, results in various practical difficulties. It gives an unduly theoretical and abstract cast to the views presented. We have no objection to theories. Good theories are the skeletons of facts, and most instructive in their government. A theory is theoretical only as it is partial, incomplete. It thus becomes in a measure opposed to the facts. We employ the two adjectives, practical and theoretical, to express this varying power of interpretation, this degree of application of any view to the phenomena it would expound and govern. The theory of the nation by Mr. Mulford is in this sense theoretical. It runs too high above the facts, or moles too low beneath them. It does not thread them, penetrating the eye of each exactly, as it is able. It brings forward its one supreme principle; if this does the work, as it often does, very well; if not, the work remains undone. The author seems to feel that the sun has risen, and that there is small use in lighting the dim candle of experience to search out here and there a corner. The notion of the moral being of the nation does the work, and a new reiteration of this fact is better, therefore, than to run over again musty precepts and experiments in government to see what modicum of truth may possibly linger in them.

The theoretical force which a single idea assumes in the mind of the author is seen in his treatment of political freedom. This freedom is secured in the establishment of rights, and these rights are founded in human nature. "They are inherent; they are written in the law and the constitution of the being of man." With this solution of the problem in mind the author brushes briskly aside the empirical or practical guides to what political freedom may actually embrace. "Mr. Emerson says, it, political freedom, is the largest liberty compatible with the liberty of every other man. But freedom is not described in this external limitation, nor is the freedom of one the restriction of the freedom of another. . . . The largest freedom in each is consistent with the same in

all. This conception empties freedom of all moral content, and it would be constructive only of a formal, not a real freedom. It could not be the postulate of the freedom of the people in its organic and moral being and relations in history" (p. 123). We are not satisfied with this method. Rights are doubtless inherent in men under a given constitution of society, but this fact, the fact of "organic and moral being," as Mr. Mulford delights to call it, is no sufficient explanation of what these rights are under specified circumstances. The precept of Mr. Emerson may cast light on this point, and help to determine what may be allowed in one citizen, since we decide this question more readily when we ask, what can be allowed in all citizens. An equality of rights kept in view helps to explain the rights of each. Nor is it true that the largest freedom of each is consistent with the same in all, unless we have attached to the word freedom a restricted meaning; and so limited, the assertion ceases to be an answer to Mr. Emerson. If freedom means, as the author would have it, the doing of that, and that only, which is in harmony with the rights of the party, his freedom of course does not interrupt a like freedom in his neighbor, because the narrow definition has excluded the conflict. Our lexicography, however, gives no light, and we must still inquire what is allowed by freedom? — what does as a right inhere in the moral constitution of society? And in answering this question the principle stated by Emerson is of service. We see by it that liberty must not consume itself, and that the individual must be put on a footing with his fellows before we can define his privileges.

This constant limitation of theory by rules of a purely empirical character is seen in the matter of suffrage. The age of twenty-one is defined by no inherent necessity or unswerving fitness. One at eighteen is wiser than another at twenty-eight. The age designated gives us a rule of empirical form and practical convenience. So is it with the period of naturalization. Some foreigners are ready as soon as they land in this country to partake of the right of suffrage; some

are never ready ; they remain forever foreign to the spirit and purposes of our institutions.

With a like peremptory, theoretical force does Mr. Mulford set aside every limitation of the right of suffrage. He says : " The representative government is therefore constituted in the representation of the people, in the realization of its moral being. It is the representation of persons. The right to vote is the right of every person who is a member of the nation. It is the birth-right of freedom. It is the right only of a person, that is, one in whom there is the realization of personality, one whose action is self-determined, one who has the consciousness of law and of freedom in the self-determination of his own spirit, and in that alone is the power which can shape the course and destination of the state " (p. 225).

Mr. Mulford seems in this language at once to grant and to deny universal suffrage. We leave the reader to judge whether a practically sufficient test could be found in the phrase, " one who has the consciousness of law and of freedom in the self-determination of his own spirit." It would certainly yield more amusement in the use than either a property or educational test. How many of our citizens would be able to stand by their consciousness of law and freedom in self-determination, it would be interesting to determine. The truth is, universal suffrage of all normal adults, male and female, is the ultimate goal of liberty ; but who shall vote in any one nation, or whether any shall vote in it, must be decided by its development. A property test may be a convenient, serviceable safeguard ; and if that be a fact, the fact justifies the law. We, too, believe in the force of nature, — the organic nature of the state, but in it as expounded by the particular conditions before us.

We give one more instance of this light-footed theoretical tendency. In speaking of the powers of the nation, legislative, executive, and judicial, he says of them that they are organic, co-ordinate, co-extensive, correlative. To this, with the exception of the word co-extensive, we make no objection. But hurried on, as usual, by the force of his idea, he speaks

too lightly of the aid furnished in fixing the scope of the three classes of powers by the idea of a balance between them, a system of compensations and restraints. Such a system certainly does not express the true theory of their origin, nor of their central relation to each other; this is one of mutual aid, but it does as certainly greatly guide us in the details of their construction. By constitutional force and interdependence they do as certainly check as aid each other; and aid by limitation as well as by completion. We may, therefore, in their right formation, bear in mind the one fact as well as the other. Restriction may be more external, more incidental, than mutual support; but for that reason it may be easily seen, and furnish a rule more readily applied. Exclusively used it may give a formal and mechanical conception of the state; but applied wisely it will lend practical direction of great value. This the author so far sees as not to wholly reject it, though theoretically disparaging it.

A second consequence of the singleness and severity of the idea on which Mr. Mulford relies is a tendency to dogmatic assertions. We understand by dogmatism the reiteration of one doctrine or dogma without sufficient proof, or the needed qualifications. Of this we give an example taken from the chapter on the nation in its relation to other nations. "The science of international law has its foundation in the being of the nation as a moral person As the nation is constituted as a moral person, it cannot abdicate its responsibility, which is given in its being, and can, in its ultimate determination, be responsible to none on earth, but only and immediately to God." Here is your dogma certainly, the nation as a moral person; and the too limited and authoritative conclusion, the nation is responsible to God only. War, except as a brute struggle, means the responsibility of one nation to another for at least a portion of its action. There is a responsibility between and to nations, exactly as between individuals, and for the same reason, to wit, the need of it. Hence international law, and we look for the time when this law shall find a judicatory and judicial enforcement.

Again, in the chapter on the nation and the individual, he thus justifies the sacrifice of the individual to the nation : "The unity which subsists with the sacrifice of the individual for the nation, as it is formed in the manifestation of the law of the highest moral unity in the life of humanity, can proceed only in the conception of the being of the nation as a moral person. It cannot consist with mere individualism, in its principle or result ; and it is abhorrent that the sacrifice of those who had the higher moral spirit — the worthier going forth in their prime with joy and trust — should be counted only to serve the private and special ends of the individual, and to secure or promote their pleasure or possession ; and when the names and sacrifice of these are kept in the memory of the people, it is abhorrent that any should regard the nation as existent only to subserve their private and special interests and ends. But this is the necessary assumption of individualism." Here, as ever, we have the talisman of a moral person, and the unestablished assertion that this alone can justify the sacrifice of individuals to the common good. Strike out the words "private and special," in the above extract, — for the author has no right to them, — and remember that by the individual is meant the typical individual — the individual that often enough repeated makes the nation, — and the exact opposite of what is then asserted seems to us obviously true. One, two, ten men may sacrifice themselves for one thousand, ten thousand, an hundred thousand, and find their excellence in so doing. Nay, entering on this liability of sacrificing themselves for the nation, they sacrifice themselves for themselves ; since they, too, live in and by it.

We offer one more among the many illustrations the work affords : "The nation can meet the forces with which it has to contend only as it realizes its own moral being, and recognizes its origin and end in God" (p. 381). If the author had confined the assertion to the first clause, and intended by a realization of its own moral being a hazy, half-unconscious experience and relish of its own power and proper

good, we would have accepted it. As it now stands, in its unrestricted, emphatic form, we regard it as dogmatism.

Occasionally this positive temper forces the author into a position in which he overleaps his own conclusions. Thus he says: "The nation in its necessary being can have its origin only in the divine will, and its realization only in that." If this language is to be pushed at all into any real significance and force, it supersedes the freedom and growth of the nation, on which Mulford has everywhere insisted. Moral growth and freedom find their characteristic in the fact that they spring from the spontaneity of the individual, and are pushed out by no forces back of themselves. The only sense, therefore, in which a free nation, a nation developed under its own impulses, can have its origin and realization in the will of God, is that of permission; and the statement sinks back into a truism for the devout mind.

An idea held in so exclusive and unqualified a way leads in time to barrenness. One feels this as the work progresses. We have seen, again and again, the scope of the work open to it, and we come, as we read on, to be increasingly impressed with the necessity of more enlargement — of the introduction of new conditions and considerations to meet the complexity of the facts before us, and the perplexity of conflicting theories. The single, vigorous, germinal conception acts alone, like light in a vacuum. It gives a solid beam of radiance, piercing the darkness, yet calls for an atmosphere to scatter, reflect, and mellow it, that it may bring a genial and sufficient illumination to every object. The author abides in his solid beam, and shoots it, like a bolt, at every adversary. The effect is often very happy. Mole-eyes are closed in an instant; merely mechanical theories disappear, like a spider's web whose dew-drops the sun has drunk up; social contracts and formal concessions are seen to be either altogether hypothetical, or with no force in themselves. This admirable work of the author's in dazing empiricism, and exploding its feeble theories, we have not dwelt on. For this impression the book must be read. We

insist only that the conceptions of the author are not so constructive and varied as they should be, because he does not sufficiently recognize the conditions under which, the forces with which, his own forces are to build the national structure.

The style of the author seems to us a product of this tendency of his mind, and to aid it. We should term it a stilted and technical one. Its technicalities do not belong to any art or science, but to the writer's thought. Words have passed with him a little from their ordinary use and relations; and thus his own mind glides along them with less opposition and obstruction than would arise to the theory, if expressed in a perfectly simple, familiar, intelligible form. A peculiarity of style, a restricted and semi-technical use of words, assist a thought that tends to restriction and extravagance. A slight haze surrounds the idea; the newness of the expression lends to it a deceitful freshness; it seems fairly set agoing on its own railroad line of logic, and we do not bring it into close contact and comparison with the familiar thoughts and common sense of men. The author, moreover, when he has achieved this seemingly vigorous utterance of an idea, finds it reacting on his own mind with new force, and exercising an unrelenting rule over it from its throne of language. After we have made an idol, we are quite sure to bow down to it with increased devotion. Mulford's style has in it just enough of idiosyncrasy, strangeness, and fictitious taint of philosophy to bewilder the mind, and sometimes to unduly please it with the supposed results. We give one or two brief illustrations: "For rights in the nation are the asserting and the positing of personality, in the external sphere, through its self-determination, which is its freedom. They are the process in which personality affirms itself, and attains recognition in the nation" (p. 73). "Political rights are those rights which are instituted in the moral process of the people as an ethical organism. Political rights include the right of every person who is a member of the nation to the actual determination of a person in its destination" (p. 100). "The

will, defined in an abstract and formal conception, and divested of personality and its subsistence in it, allows no freedom, and when thus divested of its content it is without freedom also" (p. 109).

This method of expression would seem to have grown up from an intensely private thought—a mental growth which had suffered little contradiction or modification from other persons. It is but just to add that there are some very bright points in Mr. Mulford's work as a mere matter of composition, some very happy references.

We have spoken of the theoretical, dogmatic cast the work receives from the intensity and singleness of the author's mind. This fact has also imparted to the conception of the nation an ideal cast. It is not so much any nation that has been, or that is likely to be, that is spoken of, as a vision of a perfect nation that hovers before the mind, defines the principles of its own being, and lures on the imagination through glowing description. This is seen both in the captions and the contents of chapters. Some of the former we adjoin: *The Nation the Institution of Rights*; *The Nation the Realization of Freedom*; *The Nation the Antagonist of the Empire*; *The Nation the Goal of History*. In each case we are ready to add the adjective "perfect." The perfect nation, and that only, is the realization of freedom, the antagonist of the empire, and the goal of history. It is of such a nation that the author is speaking, when he says, in anarchy and oppression and violence and crime there is the negation of its being: "As the nation is called to be a power in history, it is in the realization of its being the Christian nation. It is this in its necessary conception. It has not in its option the alternative to determine whether it shall be, but yet shall or shall not be this, but its necessary realization is the Christian nation." He then proceeds to force the facts under this narrow statement, in this fashion: "The nations of the ancient ages, Judea and Greece and Rome, in their historical calling, held in their ongoing toward the coming of Christ, the fulfilment of the divine purpose" (p. 368). There

is a great deal of explanation that consists only in the expansion of the meaning of words. This is of that sort. In the first place, every nation must be Christian. Yet Greece and Rome were nations, hence they must be Christian nations; yes, we have it—they were Christian by virtue of an ongoing toward the coming of Christ. To such nonsense does a tension of words—an India-rubber stretching of language—lead us.

The true idea, though overworked and not sufficiently sustained by complementary forces, is found in *The Nation*. We take it to be this in substance: Men by constitution grow in families; families by economic, social, intellectual, moral constitution, grow in nations. Nations find their justification, the basis of internal rights and external authority in this nature, this necessity of things; in the organic force which creates them. A particular nation must look for its justification in the manner in which it is meeting its own actualities and possibilities. Monarchical or republican, its foundations are the same, the present condition of the people, and the stages of growth open to them. Every nation is therefore left, and must be left, in the light and the darkness of contemporary facts to feel its way through them, with much halting, many a slip, and fall, toward each higher state; its diligence defined every instant by its whereabouts, the obstacles it has overcome. The nation has no moral being or ultimate goal, aside from the individual and his prosperity. The individual represents, covers every sensitive, moral point in the nation. There are no other centres from which rational, moral acts can go forth; none to which good can return. The responsibility of a nation is a responsibility which must be visited on its rulers, on its people, or visited nowhere; its rewards are enjoyments that must return to its members in their individual susceptibilities, or find no contact with the earth. The nation, as itself a separate, generic, moral person, is a pure fiction, a personification, a return of realism, a hunting up again of that generic being that lies back of general terms, that

horse that is neither this nor that horse, but every and no horse; that sweetness which is neither of honey nor sugar, but is of them both. One may give force to a thought by thus clothing it with a definite personal word; but it is a device of rhetoric, not of logic. Men in every common relation, on ship-board, in a hunter's camp, in a commercial corporation, do and must organize themselves by the very force of different adaptations, varying duties, and common interests. By a like necessity, families must become the nation; but in neither case is some second thing created, something which, as a partially independent entity, reacts for ends of its own on those who called it up. This idea of the nation as a constitutional necessity, a primordial force, a common-stock life to those who compose it, the result at once of a union and division of labor, like the coral rock to the polyps who fashioned it, needs to be traced under all the varying conditions which the purposes it has to subserve, and the circumstances under which it struggles forward, impose upon it. Mr. Mulford has seized the main force, not so well the limitations which other forces bring to it. His attitude of mind is one that refers everything to inborn power, to genius, and little or nothing to the sunlight and soil under which and on which genius grows.

We have in *The Nation* the work of a devout, enthusiastic mind, full of insight, headlong in conclusion, capable of overthrowing much, and also making ready to build much. From minds endowed with these vigorous, intuitive faculties good things are sure to come; sometimes great things are thus given us.

ARTICLE IV.

PAUL'S PANEGYRIC OF LOVE. — A NEW CRITICAL TEXT,
TRANSLATION, AND DIGEST.

BY A. W. TYLER, A.M., NEW YORK.

[Continued from page 143.]

No. II. — TEXT AND DIGEST OF AUTHORITIES.

IN the Introduction to the former part of this Article it was stated that "many and serious difficulties beset the use of citations from the ecclesiastical writers; but these difficulties render it none the less imperative that we should sift the wheat from the chaff, and avail ourselves of whatever the Fathers, so called, have preserved for us." In examining these difficulties we find that the works of the early writers were not only liable to the same accidents of transcription, which have been mentioned as corrupting the text of the New Testament itself, but that scripture quotations especially encountered many peculiar obstacles to their perfect preservation and correct transmission to us. All these hinderances must be carefully considered before we can make an accurate estimate of the value of the citations which we find strewed in such wonderful profusion up and down the pages of the Fathers. The obstacles are of two classes, those proceeding from the Fathers themselves, and those which have arisen from the frailties and faults of the copyists.

In the first and second centuries scriptural quotations seem to have been given with but little regard to mere verbal accuracy; but rather with a looseness which would be quite startling to some of the modern advocates for the integrity of the text of the authorized version. Now, every word must be given in its exact relation to every other in the sentence:¹ then, the grand central truth, or the idea of the

¹ The reader, however, will probably be able to supply instances of gross miscitations of scripture, such as: "The seed of the woman shall bruise the

passage, was the only thing desired or thought of. And frequently this was all that was requisite to illustrate or enforce the argument which the writer had in hand. Accordingly we find that the citations of those two centuries, as given by Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Justin Martyr, and others, are often but the merest references, sometimes so remote that it is difficult or impossible to determine which of several passages is the one referred to. Such citations are of but little value in settling the *words* of the sacred text, though their weight may be great when thrown into the balance to determine the question of the omission, retention, or insertion of a *passage*.

In the third and succeeding centuries the discussions, contentions, and disputes which occurred, and the rise of so many heresies, caused the words of scripture to be carefully studied and more accurately quoted. Both sides referred to the same writings as the ultimate arbiter, and neither, with comparatively rare exceptions, dared falsify their text, which was jealously guarded by all. It is, therefore, what we should expect, when we find that the Greek Fathers, from Irenaeus downward, quote with a good degree of verbal accuracy; or would have done so had not the cruel persecutions to which they were subjected, and the other circumstances of their lives, compelled them to cite so often from memory. It is true that in those days the memory was trained to feats which now seem beyond belief, but in the New Testament where the central thought of so many passages is identical or similar, and the endings of many so nearly alike, the task of keeping each in its proper place was too great for human power to accomplish. (Compare the citation of 1 Cor. xiii. 3 in Clem.-Alex. *Stromata* iv. c. 18, p. 614, or of verse 8, as found in Orig.-Int. *Comm. in Mat.* c. 4, Opp. iii. p. 832^e, or verses 1-3 in Chr. *de Anathemate* c. 3, Opp. i. 694^d, for fair illustrations of confusion from this cause.)

serpent's head"; "Ephraim is joined to his idols"; "It is appointed unto all men once to die," etc.; and these even by prominent writers.

Prominent among the reasons for citing from memory was the great inconvenience of turning the scrolls, upon which the books of the New Testament were then written, to the exact place wanted. On this account, unless the writer intended to make quite a long quotation from scripture, he was not likely to take this trouble, particularly if he had, or, what is the same thing, thought he had, a pretty fair recollection of the passage he wished to cite.

The idiosyncrasies in the style of scripture quotation of each Father need to be thoroughly studied and clearly understood before the precise value of his citations can be rightly estimated. Some of the Fathers quote so loosely that their citations, unless particularly explicit, can have little or no determining weight and may as well be passed by in silence. The memoranda from which this Article was prepared include a large number of such worthless citations. Tertullian is, probably, the most remarkable of any of the Fathers upon our list for the looseness of his scripture quotations. Other Fathers again are very careful in their citations; and where we can be assured that we have what they actually wrote, we are pretty certain that the citation is as they read it in their copies. Origen, Eusebius, and Jerome are conspicuous examples of this class. Especially valuable is the testimony of these three Fathers where they discuss the various forms in which a reading was extant in their day, and give the reasons for the opinions they express. Such passages in their writings can hardly be so corrupted as to destroy their evidence; and even when so rewritten, as they have been,¹ as to testify to a reading they were meant to oppose, the change is readily detected by the skilful critic.

Curious as it may appear there are some Fathers who seem to combine the two methods of citation, quoting at one

¹ The Latin interpretation of Irenaeus, which is probably contemporaneous with that Father himself, twice testifies to the omission of the name Jesus, in Matt. i. 18; but the Greek of the passage, as preserved in a citation of Germanus, Patriarch of Constantinople, has been assimilated to the common text, and thus Irenaeus is made to testify to a reading of whose existence even he probably had never heard.

time quite accurately and at another in the freest possible manner. For example, Cyril of Alexandria cites the third verse of our passage three times with great exactness, and once, where he uses *καυθῆ*, quite loosely; but scarcely any two of his more than twenty-five citations of the twelfth verse will be found to agree throughout with any manuscript on our list, or even with each other. This fact, of course, greatly impairs the value of his testimony where it bears upon important readings of a character liable to misquotation.

Not a few of the Fathers wrote commentaries upon the whole, or upon greater or less portions of scripture. In most of these the passage commented upon is given at length after the manner of most modern commentaries. This "text" was peculiarly liable to corruption at the hands of copyists who were likely, either from accident or from design, to bring it into accordance with the New Testament manuscripts which they considered authoritative. The citations in the body of the commentary — a word, or a phrase or two — were much less liable to change from this cause. When, therefore, we find these citations differing from the text, we may feel pretty sure that they give what the writer intended to be read, and that the text does not. One will not have to read our digest very carefully to find instances of this difference of citation in the "text" of a Father and his commentary thereon.

All the causes which were mentioned in the first Article as likely to corrupt the text of the manuscripts of the New Testament, have even a greater force with regard to the works of the Fathers. The changes from design are far more certain to have occurred, for this reason: that the sacredness which was more or less attached to the text of scripture was not felt with regard to the writings of the Fathers. And, therefore, when a copyist found a citation differing from that with which he was familiar, he would be much more likely to consider the writer wrong and his manuscript of the New Testament correct, than that the contrary was the fact, and would, on that account, be tempted

to force the former into an accordance with the latter. It will be evident at once that the peculiar authority which was early attached to Jerome's Vulgate rendered the works of the Latin writers, or the Latin *interpretation* of the Greek writers, especially obnoxious to this kind of corruption. Accordingly where we find the Latin interpretation of a Greek Father concurring with the Vulgate against the most ancient Greek uncials, it is to be regarded with great suspicion. But should the interpretation differ from the Vulgate and agree with the earlier Greek manuscripts, we may be pretty sure that we have the correct translation of a passage whose original may have perished more than a thousand years ago, or may perchance have been brought to light since the standard edition of the Father was published. An instance illustrating this occurred in the preparation of this Article. The writer had a very long search for an edition of Amphilochius of Iconium which would give the Greek of the *Oratio ii. in Circumcisione Jesu Christi*. That *oratio* is omitted in Vol. xxxix. of Migne, and Vol. vi. of Gallandi, and given in the Latin only in Vol. v. of Despont's *Bibliotheca Maxima*, p. 1060^d. But in this last is found *scientiæ cessabunt*, which agrees with Tertullian, Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus Confessor, Damascenus, and the Sinaiticus, in using the plural forms where the *Old Latin* and Vulgate use the singular. In view of this fact it seemed reasonably certain that if the Greek existed it would read *γνώσεις παύσονται*, and the original of the passage, as finally found on p. 11 of Combefis's edition, proved the conclusion correct.

The editions of the works of the Fathers are by no means what they should be to enable us to cite them with much confidence. Allowing that the Jesuits and Benedictine monks, who edited so many of them, were fine Latin scholars they neither were able to collate all the manuscripts extant of the works they were editing, nor possessed the critical skill and acumen rightly to discriminate in the use of those they did have. Worse than this, they have not always been

honest in their work. For example in the Benedictine edition of the works of Ephraem Syrus, which we have cited in our digest, are several things given as Ephraem's which, according to Professor Rödiger¹ and Cardinal Wiseman,² are really the writings of James of Edessa, who lived three centuries later, and were properly accredited to him on the manuscripts from which they were edited. Other things of a similar nature could easily be cited.³

We need, and must have, thoroughly critical editions of the earlier and more important Fathers, say all to the end of the fourth century at least, before we can be assured of the ground upon which we stand when we state that a given reading has the support of Origen *four* times and Eusebius *once*, while it is opposed by Chrysostom *six* times, *once* expressly. The best editions now existing may justify such a statement, but a thorough examination of such codices of Chrysostom's works as the Codex Guelferbytanus, of the sixth century, may show quite a different state of affairs. Chrysostom was an especially favorite author, and the great frequency with which his writings have been copied has undoubtedly conduced largely to the modernized form in which we now find the scripture quotations in his works. It is little less than incredible that Chrysostom's manuscripts of the New Testament were so corrupted as the citations in Montfaucon's edition and the catenae would lead us to suppose. And here we would remark, in passing, that the citations given in the catenae are the least trustworthy sources of evidence we have, as they were almost certain to be assimilated to the text they were intended to illustrate.

¹ Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie, Vol. iv. p. 89, or the American ed. (Phila. 1860), Vol. ii. pp. 211, 212.

² Wiseman's Essays on Various Subjects (Lond. 1853), Vol. iii. pp. 277, 278.

³ On the corruptions in the writings of the Fathers, compare chap. iv. in Daillé's Treatise on the Right Use of the Fathers (London, 2d ed. 1843). (Chap. v. cites some very glaring and vicious mistranslations into Latin of Origen and Theodoret which were made for dogmatic reasons). See also Collette's Dr. Wiseman's Popish Literary Blunders Exposed (London, 1860); and Tyler's Worship of the Virgin Mary (London, 1844). The works named in these three notes (except the German of Herzog), may all be found in the Astor Library, New York.

The testimony of the Fathers has been valued more or less highly by all the editors of the text of the Greek Testament. Erasmus and his successors occasionally cited particular readings out of such manuscripts as they were able to consult; but Mill was the first editor who really appreciated their value or attempted their systematic collection. Bentley, in his proposed edition of the Greek Testament, intended to make use "of all the Fathers, Greeks and Latins, within the first five centuries"; and Tregelles¹ thinks that "he would have done much to *investigate* every citation he used, so as to know if it were really the testimony of the Father himself." Bengel made use of what had been gathered by Mill, and seems to have added to them from his own reading. Wetstein largely increased the stock of patristic citations, and sometimes went further and showed how a quotation applied in the case under consideration.

Griesbach, in his *Symbolae Criticae*, published a thorough collation of the citations to be found in the Greek works of Origen, which he gave with a greater exactness of statement than his predecessors. The citations which he gave from Clement of Alexandria were not, however, collected with equal care. The results of these collations were given in the second edition of his Greek Testament, whence Scholz transferred them to his edition. The citations from Irenaeus, Origen, Cyprian, Hilary, and Lucifer of Cagliari are stated very carefully in the larger edition of Lachmann, that of 1842-1850, for which they were re-examined partly by Buttmann, and partly by Lachmann himself.

Tischendorf's first and second editions, those of 1841 and 1849, were merely manuals and, therefore, it did not come within the author's design to give any *extended* citations from the Fathers. In the first his researches seem to have been mainly confined to the verification of passages already cited by former editors; while in his second, although he

¹ In Horne's Introduction (London, 1856), Vol. iv. p. 341, whence the facts regarding the Greek Testaments, down to that of Lachmann inclusive, are mostly drawn.

made a beginning of original investigation, he did not carry it to any great extent. In both the Fathers are cited merely by name, with no reference to volume or page, except when taken from a commentary *in loco*. His seventh edition, which was completed in 1859, was a marked advance upon anything which had gone before it (except the first part of Tregelles's edition, mentioned below), and gave a very large number of new and valuable citations. The second part of the volume, from Acts to Revelation, shows a great improvement upon the first in its method of citation, and far more often makes reference by volume and page.

In 1857, Tregelles issued the first part of the noble edition which was completed in March, 1872. In this magnificent work, to use Tregelles's own words,¹ "will be found all the citations that he could gather from the Fathers, Greek and Latin, of the first three centuries, including Eusebius and others who belong partly to the fourth; and besides these, there are given the citations of the Latin Fathers, on which Lachmann relied as authorities for the *old* Latin text." "No actual quotation is *intentionally* omitted; though not a few that superficially *appear* to be such have been passed by in silence, after a thorough investigation, from its seeming to be certain that they do not actually relate to the passage with which they have been connected. The result is that from Tregelles's notes will be seen all the patristic evidence, with full references to the works themselves, which has been observed as at all bearing on the reading of the text during the three first centuries, and more."

It must have been the influence of this edition which caused Tischendorf to make so much improvement in the second part of his seventh edition, which he was issuing from the press at the time the first part of Tregelles's edition appeared. Still more did it influence him in his method of giving citations in his eighth edition, which began to be issued in numbers in 1864; for in this he begins at once to cite the Fathers, by volume and page. This eighth edition

¹ Horne's Introduction (London, 1856), Vol. iv. pp. 341, 342.

of Tischendorf, the text of which is now happily completed, is likely to be our thesaurus of patristic lore for many years to come ; giving, as it does, an immense number of citations never before published, which are the results of careful and protracted researches which can scarcely be conceived of, except by one who has labored in the same field.

The digest published herewith gives the testimony of the manuscripts, versions, and Fathers, in the fullest and most complete form practicable. It aims to present all the available evidence (within the assigned limits of our lists) for the criticism of the passage selected. To accomplish this end, it shows every variation, however minute, of all the uncials of which editions have been published. It is, in fact, an exact collation of codices α ABCDFGP and the lectionary 2^h. It also gives all the evidence of the MSS. K and L, of the cursive mss., and of the versions, which could be gathered from the digests already published, or by consultation or correspondence with eminent scholars in this country or in England. And here the writer would express his grateful appreciation of the courtesy of Professor William Wright, LL.D., of Cambridge, England, in the kind promptitude with which he answered the letter of inquiry concerning the reading of the Aethiopic in the important passage in the third verse of 1 Cor. xiii.

The patrology of the passage is presented in the form herewith given, in order to show how much change is needed in the current method of citing the Fathers. One examining a subject or passage critically, and wishing to *verify every step*, as he should, can find but few of the patristic citations given in the critical editions of the Greek Testament, unless he happen to be within reach of the very editions of the Fathers used by the editors in their researches. These cannot always be found, even when other, and it may be inferior, editions can. Especially is this likely to be the case since the publication of the immense Latin and Greek Patrologies of Migne, which comprise three hundred and eighty-nine volumes, and a very large proportion of the existing works of the early

ecclesiastical writers. To render these, or any other editions of the Fathers, available to the readers of this Article, every citation is given, at least once in each verse, with full reference to treatise, book, chapter, section, volume, and page. This method of giving such citations is gradually coming into use by authors who have much occasion to refer to the patristic writings. It was suggested to the writer by his friend, Professor Ezra Abbot, D.D., LL.D., of Cambridge, to whom he is deeply indebted for many important citations in the third verse, and for much kind advice and assistance, extending over the whole period of the preparation of this Article. Its value is largely due to the numberless suggestions received from him.

In the *digest*, as is rightly the custom, readings cited from the *uncials* are given without breathings or accents, as these not unfrequently determine the meaning of a word which should be left unsettled until discussed. (For example, *αὐτοῦ* cannot be said to occur in the Greek of the New Testament, although often found in the *Textus Receptus*.) Extended citations from the cursives or Fathers are fully accented. In company with recent critical works, the final sigma (ς) is discarded; a diligent search through the second volume of Silvestre's *Paléographie Universelle* having failed to find more than a trace of its existence in any New Testament manuscript; and that trace, even, is probably but a slip of the pen. The letter *j* has also been thrown out of the Latin citations, as its use retards the speedy introduction of the scientific method of pronunciation which was recommended by the Committee of the American Educational Convention, at its session held in Boston in August last.

The writer has endeavored so to arrange his digest as to give the clearest view of all the evidence. Each new subject discussed is a paragraph by itself. The main subdivisions of the readings are separated by a perpendicular dash (|); and the minor divisions by inverted leaders (···)

GREEK TEXT.

27 Ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρουσ.

DIGEST OF AUTHORITIES.

27. υμεῖς **ABCD**^c (D* υμῖς by itacism), all the critical editions, Orig. iii. 640.^b iv. 197^a. Orig.-Int. iii. 61^b. 372^c. 889^e. iv. 564^d. 600^d. Eus. *Dem. Evan.* 10. p. 467^b. *in Ps.* xv. p. 53^b. lxi. p. 370^a. lxx. p. 398^c. lxxvii. p. 548^c. xc. p. 592^d. 602^d. Didym. *in Ps.* lxxxviii. 39. (Mai *Nov. Patrol.* vii. 269). Nyssen. *Tunc ipse Filius subiicietur Oratio*, Opp. i. p. 847^c. Basil. *Prooem. de Iud. Dei* § 3. ii. 216^b. Chr. iii. 547^c. x. 285^c *bis*. Theodoret. *in Ps.* lxxxii. Opp. i. 1200. *in Cant.* iv. Opp. ii. 101. *Interpret. Epist. I. ad Cor. in loco* iii. 249. Proclus *Epist.* 13. p. 698^b (omitting δέ). Int.-Joannis Maxentii *Dial.* ii. c. 13 (omitting δέ, *autem*) (M. lxxxvi. 145^a). Leontius-Byzantinus *adv. Nestorianos* vii. c. 3. (omitting δέ) (M. lxxxvi. 1765^b). Damascen. *in loco* ii. 107^c. Theod.-Studit. lib. ii. *Epistt.* 11. 122. (Sirmond Opp. v. 311^a. 451^d). Oecumen. *in loco* i. 545^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 200^a. | υμας FG. | ημεῖς Didym. *de Trin.* iii. c. 8. p. 360. Basil. *adv. Eunom.* iv. Opp. i. 291^c. Chr. iii. 733^d. | omit δε 2^a (ἀδελφοὶ ὑμεῖς ἐστὲ). Scr's a* h. Proclus 698^b. Int.-Joan. Maxent. 145^a. Leont.-Byzant. 1765^b.

— ἐστε σῶμα **NA** (ἐσται by itacism) BCD, all the critical editions; the Fathers generally, as for ὑμεῖς above, and Orig. Cat. Cor. 182. | σῶμαι ἐσται F. . . . σῶμα ἐσται G. g. Ambros. *in Lucam* xv. lib. vii. c. 209. Opp. i. 1461^f. (but *estis corpus* lib. viii. c. 26. i. 1476^f.) | σῶμα ἐσμεν Eus. *in Ps.* xxxiv. p. 143^c. Epiph. *adv. Haer.* lxvi. c. 86. Opp. i. 707^a. . . . ἐσμεν σῶμα Didym. *de Trin.* 360. Cyril. *in Zachar.* ii. § 13. Opp. iii. 669. cap. iv. § 27. p. 692.

— μερουσ **ABCD**^cFG. 17. 37. 47. 2^h., all the editions, Orig. iii. 640^b. iv. 197^a. Orig.-Int. iii. 61^b. 372^c. 889^e. iv. 564^d. 600^d. Eus. *Dem. Evan.* x. p. 467^b. *in Ps.* 143^c. 370^a. 398^c. 548^d. 592^d. 602^c. Did. *de Trin.* 360. Basil. i. 291^c. ii. 216^b. Chr. iii. 547^c. 773^d. x. 152^c. 285^{c,d}. Cyril. iii. 692. Theodoret. lib. iii. *in Cantic.* iv. 11. Opp. ii. 101. *comm. in loco* iii. 249 *bis*, (the comment is also given in Cramer's Cat. Cor. p. 242). Euthal.-cod. Max.-Confess. *Cap. Theol. et Oecon. cent.* 2. § 30. p. 491. § 84. p. 506. Damascen. ii. 107^c. Theod.-Studit. *Epistt.* lib. ii. *Ep.* 8. p. 304^b. *Ep.* 11. p. 311^a. *Ep.* 15. p. 321^b. *Ep.* 17. p. 324^c. *Ep.* 122. p. 451^d. *Ep.* 213. p. 580^c. Oecu-

A LITERAL TRANSLATION.

27 Now are ye the body of Christ, and members individually.

28 Καὶ οὓς μὲν ἔθετο ὁ θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, πρῶτον ἀποστόλους, δεύτερον προφήτας, τρίτον διδασκάλους, ἔπειτα δυνάμεις, ἔπειτα χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων, ἀντιλήμψεις,

men. *in loco* i. 545^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 200^a. | μελουσ D*. d. e. f. Am. Hcl.-txt. (but μερουσ in Greek on the margin,) Arm. Orig. ii. 640^f. Eus. Ps. 53^c. Didym.-Alex. (Mai. vii. 269). Nyssen. *Filius subiicietur Orat.* i. 847^c. Epiph. *adv. Haer.* lxxvi. c. 86. i. 707^a. Severian. Cat. Cor. 243 (οὐκ εἶπεν μέλη ἐκ μέλων, ἀλλὰ μέλη πολλὰ ἐκ μέλουσ ἐνός. μέλοσ γὰρ ἡ κεφαλὴ τοῦ ὅλου σώματος). Cyril. iii. 669. Theodoret. i. 1200. Proclus 698^b. Leont.-Byzant. 1765^b. Int.-Joannis Maxentii 145^a. (Ambrosius i. 1461^f. 1476^f.) the Latin Fathers generally, with the Vulgate, but Hil. *de Trin.* lib. viii. c. 33. i. 967^b and Aug. *Tract.* 21 *in Joan.* § 8. Opp. iii. pt. 2. 460^a omit ἐκ μέρουσ or ἐκ μέλουσ.

28. ἐκκλησία G. Orig. iii. 501^c. Cat. Cor. 245. Chr. iii. 75^d. x. 660^b. etc. | ἐκκλησία F.

—τρίτον διδασκαλουσ without copula ABCD^cFG. 17. 47. 2^h. Iren.-Int. *adv. Haer.* lib. iv. c. 26. § 5. p. 263. Orig.-Int. iv. 600^a. Cat. Cor. 245. Cyril.-Hier. *de Eccl. Cath.* c. 27. p. 298^b. Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* lib. ii. c. 2. p. 222. Basil. *de Spirit. Sanct.* c. 16. § 39. iii. 34^a. Chr. iii. 75^c. x. 285^e. 286^c. Cat. Cor. 243. Cyril. *de Adorat.* lib. xiii. Opp. i. 470. *de Recta Fide* v. pt. 2. 64. *Thesaur. de Sanct. et Consub. Trin. Assert.* 34. v. 346. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 250. Basil.-Seleuc. *Orat.* 34. (M. lxxxv. 369^d). Cosmas Indicopleustes *Christ. Opin. de Mundo* lib. x. (Montf. ii. 315^d). Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^a. Michael Monach. *in Vita Theodori Studitae* (Sirmond v. 37^a). Oecumen. *in loco* i. 545^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 200^d. Hil. *de Trin.* lib. viii. c. 33. i. 967^b. Ambros. *in Ps.* cxviii. § 15. i. 1250^c. *de Spir. Sanct.* lib. ii. c. 13. § 149. Opp. ii. 662^f. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. pt. 2. 153^f. Hier. *adv. Iovinianum* lib. ii. c. 23. Opp. ii. 361^c. | τρίτον δε D*. | και τρίτον 37. Orig. iii. 501^c.

—ἐπειτα] ειτα D*: (text D^b) ειπειτα FG. | ειτα Hcl.-mg. Gr. Oecumen. *comm. in loco* i. 546^b.

—δυναμιο ND*: (text D^{b-c}) δυναμησ Scr's d.

—ἐπειτα χαρισματα ABC. 17. 39. 73. 74. 93. Scr's a. Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. Cyril.-Hier. 298^b Basil. iii. 34^a. Chr. x. 285^e (R. 333). 286^d

28 And some God placed in the church, first apostles, secondly prophets, thirdly teachers, then powers, then gifts of healing,

29 κυβερνήσεις, γένη γλωσσῶν. μὴ πάντες ἀπόστολοι; μὴ
 πάντες προφῆται; μὴ πάντες διδάσκαλοι; μὴ πάντες
 30 δυνάμεις; μὴ πάντες χαρίσματα ἔχουσιν ἰαμάτων; μὴ
 πάντες γλώσσαις λαλοῦσιν, μὴ πάντες διερμηνεύουσιν;

(R. 334). Cat. Cor. 243. Cyril.-Alex. v. pt. 2. 64 (*ex codice Segueriano*). 356. Euthal.-cod. Damascen. ii. 108^b. | εἶτα KsL. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's mss. Wd. 5. Chr. iii. 75^e bis. Cyr. v. pt. 2. 64, as printed. Theodoret. iii. 250. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 545^c. Theophyl. ii. 200^d. . . . *f. Am. deinde — exinde. . . . deinde — et* Hier. *adv. Iovin.* ii. 361^c. . . . *deinde — deinde* Ambrosiast. *in loco*. Aug. *de Gestis Pelagii* c. 13. § 32. x. 209^d. | omit *επειτα* or *εἶτα* DEFG. *d. e. g.* Hil. i. 967^b. Ambros. *in Ps.* cxviii. Opp. i. 1250^c. *de Spir. Sanct.* ii. 662^a. 663^a.

28. ἀντιληψ- $\aleph$ AB*D* (FG ἀντειληψ-), Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. | ἀντιληψ- B³CD^cEKL, all cursives so far as known, Wd. 5. || -εις $\aleph$ ABCD^{b-c}E_sFG. | -ισ D*.

— κυβερνησις $\aleph$ D* : (corrected by D^{b-c}).

— γένη] omits $\aleph$ * by error: ($\aleph^a$ supplies it).

— γλωσσων F^{corr.} | γλωσσον F* by itacism. || After γλωσσων add *interpretationes sermonum* Vulg.-Clem. Harl.^{corr.} Tol. Demid. (*interpretationem*), Hcl. Arm. Ambrosiast. *in loco*, (but *int. serm.* is lacking in some mss. of Ambrst.) *Epist. ad Demetriadem Virg.* c. 12 p. 506 (*interpretatio*). | codices *Am. Fuld.* omit *int. serm.*, as do all the Greek MSS. and editions, and Fathers so far as noted.

29. δυνάμις $\aleph$ D*FG, itacism. | -μεις ABCD^{b-c}.

— Between *μη* and *παντες αποστολοι* G^{mg. corr.} adds *γυσαι* or *γυσω*. The word is difficult to read.

30. εχουσιν, λαλουσιν, διερμηνευουσιν FG.

— Between *μη* and *παντες γλωσσαις* G^{mg. corr.} would insert *γισω*.

— The *ν ἐφέλκυστικόν* is affixed to *λαλουσιν* and *διερμηνευουσιν* by $\aleph$ AB*CDFG. 37. Tisch. Ti. Tif. Tr. Alf. Ln. | It is omitted by Wd. 5. solely on the authority of B³, (and possibly K), and the cursives.

29 assistants, governings, diversities of tongues. Are all apostles? Are all prophets? Are all teachers? Are all *possessors of* 30 powers. Have all gifts of healing? Do all speak with tongues? Do all interpret?

31 Ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα· καὶ ἔτι καθ'

31. ζηλουτε $\aleph$ BCD | ζηλονται A. Scr's k o². ζελονται FG.
Itacisms.

—δε] omit Orig. iv. 77^d. Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 2 § 1. (M. xl. 1108^a). Chr. ii. 490^d. vii. 486^d. x. 288^e. (289^b γάρ). xii. 21^d. 35^d. (Severian. Cat. Cor. 246). Cyril. *Thesaur. Assert.* xi. Opp. v. 84. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^d. *Sacra Parallela*, a. 18. p. 353^c. ζ. 5. p. 532^b. π. 2. p. 634^b. Photius Cat. Cor. 247, line 18, (inserts in line 13).

—τα χαρίσματα $\aleph$ ABCD. Orig. iv. 77^d. Cat. Cor. 94. Chr. and Photius Cat. Cor. 247. Damascen. ii. 108^d. 353^c. 532^b. 634^b. etc. | omit τα FG.

—τα before μείζονα in F is above the line, in a smaller hand, possibly F^{corr}. It is given correctly in G.

—μείζονα $\aleph$ (μίζ-) ABC. 17. 37. 5. 6. 10. 31. 39. 67². 73. 137. 213. *Am. Aeth.* (both editions). Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. Orig. iii. 647^a. iv. 418^a. Orig.-Int. iv. 649^c. Cat. Cor. 94. Phileas Martyr. (*ap.* Routh, *Reliquiae Sacrae*, ed. altera, iv. 88. Oxon. 1846; Eus. *Hist. Evan.* viii. c. 10. p. 302 ed. Viger: διὸ καὶ ζηλώσαντες τὰ μείζονα χαρίσματα οἱ χριστοφόροι μάρτυρες). (Eph.-Syr. *Inst. ad Monachos* iii. 333^e πνευματικά). (Chr. vii. 376^c. πνευματικά). Chr. Cat. Cor. 246 (τὰ μείζονα καὶ τὰ μικρότερα χαρίσματα). Theod.-Mops. Cat. Cor. 246 (see full citation from Theodoret. under κρείττονα). Cyril. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Euthal.-cod. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^d. *Sacra Parall.* π. 2. ii. 634^b. Hier. *adv. Iovin.* ii. c. 23. Opp. ii. 361^d. *in Naum* I. 1. Opp. vi. 535^a. | κρείττονα Ks L. 2^h. Scr's mss. except m (our 37). Vulg.-MSS., except *Am. Vulg.-Clem.* Memph. *ut vid.* Arm. Wd. Eras. 5. Orig. iv. 77^d. (τὸ ἐπὶ Παύλου προστεταγμένον· ζηλοῦτε τὰ χαρίσματα κρείττονα, μείζονα δὲ τῶν χαρισμάτων τὸ καὶ πάντων προτεταγμένον ὥσπερ ἐστὶ λόγος σοφίας·). Orig.-Int. ii. 141^a. Aphraates *Sermo* 2 *de Dilectione* 15. (Gall. v. p. xvii^b). (see note under καθήσονται in verse 3). Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 2. § 1. p. 1108^a (*praestantiora*). Chr. ii. 490^d. vii. 486^d. x. 288^e (R. 337). 289^a expressly (καὶ οὐκ εἶπε· “τὰ μείζονα” ἀλλὰ “τὰ κρείττονα,” τουτέστι τὰ χρησιμώτερα τὰ συμφέροντα. This remark is repeated by Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 201^b), 289^b. xii. 21^d. 35^d. Cat. Cor. 247 *bis*. Severian. Cat. Cor. 246. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 250 (ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ κρείττονα. τοῦτό

31 But earnestly desire the greater gifts; and moreover I am

1 ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι. ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀντι-
 τινες κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἀνέγνωσαν, ἀντὶ τοῦ, ὅλως γὰρ ἐφίεσθε τῶν μεζόνων
 χαρισμάτων; εἰ ὄντως ἐφίεσθε, ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐπὶ ταῦτα [p. 251] ποδηγήσω
 [Cramer προοδηγήσω] προθύμως. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπήγαγε· καὶ ἔτι καθ'
 ὑπερβολὴν ὁδὸν ὑμῖν δείκνυμι. τουτέστι· τῶν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν, μεζόνων
 χαρισμάτων δείκνυμι τὴν ὁδὸν· καὶ διδάσκει αὐτοὺς ὥς τούτων ἀπάντων
 κρείττων ἢ περὶ τὸν πῆλας ἀγάπη. From ἀντὶ τοῦ ὅλως to the end
 this citation is given in Cramer's *Catenae* as by Theodore of
 Mopsuestia. And because it has not been noticed that they are the
 same citation, Theod.-Mops. and Theodoret.-comm. have been cited
 for μεζόνα, and Theodoret.-txt. for κρείττονα. Very likely Theodoret,
 the *pupil*, borrowed the comment from Theodore of Mopsuestia, his
 master, and if so he must have written μεζόνα in his text, which
 the copyists, with their customary carelessness, or something worse,
 corrupted to κρείττονα. It is possible, however, that this is one of
 the cases so often met with in the works of the Fathers, where
 whole passages are interpolated by the copyist, and no hint of the
 fact given. It is worthy of notice here, as showing how little
 dependence can be placed in the Latin versions of the Greek
 Fathers, that *meliora* is given for both κρείττονα and μεζόνα in the
 Latin of this passage). Damascen. *Sacra Parall.* a. tit. 18. Opp. ii.
 353^c. ζ. tit. 5. p. 532^b. Photius Cat. Cor. 247. Oecumen. *in loco* i.
 546^d. *comm.* 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 201^b. Ambros. *in Ps.* xxxvi. c. 4. Opp.
 i. 778^d. *de Viduis* c. 5. § 32. ii. 194^c. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. 154^c.
 (Confer. Tertul. *Uxori.* i. 3. Opp. iii. 77. *et meliorem donationem*
sectatores scimus.). | κρεισσονα D^cEs. . . . κρισσονα D*FG. Itacism.

31. καὶ **ABCDKsL**. 2^h. | omit FG. Pst.

— **ετι** **ABCD**^{b-c} **KsL**. 2^h. . . . **επι** D*F. . . . **ετει** G. Itacisms.

— **υμιν** before **δεικνυμι** **ABCDKsL**. 2^h. Orig. Cat. Cor. 249.
 Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^a. 169^d. *Inst. ad Monachos*
 iii. 333^e. Chr. ii. 490^d. vii. 376^c. 486^d. x. 289^c (but six lines below
δεικνυμι ὑμῖν). Cyr.-Alex. *Hom. in Fest. Pasch.* 7. Opp. v. pt. 2. p.
 85. etc. | **δεικνυμι** before **υμιν** FG. Chr. x. 288^e (R. 337). 289^b. 289^c
 (but see above). | **διγνυμι** A **δεικνυμι** D*: (text D^{b-c}). Itacisms.
 The syllable **δεικ** alone, is now legible in C. . . . **δεικνυω** 17.
 **δεικνυμοι** Scr's k.

— **ανθρωπων** F*. . . . text F^{corr}. G.

1. Of **μη** **εχω** only the letters **μ** and **ε** are now legible in C.

1 showing you a supereminently excellent way. If I speak with

θρώπων λαλῶ καὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, γέγονα

1. γεγονα χαλκοσ to δε μη εχω in verse 2 is omitted by *δμοιοτέλειτον* in *N**, the eye of the scribe passing from δε μη εχω at the end of a line to the similar phrase some distance below. *N** supplies the deficiency, in an elegant hand, upon the upper margin. The passage is vouched for in its entirety by all the other MSS. and mss., both Greek and Latin, the versions, and the Fathers generally whenever they cite the passage.

— γεγονα *N^aABCD^c* (also *D^b vid.*) *E^{corr}(?)* 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's mss. Orig. iv. 121^a (καὶ ὁ χωρὶς ἀγάπης ἔχων γνῶσιν μυστηρίων, ἣ προφητείαν, γέγονε χαλκὸς ἡχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον). Orig.-Int. ii. 176^b. Cat. Cor. 250. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^b. 169^d. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 333^e. Didym.-Alex. in *Ps.* cl. (Mai vii. 311). Basil. de *Fide* § 5. ii. 228^c. *Epist.* 204 (al 75). iii. 303^b. Pseudo-Basil. de *Bapt.* lib. i. § 24. lib. ii. *Quaest.* 8. Opp. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 21. c. 9 (M. xl. 1165^a). Chr. vi. 288^c. x. 290^a bis. Severian. Cat. Cor. 248. Cyril. in *Joannem* xiii. 35. lib. ix. Opp. iv. p. 754. Hom. in *Fest. Pasch.* 7. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. in *loco* iii. 251. Max.-Confess. *Loci Comm. Serm.* 6. Opp. ii. 545. Damascen. in *loco* ii. 108^d. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. Oecumen. in *loco* i. 546^d. Theophyl. in *loco* ii. 201^c bis. (Aug. six times *factus sum*. So *f. Am.*). | εν ειμι *D*E** (F) (G) *f^{corr}* over Greek. (εν ειμει η FG). . . . d. e. g. *m¹⁶*. Ambrosiast. in *loco* Opp. ii. pt. 2. p. 154^e. read in (g. *m¹⁶*. Ambrosiast. om.) *unum sum ut* (Ambrosiast. *velut*).

— χαλκοσ Orig. iv. 121^a. Chr. vii. 486^d. etc. | χαλικοσ FG.

— αλαλαζον *N^aBC* (-ζον alone now legible) FGKL. 37. 47. 2^h. (Hcl.-mg. Gr. αλλαλαζον) Tisch. Tr. Ln.-txt. Alf. Wd. Eras. 5. Clem.-Alex. *Strom.* iv. 18. p. 614. Orig. iv. 121^a. Cat. Cor. 250. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^b. 169^e. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 333^e. Didym.-Alex. in *Ps.* cl. (Mai vii. 311). Basil. ii. 228^c. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. vi. 288^c. x. 290^a. Severian. Cat. Cor. 248. Cyril. in *Isaiam* ix. 11-12. lib. i. *Orat.* 6. Opp. ii. 162. in *Joan.* Opp. iv. p. 754. *Fest. Pasch.* v. pt. 2. 85. Theodoret. in *loco* iii. 251. Isid.-Pelusiot. lib. i. *Epist.* 108 (M. lxxviii. 256^b). Max.-Confess. ii. 545. Damascen. ii. 108^d. 353^d. Oecumen. i. 546^d. Theophyl. ii. 201^d. | αλαλαζων ADE. 17. Scr's d. (Lectionary 8 *κυμβαλοσ αλαλαζων*). Ln.-mg.

the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I have 2 become *as* sounding brass or a clanging cymbal. And even

2 χαλκὸς ἡχῶν ἢ κύμβαλον ἀλαλάζον. καὶ ἐὰν ἔχω προφη-

2. καὶ εἰαν $\aleph$ BDEFGK (καὶ αν) L. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's mss. and nearly all other cursives, Tisch. Tr. Alf². Wd. Eras. 5. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Basil. *Epist.* 204 (al 75). c. 1. Opp. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. *de Bapt.* i. 24. ii. 8. § 8. Opp. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. vi. 288^c. x. 290^c (R. 339). (290^d ἐὰν ἔχω omitting καί). Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 251. Euthal.-cod. Max.-Confess. *de Charitate cent.* 4. § 100. p. 458. (ἐὰν omitting καί). Damascen. txt. *in loco* ii. 108^d. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 546^d. Theophyl. *in loco* iii. 202^a. | † καν AC. 17. Alf. Ln. Eph.-Syr. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 333^e. Basil. *de Fide* c. 5. ii. 228^c. Cyril. *Fest. Pasch.* 7. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Damascen. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d.

— προφητειαν ABCD^{b-c}FG. 2^h. the Fathers, as now printed. . . . προφητιαν $\aleph^a$ (*sic*, not as Tisch.) D*L.

— εἰδω $\aleph^a$ BCD^c. 47^{corr 1}. 2^h. (*noverim d. e. f. g. m*¹⁶.) Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. Basil. ii. 228^c. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. vi. 288^c. vii. 300^d. Theodoret. iii. 252. Max.-Confess. 458. Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 202^a. etc. | ἰδω AD*. 17. 47*. 72. and some other cursives, Eph.-Syr. ii. 169^e. iii. 333^f. Ps.-Basil. 665^d (ed. Garnier, but εἰδῶ ed. Gaume). Damascen. *in loco bis*, ii. 108^{d-e}. *Sacra Parall.* 353^d. | οὐδα FG (perhaps for οὐδα).

— τα μυστήρια παντα $\aleph^a$ ABCD. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Basil. ii. 228^c. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 694^d. vi. 288^c. vii. 300^d. x. 290^d. Cyril.-Alexandrinus *Homil. in Fest. Pasch.* 7. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. *txt. et comm. in loco* iii. 251–2. Max.-Confess. 458. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^{d-e}, *text. et comment.* (*text.* ἅπαντα). *Sacra Parall.* ii. 353^d. Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 202^a. | τα μυστήρια τα παντα FG. | παντα τα μυστήρια Orig. iv. 352^d. | omits παντα Eph.-Syr. iii. 333^f.

— πασαν την γνωσιν] Pseudo-Basil. ii. 665^d, as printed, omits. One ms., however, does not omit.

— καὶ εἰαν $\aleph^a$ CDEFGKsL. 37. (47 omitting ἐὰν ἔχω). 2^h. Tisch. Tr.-mg. Alf². Ln. Wd. Eras. 5. Orig. iii. 576^d (omitting καί). 579^d. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* 9. § 4. p. 733^d (Jahn. 44). Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. iii. 333^f. Ps.-Athanas. *Quaest. ad Ant. Duce.* 89. ii. 236^f. Basil. ii. 228^c (*sic*, not omitting ἐὰν ἔχω as Tisch.). iii. 303^b (omitting ἐὰν). Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. vi. 288^c (omitting πᾶσαν τήν). vii.

though I have the gift of prophecy, and comprehend all the mysteries and all knowledge, and even though I have all faith, so

τείαν καὶ εἰδῶ τὰ μυστήρια πάντα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν,
*καὶ ἔαν ἔχω πᾶσαν τὴν πίστιν, ὥστε ὄρη μεθιστάναι,

300^d (omitting καί). x. 290^e (R. 339). 291^b (omitting καί). xii. 36^a (omitting πᾶσαν τήν). Euthal.-cod. Theodoret. *in* 1 *Cor.* xii. 9. Opp. iii. 244. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^d. Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 202^a. | * *καν* AB. 17. 31. Tr. Alf. Ln¹⁸³¹. Clem.-Alex. *Strom.* iv. 18. p. 614. Orig. iv. 427^e. Cat. Cor. 251. Cyril. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Damascen. ii. 353^d. | 47. Eph.-Syr. ii. 169^e. Basil. *Reg. brev. Respons.* 282. Opp. ii. 514^e. read καί, omitting ἔαν ἔχω; but *Basil.* puts the ἔαν ἔχω before πᾶσαν τὴν γνῶσιν.

2. Omits ὥστε 37.

— μεθιστάναι *N^a* BDEFG. 17. 37. 2^h. 19. 31. 43. 44. 48. 52. 55. 73. Tisch. Tr. Ln. Clem. *Strom.* iv. 18. p. 614. (v. 1. p. 644. ὁποῖοι ἦσαν οἱ ἀπόστολοι, ἐφ' ὧν τὴν πίστιν ὄρη μετατιθέναι, καὶ δένδρα μεταφυτεύειν δύνασθαι εἴρηται.). Cyril. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theophyl. ii. 202^a. (FG μεθιστάναι by itacism). | † μεθιστανεῖν ACKsL. Alf. Wd. Eras. 5. Orig. iii. 576^d. 579^d. Cat. Cor. 250. 251. Ps.-Athanas. ii. 236^f. Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Didym.-Alex. *in Ps.* xvii. 8–9. xlv. 3. (Mai *Nov. Patrol. Gr.* vii. 181. 227). Basil. ii. 228^e. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 694^d. vi. 288^e. vii. 300^d. x. 290^e (R. 339). 291^b (R. 339). xii. 36^a. Cyril. *in Joan.* xi. 40. lib. vii. et viii. fragmenta. Opp. iv. p. 687. Theodoret. iii. 244. 251. 252. Euthal.-cod. Damascen. ii. 108^d. *Sacra Parall.* 353^d. Oecumen. i. 547^a. | μεθισταν Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* 9. § 4. p. 733^d. Eph.-Syr. iii. 333^f. Basil. iii. 303^b. Chr. Cat. Cor. 251. | μεθιστα Ps.-Ignat. *Epist. ad Heronem* c. 2. p. 109^b.

— ουθεν *N* ABCD^e L. 17. 2^h. Scr's a b c (*tacite*) e f g h k l o, five cursives cited by Matthaei, Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. 5. 5^e. Clem.-Alex. 614 (*sic*; not οὐδέν, as Tregelles). Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Macarius-Aegypt. *Hom.* 26. c. 16 (Gall. vii. 99^b). Basil. ii. 228^e (with four ancient mss., but ed. Paris of 1618 οὐδέν). Ps.-Basil. ii. 665^d. Euthal.-cod. Damascen. ii. 108^d. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d (*sic* ed. Le Quien, Paris, 1712, but Migne gives οὐδέν). Oecumen. i. 547^a. (*in comm.* p. 549^a οὐθέν εἰμι; οὐκ εἶπε μικρότατος εἰμι καὶ εὐτελής, ἀλλ' "οὐδέν εἰμι." Some copyist has blundered here). Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 202^b | ουθεν D*FGKs. 37. 47s. Scr's. d. Wd. 5^b. 5^e. Clem. *Paed.* ii. 1. p. 166. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* 9. § 4. p. 733^d. Eph.-Syr. iii. 333^f. Macar.-Aegypt. *Hom.* 27. c. 14 (Gall. vii. 107^e). Basil. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. Chr. i. 694^d (but see under

3 ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, οὐθέν εἰμι. *καὶ ἐὰν ψωμίσω πάντα τὰ ὠφελοῦμαι). vi. 288^c. vii. 300^d. x. 290^e (R. 339). 291^b (R. 339). xii. 36^a. Cat. Cor. 251. Cyril. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. iii. 251. Theophyl. *text. in loco* ii. 202^b. (Compare Phrynichi *Eclogae Nominum et Verborum Atticorum*, p. 181, ed. Lobeck, 1820; p. 76, ed. De Pauw, 1739: “Οὐθείς διὰ τοῦ θ, εἰ καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ οἱ ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν οὕτω λέγουσι, σὺ δὲ ἀποτρέπου λέγειν· οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι διὰ τοῦ δ̄ λέγουσιν, οὐδεῖς.” See also the important foot-note in Lobeck’s edition).

2. εἰμι ABCDEFGKsL. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr’s mss. *d. f. g. m*¹⁶. *Am.* the versions, all the critical editions, Clem. 166. 614. Meth. 733^d. Aphraates *Sermo* 2. c. 15. p. xvii^b. Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. iii. 333^f. Macar.-Aegypt. *Hom.* 27. c. 14. p. 107^c. Basil. ii. 228^c. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. vi. 288^c. vii. 300^d. x. 290^e. 291^b. xii. 36^a. Cat. Cor. 251. Cyril. v. pt. 2. 85. Theodoret. iii. 251. Damascen. ii. 108^d. 353^d. Oecumen. i. 547^a. 549^a *bis*. Theophyl. *in loco, txt. et comm.*, ii. 202^b. Cyprian. *de Unit. Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304. Zeno-Veronensis *de Spe, Fide, et Caritate* c. 6. p. 112^d. Aug. *in Ps.* cxli. § 7. Opp. iv. 1582^b. *et quater*. Julian.-Pomerianus *de Vita Contemplativa* iii. c. 14. p. 44. *Epist. ad Demetriadem Virg.* 19. p. 508. (FG εἰμι by itacism). | ὠφελοῦμαι A. Chr. i. 694^d. Max.-Confess. 458. Ambros. *in Ps.* xlv. 3. § 9. Opp. i. 929^f. *Epist. Horontiano* (78) c. 6. Opp. ii. 1094^b. Ambrosiast. ii. pt. 2. p. 155^a. Aug. *de Verbis Joan.* xvi. *Sermo.* 145. c. 4. Opp. v. 698^d.

3. καὶ εἰ ἐὰν ABCDEFGKsL. 37. 47. 2^h. Tisch. Alf². Wd. 5. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Basil. *Reg. brev.* 282. ii. 514^d. Ps.-Basil. *de Bapt.* i. 24. ii. 8. § 8. Opp. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 445^d (καὶ γὰρ ἐάν). 694^d. x. 226^b. (ἐὰν γάρ). 291^b (R. 339). xii. 36 (omitting καί). 432^e (omitting καί). Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 252. Max.-Confess. *Loci Communes, Sermo* 6. ii. 545 (omitting καί). Oecumen. *in loco* i. 547^a. Theophyl. *in loco* p. 202^c. | *καὶ ABC. 17. Tr. Alf. Ps.-Ignat. *Epist. ad Heronem* c. 2. p. 109. Clem.-Alex. *Strom.* iv. c. 18. p. 614. Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. Eph.-Syr. *Inst. ad Monachos* iii. 333^f. Basil. *Prooem. in Reg.* 3. ii. 329^d. *Epist.* 204 (al. 75) c. 1. Opp. iii. 303^b. Chr. vii. 748^e. x. 292^d (καὶ πάντα τω δῶ). Cyril. *de Ador.* lib. vii. Opp. i. 243. *in Amos* viii. 4–6. tom. iv. § 73. Opp. iii. 331. *in Joan.* xiii. 35. lib. ix. Opp. iv. 754. *Fest. Pasch.* 7

3 as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing. And even though I dole out all my goods to feed the poor, and even though I deliver over my body that I may glory, but have not

ὑπάρχοντά μου, *καὶ ἐὰν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμά μου ἵνα *καυχή-

Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^e. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. So, also, Tif.¹⁸⁴¹.

3. ψωμῶ NABCDEFGL. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's a b c (*tacite*) d e f g h k l o, the cursives generally so far as noted, *d. f. g. m*¹⁶. *Am.* Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. Wd. Eras. 5. 5^e. 5^m. Clem. 614. (166. *διαδῶ*). Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. iii. 333^f. Basil. ii. 329^d. 514^d. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 694^d. vii. 749^a. x. 226^b. 291^b (R. 339) *bis*. (292^d δῶ). xii. 36^e. 432^e. Cat. Cor. 253. Cyril. i. 243. iv. 754. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. iii. 252 *bis*. Euthal.-Cod. Max.-Confess. ii. 545. Damascen. ii. 108^e. 109^a expr. Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 202^e. Cyprian. *de Unit. Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304. Zeno *de Spe, Fide, Caritate* c. 6. p. 112^e. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. 155^e. Ps.-Hier. *in loco* xi. 266^e. Aug. *in Joan.* c. iv. *Tract.* 8. § 9. Opp. iii. pt. 2. 282^e. *et novies. Epist. ad Demetriadem Virg.* 19. p. 508. Julian.-Pomerianus *de Vita Contemplativa* iii. c. 14. p. 44. | ψωμίζω Ks. (?) 5^b. and thence 5^e. (Of this Wetstein, *Novum Testamentum Graecum*, says: *In editionibus T. Bezae legitur ψωμίζω vitio typothetarum: ipse enim Beza, ut ex versione et annotationibus constat, legit ψωμίσω*). Damascen. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d (perhaps a mistake of the printer or copyist). . . . Clem. 166 *διαδῶ*. Chr. x. 292^d δῶ. . . . ψωμεισώ F. . . . ψωμμεισώ G*: (the ν is dotted for omission by G^{corr.}).

— μου] μοι Scr's l.

— καὶ εἰ N(B)DEFGKsL. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Tisch. Tr. Wd. Alf². 5. Clem. *Strom.* iv. 18. p. 614 (omitting καί). Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* ix. § 4. p. 733^d (Jahn 44). Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. Macar.-Aegypt. *Hom.* 26. c. 16. p. 99^b (omitting καί). Basil. ii. 329^d. 514^d. iii. 303^b (omitting εἰν). Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 445^d (καὶ γὰρ εἰν). 694^d. ii. 612^d (omitting καί). viii. 215^a (omitting καί). x. 226^b (omitting εἰν). 291^b (R. 339) *bis*. 291^d (omitting καί). xii. 432^e (omitting εἰν). Cat. Cor. 253 (omitting καί). Cyril. i. 243. v. pt. 2. p. 85 (omitting εἰν). Theodoret. iii. 252. Max.-Confess. ii. 545 (omitting εἰν). Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 202^e. | *καν AC. Alf. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Ln. Pseud.-Ignat. 109. Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. Eph.-Syr. iii. 333^f. Ps.-Athanas. *Quaest. ad Ant.* 89. ii. 336^f. Chr. vii. 748^e. x. 292^d. Cyril. iii. 331. iv. 754. Damascen. ii. 108^e. 353^d. . . . (B καὶ αν, by itacism for καὶ εἰν).

— παραδῶ NABCDE. 17. 37. 47. 2^h, all the critical editions, the

4 σωμαι, ἀγάπην δὲ μὴ ἔχω, *οὐθ' ἐν ὠφελοῦμαι. ἡ ἀγάπη

Fathers generally as for καὶ ἐὰν and κἄν, above. | παραδωσω FG. Meth. 733^d (Jahn 44). Clem. 614 ἐπιδῶ.

3. *καυχῶμαι* SAB. 17. Greek MSS. *ap. Hier.* (Aeth.-*Rom.*, probably, but see under *καυθήσωμαι*), *Memph.-Wilkins* (*sic*, see below), *Memph.-Boetticher*, *Memph.-MS.* *Memph.-Rom.* p. 107. *Theb.-Rom.* p. 107. *Eph.-Syr. Paraen.* 26. ii. 112^b (but *καυχήσομαι* by itacism, with Jerome, and some cursives not on our list). A careful examination of the text of Wilkins's *Novum Testamentum Aegyptium*, (*sic*, not *Aegyptiacum* as Tregelles in Horne, *Introduction*, tenth edition, 1862, p. 731), which was published in London, 1716, shows the word here used to be *enta-shoushou*, of which *enta* is the personal infix of the subjunctive mode, and *shoushou* the verb *to glory*, which is also used in 2 Cor. xii. 5, 9, and Ps. v. 11, with the same signification. [On p. 107 of the *Rudimenta Linguae Coptae sive Aegyptiacae* this whole verse is given in Memphitic and Thebaic, with a Latin translation. In both the word is *shoushou*; but, in place of the Memphitic infix *enta*, the Thebaic has the auxiliary *eie*, *that I shall*. The Latin is *ut glorier*. The variations in the text show clearly that it was taken from MSS. altogether independent of those used by Wilkins. See, also, Wakefield's *Translation of the N. T.*, London, 1791. In the third volume of this, p. 173, the author, himself a Coptic scholar, in his note defending his adoption of *καυχῶμαι*, calls particular attention to the inaccuracy of Wilkins's Latin in this place. This error of Wilkins's has misled Tischendorf, Tregelles, Scrivener, and other recent editors; though Mill, Bengel, Wetstein (who says: *Versio Copt. quamvis Editor aliter nos legere iubeat*), Griesbach, and Scholz have given the citation correctly, as did Tischendorf in his first edition, that of 1841.] Jerome is decided in his testimony. In his Commentary upon Galatians v. 26, ed. Vallars. vii. p. 517^a, he says: "*Loquatur apostolus, loquatur electionis vas*: 'Si tradidero corpus meum ut glorier: caritatem autem non habeam, nihil mihi prodest.'" A little further on he says: "*Scio in Latinis codicibus in eo testimonio QUOD SUPRA POSUIMUS*: 'Si tradidero corpus meum ut glorier'; 'ardeam' habere pro 'glorier'; sed ob similitudinem verbi qua apud Graecos 'ardeam' et 'glorier,' id est *καυθήσωμαι* et *καυχῶμαι*, una literae parte distinguitur, apud nostros error inolevit. Sed et apud ipsos Graecos exemplaria sunt diversa." *καυχῶμαι* was

adopted by Lachmann in his edition of 1831, and is preferred by Dean Stanley in his *Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*. | * καθήσονται CK. 37. Scr's ab*elo. Vulg.-Clem. Vulg.-Martianay, d. e. f. g. m¹⁶. (Am. ardeat, and so Pst. and Hcl.-txt. read , ut comburatur, not , ut comburar, as Hcl.-marg.) Goth. Arm.

Aeth.-Platt (la-wě'yata esāt, to the burning of fire), (Aeth.-Walton reads: la-ěma if, ablā' ku I give to be eaten, kama that, ětmazagan I may be rewarded. [In Dillmann's Lexicon ablā' ku is so connected with the conception of burning, fire, etc., as to render it possible that it is intended to render καθήσονται and not καυχήσονται. The rendering, however, is so much of a paraphrase as to leave some room for doubt in the case.]) Pseud-Ignatius *Epist. ad Heronem*, c. 2. p. 109 (κάν παραδῶ τὸ σῶμα εἰς καῦσιν). Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. (Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg. Orat.* ix. § 4. p. 733^d πρὶ παραδώσω). Aphraates, *Hom.* iii. § 15. p. 38 (Syriac text) ed. Wright, agrees with Pst. (note that these Homilies have been erroneously ascribed to Jacob of Nisibis; see list of Fathers for the facts in the case; comp. Gallandi's *Bibl. Vet. Patrum*, vol. v. p. xvii^e for the Arm. version). Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 46. ii. 169^e. *Instit. ad Monach.* iii. 333^f (Tisch. always fails to note the vol. with this citation; and also with all references to Chr. x.). Pseud-Athanas. *Quaest. ad Ant.* 89. Opp. ii. 236^f. Basil. *Prooem. in Reg.* 3. ii. 329^d. *Reg. brev.* 282. ii. 514^d. *Epist.* 204 (al. 75), c. 1. Opp. iii. 303^b (ἵνα καθῆῃ). Pseud-Basil. *de Bapt.* i. 24. Opp. ii. 647^a καθήσονται one MS. and Garnier's ed., -σονται other MSS. and editions; ii. 8. § 8. p. 665^d (sic not -σονται, as Tisch.). Isaias-Abbas. *Orat.* xxi. § 9. col. 1165^a. Theoph.-Alex. (A.D. 391), *contra Originistas Epist. Pasch.* 1. (Despont *Bibl. Max. Patr.* v. 845^b). Chr. i. 445^d. 694^d. ii. 612^d. vii. 749^a. viii. 215^a. x. 226^b (ἵνα καθῆῃ). 291^{b. c. d} (R. 339-40, but Moscow codex *ap.* Tisch. has -σονται once). xii. 432^c (ἵνα καθῆῃ). Chr. Cat. Cor. 253. Cyril-Alex. *in Amos* viii. 4-6. tom. iv. § 73. Opp. iii. 331 (ἵνα καθῆῃ). *Hom. de Fest. Pasch.* 7. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 252. Eus.-Alex. *Sermo de Charitate* (ἵνα καθῆῃ), (M. lxxxvi. col. 325^a). Damascen. *in loco* ii. 108^e. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. Oecumen. *txt. in loco* i. 547^a. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 202^c. Tertul. *adv. Prax.* c. 1. p. 190 (etsi corpus suum tradidisset exurendum). Cyprian. *de Unit. Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304. Auctor *lib. de Rebapt.* c. 13. p. 368^b (*ap.* Cyprian. p. 363) ita ut exurar igni. Optatus *de Schism. Donat.* iii. 8. p. 484^b flammis tradam. Zeno Veronensis *Tr.* i. 2. c. 6. p. 112^e.

Pacian (fl. A.D. 370–390), *Epist.* ii. 7, (Despont iv. 308^h) *ad comburendum*. Ambrosiast. *in loco* p. 155^c. Aug. *ad Donatum Epist.* 173. c. 5. Opp. ii. 614^{c.e.f.}. *de Verbis Joan.* xvi. *Serm.* 145. c. 4. Opp. v. 698^d (*si distribueres omnia tua pauperibus, et traderes corpus tuum ut arderes, caritatem autem non haberes, nihil esses*), and very often besides; and other Latin Fathers (see Sabatier, *Bibl. Sac. Lat. Verss. Ant.* iii. 706). *καυθήσωμαι* is read by Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Tr. Alf. Ln. Eras. 5. | * *καυθησομαι* DFGL. 47. 2^h. 29. 80. Scr's b^{2c} d f h k. Tisch. Tr. Tif. (Clem. *Strom.* iv. 18. p. 614, alluding, says: *ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλος παραδιδούς τὸ σῶμα ἵνα καυθήσεται*). Gr. MSS. *ap.* Hier. vii. 518^a (see citation under *καυχῆσωμαι*), and comp. *in Isaiam* lviii. 3 (iv. 688^b, *ut ardeat, sive glorietur, utrumque enim fertur in-exemplaribus*). Macar.-Aegypt. *Hom.* xxvi. 16. p. 99^b. Pseudo-Basil. *de Bapt.* i. 24. MSS. and edd. Opp. ii. 647^a. Cyril. *de Ador.* lib. vii. Opp. i. 243. *in Joan.* xiii. 35. lib. ix. Opp. iv. 754. Max.-Confess. *Loc. com. Serm.* 6. Opp. ii. 545 (*sic*, not i. 545, as Tisch.). Euthal.-cod. Oecumen. *comm. in loco* i. 549^a (but Migne has changed this to *καυθήσωμαι*!)

3. When we consider the full weight of the combined testimony of **AB**. 17, and the two Egyptian versions Memph. and Theb., the evidence seems almost to amount to demonstration that *καυχῆσωμαι* is the very word employed by Paul. It is by far the more difficult reading (see note on p. 142), and is not to be outweighed by the fact that the preponderance of numbers now opposes it. (Eusebius in stating what was, in the first quarter of the fourth century, the evidence of the great majority of Greek MSS. regarding the omission of the last twelve verses of Mark, has shown us how completely changed may be the evidence of the majority of codices which exist to-day. Then these verses were wanting "in the accurate copies," and "in almost all the copies," yet they were found "in some copies." [*Quaest. ad Marinum*, c. i. § 1, Eus. *in Mai Nov. Patrum Bibl.* iv. pp. 255–56]. To-day **AB** (L) represent "the accurate copies" of Eusebius, while the numerical majority has shifted to the other side). If *καυχῆσωμαι* were the original word it was almost certain to be changed into *καυθήσωμαι*, while the converse can hardly be maintained. The *present condition* of the patristic evidence is such, however, that we are compelled to mark *καυθήσωμαι* or *καυθήσομαι* as equalling our text in value. Between these two words there is little possibility of deciding if the liability to itacism, and the grammatical anomalies of both, be fairly considered.

— *δε μη* has perished in C. | For *μη* F seems to have two iotas

μακροθυμῇ, χρηστεύεται · ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ ζηλοῖ · ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ

dotted, followed by η, there being a little space between the last ι and the η.

3. ουθεν NA. 17. 31. 73. Tisch. Ln¹⁸³¹. Basil. *Reg. brev.* 282. ii. 514^d (one MS.; ed. Garnier οὐδέν from other MSS.). *Reg.* fol. 28, from a MS. cited by Wetstein. | * ουδεν BCDEFGKsL. 37. 47. 2^h. Tr. Ti. Tif. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Alf. Ln.¹⁸⁵⁰. Wd. Eras. 5. Clem. 166 (*sic*, and not for οὐδέν in ver. 2 as Tisch. and Tr.). Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^b. 169^e. iii. 333^f. Ps.-Athanas. 653^a. Basil. *Reg. brev.* ii. 514^d, in most MSS. *Prooem. in Reg.* p. 329^d. *Epist.* c. 1. iii. 303^b. Ps.-Basil. ii. 646^e. 665^d. Chr. i. 445^d. 694^d. ii. 612^d. vii. 748^e. viii. 215^a. x. 226^b. 291^{b,c}. 292^e. xii. 36^e. 432^e. Cyril. i. 243. iv. 754. v. 2. p. 85. Theodoret. iii. 252. Eus.-Alex. p. 325^a. Euthal.-cod. Max.-Confess. ii. 545. Damascen. ii. 108^e. 353^d. Oecumen. i. 547^a. Theophyl. ii. 202^e.

—ωφελουμαι] ουφελουμαι 17. εμμ Clem. 166. Chr. i. 694^d. xii. 36^e. Max.-Confess. ii. 545. by confusion with ver. 2.

4. μακροθυμει Clemens-Romanus *ad Corinthios Epist.* 1. cap. xlix. (Gall. i. 33^a). Clem.-Alex. *Paed.* iii. 1. p. 251. Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^c. 169^e. Basil. *Reg. brev.* 200. ii. 482^e. Chr. i. 694^d. x. 299^a. 310^e. xii. 183^e. etc. | μακροθυμαι F* (not G).

— ἡ ἀγάπη before οὐ ζηλοῖ is omitted, through mere error, by 41. 71. Clem. 251. Orig.-Int. iv. 532^a. Basil. ii. 482^e. Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 21. c. 9. p. 1165^b. Chr. i. 694^d. x. 299^a. (300^{b,e}. 304^e. 310^e.) xii. 183^e. Max.-Confess. *Epist.* 2. *ad Joan.* Opp. ii. 226. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 202^e. Tertul. *de Pat.* c. 12. p. 97. Ambros. *Expos. in Luc.* lib. v. § 77. Opp. i. 1374^b. Aug. *Serm.* 354. Opp. v. 1377^e. Julian.-Pomerianus *de Vita Contemplativa* iii. c. 14. p. 44.

— ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ ζηλοῖ · ἡ ἀγάπη οὐ περπερεύεται is thus divided by authority of Orig. Cat. Cor. 252. Eph.-Syr. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 333^f. (Basil. ii. 482^e.) Chr. i. 694^d. ii. 473^d. vii. 695^b. x. 299^a. 300^d (R 350). (310^e. xii. 183^e?). Cyril. *Fest. Pasch.* 7. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 85. (*Apophthegmata Patrum* π. 74. M. lxv. 340^e). Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 253. Max.-Confess. seems to favor this punctuation *Cap. de Charit. Cent.* i. c. 38. Opp. i. 399. *Cent.* iv. c. 18. p. 446. c. 61. p. 452. *Epist.* 2. *ad Joan.* Opp. ii. 226. Damascen. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d; (does not omit οὐ ζηλοῖ ἡ ἀγάπη, as Tisch.). Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 202^e. So, also, Ti. Tif. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Tr. Alf. Wd. 5. | χρηστεύεται ἡ

4 love, I am in no wise advantaged. Love suffereth long, is kind;

5 *περπερευεται, οὐ φυσιοῦται, οὐκ ἀσχημονεῖ, οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἀγάπη, οὐ ζηλοῖ ἡ ἀγάπη*, is the division and punctuation of Tisch. Ln. on authority of the division of lines in D (thus : *χρηστ. η αγ. || ου ζηλ. η αγ. ||*). Damascen. *in loco* ii. 109^c. [It is difficult to see why Tischendorf should cite, as authority for his method of punctuation, Antiochus Monachus Sabae (fl. A.D. 614), *Homil.* 96, *de Dilectione Proximi*, p. 1180 ed. Du Duc (M. lxxxix. p. 1728^a); as in that place Antiochus reads : *ἡ ἀγάπη μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται · ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει*, which can hardly be read differently from our text]. | **Σ**, the other MSS., and most of the Fathers, cannot be cited with certainty for either method of division.

4. *η αγαπη* before *ου περπερευεται* **Σ**ACDEFGKsL. 37. 47. 2^h. *d. e. g. m*¹⁶. Pst. Hcl. Goth. Tisch. [Tr. Ln. Alf.] Wd. Eras. *ς*. Orig. ii. 591^f. 844^a. *in Prov.* xxix. (Mai *Novae Patrum Bibliothecae* vii. pt. 2. p. 53). Cat. Cor. 253. (Orig.-Int. iii. 832^e would seem to favor the insertion of *ἡ ἀγάπη* rather than its omission, for which it is cited by Tischendorf and Tregelles, for it has *charitas*; but the citation, evidently from memory, is badly confused, and the word is out of place, before *non inflatur*, thus : *Charitas patiens est, benigna est. Charitas non inflatur, non agit perperam*, etc.). Chr. ii. 473^d. x. 300^d. Cyril. *Fest. Pasch.* 8. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 95. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 253. Damascen. ii. 109^d. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 549^b. Cyprian. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304. | omit *η αγαπη* B. 17. 73. 74. Scr's a, five other cursives, *f. Am.* Memph. Arm. Clem. *Paed.* iii. 1. p. 251. *Quis Dives Salvetur* 38. p. 956 (?). Orig.-Int. iv. 532^a. (for iii. 832^e. see above). Eph.-Syr. ii. 169^e. iii. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 333^f. (ii. 112^c omits *ἡ αγ. ου περπ. ου φυσ.*). *Basil.* ii. 482^c. Chr. x. 299^a (R. 349). 300^b. 300^e. 310^e. xii. 183^c. (Cat. Cor. 254). Cyril. *de Ador.* 7. i. 243. *Fest. Pasch.* 7. v. pt. 2. p. 85. Max.-Confess. ii. 226. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 203^a. Tertul. *de Pat.* c. 12. p. 97. Cyprian. 199. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. pt. 2. 155^d.

— *περπερευεται*] A. Eph.-Syr. ii. 169^e, corruptly, *περπορευεται*. Orig. ii. 591^f, *περισσεύεται*. . . . *d. e. m*¹⁶. *non est perpera*. . . . *g. non perperat t.* (for *aut*) *non perperam agit*. . . . *f. Am.* Orig.-Int. iii. 832^e. iv. 532^a (*non perperam agit*). Cyprian *de Unit Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *Testim.* iii. c. 3. p. 304. *non agit perperam*. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. pt. 2. p. 155^d. *non perperam agit*. Tertul. *de Pat.* c. 12. p. 97. *nec*

5 Love envieth not ; Love vaunteth not herself, is not self-inflated, doth not behave herself unbecomingly, seeketh not her own, is

6 *ἐαυτῆς, οὐ παροξύνεται, οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν, οὐ χαίρει* (Tisch. reads *non*) *protervum sapit*. . . . Tisch. errs in citing Eph.-Syr. iii. 333^f for *περπορεύεται*. He there reads *περπερεύεται*, but in *Paraen.* 46. ii. 169^e he reads *περπορεύεται*.

4. *φυσιονται*] *φυσειονται* FG, by itacism.

5. *οὐκ ασχημονει* F^{corr.} G. | *οὐκ κασχημονει* F*. . . . *οὐ καυχημονεῖ* Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. ii. 112^c. (Damascen. *in loco* ii. 109^d, *ap.* Le Quien *οὐ ἀσχημονεῖ*, but Migne *οὐκ*).

— *ζητει*] *ζητι* N, by itacism.

— *τα εαυτης* NACDEFGKL. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. *Am.* Pst. Hcl. Memph. Goth. Arm. Aeth. Tisch. Tr.-txt. Alf. Ln. Wd. Eras. 5. Clem.-Alex. *Quis Dives Salvetur* c. 38. p. 956 (*sic* page, not 947 as Tisch.). Orig. iii. 563^c. Cat. Cor. 121. 253. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. ii. 112^c. 169^f. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 334^a. Basil. *Reg. Fus.* 7. c. 1. ii. 345^e. *Reg. brev.* 200. ii. 482^d. Ps.-Basil. *de Bapt.* ii. *Interr.* 12. § 2. Opp. ii. 672^c. Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 21. c. 9. p. 1165^b. Chr. i. 102^b (R. 124). 694^d. (x. 302^e and 304^a in two codices *ap.* Tisch.). Cyril. *de Ador.* 7. 8. Opp. i. pp. 243. 249. 265. *in Joan.* vi. 1. lib. iii. c. 4. Opp. iv. 271. *Fest. Pasch.* 7. 8. Opp. v. pt. 2. pp. 85. 95. Theodoret. lib. i. *in Cantic.* i. 5. Opp. ii. 41. *in loco* iii. 253. Procop.-Gazaen. *in Levit.* xi. 14. Opp. i. 344. Max.-Confess. *Epist.* 2. *ad Joannem.* ii. 226. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 109^d. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 549^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 203^e. Optatus *de Schism. Donat.* vii. 3. (Gall. v. 501^a). Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. pt. 2. 155^d. Aug. *ad Sanctimon.* *Epist.* 211. c. 12. Opp. ii. 786^b. *Epist. ad Deme- triadem Virg.* c. 19. p. 508. | *το εαυτης* 80. Aphraates *Sermo.* 2. *de Dilectione* c. 15. p. xvii^c. Ps.-Basil. *in Esaiam* c. xv. § 293. i. 601^c. Chr. x. 302^e (R. 353) *bis*. 304^a (R. 354). 310^c. | † *το μη εαυτης* B. Tr.-mg. Clem. *Paed.* iii. 1. p. 252. It is quite possible that this is the original phrase of the apostle. If so, however, it must have been misunderstood, and corrected (after the fashion of that age) at a very early day, as no trace of it has been found among the Greek Fathers below Clemens-Alexandrinus.

— *παροξύνεται*] *παρωξύνεται* FG, by itacism.

— P begins with *-ζεται το κακον*, after an hiatus from ver. 23 of chapter xii.

6. *χαρει*] *χαρι* G. itacism. *επιχαρει* Clem. *Quis Dives Salvetur.* c. 38. p. 956.

6 not easily provoked, reckoneth not the evil, rejoiceth not at

7 ἐπὶ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, συγχαίρει δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· πάντα στέγει,
πάντα πιστεύει, πάντα ἐλπίζει, πάντα ὑπομένει.

8 Ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτει· εἴτε δὲ προφητεῖται, κα-

6. τη ἀδικία] omit τη FG. ἀδικεια B* (text B³).

— συγχαίρ- $\aleph$ AB³CD^cEKsLP. 2^h. Scr's MSS. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Tif. Tr. Alf. Ln. Wd. Eras. 5. | συνχαίρ- B*D*FG. Tisch. Ti. || -χαίρει ABCDEsP. 2^h. -χαίρι $\aleph$ FG. by itacism.

— τη ἀληθεια] prefixes επι Scr's c.

— ἀληθεια ABCD^bP. ἀληθια $\aleph$ D*FG, by itacism.

7. παντα στεγει is repeated by B*. B³ does not restore the first, but puts it in hooks, or parentheses.

— στεγει $\aleph$ ABCDP. 2^h (*d. e. f. g. Am. read suffert*), the Fathers generally, except as below. | ασταγι FG. | στεργει. Marcus Eremita *Opusc.* vii. *Disputatio cum Causidico* c. 3. (Gall. viii. 74^c). Photius *Epist.* lib. i. 2 (M. cii. 956^a). Cyprian. *de Unit. Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *de Bono Patientiae* p. 252. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304. Zeno *de Spe, Fide, Caritate* c. 6. p. 112^c. (Cyprian and Zeno *diligite*). add εν ἐλπίδι Hcl.-mg.-Gr.

— υπομενει] υπομενι FG. itacism.

8. η ἀγάπη $\aleph$ ACDEFGKsLP. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. Wd. Eras. 5. Clem. *Paed.* ii. 1. p. 166. *Quis Dives Salvetur* c. 38. p. 956. Orig. ii. 564^a. 813^d. iii. 541^d. Orig.-Int. iv. 568^b (*certum erit illud quod pronuntiavit apostolus quia charitas nunquam cadet*). iv. 569^b. Eph.-Syr. *Paraen.* 26. 46. Opp. ii. 112^c. 169^f. *Inst. ad Monach.* iii. 334^a. Macarius-Aegypt. *de Perfect. in Spir.* 6. 171^a. Nyssen. *de Anima et Resurr.* Opp. ii. 656^d (ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη). *de Propos. secundum Deum* Opp. ii. 753^d. Basil. *Reg. brev. Interr.* 200. ii. 482^d. Chr. x. 305^a. Cyril. *de Ador.* 7. Opp. i. 243. *de Fest. Pasch.* 7. 8. Opp. v. pt. 2. pp. 85. 95. Theodoret. *in Ps.* xvii. 2-3. Opp. i. 702. *in loco* iii. 254. Cat. Cor. 254. Eus.-Alex. *Serm. de Charitate* (M. lxxxvi. 325^a). Andreas *Prooem. in Apoc.* p. 1. (M. cvi. 217^b). Max.-Confess. *Epist.* 2. *ad Joan.* ii. 227. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 110^a. *Sacra Parall.* 18. ii. 353^d. Photius Cat. Cor. 254. Oecumen. i. 549^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 204^b. | omit η B. Chr. iii. 131^b.

— πίπτει $\aleph^*$ ABC*. 17. 47*. 67². 80. Tisch. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Tr. Alf. Ln. Orig.-Int. iv. 569^b. Macar.-Aegypt. *de Cust. Cordis* c. 14. (M. xxxiv. 840^d). Nyssen. ii. 656^d. Andreas 1. Max.-Confess. ii. 227. Ambrosiast.

7 iniquity, but rejoiceth together with Truth; beareth all things,
8 trusteth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Love

ταρρηθῆσονται· εἴτε γλῶσσαι, παύσονται· εἴτε *γνώσεις,

in loco ii. pt. 2. 155^d. Aug. *in Job*. xxxviii. 30. Opp. iii. 671^f. | *εκπιπτει* $\aleph^c C^3 DE$ (FG *εκπιπτει*) KsLP. 37. 47². 2^b (46. *εκλειπει*). Ti. Tif. Wd. Eras. 5. Clem. 166. 956. Aphraates *Serm.* 2. *de Dilectione*, § 15. p. xvii^e. Orig. ii. 564^a. 813^d. iii. 541^d. Eph.-Syr. ii. 112^e. 169^f. iii. 334^a. Macar.-Aegypt. 171^a. Basil. ii. 482^d. Chr. iii. 131^b. x. 305^a *bis*. Cyril. i. 243. v. pt. 2. pp. 85. 95. Theodoret. i. 702. iii. 254. Cat. Cor. 254. Euthal.-cod. Eusebius.-Alex. 325^a. Damascen. ii. 110^a. 353^d. Photius *Epist.* lib. i. (M. cii. 596^a). Cat. Cor. 254. Oecumen. i. 549^b. *in comm.* 550^b. Theophyl. ii. 204^b. . . . *excedit Am.* . . . *excidit d. e. f. m*¹⁶. *Vulg.-Clem.* and *MSS.* Orig.-Int. iii. 832^f. the Interpreter of Aphraates, as above. Cyprian *de Unit. Eccl.* c. 14. p. 199. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 304 (ed. Venet., 1728, but *excidet* ed. Paris, 1726). Zeno *de Spe, Fide, et Caritate* c. 6. p. 112^d. Petrus-Chrys. (fl. A. D. 433-450). *Serm.* 162. (Despont vii. 968^e).

8. *ειτε δε*] In C τε δε is re-written over an erasure by C². Tischendorf, in his edition of the *Codex Ephraemi Rescriptus*, Paris, 1842, says : “ *sine dubio a prima manu deerat ΔΕ.*” C ends the page with γλῶσσαι, and has a grievous hiatus thenceforward to ver. 40 of ch. xv.

— δε $\aleph ABC^2 D^{b-c} EL$. 17. 37. 47. 2^b. Hcl. (Aeth.). Goth. Basil. *de Fide* c. 5. ii. 228^e. Chr. i. 445^e. x. 309^d (R. 361). 310^d (R. 362). Cyril. *in Malach.* iv. 2-3. § 44. Opp. iii. 867. Theodoret. iii. 254. Max.-Confess. cap. v. *Centenorum*, Cent. 4. § 31. p. 591. Damascen. ii. 110^a. Oecumen. i. 550^c. Theophyl. 204^c. Aug. *de Actis cum Felice Manichaeo* i. 9. Opp. viii. 478^a. | omit δε C²*D*FGKP. *d. e. f. g. Am.* Memph. Arm. (Clem. 956, citing freely, ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε ἐκπίπτει, προφητεῖαι καταργοῦνται, γλῶσσαι παύονται, ἰάσεις ἐπὶ γῆσ καταλείπονται.). Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* iii. c. 41. § 2. p. 446. Chr. i. 445^e (τὸ μὲν γὰρ προφητεῖαν, κτῆ. This not the same citation as that given above, from i. 445^e, for insertion of δέ). Theodoret. Cat. Cor. 255 (εἴτε προφητεῖαν, κτῆ). Max.-Confess. *ad Thal. Quæst.* 60. p. 211. Aug. *de Spir. et Littera.* c. 24. § 41. Opp. x. 107^a. | γαρ Pst. Amphil. *Sermo in Circum. Jesu Christi, Orat.* 2. p. 11^b. Cyril. *de Ador.* xii. Opp. i. 446.

— *προφητεῖαι καταργηθσονται* ($\aleph$) (A) CD^bEF^gGKsL(P). 17. 37. 47. 2^b. Memph.-Rom. p. 114. Theb.-Rom. p. 114, and the versions

never faileth ; but whether there be gifts of prophecy, they will be brought to naught ; whether there be tongues, they will be silenced ; whether there be knowledges, they will be brought to

9 καταργηθήσονται. ἐκ μέρους γὰρ γινώσκουμεν καὶ ἐκ

generally. The critical editions; the Fathers generally wherever they cite the passage. Tertul. *de Pat.* c. 12. p. 97, *Nunquam excidet; nam caetera evacuabuntur, consummabuntur; exhaurientur linguae, scientiae, prophetiae.* καταργοῦνται Clem. 956 (*sic*, not p. 946 as Tisch.). . . . προφητια A (by mere error, as it has καταργηθῇσονται to agree with it). . . . προφητῖαι ND*P, by itacism. | προφητῖα καταργηθῇσεται B. Prosper.-Aquit. *in Ps.* ciii. 11. p. 208.

8. γλῶσσαι παύονται Clem. 956. . . . καταργηθήσονται Macar.-Aegypt. *de Pat. et Discretionē* 11. p. 182^d. . . . παύσονται Scr's c.

— γνῶσις καταργηθῇσονται N (but γνῶσις by itacism) AD^bFG. 17. 47. (but 17. 47. γνῶσις by itacism) g. [Aeth.] Tr.-mg. Ln.-mg. Amphil. *Sermo in Circum. Jesu Christi, Orat.* 2. p. 11^b (but παύσονται for καταργηθήσονται). Nyssen. *de Anima et Resurr.* ii. 656^d (but παύσονται). Cyril. *in Malach.* iv. 2-3. § 44. Opp. iii. 867 (but παύσονται for καταργ.). Max.-Confess. *ad Thal. Quæst.* 60. p. 211. Damascen. *text. in loco* ii. 110^b. (Oecumen. Cat. Cor. 258. γνῶσις). Tertul. *de Pat.* c. 12. p. 97, as above. | * γνῶσις καταργηθῇσεται BD^{*c}E (but γνῶσις by itacism or misapprehension of the corrections in D) KsL. 37. 2^h. Scr's MSS. *d. e. f. Am.* Pst. Hcl. Memph.-Wilkins, Memph.-Rom. p. 114. Theb.-Rom. p. 114. Goth. Arm. Tisch. Tr.-txt. Alf. Ln.-txt. Wd. Scrivener, Eras. 5. Orig. Cat. Cor. 255 (περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος γὰρ εἶπεν χρόνου καταργεῖσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν). Orig. iv. 220^a (possibly a reference: ἐλάμβανε τὴν ἐκ μέρους γνῶσιν). Orig.-Int. ii. 325^d. Archel. *Act. Disput.* c. 37. 593^a (in Latin only). Didym.-Alex. 446. Basil. ii. 228^c. Chr. i. 445^e bis. 446^a (καταργεῖσθαι). 446^{b-e}. x. 309^d. 310^e (R. 363). 311^a (R. 363), and once καταργεῖται. Cyril. i. 446 (παύσεται). *in Joan.* xvi. 25. lib. xi. c. 2. Opp. iv. 938 (παύσεσθαι δὲ γνῶσιν). Theodoret. *text. in loco* iii. 254^a (*comment.* four lines below, παύεται). Cat. Cor. 255 bis, (once παύσεται). Max.-Confess. *ad Thal.* p. 26. *Cent.* 4. p. 951. Damascen. *comm. in loco* ii. 110^b (καὶ ποῖα γνῶσις καταργεῖται). Photius Cat. Cor. 256. Oecumen. i. 550^{c-e}. Theophyl. ii. 204^d. Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. pt. 2. 155^c. Hier. *adv. Iovin.* lib. ii. c. 23. Opp. ii. 361^d. Aug. *in Ps.* ciii. *Serm.* 3. c. 3. Opp. iv. 1151^a. *de Actis Felice* viii. 478^a. *de Spir. et Litt.* x. 107^a. Prosper.-Aquit. *Exp. in Ps.* ciii. 11. p. 208. | γνῶσις παύσεται P. Cyril. i. 446. Theodoret. Cat. Cor. 255.

9. γὰρ NABDEFGP. 17. 37. 47. Latt. Am. Pst. Hcl. Memph.

9 naught. For we know in part, and we prophecy in part; but

10 μέρουσ προφητεύομεν· ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ τὸ τέλειον τὸ ἐκ μέ-

Arm. Aeth.-Platt. Tisch. Tif.¹⁸⁴¹. Tr. Alf. Irenaeus-Int. iv. c. 9. § 2. p. 238. v. c. 7. § 2. p. 301. Orig. iv. 224^c. Archel. *Act. Dispt.* c. 37. 593^a. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* ix. 2. p. 731^c (Jahn 43). Athanas. *in Ps.* xl. Opp. i. 851^e. Eus. *in Ps.* xxxix. 6 (Montf. i. 166^b, μὲν γάρ). Amphil. *Circum.* ii. p. 11^b. Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* iii. c. 41. p. 446. (*in Ps.* lxii. 2. Mai vii. p. 247). Chr. i. 446^e. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 254. *Epist.* 109. iv. 1179. Cat. Cor. 255. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 110^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 204^d. Hil. *in Ps.* cxxiv. § 4. p. 404^a. Ambrosiast. *in loco* 155^e. Hier. *adv. Iovin.* ii. c. 23. Opp. ii. 361^d. Aug. *in Ps.* ciii. *Serm.* 3. c. 3. Opp. iv. 1151^a. *de Actis Felice Manich.* i. c. 10. viii. 477^c. c. 11. 478^a. Prosper.-Aquit. *in Ps.* ciii. 11. p. 208. | δε KL. 2^h. Scr's a b e d f g h k l o. Ti. Tif. Eras¹. (Iren.-Int. ii. c. 28. § 7. Opp. i. 158, *ex parte quidem cognoscimus*). Photius Cat. Cor. 256, and *ap. Oecumen.* i. 551^a, expr. (ἐκ μέρουσ δὲ γινώσκομεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκ μέρουσ γὰρ κτῆ.). Oecumen. i. 550^e. | omit γαρ or δε 67². Goth. Aeth.-Rom. Ps.-Justin Martyr. *Expos. rectae Fidei* c. 8. ed. Otto. iii. pt. 1. p. 24. Orig. iv. 352^d. Cat. Cor. 249. Cat. Ephes. 112. Orig.-Int. iii. 120^c. iv. 520^a. 522^c. (545^d). Eus. *de Eccl. Theol. contra Marcel.* iii. c. 16. p. 186^c. *in Ps.* xlv. 14. i. 191^e. *in Isaiam* xviii. 7 (Montf. ii. 427^d). Didym.-Alex. *in Ps.* lv. 11. lxvii. 15. pp. 240. 252. Melet. *ap. Epiph. adv. Haer.* lxii. c. 32. Opp. i. 880^d (*sic* page, not as Tisch.). Basil. *Epist.* 235 (al. 401) § 3. iii. 359^d. Chr. i. 446^{d-e}. 449^e. 450^{a-b}. 459^d. 486^c. ii. 503^c. iii. 468^e. 759^a. v. 289^c. 461^b. vii. 427^e. *in loco* x. 311^a (R. 363). xi. 84^a. (Cyril. *de Ador.* 12. i. p. 446, καὶ ἄρτι μὲν ἐκ μέρουσ). Cyril. *in Ps.* xxxix. 6. Opp. i. [pt. 2] p. 184. (*in Isaiam* xlii. 18-21. lib. 4. Opp. ii. 572, νῦν μὲν γιν. ἐκ μέρουσ). *in Joan.* xvi. 12-13. lib. x. Opp. iv. p. 925. and *in ver.* 25. lib. xi. c. 2. Opp. iv. 938 (καὶ γιν. ἐκ μέρουσ). Theodoret. *de Providentia* 10. iv. p. 654. Isidor.-Pelusiot. *Epist.* 56. lib. ii. p. 500^a (ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρουσ, *bis*). Procop.-Gazaeus *in Isaiam* lx. Opp. ii. 694. (*in Isaiam* xv. p. 318, οὐκ ἐκ μέρ. ἔτι γινώσκοντες). Cosmas-Indicopleust. *Christ. Opin. de Mund.* lib. vii. p. 295^d. Hesych. lib. i. *in Levit.* ii. 3. fol. 806^b (Latin only). Barsanuphius *Epist.* (Gall. xi. 596^b). Hier. *Epist.* 41, *ad Marcellam* i. 190^b. *Hom.* 5. *in Jeremiam* v. 799^b. Aug. *Serm.* 288, *in Nat. Joan. Bapt.* 2. c. 4. Opp. v. 1156^g. *de Civitate Dei* lib. xxii. c. 29. § 1. Opp. vii. 696^b. § 2. p. 696^g. *Act. Fel. Manich.* i. c. 9. Opp. viii. 476^g. c. 12. p. 478^g.

— γινώσκομεν] γεινώσκομεν B*D*FG, by itacism.

11 ρουσ καταργηθήσεται. ὅτε ἡμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς

10. τελειον] τελιον $\aleph P$, by itacism.

— το εκ $\aleph ABD^*(FG)P$. 17. 47. 31. 39. 67^a. 73. 74. 80. 137. *d. e. f. g. Am.* Memph. Goth. Arm. Aeth. Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. Wd. Iren.-Int. iv. c. 9. § 2. p. 238. Orig. i. 645^c. iii. 519^e. iv. 209^d. 352^d (καὶ τὸ ἐκ). Cat. Cor. 249. Orig.-Int. ii. 212^c. 695^a. iv. 520^a. 522^c. Archel. *Acta Dispt.* c. 36. p. 593^c. c. 37. p. 593^b. Eus. *in Ps.* xlv. 14. p. 191^e. Athanas. *in Ps.* xl. 14. Opp. i. 851^f. Basil. *Epist.* 235 (al. 401) § 3. Opp. iii. 359^e. Epiph. *adv. Haer.* lxvi. c. 61. Opp. i. 673^c (τὸ ἀπὸ μέρους). Cyril. *de Ador.* xi. xii. Opp. i. 398. 446. *in Isaiam* xliii. 18-21. lib. iv. *Orat.* 1. Opp. ii. 572. *in Malach.* iv. 2-3. § 44. Opp. iii. 867 (καὶ καταργούντος μὲν τὸ ἐκ μέρους). *in Joan.* xiv. 21. Opp. iv. 827 (τὸ γὰρ ἐκ). *in c. xvi.* 25. p. 938. Euthal.-cod. Ps.-Dionys.-Areop. *de Caelest. Hierarch.* c. i. Opp. i. 9^d (τὸ γὰρ ἐκ). Procop.-Gazaeus *in Isaiam* xliii. lx. Opp. ii. 491. 694. (*in Exod.* xii. 10. Opp. i. 251, and *in Levit.* vii. 12. Opp. i. 338, Latin alone extant). Hesych. *in Levit.* ii. 3. lib. i. p. 806^b, vi. lib. ii. p. 849^b (Latin only). Max.-Confess. *ad Thalass. Quaest.* 9. p. 26. (*Cap. Theol. et Oecon. Cent.* i. c. 70. p. 475 ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ ἐκ μέρους). Damascen. *in loco* ii. 110^b bis. 110^c. (Photius *Bibliotheca* lib. vii. *codd.* 222. 3. p. 788^d). Ambrosiast. *in loco* ii. 155^e. Hier. *adv. Iovin.* ii. 23. Opp. ii. 361^c. Aug. *in Ps.* ciii. *Serm.* 3. c. 3. Opp. iv. 1151^b; and five times besides. Prosper.-Aquitani. *in Ps.* ciii. 11. p. 208. | τότε το εκ $D^{b-c} KsL$. 37. 2^h. Scr's mss. Pst. Hcl. Eras. 5. Orig. ii. 497^b (καὶ τότε). Cat. Cor. 69. Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* iii. 41. p. 446. Melet. *ap. Epiph. adv. Haer.* lxxiii. c. 32. Opp. Epiph. i. 881^a. Chr. i. 446^c. iii. 469^a. vii. 209^e. x. 311^a (R. 363). Theodoret. *in Cantic.* iv. 5-6. Opp. ii. 94. *in loco* iii. 254. *de Providentia* 10 Opp. iv. 654. Cat. Cor. 255. Cosmas-Indicopleust. *Chr. Opin. de Mundo* lib. vii. p. 249^d. Photius *Bibliotheca* lib. vi. cod. 222. 3. fol. 765^b. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 550^c. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 204^d.

— το εκ μερους καταργηθήσεται $\aleph ABD^b P$. 17. 37. 47. Scr's mss. Iren.-Int. i. 238^a. Orig. i. 645^c. ii. 497^b. iii. 519^e. iv. 209^d. 352^d (καταργηθῆ). Cat. Cor. 69. 249. (Note that Orig.-Int. here follows *Vulg.* for the contrary order. No dependence can be placed on him in such cases). Archel. *Dispt.* § 36. p. 593^c. § 37. p. 593^b. Eus. *in Ps.* xlv. 14. p. 191^e. Athanas. i. p. 851. Didym. 446. Basil. iii. 359^c. Epiph. i. 673^c. Melet. i. 881^a. Chr. i. 446^c. iii. 469^a. vii. 209^e. x.

10 when the perfect is come that which is in part will be brought to

νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλογιζόμεν ὡς

311^a. Cyril. i. 398. 446. [pt. 2] 189. ii. 572. iv. 827. 938. Theodoret. ii. 94. iii. 254. iv. 654. Cat. Cor. 255. (Ps.-Dionys.-Areop. i. 9^d). Procop.-Gazaues *in Levit.* vii. 12. Opp. i. 338. ii. 491. 694. Cosmas-Indicopleustes 295^d. Max.-Confess. i. 26. 475 (καταργείται). Damascen. ii. 110^{b,c}. Photius iii. 765^b. Oecumen. i. 550^c. Theophyl. ii. 204^d. Aug. iv. 1151^b. *Serm.* 288. v. 1157^a. *de Civit. Dei* lib. xxii. c. 29. § 2. Opp. vii. 696^g. *Act. Fel. Manich.* i. 11. Opp. viii. 478^a. *de Spir. et Litt. ad Marcell.* c. 24. § 41. Opp. x. 107^b. Prosper.-Aquit. 208. | καταργηθῆσεται το ἐκ μερουσ D*^c E (FG τα ἐκ) *d. e. f. g. Am.* Pst. Goth. Orig.-Int. ii. 212^c. 695^a. iv. 520^a. 522^c. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg.* 9. c. 2. p. 731^c (καταργήσεται). Cyril. iii. 867. Procop.-Gazaues *in Exod.* xii. 10. Opp. i. 251 (Latin only). Hesych. *in Levit.* ii. vi. pp. 806^b. 849^b (Latin only). Photius iii. 788. Ambrosiast. 155^c. Hier. ii. 361^c.

11. οτε ημην] οτε δε ημην D*. *Fuld.* (txt. D^{b,c}).

— ελαλουν ὡς νηπιος, εφρονουν ὡς νηπιος, ελογιζομεν ὡς νηπιος NAB. 17. 80. 93. *f. Am.* (Pst. Hcl. *ap. Treg. sed contra vult Tisch. in ed. octava*). Memph. Aeth. Tisch. Tr. Alf. Ln. (Wd. ?) Clem. *Paed.* i. 6. p. 117. (ἐφ. ὡς νήπ., ἐλ. ὡς νήπ.). Orig. Cat. Ephes. 172 (ὅτε ἡμην ὡς νήπ. ἐλ. ὡς νήπ. ἐφ ὡς νήπ. ὅτε δὲ κτῆ omitting ἐλάλ. ὡς νήπ.). Orig.-Int. ii. 673^b. iii. 27^d (*loquebar sicut parvulus, sicut parv. sapiebam, sicut parv. cogitabam: etc.* [see 37. below]). Archel. *Dispt.* c. 48. p. 602^a (omitting ἐλάλ. ὡς νήπ.). Amphil. *de Circum.* ii. p. 12 (ὡς νήπιοι λαλῶμεν, ἢ φρονῶμεν ἢ, λογιζώμεθα.). Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* iii. 41. p. 446 (omitting ἐφρ. ὡς νήπ.). Nyssen. *de Hom. Opific.* c. 30. i. 137^c (omitting ἐφρ. ὡς νήπ.). Basil. *Hom. in Ps.* xlv. § 2. Opp. i. 159^c. Theodoret. *de Prov.* 10. iv. 654 (but in ed. Paris ὡς νήπ. is placed before ἐλάλ.). (Isidor.-Pelusiot. lib. i. *Epist.* 443. *txt.* ὅτε ἡμην νήπ. εφρόνουν. but see below). Nilus *Peristeria, sectio* xii. c. 6. p. 214. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 110^c. (Hier. *in Esaiam* lvi. 2. lib. xv. Opp. iv. 655^c). Aug. *Fel. Manich.* i. c. 11. Opp. viii. 478^{a,b}. | ὡς νηπιος ελαλουν, ὡς νηπιος εφρονουν, ὡς νηπιος ελογιζομεν DE (FG) KsLP. (37). 47. 2^b. Scr's mss. *d. e. g. Fuld.* (Pst. and Hcl. *ap. Tisch.* and Treg. but see above). Goth. Arm. Eras. 5. (Clem. *Paed.* p. 118 ὅτε ἡμην νήπιος, τουτέστιν, ὅτε ἡμην Ἰουδαῖος · Ἑβραῖος γὰρ ἄνωθεν ἦν · ὡς νήπιος ἐφρόνουν, ἐπειδὴ εἰπόμεν τῷ νόμῳ ·). Orig. Cat. *in* 1 Johān. 115 (Orig.-Int. iii. 27^d see below). Meth. (Jahn 79). Basil. *de Fide*

11 naught. While I was a child I spake as a child, I thought as a

νήπιος· ὅτε γέγονα ἀνὴρ κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου.

c. 2. Opp. ii. 225^e (*sic*, not 223, as Tisch.). Epiph. *adv. Haer.* lxiv. c. 32. Opp. i. 555^e. Chr. i. 446^e. 447^b (ὡς νήπ. ἐφρ.). iii. 469^a. v. 29^b. 289^e (omits ὡς νήπ. ἐλάλουν). x. 311^b (R. 363). Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 254. Cat. Cor. 255. Isidor.-Pelusiot. *comm. in Epist.* 443. p. 425^e (ὡς νήπ. ἐλ., ὡς νήπ. ἐφρ.). Euthal.-cod. Oecumen. *text. in loco* i. 551^a (but, probably by typographical error, νήπιος is omitted before ἐλάλουν. The comment at 551^e has ὡς νήπιος ἐλάλουν.). Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 205^a. Tertul. *de Pudic.* c. i. p. 366 (omitting *cogitabam ut parvulus*). Ambrosiast. *in loco* 155^f. Aug. *de Civit. Dei.* xxi. c. 29. § 2. Opp. ii. 697^a (*quasi parv. sap., quasi parv. loq., quasi parv. cogit.*). | ἐλ. ὡς νηπ., ὡς νηπ. ἐφρ., ὡς νηπ. ελογίζομην 37. Orig.-Int. iii. 27^d. Hier. *in Esaiam.* lvi. 2. lib. xv. Opp. iv. 655^e. This reading is that of Wordsworth, perhaps though, through the printer's not understanding the marks on the margin of the Greek Testament given him for copy. It seems probable that Wd. intended to adopt the reading of our text, and that he so marked his "copy."

11. ὡς νηπ. ἐφρ., ὡς νηπ. ἐλάλουν. Scr's c k.

— ἐλάλουν, ελογίζομην] λαλουν and λογιζομην FG.

— ὅτε, second time, without copula N*ABD*. 67². 119. *d. e. Am. Harl.* Tolet.* Goth. Orig. iii. 479^a. Orig.-Int. ii. 486^e. 673^e. Didym.-Alex. 446. Hil. *in Ps.* cxxxii. § 5. p. 462^f. (Hier. iv. 655^e *postquam*). | ὅτε δε N^eD^eEFGKsLP. 17s. 37. 47. 2^h. *f. g. Vulg.-Clem. Fuld. Demid.* Pst. Hcl. Memph. Arm. Aeth. (both editions). 5. Orig. Cat. Cor. 256. Ephes. 172. 1 Johan. 115. Orig.-Int. ii. 79^e. 203^e. 382^e. 673^b. iii. 27^e. iv. 520^b. Meth. (Jahn 79). (Macar.-Aegypt. *de Pat. et Discret.* c. 11. p. 182^e γάρ). Nyssen. i. 137^e. Basil. i. 159^e. ii. 225^e. Epiph. i. 555^e. Chr. i. 446^e. iii. 469^a. v. 29^b. 289^e. x. 311^b (R. 363). Theodoret. iii. 254. iv. 654. Cat. Cor. 255. Isidor.-Pelusiot. *Epist.* 443. Nilus 214. Euthal.-cod. Damascen. ii. 110^e. Oecumen. i. 551^{a-b}. Theophyl. ii. 204^e. Tertul. *de Pudic.* c. i. p. 366 (*at ubi*). Ambrosiast. 155^f (*at ubi*). Aug. vi. 502^a. vii. 697^a. viii. 478^b. x. 105^d.

— γέγονα NADFGKsLP. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's mss. Clem.-Alex. 118 *bis* (not 117 as Tisch. and Tr., who must have taken the citation without verification from Griesbach's *Symbolae Criticae* ii. 254, which fails to note that only ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος is found on p. 117 of Potter's edition of Clement, and that while the remainder of the verse occurs in no form upon p. 117,

child, I reasoned as a child; since I have become a man I have

12 βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρό-
it does occur twice upon p. 118). Orig. iii. 479^a. Cat. Cor. 256. Cat.
Ephes. 172. Meth. (Jahn 79). Macar.-Aegypt. 182^c. Didym.-Alex.
446. Nyssen. i. 137^c. Basil. i. 159^c. ii. 225^c. Epiph. i. 155^c. Chr. i.
447^a. iii. 469^a. v. 29^b. 289^c. x. 311^b (R. 363). Theodoret. iii. 254. iv.
654. Cat. Cor. 255. Isidor.-Pelusiot. *Epist.* 443. Nilus 214. Dam-
ascen. ii. 110^c. Oecumen. i. 551^{a,b}; (once ὅταν δὲ γέγονα ἀνὴρ and once
ὅτε δὲ ἀνὴρ γέγονα). Theophyl. ii. 205^a. | *εγενομην* B. Orig. Cat. in
1 Johan. 115.

11. κατηργηκα τα του νηπιου **ABKsLP**. 17. 37. 47. 2^h. Scr's mss.
f. Am. Clem.-Alex. p. 118, line 2. Orig. iii. 478^d (καταργησάντων).
479^a. Cat. Cor. 256 (ἀπέριψα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου). Cat. in 1 Johan. 115.
Cat. Ephes. 172. Orig.-Int. ii. 203^c. 486^c. 673^b. iii. 27^c. 956^c. iv. 520^b.
Arch. 602^a. Meth. (Jahn 79, κατήγησα). Macar.-Aegypt. 182^c (κατήρ-
γησα). Didym.-Alex. 446. Nyssen. i. 137^c (κατήργησα). Basil. i. 159^c.
Chr. i. 447^a. v. 29^b. 289^c. Theodoret. iii. 254. iv. 654. Nilus 214.
Damascen. ii. 110^c. Oecumen. i. 551^a. Theophyl. ii. 205^a. Hier. iv.
655^c. Aug. vi. 502^a. vii. 697^a. viii. 478^b. x. 105^d. . . . Eras.¹ κατήργην
κατὰ τοῦ νηπίου. Eras.² κατήργη κατὰ τοῦ νηπίου. Eras.³ κατήργη τὰ
τοῦ νηπίου. | τα του νηπιου κατηργηκα **DEFG**. *d. e. g.* Hel. Arm. Goth.
Orig. iii. 663^d (ἀνὴρ τὰ τοῦ νηπίου κατήργησας). Orig.-Int. ii. 79^c.
382^c. 673^c. Basil. ii. 225^c (not 223 as Tisch.). Epiph. i. 555^c (κατήρ-
γησα). Chr. iii. 469^a. x. 311^b. Theodoret. Cat. Cor. 255. Isidor.-
Pelusiot. *Epist.* 443. Tertul. *de Pudic.* c. i. p. 366. Hil. *in Ps.*
cxxxii. § 5. p. 462^f. Ambrosiast. 155^f.

12. βλέπομεν **ABDEFG**. 17. 47. 2^h. mss. generally; all the crit-
ical editions; most Fathers, with some exceptions, however. (This
is a favorite verse with the Fathers, who cite it with every conceiv-
able verbal variation, scarcely any of which we can give, but the
sense of their citations is pretty generally identical with the text as
found in the great uncials. Cyril.-Alex., alone, cites the verse, more
or less fully, over thirty times, with nearly as many variations as
citations. We give the *variations* of βλέπω so that it may be seen
how little regard the Fathers had for verbal accuracy. Beyond this
we cite few variations not sanctioned by some of the manuscripts
on our list). . . . βλέπωμεν P. 42, by itacism. . . . βλέπομεν 37. . . .
Orig. *in Cantic.* ii. 3 (θεωρήσωμεν) (Mai *Class. Auct.* ix. 288). Orig.-
Int. iv. 536^d (*videntur*). 537^b (*contuendo*). Chr. x. 312^c (βλέπει).

12 laid aside the things of a child. For now we are seeing **in a**

σωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ

Cyril. *Glaph. in Genes.* lib. v. c. 4. Opp. i. [pt. 2.] p. 172 (βλέποι). (*in Exod.* lib. ii. Opp. i. [pt. 2.] 274 ὁψόμεθα). *in Joan.* v. 38. lib. iii. c. 2. Opp. iv. 258 (βλέπειν). xiv. 9. lib. ix. p. 780 (θεωρήσειε). *Fest. Pasch.* 12. Opp. v. pt. 2. p. 171 (βλέποντες). *Thesaur. Assert.* 31. Opp. v. 267 (ὀρώμεν). *de Sancta Trin. praeft. Dial.* i. Opp. v. 383* [389] (βλέπειν), so also p. 391. *de Incarnatione* v. 678 (βλέπουσι). *ad. Imperat. Theodosium de recta Fide* Opp. v. pt. 2 [3]. p. 18 (ὀρῶ μὲν, probably ὀρώμεν). *contra Iulianum* iv. Opp. vi. [pt. 2.] 121 (βλέποντας). Ps.-Cyril. *de Incarnatione* c. 34 (βλέπειν) (*Mai Nov. Pat. Bibl.* ii. 73). Theodoret. *in Cantic.* ii. 3, and 11–13; and viii. 5. Opp. ii. 55. 70. 155 (βλέπω). *de Provident. Orat.* 10. iv. 654 (βλέπω). Ps.-Dion.-Areop. *de divin. Nomin. Paraphrasis Pachymerae* c. 13. § 3. Opp. i. 537. Max.-Confess. *Scholia* upon the above, vol. ii. of Dion.-Areop. p. 229 (ὁψόμεθα). Max.-Confess. *Quaest. ad Thalass.* 9. p. 26 (βλέπειν). *cap. Theol. et Oecon. Cent.* 2. § 57. p. 497 (ἀποδημεί, κατὰ τὴν πρόσωπον [p. 498.] πρὸς πρόσωπον θεωρίαν· ἐνδημεί, κατὰ τὴν ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ καὶ αἰνίγμασι θεωρίαν).

12. γαρ NABD^cKLP (*ita* Tisch.¹⁸⁷¹!), all cursives apparently, *Lat-harv.* Hel. Memph. Clem. *Paed.* i. 6. p. 120. *Strom.* i. 19. p. 374. v. 1. p. 647. Orig.-Int. iv. 600^c. Marcellus *ap. Eus.* lib. ii. p. 53^b. lib. iii. c. 10. p. 177^d. Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* iii. 41. p. 446. Nazian. *Orat.* 26. i. 452^b. Chr. iii. 469^a. x. 311^b (R. 363) Cyril. *Glaph. in Genes.* lib. ii. c. 4. Opp. i. [pt. 2.] 50. *in Joan.* viii. 23. lib. v. c. 4. Opp. iv. 507. xiv. 9. lib. ix. p. 777. xvi. 25. lib. xi. c. 2. p. 938. *de Trin. Dial.* 2. Opp. v. 450. *Epist.* 55. [olim 47.] Opp. v. pt. 2 [2.] p. 175. (v. pt. 2 [3.] p. 18). *contra Iulianum* lib. iii. Opp. vi. [pt. 2.] p. 89. lib. viii. p. 272. *adv. Anthropol.* 1. Opp. vi. [pt. 2.] p. 366. Theodoret. *in loco* iii. 255. Damascen. *in loco* ii. 110^c. Theod.-Studit. *Antirrheticus* iii. c. 13. p. 133^b. Oecumen. *in loco* i. 551^b. Theophyl. *in loco* ii. 205^b. Ambros. *de Fide Resurr.* ii. c. 109. Opp. ii. 1163^f. Aug. *Fel. Manich.* i. 9. Opp. viii. 478^b. Gaudent. *Serm.* 1. p. 946^e. 5. p. 950^f. | omit γαρ D*FGP (*ita* Tisch. *in ed. codicis*). *d. e. f. g. Am.* Goth. Arm. Clem. *Strom.* v. 11. p. 690. *Excerpt. Theodoti ap.* Clem. xv. p. 972 (not 962 as Tisch.). Orig. i. 731^a. Orig.-Int. iii. 120^c. Eus. *de Fide* ii. (Gall. iv. 477^c. or M. xxiv. 1067^c). Chr. i. 447^b (βλέπομεν νῦν δὲ). v. 289^c. Cyril. *in Malach.* iv. 2–3. § 44. Opp. iii. 866. *contra Iulianum* viii. Opp. vi. [pt. 2.] p. 265. Theodoret. ii.

mirror obscurely, but then face to face; now I am knowing in

70 (ἄρτι βλέπω ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ, ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι). 155 (βλέπω ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ, ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι). iv. 654. (Max.-Confess. *Schol. in Ps.-Dion.-Areop.* ii. 188. 229). Hesych. in *Levit.* ii. 3 (M. xciii. 806^b, but as it is in Latin it cannot be trusted. See Latin Fathers below). Photius *Bibliotheca* lib. vii. codd. 222 (M. ciii. 788^d). The Latin Fathers generally, or at least the copies of their works now extant, except as above. | δε (or *autem*) Pst. (Aeth.). Orig.-Int. iv. 573^a. Didym.-Alex. *de Trin.* i. 9. p. 7. Isaias-Abbas *Orat.* 25. § 20. fol. 1188^a. (Max.-Confess. *ad Thalass. Quaest.* 9. p. 26). Zeno *de Resurr.* xiv. p. 132^e. . . . [Damascen. *de Imaginibus Orat.* 2. c. 20. Opp. i. 340^c (βλέπομεν γάρ, ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ, καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι, κτῆ.)].

12. ἀρτι] ἀρτεi FG, by itacism.

— δι ἈΒΒΓΡ. 17. 37. 47. *d. e. f. g. Excerpt. Theodoti* Clem. 972. Orig. i. 282^d. 720^e. 731^a. iii. 174^e. 686^a. iv. 17^d. 209^d. 220^b. 229^a (διὰ κατόπτρου). in *Cantic.* ii. 3 (Mai *Class. Auct.* ix. 288). Orig.-Int. iii. 120^e. iv. 462^a. 536^d. 537^b. 573^a. 600^c. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg. Orat.* 5. c. 8. p. 703^b. Eus. *de Fide* p. 477^c. Marcell. 53^b. 177^d. Macar.-Aegypt. *Hom.* 37. § 5. p. 128^d (οὐκέτι ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ). Didym.-Alex. pp. 7. 446. Nazian. i. 452^b. Isaias-Abbas 1188^a. Chr. i. 447^b. 486^c. iii. 469^a. v. 289^e. x. 311^b. 312^c. 467^a. Cyril. i. 50. (172 ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ βλέποι). (274). (iii. 866). (iv. 258. 507. 780. 808. 827). 938. (v. 356. 383^{*}. 391). 450. (678). (v. pt. 2. pp. 18. 171. 175). vi. [pt. 2.] 89. (121. 265. 272. 366). Theodoret. iii. 255. Hesych. 806^b. Max.-Confess. 26. (497). Damascen. ii. 110^c. Theod.-Studit. 133^b. (Photius 788^d). Oecumen. i. 551^b. Theophyl. ii. 205^b. Cyprian. *Testim.* iii. 3. p. 319. Hil. in *Ps.* cxxi. § 1. p. 384^f. *Ps.* cxxiv. § 4. p. 404^a. *Ps.* cxlii. § 11. p. 549^e. *Ps.* cxlvi. § 4. p. 577^d. Ambros. *de Bono Mortis* 49. i. 410^b. *de Fide* ii. 1163^f. Ambrosiast. 155^f. Hier. *Epist.* 41, *ad Marcellam*, i. 190^b. Aug. *de Civ. Dei* xxii. 1. Opp. vii. 696^b; and seven times besides. Gaudent. 946^c. 950^f. | ὡς δι DE. 2^h, *semel*. 73. 80. 93. Scr's b g o. Pst. Hcl*. Arm. Aeth., (but a free translation). Clem. 120. 374. 647. 690. Orig.-Int. iv. 462^b. Meth. *Conviv. dec. Virg. Orat.* 9. c. 2. p. 731^c. Cyril. (i. 257. iv. 393. 769. 777. v. 267. 675. vi. 245). (Theodoret. ii. 55. 70. 155. iv. 654). (Ps.-Dion.-Areop. *de divin. Nomin.* c. 13. § 3. Opp. i. 537. Max.-Confess. *Schol. in de divin. Nomin.* ii. 188. 229). Tertul. *adv. Prax.* c. 14. p. 221.

— ἐσοπτρον F, ed. Scriv. | ἐσοπτρον F, Treg. (by error?)

— αινειγματι FG. . . . ενιγματι D*P. Itacisms.

— εν αινιγματι ἈΒΔ^c(FG) Ks. 17. 37. 47. *Excerpt. Theodoti ap. Clem.* 972. Orig. iii. 174^e. Orig.-Int. iv. 573^a. Marcell. 53^b. 177^d.

13 ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. νυνὶ δὲ μένει πίστις

Didym.-Alex. 446. Isaias-Abbas 1188^a. Chr. i. 447^b. 486^c. iii. 469^a. v. 289^c. x. 311^c. (312^c). 467^a (Cyril. i. [pt. 2.] 274. iv. 777). Theodoret. (ii. 70. 155. ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι.). iii. 255. Hesych. 806^b. (Damascen. ii. 110^c ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι). Oecumen. i. 551^b. Theophyl. ii. 205^b. Tertul. *adv. Prax.* c. 14. p. 221. Hil. 384^f. 404^a. Zeno *de Resurr.* 132^c. Phoebadius *de Fide Orthod.* ii. (Gall. v. 257^c). Ambros. i. 410^b. Ambrosiast. 155^f. Hier. i. 190^b. Aug. *ad Vincent., Epist.* 92 c. 4. Opp. ii. 229^a, and seven times besides. Gaudent. 946^c. 950^f. | καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι L(P). 109. 178. Scr's f. Orig. i. 282^d. (720^e). 731^a. iii. 686^a. iv. 17^d. 92^c. 209^d. (220^b, not 222^a as Tr.). *in Cantic.* ii. 3 (Mai *C.A.* ix. 288). Orig.-Int. iii. 120^c. iv. 462^a. 536^d. 537^b. 596^a. 600^c. Macar.-Aegypt. 128^d. Didym.-Alex. 8. Nazianzen. i. 452^b. Chr. i. 468^c. x. 508^d. Cyril. i. [pt. 2.] 50 (καὶ αἰνίγματος). 172, 257 (om. ἐν). 274 (ἐν αἰν. καὶ ἐσόπτ.). iii. 866 (om. ἐν). iv. 258. 393 (om. ἐν). 507 (δι' αἰνίγματος). 769 (om. ἐν). 777 (ὡς ἐν αἰν.). 780 (om. ἐν). 808. 827. v. 267 (om. ἐν). 356. 383* (om. ἐν). 391 (om. ἐν). 450. 675. 678 (om. ἐν). pt. 2. [1.] 171 (om. ἐν). [2.] 175 (om. ἐν). [3.] 18 (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τε καὶ αἰνίγματι). vi. 245 (ὡς ἐν αἰνίγ., καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτ.). [pt. 2.] 89 (βλέπομεν γὰρ δι' ἐσόπτρου καὶ δι' αἰνίγματος, κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον.). 121 (om. ἐν). 265. 272. 366. Pseudo-Cyril. (Mai *Nov. Pat. Bibl.* ii. 73). Theodoret. ii. 55-6 καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι). iv. 654. (Ps.-Dion.-Areop. i. 537. νῦν ὡς ἐν αἰνίγματι καὶ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ ὁρῶμεν · so the *Scholium* of Max.-Confess. ii. 229 ; but that on p. 188 of vol. ii. reads: νῦν ὡς ἐν κατόπτρῳ καὶ αἰνίγματι βλέπομεν.). Max.-Confess. p. 26 (πότε δὲ δι' ἐσόπτρου καὶ αἰνιγμάτων βλέπειν λέγων τὰ μέλλοντα ·). 497-8 (as above under βλέπω). Aug. *Fel. Manich.* i. 12. Opp. viii. 478^g. | Clem. 120. 374. 647. 690. omits καὶ ἐν αἰνίγματι.

— ἀρτί] ἀρτεὶ FG.

— γνωσκω $\aleph B^3 F K s L P$. 2^h, and the Fathers as now printed. | γειν. AB*. . . . γιν. DE. . . . γνωσκω G. (Didym.-Alex. 446 γινώσκωμεν and ἐπιγνώσομεθα). || ἐκ μερονος επιγ. G*. (omit ἐκ μερονος FG^{corr.}).

— τότε] το $\aleph^*$ (text $\aleph^a$).

— επιγνωσομαι] γνωσομαι K.

— επεγνωσθην] επι γνωσθην F. . . . επι γνωσθην G. | prefix εγω F

part, but then shall I fully know even as I was fully known.

13 And now there is abiding Faith, Hope, Love, these three, but the greater of these is Love : pursue after Love.

ἐλπὶς ἀγάπη, τὰ τρία ταῦτα • μείζων δὲ τούτων ἡ ἀγάπη •
διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην.

(but not *f.*) *G. d. e* (but omits *et*). *g. Tolet.* Cyprian. 319. (Perhaps the exemplar of *D*, as that codex has *καὶ ὡς ἐπεγνωσθῆναι*).

13. *νυνι*] *νυνει* B*D.

— *νυνι* δὲ *μενει* most of the Fathers. | *μινειδε* F. . . . *μινει* δὲ *G.* . . . *μενι* *D*, (no correction). || *μένει* δὲ *Clem. Quis Dives Salvetur* 38. p. 956. *Chr. i.* 445^e. *Cat. Cor.* 258 (*νῦν δὲ μένει*). (*Chr. vi.* 288^a, and *xi.* 490^d *μένει γὰρ*). *Hil. Fragmentum* p. 1279^a.

— *μειζων* *D^c*. | *μειζω* *D**. | *μειζον* *L. Orig. Cat. Rom.* 34. *Ps.-Athanas. ad Antioch. Ducem* 76 (*M.* xxviii. 645^b).

— *τουτων*] *τουιων* *Eras*¹. (text *Eras*²⁻³).

— We join to our passage the first clause of chapter xiv. on authority of the Sinaiticus, which has no pause at *ἀγάπη*, but its greatest at *ἀγάπην*. Six lines read thus :

ΔΕΤΟΥΤΩΝΗΑΓΑ
ΠΗΔΙΩΚΕΤΕΤΗΝ
ΑΓΑΠΗΝ
ΖΗΛΟΥΤΕΔΕΤΑΠ̄ΝΙ
ΚΑΜΑΛΛΟΝΔΕΪ
ΝΑΠΡΟΦΗΤΕΥΗ

It will be perceived that the *Z*, in the fourth line, projects half its diameter to the left of the other lines. The beginning of a new paragraph is very frequently thus indicated in the Sinaiticus.

The Vaticanus also contracts the *ην* at the end of *αγάπην* so as not to run on to the next line, and begins the next *ζηλουτε*. *Damascenus*, *Oecumenius*, and *Theophylact*, in their commentaries on this passage consider *διώκετε τὴν ἀγάπην* by itself, and thus do not show whether they connected it with the preceeding or with the following clause. It is possible, therefore, that they may have known MSS. divided as *AB*. This method of division adds greatly to the impressiveness and beauty of chapter xiii., and if the succeeding δὲ be translated *now* (as it should be in verse 27 of chapter xii.), no violence will be done to chapter xiv. In fact the three chapters are so closely connected as hardly to bear separation at all.

— *διωκετε*] *αιωκεται* *FG*. Itacism and blunder combined.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

The text and translation on pp. 492-519 are to be considered those of the Article. — Every possible pains has been taken to ensure accuracy in the digest, every citation having been corrected by the original memoranda, which, down to Photius inclusive, were recompared with the originals, while the Article was going through the press. But still, errors will probably be found, and, if there be, the writer will be grateful to any one who will communicate them to him, at the Astor Library, New York City.

Tif.¹⁸⁴¹ could not be used prior to p. 501. Before that page it concurs with our text except: ἀντιλήψεις in vs. 28, *κὰν semper* in verses 2, 3. It has a ¶ at ver. 31. — P. 134. F and G belong to Century VIII. or IX., authorities disagreeing. H is not wholly in Paris, eight leaves being at St. Petersburg or Moscow. — P. 135. The Harclean Version was made about A.D. 508, by Philoxenus or Polycarp, and revised by Thomas of Harkel, A.D. 616. — P. 136. The Armenian is now generally accredited by critics to the Vth Century. — P. 138, line 7, dele "as reprinted," etc., as the citations have all been verified in Schultze. — P. 139, line 3 from bottom, read "1842-50." — P. 137, line 20, read "Mai's *Nova Patrum Bibliotheca*"; so p. 492, line 5 of digest; p. 504, line 30; and p. 506, line 14. — P. 137, line 21. For "1615" read "1609-11"; line 22, for "1609-11" read "1615." — P. 138, line 9, read "Selucia." — P. 502, lines 13 and 18. For "infix" read "prefix and infix," as *enta* is both. — P. 503, line 1. After "1831" add "and is now by Tregelles," as he informs the writer in a letter of May 13, 1873. — In ver. 10, both Tisch. and Tr. err in citing Orig.-Int. iv. 573^b for καταργηθήσεται τὸ ἐκ μέρους., as on that page he has only *cum venerit quod perfectum est*; and *cum venerint illa quae perfecta sunt*; and nowhere on the page has the remotest allusion to the latter part of the verse.

Ver. 12, *Lat.-harv.* is a ms. of *Vulg.* at Harvard University, and is the only one known having *enim* after *videmus*. — Besides the readings of 2^h given in our digest it is necessary to say, that being a Lectionary, our passage is contained in Lessons 109, 325, and 357, on pages 173, 460, and 541. The title to all three Lessons is *προσκορινθου α*. Ver. 11 has Ἀδελφοὶ *semel*, at beginning of Lesson, before first ὄτε.

ARTICLE V.

ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF ISAIAH XL.-LXVI.

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THIS question, linking itself with the historic integrity of the books of the Old Testament, and practically involving the whole issue as to real *prophecy*, deserves at the hands of all intelligent friends of divine revelation a thorough and fearless investigation. The issue upon this point in our times comes up in the form of a challenge from the neological critics of the present century to make good the long-admitted doctrine that the one Isaiah of the age of Hezekiah wrote as well the last twenty-seven chapters of this book as the first thirty-nine. The *animus* of this challenge is a denial of all real inspiration, inasmuch as on their admission stubborn proofs of divine prescience appear in these latter chapters, provided they were really written in the age of Hezekiah, and because, if these proofs can be set aside, other like proofs of real prophecy may be summarily disposed of by similar criticism.

This question was discussed at some length, yet not exhaustively, in the Introduction to my Notes on Isaiah (pp. 12-21). That discussion called forth some adverse criticism,¹ much in the spirit of modern neology, mainly useful as re-opening the discussion and suggesting new points in support of the ancient faith of the church of God. The present Essay may therefore be regarded both as supplementary to my Introduction to Isaiah, and as a reply to the points of adverse criticism above referred to.

Who was the Author of Isaiah xl.-lxvi?

The neological critics (as above) held thus:

1. That a striking difference of diction and literary char-

¹ E.g. in the "Nation," March 11, 1869, p. 195.

acter in general distinguishes the last twenty-seven chapters from the first thirty-nine.

2. That the compilers inserted the historical chapters (xxxvi.-xxxix.) between the two divisions intentionally, to guard the reader against the mistake of supposing that the same author wrote both portions.

3. That the compilers (not the author) prefixed the name of Isaiah to the whole book as in our Bibles, just as they prefixed the name of Samuel to the two books which bear his name.

4. That, inasmuch as certain other books of the Old Testament (e.g. those of the Pentateuch and of Job) appear without the names of their authors, there is no objection *a priori* to their hypothesis that this portion of Isaiah appears without the name of its author.

5. That the author of the latter portion may have been Baruch, Zerubbabel, or Daniel.

6. That the allusions in chapters xli.-xlvii. to the rise of the Persian empire, to Cyrus, and to Babylon, are *historic*, and not *prophetic*.

These positions should be examined.

1. They assert a striking difference of diction and literary character in general between the earlier and the later portions of this book.

This position, to be of any avail, must affirm not only a slight, but a striking, diversity; not merely such as should be expected in the same author between his middle life and his old age — between what was written amid the exciting scenes of present history and what was written in the retirement of age, when borne forward into the gloriously-anticipated future. The diversity affirmed should be such as demands another author and another age, namely, dialectic differences, affecting the cast of the tongue itself, or such marked mental peculiarities as refuse to come under the supposition of the same author. The former class of diversities may be readily admitted; the latter are altogether denied.

The dialectic changes in the Hebrew language from the

age of Hezekiah to the age of Zerubbabel and Daniel are fortunately "not far to seek." The Chaldaic forms and words which appear in the Psalms of the later age, and in Ezra and other writers of the restoration, are well known. But those forms and words do *not* appear in the later chapters of Isaiah — certainly not in any such number and frequency as to give it the general character of the Chaldaic age. No competent critic has ever shown this ; there is not the least danger that any such critic ever will. Further, those peculiarities of style which embody and express an author's mind, which are accepted by all competent judges as identifying the author by his thought-power, his taste, his imagination, his habits of mental action and expression — all these peculiarities stand out with unrivalled boldness in Isaiah, as compared with any other Hebrew prophet or author, — not to say, any other author of all time, — and, beyond all reasonable question, are essentially the same in the latter portion as in the former. There is no evidence that, prior to the last hundred years, even so much as one out of the thousands who have read Isaiah has ever detected any such difference between these two portions as would indicate one mind in the former, another in the latter. Let this argument take a yet more definite form. The men best qualified to detect such differences of style as would prove a different author are, of course (other things being equal), those who are most familiar with the language, who are conversant not only with the limited amount of ancient Hebrew now extant, but with the entire literature of their nation, and with its changes during the lapse of time involved in the question. These best judges are, unquestionably, the ancient Jews — first and chief, the learned scribes of the age of Ezra and onwards, who compiled the Old Testament canon, and who retained their ancient Hebrew, despite of their former Chaldean surroundings (Neh. viii. 8) ; next, the Jewish doctors in the schools of Hillel and Shammai, flourishing in the first century before the Christian era, and also the first after ; then, the men who taught in the colleges of Tiberias,

and also of Babylon ; those who have given us the Chaldee Targums ; and, indeed, the continuous series of learned Jews, down to the great Reformation in Germany, when even German scholars sat at the feet of the learned Jews of Spain. Through all these centuries of Jewish learning, and among the hundreds of scholars profoundly versed in the tongue sacred to their national history and literature, not a witness has ever arisen to testify against the authorship of the one Isaiah. Not a man has left upon history the first hint that he found reason to question the universally accepted doctrine that Isaiah wrote the entire book which bears his name.

Such testimony is unimpeachable. No set of critics can ever arise competent to impeach it. The Hebrew tongue is dead ; the men to whom it was a living language have given us their testimony, and have passed away, never to have any successors of equal competency on this question. A body of national literature whose limits are no longer known was at the command of the fathers in this series of witnesses, and can be reached by no critics of modern times. Therefore it is simply impossible that any critics shall ever arise competent to revise and reverse the decision of the ancient Jews on the question of the literary diction of the book of Isaiah. The attempt is simply an impertinence—a puerile assumption.

It scarcely need be added that these ancient Jewish witnesses to the authorship of Isaiah (especially the oldest, who are the most important witnesses in the long succession) were not only competent on the score of being masters of the language, and judges, therefore, of all that pertains to dialect and style ; but they were men of staunch integrity and of most watchful jealousy against everything false. They were servants of the God of truth ; consecrated to the purity of God's word of truth. So much can be affirmed most positively, without opening the question with the neologist as to their special inspiration for this work.

2. It is claimed that the compilers inserted the historic chapters (xxxvi.—xxxix.) between the two portions of this

book, with the intention to guard the reader against assuming that the same author wrote them both.

This assertion is without proof. There is not the slightest intimation of such a purpose in the location of these historic chapters here. But, on the other hand, these historic chapters are here for the double purpose: (a) Of giving the historic fulfilment of foregoing prophecies respecting the fall of Sennecharib, e.g. Isa. x. 5-34 — a prediction which, judging from the dates of the chapters that precede and that follow, was written in the reign of Ahaz; also, Isa. xvii. 12-14, xviii. and xxxiii. It was important that these prophecies of the fall of the Assyrian should be verified to all future readers of this book by this historical narrative of the facts. (b) The concluding verses of this narrative (xxxix. 5-7) foreshow the captivity to Babylon, and therefore naturally introduce the chapters that follow (xl.-lii). These historic chapters (xxxvi.-xxxix.) are here, therefore, not to break the connection between the former portion and the latter, but to cement it. They give just enough of history to verify the foregoing prophecies of Sennecharib's fall, and to introduce the great prophetic fact of the captivity to Babylon — a fact which is assumed throughout the concluding portion, not as having transpired, but as being certain to transpire.

3. It is claimed that the compilers (not the author) prefixed the name of Isaiah to the whole book as in our Bible, just as they prefixed the name of Samuel to the two books which bear his name.

Let the question be put, and fairly met: Who wrote the first verse of Isaiah — "The vision of Isaiah the son of Amoz, which he saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem"? The neological critics say: The compilers of the Bible, and not Isaiah himself. On the contrary, I maintain that it was written by Isaiah the prophet, and on the following grounds: (a) By the general, if not even universal, usage of antiquity, the author put his name at the head of all documents which required his name at all. Cicero's Epistles begin: "Marcus Tullius Cicero to —." So the Persian kings, as in Ezra

i. 2: "Thus saith Cyrus, king of Persia"; and vii. 12: "Artaxerxes, king of kings, unto Ezra the priest," etc.

(b) *Every prophetic book of the Old Testament opens with the prophet's own name*; this introduction being more or less inwoven into the following context as part of the book itself. This inweaving is strongly marked in Jeremiah, in Ezekiel, in Hosea; all indicating that the prophet himself introduced his own name, and not the compilers. Moreover, this introduction of the prophet's name appears with considerable variety in form, such as might be expected if written by the various authors, but not what we should expect from one and the same body of compilers. Still further; this introduction of the prophet's name appears in all the manuscripts and in all the ancient versions, and therefore comes down to us with the strongest possible evidence of being the writing of the author. (c) A similar announcement of the prophet's name appears in Isa. ii. 1; xiii. 1, and a statement very analogous in xx. 2; "The word that Isaiah the son of Amoz saw concerning Judah and Jerusalem," etc. To suppose that these verses are the work of the compiler, and not of the author, is simply preposterous. But the usage which reached to particular individual prophecies must have obtained in regard to the entire book. If these are Isaiah's own words, then, so is the first verse of chapter first.

Yet another assumption of the critics in question demands notice, expressed in the words: "Just as they prefixed the name of Samuel to the two books which bear his name." That is, as the compilers put the name of Samuel as the author at the head of two historical books, and made a bad mistake in so doing, so the same compilers put Isaiah's name at the head of this entire prophecy, and made a similar mistake in regard to the latter part of the book. Is there any truth or force in this criticism? None at all. The compilers never supposed that Samuel was the author of these entire books. They never meant to hint it. The supposition that they did is the blunder in the case—the blunder, not of the compilers, but of their modern critics.

Samuel himself had not written his own name into the introduction to this historic book, as the prophets did in their prophetic books, thus: "The words of Samuel the prophet, the son of Elkanah." They did not signify their opinion as to the author by the Hebrew preposition (*lamed*) before the name "Samuel," as is common in the Psalms: (ascribed) "*to* David," or "*to* Asaph." Nothing of the kind. They only placed the name "Samuel" at the head of these books, to distinguish them from other books: over the first "Samuel א"; over the second, "Samuel ב." This mode of designation was of no authority, and was entirely disregarded by the translators of the Septuagint, who, as is well known, designate these historical books as the first, second, third, and fourth "Book of Kings." Indeed, the full caption, which has so unfortunately misled our American neological critics dates no further back than King James. Yet further, if the assumption made by the critics in question is valid, then, on the same principle, the compilers must have supposed that the third and fourth of these historical books were written by *the* "Kings," and the fifth and sixth by a certain ancient gentleman honored by the name of "Chronicles"!

4. The next point is, that, inasmuch as certain other books of the Old Testament (e.g. those of the Pentateuch and of Job) appear without the names of their authors, there is no objection, *a priori*, to the hypothesis that this latter portion of Isaiah appears without its author's name.

This comparison between the historical books, on the one hand, and the prophetic books, on the other, is admirably suggestive. It opens a mine of truth which will pay well for the working. The assumption is that these two classes of books stand on the same footing as to being anonymous—that, as some of the historical books appear without name, therefore any of the prophetic may appear so without prejudice against their reference to an unknown author. On this point my appeal is to *the facts of the case*.

No historical book in the Old Testament (save Nehemiah)

appears with the author's name incorporated into the first verse with the usual ancient formula. The first five books (the Pentateuch) are indicated severally by their first Hebrew words, represented by, "In the beginning," "The names," etc., etc.; the subsequent books variously; yet in no case (save Nehemiah) is the author's name given. Obviously, it was not deemed important that the author of an historical book should make himself responsible as its author by incorporating his name in his work. These historical books, written close upon the time of the events, or drawing from records already in the public archives of the nation, simply narrated events well known. These books themselves went, like the books of Moses, into the national archives. The fact of their being accepted by the proper authorities, and placed in these archives, was all the voucher needed. Practically, nothing was left dependent before the Hebrew people upon the author's name or standing. Whether the narrator were "Nathan the prophet," or "Gad the seer," was a matter of very little consequence. So we must infer from the utter absence of the author's name. Moses is presumed to have been the author of the first five books (using antecedent documents, however, in the case of Genesis); but this assumption rests not on the testimony of his name standing in the first verse of each book, after the form of the prophetic books.

But, turning to the prophetical books, we find a totally different usage. *Every prophetical book of the Old Testament bears the prophet's name as author in the introductory verse or verses.* These are declared to be "his words." He is the man who "had the vision"—the man to whom "the word of the Lord came." This invariable fact is a point of supreme importance to our main question of the authorship of the latter portion of Isaiah. Let us scan this fact thoroughly. It includes every one of the twelve minor prophets. It is made boldly prominent and emphatic in the first three of the major series, viz. Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. The book of Daniel begins with history, and, con-

sequently, its opening verses follow the usage of history, not that of prophecy. But each several prophetic vision gives the name of Daniel with scrupulous care: "In the first year of Belshazzar, king of Babylon, Daniel had a dream and visions of his head upon his bed; *then he wrote the dream*, and told the sum of the matters" (vii. 1). So Daniel viii. 1; ix. 1, 2; x. 1. This usage reaches even to the one prophetic book of the New Testament, the Revelation of John. It is, therefore, invariable and universal. This fact alone is of itself a sufficient refutation of the neological assumption that Isa. xl.-lxvi. is the work of some nameless prophet, which, after floating about loose for a season, was picked up by somebody, and appended to the writings of the great Isaiah.

But we have not only the fact of a universal usage, the prophet's own name at the head of every recognized prophetic book; we have also *most abundant reasons for the fact*. Unlike the modern neologists, the ancient Hebrews believed in real *prophecy*. It was to them a fact of tremendous import that God spake to them through human lips, often disclosing the future destinies of themselves or of their enemies, such as no human prescience could reach. But it came to pass, in the degenerate age of the nation, that false prophets arose — arose not merely to display their skill in forecasting the future; not merely to get power over mind or to amuse the people, but to gainsay the real word of the Lord, to stiffen the rebellious heart of the people, and in the result to bring down upon the nation untold calamities. No set of men ever played more boldly the game of "stealing the livery of heaven to serve the devil in." The history shows that they stole the customary formulae of the true prophets: "Thus saith the Lord," "The burden of the Lord," etc. (Jer. xxiii. 25-40). They used prophetic symbols, after the manner of the true prophets, for the sake of the stronger impression upon the people (Jer. xxviii.). They even "wore the rough garment to deceive." Consequently, the most vigilant scrutiny was demanded to discriminate between the true and the false. The Mosaic law, in providing

for this order of men, laid down the principles by which their character and claims were to be tested. These principles (Deut. xiii. 1-5 ; xviii. 15-22) shut off not only those whose predictions failed to be verified, but those also whose teachings led men into idolatry, and, by parity of reasoning, toward any sin. The prophet must be upright before God and man. He must have a known personal character, and this must be unimpeachable. The prophet was currently spoken of as a "man of God." Consequently each author-prophet must stand on his own bottom. When he writes, let him back it *with his own proper name*. This demand was imperative ; there could be no evading it. Every accepted prophetic book must bear the veritable name of its prophetic author. So we find it. Therefore the neological assumption that the last twenty-seven chapters of the book of Isaiah were found floating about with no prophet's name anchored thereto, and yet were taken up and honored with the name of Isaiah, — the greatest prophet of Hebrew antiquity, — is more than an anomaly ; it is, critically speaking, an absurdity, an utter impossibility.

Though to all unprejudiced minds it will seem superfluous to say more, yet, out of deference to the spirit of neological criticism, it will not be amiss to push this investigation yet further. Be it remembered, then, that false prophets had reached the summit of their power in the age of Jeremiah, and in the early years of the captivity. Some of them appear in the history among the captives in Babylon, close, therefore, upon the time where the critics in question locate the pseudo-Isaiah. Sensible Jews were still smarting under the terrible curses brought upon them by false prophets. Just here the pseudo-Isaiah appears. Did Ezra and the men of his school, "the great synagoguc," the recognized compilers of the Hebrew scriptures, know anything of this nameless personage ? They must have known him, if he lived where the new critics place him. Did they lend themselves to the fraud of palming off his book upon the great Isaiah ? Where is the first trace of proof against them that

they were parties to such a transaction? Yet, on the theory in question, it is simply impossible that they should not have known the writer of these twenty-seven chapters. Were they the men to offer a bounty upon irresponsible prophesying? On the neological assumption, they must be held responsible for palming off the prophecies of this nameless and irresponsible false prophet ("pseudo-Isaiah") upon the renowned Isaiah. Believe this, who can?

Essentially the same might be said of the translators of the Septuagint, who give us the entire sixty-six chapters as the prophecies of the one Isaiah. Had they ever heard of this Isaiah Second, the pretender; and were they parties to the deception of ignoring his name, and honoring him with the prestige of the immortal Isaiah?

Josephus bears some very emphatic testimony to the profound esteem in which all Jews held their sacred books, and to the argus-eyed jealousy with which they watched over their integrity and honored the memory of their prophetic authors. Is it quite in keeping with this testimony that some unknown author should append twenty-seven chapters to the book of the distinguished Isaiah, and this jealous, watchful people never know it, or, knowing it, connive at the fraud? The men who can believe this must have large credulity, to be used whenever it may be useful to carry a point against valid prophecy.

5. It is said that "the author of this latter portion of the book of Isaiah may have been Baruch, Zerubbabel, or Daniel."

It must be very convenient (for the purpose of baffling investigation and refutation) to name Baruch and Zerubbabel — men of whose minds and style as authors nothing to the purpose can be known. But when they name *Daniel* as the pseudo-Isaiah, the authors of chapters xl.-lxvi., they come within the range of review. The prophetic writings of Daniel and the latter portion of Isaiah can be readily compared. In all that pertains to prophetic diction, style, symbolism, they are wide as the poles apart. The one is of Jerusalem; the other, of Babylon. The one conceives of

the church of God as a Hebrew, all true worship at the Temple — all Gentiles gathering there into the one Zion of God; but the other has been schooled, not at Jerusalem, but in the courts of kings and in the succession of world-empires, and you would not be reminded that he had ever been at the Temple by any power it has ever had over his symbolism. Great hostile powers with him are savage wild beasts — of all which symbolism Isaiah knows nothing. The contrast between these two men is the widest possible. The only charitable supposition is that the critics who pitched upon Daniel as the author both of the visions that bear his name, and of Isa. xl.—lxvi. had never read these writings.

6. Finally, it is claimed that the allusions in Isa. xl.—xlvii. to the rise of the Persian empire, to Cyrus, and to Babylon are historic, and not prophetic. That is, the writer lived so far down in the age of the captivity that he knew Cyrus personally, and had the sagacity to see in him a great conqueror, the prospective deliverer of God's people from Babylon. It was a happy *hit* — a fine specimen of wise, successful forecast — so much; nothing more. There is no real prophecy here — nothing which demands the foreknowledge of the Infinite Mind. This is the neological assumption. Granted; and it proves the *pseudo*-Isaiah to be *false*, indeed, and even *blasphemous*. For, throughout this entire passage (xli.—xlvii.) which treats of the Persian Cyrus and of Babylon, the writer *claims to write real prophecy*. Or, more precisely, he introduces Almighty God (Isa. xli. 1–5) as convening the heathen nations and their idol-gods, and challenging them to produce the first case of real prophecy; and then, over against their utter failure, he sustains his own true divinity on the ground of having repeatedly predicted future events which have already come to pass, and of now foretelling yet other events, viz. those pertaining to Cyrus, of which he avers that not the first germ had yet developed itself to human view. Hear his words: “Let them [the heathen and their gods] bring forth and show us what shall happen; let them show the former things what

they be [former prophecies which they have predicted], that we may consider them, and know the latter end of them [i.e. may see if they have been fulfilled]; or let them declare to us things to come [things yet future — new prophecies]. Show the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that ye are gods," etc. (Isa. xli. 22, 23). Thus God challenges them to show themselves gifted with prophetic power. But of himself God says: "Behold, the former things [previous predictions] are come to pass, and new things do I declare; before they spring forth, I tell you of them" (Isa. xlii. 9), i.e. before the first germ of the bud appears to the human eye, I give you predictions of events which no human sagacity can ever reach. In the same strain of challenge to the heathen and their gods to produce real prophecy, and of lofty claim on his part to the highest prophetic power, are the passages: Isa. xliii. 18-21; xlv. 26-28; xlv. 20, 21; xlv. 9-11.

Thus this neological assumption sinks these chapters not only below the honesty and truthfulness of inspired revelation, but quite below the average morality of merely human authors. According to this theory, the writer has the blasphemous impudence to represent the great God as convoking the nations to hear his solemn averment; as then proceeding to make a test-issue with them of his claims to supreme divinity against theirs on the single point of *prophetic power*; and finally, making a special point of predicting Cyrus by name as his servant, before even the first germ of the bud had begun to swell so as to be visible to the human eye. And yet — such is the boldness of this blasphemy — this whole showing is false to the bottom! There is no real prophecy in it whatever. The author lived in the very age of Cyrus; and, being a pretty shrewd man, he foresaw the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus a little way in the distance, and then seeks to make capital out of his own shrewdness to support the claim of the infinite God to such foreknowledge as no sagacity of mortals could ever reach.

This is the latest American edition of German neology.

ARTICLE VI.

THE STRUCTURE OF A SERMON.—THE TEXT.

BY PROF. EDWARDS A. PARK.

§ 1 *Definitions of the words, "Sermon," "Preach," "Text."*

A SERMON is "specifically a discourse delivered in public, usually by a clergyman, for the purpose of religious instruction, and grounded on some text or passage of scripture."¹ To preach is "to pronounce a public discourse on a religious subject, or from a text of scripture; to deliver a sermon."² Dr. Wayland says: "When we preach we always take, ostensibly as the basis of our discourse, some passage of the word of God. This is called a text; and without it, our communication may be an oration, a speech, a lecture, or an essay, but it is never called a sermon."³ We cannot say that a speech without a text is *never* called a sermon; for the word "sermon," is often used in other senses than the technical, and denotes not only any kind of religious or even serious, but also any kind of dull, remark. So the word "preach" is not uniformly employed with its distinctive meaning, but is applied to various forms of address, even to any style of conversation which is particularly stupid. The specific sense of the term, however, is well understood. When we say that Edward Everett was once a preacher, that Whitefield "preached more than eighteen thousand sermons,"⁴ it is supposed at once that the specified individuals delivered discourses on texts of the Bible. In the present series of Homiletical Essays the words "preach," "preacher," "sermon," will

¹ Webster's Dictionary; word "Sermon."

² The word "Preach." Worcester in his Dictionary gives as one definition of this word: "To pronounce a public discourse on a religious subject, or on a text of Scripture."

³ Letters on the Ministry of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland, p. 64.

⁴ Memoirs of George Whitefield. By John Gillies, D.D. p. 221 (Hartford ed.).

be ordinarily used in their technical sense, and an address not introduced by a passage of Holy Writ will be regarded as a speech, discourse, oration, lecture, essay, or something other than a sermon. The statue of President Jackson on one of our American frigates was called the figure-head, after the head of the statue had been clandestinely sawed away. We read narratives of a headless man, and of a bird without wings. When, however, the occasion of our speaking does not qualify the meaning of our terms, we are understood to speak of objects in their normal, rather than their abnormal state.

The word "text" is used by writers on Homiletics in a strict sense. It "is technically applied to any passage quoted from the *text* of scripture as a subject of discourse or sermon."¹

"How oft when Paul has served us with a text,
Has Epictetus, Plato, Tully preached."

Etymologically, the text (*texere*, *textus*, *textum*) is a *composition*, a *tissue*, a *texture*, a *web*. The whole Bible is such a composition. A single passage of it is taken out, and, as one part of the web woven by supernatural skill, it is examined with appropriate care; its texture is explained, perhaps unravelled; this is the preacher's text.

§ 2. *The Advantages of Preaching from Biblical Texts.*

I. The practice tends to secure for the pulpit the reverence naturally paid to an ancient usage. In these times and especially in this land, there prevails a tendency to abandon the old because it is old, and to introduce the new because it is new. Ere long, perhaps, this love of novelty will prompt to a restoration of the ancient usages; a return from the new to the old will gratify the prominent desire for one more change. True men, however, retain their instinctive reverence for antiquity. This reverence tends to make them strong and keep them stable. "The past," says Alexander Smith, "is very tender at my heart." If there be no valid objection to the practice of discoursing from Biblical texts,

¹ Richardson's Dictionary; word "Text."

the antiquity of the practice is sufficient to recommend it. We do not pretend that the prophets of the Old Testament adopted the same style of discourse which prevails among the ministers of the New. But the modern style is a reduction of ancient usages to a system. It comprehends in itself the principles which were irregularly followed out by the teachers in the old dispensation. Ezra stood upon the platform "in the open space before one of the gates of Jerusalem," and read the Pentateuch to the assembled people, and he with the Levites at his side "gave the sense and caused [the people] to understand the reading" (Neh. viii. 1-12).¹ The Jews in their synagogues read Moses and the prophets every Sabbath-day (Acts xiii. 27 ; xv. 21). After the reading of the Scriptures in the synagogue, came, at least occasionally, the *Derash*, the sermon, the "word of consolation." Both the Saviour and the apostles gave their sanction to this service by sometimes preaching the sermon (see Luke iv. 15 sq ; Acts xiii. 15 sq). As the words of Moses, so the words of Christ and his disciples, were early made prominent in the Christian church. Jude says (vs. 17) : "Remember ye the words which were spoken before of the apostles of our Lord Jesus Christ."² The Fathers of the church discoursed from the New Testament as well as from the Old ;³ sometimes from the Apocrypha, also from the Biographies of the saints and

¹ Ordinarily, perhaps, the prophet did little or nothing more than read the original Hebrew, and then translate it into the Chaldaic, the dialect which the Jews of that century were accustomed to employ. So now the Nestorian priests publicly read the Scriptures in the classical Syriac, and then translate it into the spoken dialect of the people.

² See *Grundriss einer biblischen Keryktik* : von Rudolph Stier. § 38.

³ "St. Justin Martyr in his early account of Christian worship [A.D. 140], says : 'When the reader [of what the apostles and prophets have written] has finished, he who presides (*προεστώς*, the bishop or president) admonishes and exhorts by word of mouth (*διὰ λόγου*) to the imitation of their noble deeds.'"—Blunt's Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology ; Art. "Preaching." Ostervald says : "Formerly, when a particular subject was intended to be discussed, they [the Fathers] often took no text at all ; which is a further proof that the sermon followed the reading. When a Father ascended the pulpit, he simply said : 'My intention to-day is to address you on such and such a subject,' which he then announced."—*Essay on the Composition and Delivery of a Sermon* (American ed.), p. 54. Ostervald here implies, but does not state

martyrs. In the fourth century preachers began to confine themselves with greater strictness to the canonical scriptures; in the ninth, to a system of Lessons from them.¹ At the Reformation the law requiring the use of texts became extremely rigid.² Thus it has been a common usage of preachers in all ages to discourse on biblical texts. He who departs from such a usage must give a good reason, or else take a merited blame for his departure. The presumption is, that a usage sustained by the wisdom of the ages is a wise one. If it be decidedly unwise, no blame is merited for departing from it.

II. The minister's practice of discoursing from biblical texts is itself appropriate. He is a preacher, a public crier, a herald (*κήρυξ*). If he be thus a proclaimer, what shall he proclaim? He is to proclaim the word of God (2 Tim. iv. 2). But can he proclaim the whole word of God on every Sabbath? He is to give every hearer his portion in due season; and how shall he give every one the fitting part of the divine word otherwise than by proclaiming at one time the truths involved in one passage, and at another time the truths involved in another passage? The language of a commissioned herald is: "The Spirit of the Lord spake by me, and his word was in my tongue"; "The Rock of Israel spake to me" (2 Sam. xxiii. 2, 3). John the Baptist preached the duty of repentance. Our Lord and his disciples went through

distinctly, that the subject was ordinarily one suggested by the scripture which had been read, and which thus formed the text of the sermon. Von Ammon says: "We find many among the Fathers of the Eastern and Western churches, and even among the orators of the Middle Ages, who in their religious discourses took either no text at all, or none from the Holy Scriptures. Examples may be found in Theodoret's Discourses on Providence, in Theodore Studita, Rabanus Maurus, Bernard of Clairvaux, Geiler von Kaiserberg, Luther (in his eight sermons against Carlstadt's Works, Part xx. 5. 5). Among the more recent preachers must be here named Ewald, in his sermons on Texts from Nature, Hanover, 1791; Greiling, in the new Practical Matter, drawn from the writings of Kant, for Pulpit Discourses on Sundays and Festivals, in two Parts, Magdeburg, 1810." See von Ammon's Handbuch der Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit. § 35. That the practice of discoursing on Biblical Texts has been without exceptions in the ancient or modern pulpit we by no means pretend.

¹ Handbuch der Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit, von Dr. Christopher Friedrich von Ammon. § 34.

² See Hampden's Bampton Lectures, pp. 387, 547, 548.

the land "preaching and shewing the glad tidings of the kingdom of God" (Luke viii. 1). The apostles "preached through Jesus the resurrection of the dead" (Acts iv. 2). After the martyrdom of Stephen, the disciples "went everywhere preaching the word" (Acts viii. 4). It is, therefore, eminently fitting that he who obeys the apostolical injunction: "Preach the word," should expound one text of it at a time.¹

III. The practice of preaching from inspired texts fosters a spirit of reverence for the inspired volume. It is a perpetual memento of the fact that as the preachers, so the laymen, are to derive their religious faith from the word of God. The habit of *prefixing* to his sermon a biblical passage, is a more obvious token of the minister's veneration for the Bible than is the habit of citing various passages in the progress of the sermon. His *first* utterance makes the deepest impression, and his first utterance is a virtual announcement that it is not he who speaks, but it is the very Spirit who indited the text for the world's admonition. If the preacher read his sermon, he places it on the open Bible, as a sign that all which he says is founded on the divine message. He stands behind his discourse and behind the sacred volume, so that if he aim to project himself into the foreground his elocution belies him. His use of the text has a tendency to preserve in his mind the spirit of the gospel. If he be tempted to deliver scientific or political lectures instead of evangelical sermons, the necessity of beginning his lectures with the words of inspiration, operates as a restraint upon him. It is a perpetual memento of his duty to revere the divine word, and to preach nothing but that word. He may, indeed, attach a verse of scripture to his secular oration, but it will be like sewing a white piece of cloth upon a black garment: a violation of good taste. His use of a text in these circumstances, is regarded as a resort to a *pretext* (praetextum). Vinet compares it to a steeple surmounting a play-house.

¹ See Blunt's Dictionary of Doctrinal and Historical Theology; Art. "Preaching."

IV. The practice of discoursing on passages of the Bible leads the preacher to explain them. It is thus useful to himself, as well as to his hearers—to himself, for he must know what he makes known, and in order to teach the divine word he must study it; to his hearers, for the word gives them light and life, many of them depend on the pulpit for the larger part of their biblical knowledge. From hearing two or three inspired paragraphs explained every week, attentive listeners may derive a mass of solid information during the year. They may be, as it were, inspired intellectually and morally, by the thoughts uttered at first by the holy men of old who were inspired miraculously. The whole spiritual nature of a people is quickened sometimes by the clear exposition of biblical phrases. These phrases enliven the entire discourse. The text is the head of the sermon, as the brain is in the head of the body, and starts the life and action of all the members.

V. The practice of discoursing on biblical texts serves to invest the preacher's word with authority. His word has been compared to a kernel protected by an envelope which cannot be crushed. Men have, in greater or smaller degrees, a distrust in themselves, and are thus inclined to lean on the assertions of others. They have a constitutional faith in testimony, and so far forth as the witness is unimpeachable, just so far is his assertion an authority. The Bible is the word of an omniscient and perfectly veracious witness. When a preacher unfolds a part of this word, he simply repeats what this authoritative witness bids him repeat. The subjects on which he rehearses this divine testimony are those which affect the eternal condition of men. On such themes men are peculiarly unsatisfied with their own unaided reasonings, and feel a peculiar demand for some testimony which shall be decisive and ultimate. The preacher gives them the authority which they need; and, being an appointed expounder of the divine word, he is fitly called the president or the ruler,¹ as well as the minister or servant, of his church.

¹ Thess. v. 12; 1 Tim. v. 17; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, etc.

His arguments may not convince his auditors; but his citation of the Bible may control them.

The authority given to the preacher by his texts is particularly desirable in those discourses which contain or suggest a reprimand. The inspired word gives the reproof, and he is thus freed from the charge of personality. If he did not preface his address with a passage of scripture, he would often be awkward in stating his theme; but especially so when his theme has an objurgatory sound. Not only the most convenient, but altogether the most impressive, way of inculcating the virtue of hospitality is to introduce the text: "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers," etc. (Heb. xiii. 2). A rich yet culpatory sermon on the decencies of social intercourse was delivered by a man who would not have ventured his criticisms, except under the intimations of the Great Teacher: "When thou art bidden—to a wedding, sit not down in the highest room,—but—go and sit down in the lowest room," etc., etc. (Luke xiv. 7-11).

VI. The habit of discoursing on passages of the Bible serves to attract the attention of men to the truth, and awaken their interest in it. An important sentence uttered by an unaided orator will have far less power than that identical sentence uttered by a prophet or apostle. Men who will not listen to the voice of a human preacher will be aroused by the voice of God. There is something, too, in the Oriental style of the Bible which engages the interest of Occidentals. When Isaiah cries out: "Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and say unto her that her warfare is accomplished, that her iniquity is pardoned; for she hath received of the Lord's hand double for all her sins" (Isa. xl. 2), the attention of hearers is aroused to the seeming incongruity of rejoicing in a double chastisement. When the preacher explains the idiom as denoting that Jerusalem has received abundance of favor, notwithstanding her desert of punishment, the hearers are surprised by a sudden thought of the divine grace, which returns unmeasured good for evil; and this thought, electrically entering their minds, retains

its power over them. Notwithstanding the latent infidelity of men, they are startled by a sound from heaven, and when they are amazed at its mysterious import, they are prepared to feel a new interest in its interpretation. Written in different ages, in different countries and dialects, the Bible is rich and various in its methods of giving instruction. If a preacher adapt his discourses to the diversified style of his texts, he may preserve the fresh interest of his auditors in his fresh and diversified remarks. Each verse on which he discourses may suggest some new train, or at least new shading, of thought; some variety of matter, or at least of manner. Where the substance remains the same, the form changes. Two verses, like two blossoms of a pomegranate, are seldom found exactly alike. When a scientist,¹ eminent for his acquaintance with geology, chemistry, botany, and various branches of zoölogy, as well as with the science of the Bible, was called to his reward, the sermon preached at his funeral² elicited the closer attention in consequence of the text, which gave it a novel character: "And he spake of trees, from the cedar-tree that is in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall; he spake also of beasts and of fowls and of creeping things and of fishes" (1 Kings iv. 33).

VII. The practice of discoursing on passages in the Bible tends to fasten religious truth in the memory of the hearers. The Bible they may have always with them. The text on which they heard a sermon may be a remembrancer of the teachings which otherwise might have been forgotten. It suggests in a compressed, what was given in an expanded, form by their pastor. In private they read the words: "By grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God" (Eph. ii. 8). This compendious sentence is an epitome of four great doctrines — our desert of punishment, our rescue by divine grace, our faith as the condition of our rescue, our dependence on the Holy Spirit for our faith. The readers now remember the method in which these four truths were interlaced with each other in

¹ Rev. President Hitchcock.

² By Rev. Dr. Tyler.

a sermon which had otherwise well nigh vanished from the memory. As the text is a memento of the discourse, so each of the truths unfolded in the discourse is a memento of the text, which interlinks them all. The very name of a doctrine is often a mnemonic sign of an inspired verse, as the verse is a mnemonic sign of the doctrines which have been seen to cluster in and around it. Still, it is true, as Bishop Burnet says, that "many will remember the text that remember nothing else. Therefore such a choice should be made as may at least put a weighty and speaking sentence of the scriptures upon the memories of the people."¹

There are other advantages resulting from the practice of discoursing on biblical passages. These will be intimated in succeeding parts of this Essay.

§ 3. *Objections to the Use of Texts.*

Some of these have been happily stated by Voltaire,² in the following oft-quoted passage: "It were to be wished that Bourdaloue, in banishing from the pulpit the bad taste which disgraced it, had also banished the custom of preaching on a text. Indeed, to speak long on a quotation of a line or two, to exhaust one's self in subjecting a whole discourse to the control of this line, seems a trifling labor, little worthy of the dignity of the ministry. The text becomes a sort of motto, or rather enigma, which the discourse develops." Let us consider the particular forms in which the objections of Voltaire and others are presented:

I. A short text cannot afford matter for a long discourse. The text need not be short, nor the discourse long, some will reply. Bishop Sherlock was wont to plead for "long texts and short sermons," much reading of the Bible, and little comment on it. Others will reply: "Genius makes its observations in short-hand; talent writes them out at length"; so inspiration has compressed into a narrow compass what the uninspired intellect must expand into a broad space. The text is the seed, and the sermon is the tree; a large oak

¹ Pastoral Care, chap. ix. p. 181.

² Age of Louis XIV.

may spring up from a small acorn. The very writers who think that a verse from the Bible cannot suggest thought enough for a half-hour's discourse are able to write lengthened chapters on a single apothegm of Goethe or Richter. They can devote a volume to the saying that "thorns and briers are but discouraged buds." There is a pregnant thought in the few words of Prov. xxvii. 1; Eccl. ix. 10; Ps. xev. 7, 8. This idea is expressed by Ben Ezra: "The day is short, and the work is much"; by the Latin version, "*Ars longa, vita brevis*"; by our own vernacular: "Art is long, and time is fleeting." The uninspired aphorism is said to condense the wisdom of the race upon the theme; why does not the inspired? "He who cherishes enmity throws ashes against the wind, and will be covered by them, as they are at once blown back upon him." Here is an apothegm of Buddha, and it is fruitful of admonition. Is there less of truth or power in the aphorism of Prov. xxvi. 27: "Whoso diggeth a pit shall fall therein, and he that rolleth a stone, it will return upon him"? There is the simple phrase: "God is love" (1 John iv. 8); the greatest ideas on the moral attributes of Jehovah are presented in those three words. There is the simple announcement: "Love is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. xiii. 10); the entire system of ethics is suggested in those seven words.

II. In replying to this we are reminded of another objection which contradicts this, if it does not even neutralize it. We are told that if a man found his discourse on a verse of the Bible he will be apt to sacrifice unity of thought, or, in order to preserve a semblance of unity, he will resort to forced and unmanly connectives. When Voltaire objected to the common mode of preaching, he had before him many sad specimens of pulpit style. The sermons of the church Fathers, of the orators in the Middle Ages, of preachers in the seventeenth century, are, occasionally, attempts to exhaust the meaning of a biblical passage; are sometimes crowded with desultory remarks, often introduce artificial and puerile constructions, dissect words rather than discuss principles.

The text may be poetical, but the prosaic sentiments of the sermon are twisted into a correspondency with the Oriental poem. The text may comprehend a large variety of thought; a sermon swells itself out of all proportion in attempting the same comprehensiveness.

The objection is plausible but unnecessary. The preacher need not follow the order of the inspired words, when in order to follow it he must sacrifice the unity of his discourse. He may announce at the outset that he will confine himself to certain suggestions of his text, and may omit its other suggestions. If a passage be too general or discursive for the fit impression of a sermon, it need not be taken as the text; other and parallel passages may be found to supply its place. If in some exceptional instance this cannot be, then in such an instance a desultory sermon may be allowed. This may be one variety in the Sabbath services which ought to be somewhat diversified. There are times when a minister may discourse on a passage which wanders at its own sweet will through rich and various scenes; his homily may wander with the text, and may be as natural and easy as an Essay of Elia. Charles Lamb was a careful student of Jeremy Taylor's discourses, and some of these discourses, while they correspond with their texts, are as unconstrained in their flow as are the writings of the Essayist.

III. An objection kindred to the preceding is, that a minister is tempted by the phraseology of his text to overlook the principle of it. As soon as he recites the biblical words he is induced to comment upon them, and neglect the main thought suggested by them.

The reply to the objection is obvious. The temptation must be resisted. The minister need not hide the grand idea under the circumstantial intimations of his text. He may unfold this idea in as scientific a method as if it were unfolded independently of the Bible. True, he need not always discuss a subject in its logical relations; he must diversify his methods of preaching; but he is never obliged, even if he be tempted, to sacrifice a great and sacred thought

to the forms in which the thought may be presented in the Oriental paragraph on which he discourses. While describing the drapery we may be tempted to withdraw all attention from the form and expression of the statue; but in so doing we overstep the limits of propriety.

The objection which we thus answer, is like that which precedes it, a serious one. There is no doubt that a minister instead of using his text often abuses it, by neglecting the main idea which it suggests. "For instance, a man might take for his text Luke xiii. 3: 'Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.' He might commence with a recital of the various opinions which have been entertained concerning the event which gave rise to this saying of the Saviour. Who were these men whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices; and did this event occur at Jerusalem, or in Galilee; and for what cause was this cruelty inflicted? This naturally leads to the history of Pilate; his appointment as procurator of Judea; his general character for cruelty, meanness, and cupidity; his deposition by Vitellius, and his subsequent death by suicide." "Now if this were clothed in a style of unexceptionable rhetoric, interspersed with illustrations from science and history, and the occurrences of every day life, and delivered with animation and zeal, who doubts that it would pass with a large part of many a congregation for what is called a splendid effort? The style was polished to a hair; the history of Pilate exhibited research; the illustrations, drawn from a large range of knowledge and observation, were apposite; and what could any one ask for more? The sermon may be laid away in a safe place, and become one of the stock discourses of the author."¹

IV. By founding his addresses upon ancient, especially Oriental sayings, a minister introduces a mannerism into the pulpit. He becomes peculiar, singular. The classic authors of antiquity did not write essays on phrases culled from the writings of their predecessors; lawyers and statesmen of mod-

¹ Letters on the Ministry of the Gospel. By Francis Wayland, pp. 67, 69.

ern times do not found their remarks on selected apothegms or distichs. Our essayists are not bound to any such rule.

To this we reply: The great speeches of old and recent times have at their basis definite propositions, and these are virtually texts; it is common for political orators to speak on resolutions, motions, etc., which are essentially texts. When they address an assembly their precise topic is often pre-announced, their text is placarded in the streets. True, the announcement which they make of their theme is not exactly like that which the preacher makes. They have no inspired volume which presents authoritative statements of their subject. It is meet for the men who *have* an inspired volume as their directory, to make that volume prominent by discoursing upon it. They have a peculiar office, and are therefore justified in adopting a style somewhat peculiar. Besides, many essayists, like Addison and Coleridge, have chosen to preface their compositions with some aphorism of a departed sage; they have not made this aphorism a directory of their composition, but have used it merely as a motto. It is right that a preacher distinguish his sermon from a secular essay. He is a minister of the word; is thus "made to differ" from other men; the speaking from a passage of this word is a fitting badge of his office; it puts him into a line of apostolical succession. It suggests an argument for the divinity of the gospel. Pagan sages had no gospel, of course did not found their discourses upon one; they aimed not to instruct a populace in the principles of virtue, but to convince educated men of certain abstract truths, or to gain from the people a temporary verdict. The sacred orator aims to instruct the masses, not merely to give them great ideas, but to stimulate both the ignorant and the learned to a life of virtue; not to secure a vote on a single question, but to fix a living principle in the minds of men, women, and children. When he stands up as a herald, and proclaims a message from the Master of the assembly, he stands as a living exemplification of the truth: "To the poor the gospel is preached." The preaching of the gospel, instead of

the writing about it, for the benefit of the poor as well as the rich, forms one distinction between the office of a minister and that of a philosopher, statesman, or advocate. The use of a biblical text illustrates this distinction.

V. We will name only one more objection to the use of texts: It is said that Christ and his apostles often discoursed without them. Reply: How often, we do not know. They came to furnish texts for us. The ministry of the New Testament was not fully defined in their day. We certainly conform to the spirit of these addresses, even if we are more regular than they in discoursing on the inspired word. The very fragmentary remarks of Peter in Acts i. 15 and Acts ii. 14-36 are as much penetrated with the teachings of the Old Testament as if these teachings were the texts of these remarks.

§ 4. *Different Methods of Selecting Texts.*

I. Some ministers confine themselves to the order of texts prescribed by the authorities of their church. These authorities have arranged various passages of the Bible in a manner adapted to the Sabbaths and the festivals of the year, and require, more or less rigidly, that the pastors select their topics from the established Lessons. It is possible to make such an arrangement of Biblical passages as will be attended with some good results. When the choice of his themes is left to the minister himself he may be one-sided in his selection of them; he may have a small class of favorite subjects, not the most important, nor the most appropriate; he may lose the richness and freshness, perhaps also the dignity, which befit the ministrations of the Lord's house. The partizans of one theological school have been noted for the frequency of their preaching from the words: "Make you a new heart and a new spirit"; the partizans of another school have preached from the words, as their counter-sign: "Not of yourselves; it is the gift of God." The favorite theme of one class has been, "Live peaceably with all men"; of another class, "First pure, then peaceable." If a minister

select his own themes he may form a habit of choosing such as will hit the faults of some obnoxious hearer. Even if he do not intend to practise as a sharp-shooter, he may be suspected of such a design. But when he is obliged to take the theme prescribed in a Lectionary, he may be saved from the habit of making personal assaults, and from the suspicion of assorting his texts as a gunner assorts his bullets. His own individuality is hidden behind the rubric which prescribes his themes. When hundreds or thousands of ministers use the same Pericope, and discourse at the same time on the same topic, they may catch a new life from this symbol of their unity in the faith. Their concert of thought gives them strength. They may also be inspired by the reflection that on the same Sabbath, the first or the last, the fifth or the fiftieth of the year, when they are speaking of an attribute of Jehovah, or the resurrection of Christ, their forefathers were speaking of that identical subject on that identical part of the year one, two, three, or more centuries gone by. Thus are the preachers of the present age linked with each other and with their ancestors. These and similar advantages are enough to recommend the habit of a minister's familiarizing himself with the various Lectionaries which are presented for various denominations of Christians.¹

II. Some ministers choose their own texts without regard to any prescribed formulary. The permanent system of lessons for the pulpit is fruitful of some good, but the free choice of texts is fruitful of more. There are exigencies in the condition of the pastor, there are signal peculiarities in the state of his hearers, there are in the nation as well as in

¹ The use of a Pericope is well defended in Schott's *Theorie der Beredsamkeit*, Zweiter Theil. Kap. 1. Absch. 2. The most radical objections to the ordinary Lutheran Lessons are given by Thiess in his *Anleitung zur Amtsberedsamkeit der öffentlichen Religionslehre des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Theil 1. Absch. 2. Professor Thiess proscribes, almost entirely, the selection of texts from the Old Testament and from the Epistles, but justifies a selection from the words of Christ as recorded in the Gospels. He recommends the publication of a Biblical Chrestomathy for the use of laymen as well as clergymen, and would confine it to certain seed-thoughts in the writings of apostles and prophets, but nearly altogether to the teachings of Jesus.

the church, sudden occurrences which require the selection of texts whose pertinence could not have been foreseen.¹ The necessity of choosing his own themes is an habitual stimulus to the pastor's inquiries into the needs of his parishioners, and the fitnesses of the Bible to meet them. He may preach more earnestly from a text suggested by his own investigations than from one suggested by ecclesiastical authorities. A skater has a more graceful movement without a skater's chair than with it. The preacher *may* be less, but he *can* and *should* be more, various and appropriate in his teachings, if he may have a free range through the Bible, than if he be required to discourse on the same texts every successive year, be it a year of plenty or famine, of rain or drought, health or pestilence, peace or war.

Still, here as elsewhere, liberty may merge itself into license; and as the advantages, so the perils, of freedom may be greater than those of restraint. Here, too, as well as elsewhere, a strong man may overcome the evils of an inferior system, and a weak man may lose the benefits of a superior one. Reinhard, discoursing on prescribed texts, is far more various in his teachings than many a pastor who chooses his own themes. There is many a preacher who, whatever his text may be, discourses on a small number of topics. A former president of a New England college remarked, that he had sat seventeen years under the preaching of a very good man, and yet never heard from him more than four distinct sermons; one thanksgiving sermon, one fast sermon, one funeral sermon, and one general sermon.

III. Some preachers habitually select their text before they determine their precise theme, some habitually choose their theme before their text, and some alternate between the selection of their text first and the determination of their theme first.

1. If a minister habitually choose his text first, he will be apt to make his discourses more biblical, more distinctively

¹ Abraham Lincoln was assassinated on the evening of Good Friday, while hundreds of pastors were preparing their jubilant sermons for Easter Sunday.

sermons instead of essays; to familiarize himself more closely with the divine word, to accustom his hearers to regard that word as a peculiar treasure, *the book* among books. He will have a new motive for searching the Bible with his eye upon its moral intimations, and to keep for himself a *repertorium* of texts which have suggested to him a course of profitable thought. If he make his own selection of suggestive paragraphs from the Bible, he will be far more richly furnished for his work, than if he use a selection made by another man.¹ He will feel a new impulse to offer the prayer of Jeremy Taylor: "Holy and eternal Jesus, whose whole life and doctrine was a perpetual sermon of holy life, a treasure of wisdom, and a repository of divine materials for meditation, — give me grace to understand, diligence and attention to consider, care to lay up, and carefulness to reduce to practice all those actions, discourses, and pious lessons and intimations, by which thou didst expressly teach, or tacitly imply, or mysteriously signify, our duty." He will have a new inducement to study those biblical commentaries which bring out the spiritual meaning of the inspired words; also those devotional memoirs and meditations which unfold in pithy language the hints of the Bible. Thus noticing the words, Exodus xxxiv. 29: "When he came down from the mount Moses wist not that the skin of his face shone while he talked with him," McCheyne writes: "Oh for closest communion with God, till soul and body — head, face, and heart — shine with heavenly brilliancy; *but oh for a holy ignorance of our shining.*" Evans, meditating on 1 Sam. iii. 9: "It shall be, if he call thee, that thou shalt say, Speak, Lord; for thy servant heareth," writes: "Oh to be willing to hear what the Lord is speaking to us, speak what he will, how he will, when he will, and by whom he will." Suggest-

¹ "If I make a Chart of History for myself," said Professor Niedner, the successor of Neander at Berlin, "I find it of great service to me; but a Chart made by another man is to me of but little use." So the multitude of books like "Themes for the Pulpit," the Five Volumes of Simeon's *Skeletons of Sermons*, will aid a preacher far less than a collection of texts which he has prepared himself, and accompanied with his own sketches of thoughts upon them.

tions like these may easily start trains of thought which will be epitomes of sermons. Let the pastor's memory be stored with such intimations, and he may quickly bring forth from his treasure-house things new and old. Let him be familiar with the Bible as a repository of spiritual thoughts, and he will never be perplexed by want of a theme for a sermon.

2. If a minister habitually choose his subject first, he will be apt to make his sermons more logical, and more conducive to unity of impression, and, perhaps, more distinctively appropriate to his auditors. "A subject being chosen," says Dr. Campbell, "the next thing to be sought is the text."¹ Robert Hall stated to Dr. Olinthus Gregory, "that he never proceeded even to think of adopting a specific text as fitted for a sermon until the matter of it stood out in the form of a particular, distinct, and precise topic; he would then take it up and lay it down as he pleased."² When a clergyman reads a system of theology or of ethics, he may be impressed by the moral bearing of a truth, and may detect a simple plan of unfolding that one truth, without its irrelevant adjuncts in a sermon. That truth has its proof texts; any one of them, or all of them may be used as the basis of the sermon; and thus the sermon, although in the technical sense a logical rather than a biblical one, may be in its substantial character eminently biblical. Mr. Cecil says: "The meaning of the Bible is the Bible;" and a discourse on a doctrine or duty may be a condensation of what the scriptures mean, even when it does not give an exegesis of a single passage. If a minister desire to impress upon his hearers a conviction of the unity in God's works, the correspondency between the book of nature and the book of revelation, he may accustom himself to a reverent study of the sciences, may detect moral suggestions in the skies, the fields, the woods, and these suggestions he may embody in discourses, for which the fitting texts will present themselves. He may find "sermons in stones, books in the running brooks," and

¹ Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, p. 401.

² Works of Robert Hall (American ed.), Vol. iii. p. 39.

these may remind him of numerous scriptures which turn the eye from the works to the Great Worker. If he desire to depict the special condition of his hearers, he may gather the themes of his sermons from his parochial visits. The substance of several paragraphs in a popular German work is this: 'I do not seek for my themes; they come to me. I do not read books in order to determine what subjects I should discourse upon, for if I depend on books my subjects become too general, I am inclined to preach on "the Duty of Thankfulness," "the Nature of Benevolence," "the Workings of Faith," "the Evil Results of Sin." But my hearers have their specific forms of sin, their individual phases of virtue, and I ought to preach on these rather than on generalities. Hence I find my themes in the daily life of my parishioners, in their expressions of spiritual weakness or want, their complaints about themselves, or about each other, their methods of conducting their daily work, the spirit and results of their amusements, their style of conversation in the field, the street, the parlor. My themes suggest themselves to me as I listen to the words of my servants, my children, my wife; as I watch the current of my secret thoughts. The mental condition of my own household intimates various duties which belong to all my parishioners.'¹

3. If a minister vary his method, sometimes finding his themes in the perusal of the Bible, sometimes in the systematic examination of theological treatises, or in the field of natural theology, or in his daily walks among his people, or in the study of his own heart, he may gain the good results, and avoid the evil results, of confining himself to either one of the two preceding methods. When he preaches a course of doctrinal or ethical sermons, he naturally selects his topic first. When he preaches a course of expository sermons he, of course, chooses his text first. Alternating from the topical to the textual method, he introduces variety and freshness into his services. One man is better fitted to start from the Bible and stop with practical maxims; another to begin with

¹ Andeutungen aus dem Gebiete der Geistlichen Beredsamkeit von Dr. Johann Karl Wilhelm Alt. Erstes Heft. ss. 1-8. 17-28.

practical maxims and end with the Bible, which is the epitome of true wisdom. When all preachers lie on a bed of Procrustes the parishioners are wearied of the uniformity, and go to sleep.

§ 5. *The Fitnesses of Passages of the Bible for Texts of Sermons.*

The fact that a single advantage results from the use of biblical texts does not imply that this advantage results especially, nor in an equal degree, from the use of every text. We have seen that the reasons for founding our discourses on biblical paragraphs are diverse: one of the reasons is conspicuous in a sermon founded on one paragraph, another of them in a sermon founded on a second paragraph; two or three reasons are prominent in a sermon founded on a third passage; all of them are combined in a sermon founded on a fourth. This fourth is the corner-stone, most admirably fitted to the edifice which rests upon it and is adorned by it. The expression of the woman of Samaria: "Come see a man which hath told me all things that ever I did" (John iv. 29), does not combine all the good qualities which may belong to the text of a sermon; is not a divinely inspired assertion of Christ's superior knowledge; it is, however, a divinely inspired record of the influence which the words of Christ exerted upon the woman, and like the cognate expression: "Never man spake like this man," it has a divine sanction in proving that he taught "with authority, and not as the scribes."

I. Those passages which involve a moral principle are, in that one particular, fitted for texts.

The biblical record of facts is sometimes regarded as a mere historical statement, and a sermon is sometimes devoted to it, not as to a moral lesson, but as to an interesting narrative. There is a kind of pedantry which may be mistaken for a love of biblical preaching. Not a few sermons *approach*, we do not say that they *reach*, the degree of secularity which President Wayland characterizes thus:

"Suppose we take for our text Luke xxiv. 13: 'And behold two of them went that same day to a village called Emmaus, which was from Jerusalem about threescore furlongs.'

"We might begin by a learned discussion on the length of the Jewish furlong; we might compare it with the Roman measures of distance, with the Persian parasang, with the furlong in use among us; and thus determine, with apparent accuracy in miles, rods, and yards, how far Emmaus was from Jerusalem. We might then inquire where this village stood, whether east, west, north, or south from Jerusalem, and inform our audience of all the places now existing which have been taken for this locality, with the reasons which have been adduced in favor of each. If, as might be the case, the preacher himself had visited Jerusalem, he might tell us of the labor he had spent in the personal investigation of this subject; how carefully he had paced the distance between Jerusalem and the various localities which claimed to be the village of Emmaus. He might describe the nature of the soil; the loveliness of a summer morning in Judaea; the face of the country; the conversation of his Arab guides, and their incessant call at every turn of the road for additional bucksheesh. Finally, he might return to the point whence he commenced, by confessing that, with all this laborious inquiry, he had been unable to ascertain the locality of Emmaus, and that probably the very foundation of the little village had been erased from the face of the earth. He might close by inquiring who the two disciples were to whom reference is made in the text; imagine their feelings as they ascended the hill that gave them a full view of Jerusalem, and their feelings as they descended it, and the wicked city was hidden from their sight."¹

In the forty-six or forty-seven volumes of Reinhard's sermons there is not seldom an artificial and forced interpretation of his text. The design of it is to educe a spiritual lesson from words which appear to state a mere historical fact. On the whole, however, he deserves high praise for his skill in drawing out the moral truth which was hidden in his text, as a statue lies in a block of marble. Discoursing on the cure of the leper, and on the command of Jesus: "See thou tell no man; but go thy way, show thyself to the priest, and offer the gift that Moses commanded," etc. (Matt. viii. 4), the German preacher reminds us, not only of our obligation to be thankful for the gift of health, and to express our gratitude in forms of public as well as private worship, but also of many such facts as these: Christ intended to

¹ Letters on the Ministry of the Gospel, pp. 65, 66.

abolish the Mosaic economy, still he insisted on the observance of it during his lifetime, he waited for the fitting hour, and in this way he teaches us that we should not be overhasty in executing our benevolent purposes; we should employ wisdom and forecast in our arrangements for usefulness; we should observe a due order in our use of even the most extraordinary opportunities for doing good; we should temper zeal with discretion. Christ never gave "advice unsafe, precipitous, and bold." Discoursing on the story of the centurion (Matt. viii. 5-13) Reinhard reminds us that Christ praises the Roman officer while he blames the Jews; hence comes the duty of freeing ourselves from a partizan spirit; of reproving sin in our friends, and of praising virtue wherever found in strangers and national enemies; of loving all the members of our race, for some of them surprise us by their developments of moral worth; of cherishing a confidence in the future of Christianity, for this is to be, as it is fitted to be, the religion of the world, and every new convert should prompt us to exclaim, as our Lord was inspired to say: "Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven" (vs. 11). In the general the discourses of Reinhard deserve to be studied as illustrating the importance of searching for the moral principle which is enveloped in the text, as the kernel is concealed within its integuments. That principle is the real text, and is woven into the whole texture of revealed truth.

II. Those passages are best fitted for texts which, when so employed, most aptly represent the spirit of the Bible; make the impression most faithful to the intent of the inspired word *as a whole*.

Half of the truth is often a falsehood. There may be times when the *law* has been proclaimed so continuously, that the most fitting texts are those which illustrate the freeness of the *gospel*. On the other hand, there may be times when the freeness of the gospel has been discoursed upon so often, that the most fitting texts are those which exhibit the nature of

the law. The gospel presupposes the law. The former cannot be understood without the latter. The New Testament cannot be comprehended without the Old, and the Old Testament is obscure without the New. "The difference between the law and the gospel does not lie in their precepts, but in their promises." One rhetorician tells us, "You must not preach on any texts except the words of Christ"; another, "You must preach only on the Gospels"; another, "Only on the writings of the original disciples"; another, "Only on the New Testament." The truth is, we should preach on the Old Testament and the New, just as the mental state of our hearers may require; on the Old Testament as inclosing the New, on the New as developing the principles of the Old; on the New and the Old as exhibiting the whole truth of God. Many of our elder divines have preached disproportionately, and thus unfitly, on the Old Testament. Many of our modern divines have rushed into the opposite extreme.¹ One of

¹ It is interesting to notice the peculiar characteristic of preachers, as it is developed in the texts which they have chosen. A popular writer says that of nineteen hundred and twenty-five sermons preached by John Calvin during two decades of his ministry, thirteen hundred and thirty-seven were on texts from the Old Testament, five hundred and eighty-eight from the New, but not one from the Gospels. In the Old Testament, three hundred and forty-three were from Isaiah, two hundred from Deuteronomy, one hundred and seventy-four from Ezekiel, one hundred and twenty-three from Genesis, ninety-four from the Psalms, ninety-one from Jeremiah, sixty-five from Ezra, fifty-nine from Job, forty-seven from Daniel, forty-three from Amos, twenty-eight from Micah, twenty-five from Lamentations, seventeen from Joel and Zephaniah, each; six from Jonah, and five from Obadiah. In the New Testament, one hundred and eighty-nine were from the Acts, one hundred and ten from First Corinthians, sixty-six from Second Corinthians, fifty-five from First Timothy, forty-eight from Titus, forty-six from Thessalonians, forty-three from Galatians, and thirty-one from Second Timothy.

I have not attempted to verify this statement, but I find that in eleven volumes of the sermons of Dr. Samuel Clark, who is well known to have had no sympathy with Calvinism, there are forty sermons on texts from the Old Testament, and a hundred and twenty-four on texts from the New. Of those from the Old Testament eight are from the Book of Job, seven from the Psalms, five from the Proverbs; three from Ecclesiastes and Isaiah, each; two from Genesis, Deuteronomy, Daniel, and Malachi, each; and one from Exodus, Leviticus, First Samuel, First Kings, Second Chronicles, and Jeremiah, each. Of those from the New Testament twenty-three are from Matthew, fourteen from First

them, designing to prove that God will not hear a sinful prayer, chose for his text John ix. 31, rather than Isaiah i. 11-15, although the passage from the New Testament contains the words of only an uninspired man, and the passage from the Old Testament contains the words of Jehovah himself.

III. The fact that a biblical passage has a divine authority gives it a fitness to be used as the text of a sermon.

A true minister does not utter "for doctrines the commandments of men," for to him, in a special degree, "are committed the oracles of God." He speaks "as the oracles of God"; he preaches "the word." All this implies that he does not derive his texts from the Apocrypha, nor from the writings of Greek and Roman sages. Thiess recommends the collecting of suggestive sentences from the works of ancient and modern authors: the publishing of a volume which will be a moral anthology, a new evangel for the discourses of the pulpit.¹ The "Friends of light" have been wont to discourse in the pulpit on aphorisms selected from the writings of Goethe, Richter, Shakespeare. If, however, the canonical scriptures were "given by inspiration of God," and if a minister has received the command: 'Preach the preaching that I bid thee,' he should distinguish the Bible from all other books by preaching upon it alone.²

Corinthians, twelve from Luke, ten from Romans; nine from John, Hebrews, and Revelation, each; six from Galatians, five from First John, four from Acts, three from Mark, Ephesians, and Colossians, each; two from Second Corinthians, Philippians, Second Timothy, Titus, and First Peter, each; and one from Second Thessalonians, First Timothy, James, and Jude, each.

In a volume of sermons by Rev. Henry Melvill, there are twenty-three sermons on texts from the Old Testament and thirty-two from the New; seven are from the Psalms, three from Genesis; two from Deuteronomy, First Chronicles, and Job, each; and one from Second Samuel, Nehemiah, Esther, Lamentations, Ezekiel, Micah, and Zechariah, each; six from Matthew; four from John and Hebrews, each; three from Luke; two from Acts, Romans, Galatians, Philippians, and Revelation, each; and one from Mark, First Corinthians, Ephesians, Second Timothy, and Second Peter, each.

¹ Anleitung zur Amtsberedsamkeit der öffentlichen Religionslehrer des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, von Johann Otto Thiess. § 109.

² Even Von Ammon, in his Handbuch der Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit,

1. Here arises a question: Shall we preach from the words of an uninspired person as they are recorded by the inspired writers? Ought we not to found our discourses exclusively on such *inspired* sayings of *good* men as are treasured up in the Bible? Do we not degrade a sermon by preaching on the uninspired words of bad men?

In answer to this question, it may be said:

A. We should never use the words of an uninspired person as if they had in themselves a divine authority. There are certain remarks made by Simon Peter, and over which he wept, and on which, as if they were inspired, no minister would found a discourse. "It was a most absurd choice which one made of a text for a sermon on the future glory of the saints in heaven. This sublime doctrine he chose to treat from these words of the serpent to our first mother Eve (Gen. iii. 5): "Ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." For, though the words taken abstractly might be apposite enough, we know that as they stand in scripture they have no relation to the heavenly happiness. But what renders them still more exceptionable as a text is, they are the words of the father of lies, and, in the sense in which he used them, contain a lie, and were employed but too successfully for the purpose of seduction."¹

B. We may preach on the words of an uninspired person as they are recorded in the Bible, and as illustrating the nature, relations, or power of truth. It has pleased the original Author of the scriptures to detail the expressions of uninspired men, and thus to exhibit the essence and the workings of the doctrine which he was revealing to the race. Multitudes of discourses have been founded on the words (incorrectly explained, however) of Agrippa, Acts xxvi. 28, on such remarks of Pontius Pilate as are found in John xviii. 38, on the sayings of Judas Iscariot, Ahab, Adam,

§ 36, says: "The objective divinity of the contents of the Bible receives from the subjective divinity of its origin a credibility which strengthens the religious conviction of the educated man, and serves instead of full proof for the uneducated."

¹ Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence. By George Campbell, D.D., pp. 419, 420.

Eve. Several noted, some very ingenious, sermons have been written on the words of the demoniacs, as in Mark i. 24,¹ and on those of the prince of devils, as in Gen. iii. 4.² Are not the sayings of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle as dignified and affluent as the words of Cain and Esau? This is not the question. The question is: Are we not bound to treat with special veneration the narratives of "holy men of God," "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost," and who have detailed the operation of divine truth upon the hearts of the wicked and the weak, as well as of the virtuous and the strong?

Besides, there are words uttered by uninspired, and recorded by inspired, men which are peculiarly effective as texts of sermons. We are not authorized to acquiesce in all the sentiments ascribed by the sacred penman to Job; but we should be loath to be interdicted from preaching on his words: "There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest" (Job iii. 17). We are not bound to approve of all the opinions expressed by Eliphaz the Temanite; but we should be sorry to be prohibited from discoursing on his truly sublime saying: "In thoughts from the visions of the night," etc. (Job iv. 13-19). Zophar uttered the sentences: "Canst thou by searching find out God?" etc., etc. (Job xi. 7-9). These form an admirable basis for a sermon; yet some of Zophar's thoughts failed to

¹ One of the most pungent sermons ever preached in (a town noted for pungent sermons) Franklin, Massachusetts, was on Mark v. 6, 7, 17. The proposition was: The demoniac among the Gadarenes worshipped Christ as the Son of God, and the Gadarenes themselves besought him to depart out of their coasts. "The men of this world form the only ignorant and stupid part of the intelligent creation."

² An ironical discourse, singularly adapted to attract attention, was preached (afterwards published) from the words: "Ye shall not surely die," by Rev. Lemuel Haynes, a revolutionary soldier of African descent, whose personal history added a fresh interest to his originality of thought. See Drake's Dictionary of American Biography; also Lippincott's Biographical Dictionary, Art. "Haynes." This discourse was professedly ironical, and therefore radically unlike the sermon to which Dr. George Campbell objects. The text is cited as *false*, and is employed to illustrate the falsity of the doctrine that sin will not be punished in the next life.

meet the approval of him who declared at the last: "My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends; for ye have not spoken of me what is right" (Job xlii. 7). Both the correct and the incorrect opinions ascribed to the interlocutors in the book of Job are ascribed to them by inspiration; and some of these opinions are expressed in a way which indicates that, whether they be right or wrong, they were divinely imputed to the interlocutors. The manner in which they are expressed fits them to be suggestive and formative introductions of sermons.¹

C. Whenever we preach on the words of an uninspired man, we should state, frankly and honestly, their title to our regard. The Pharisees uttered some truths, as well as some errors; the men who participated in the act of crucifying our Lord made some important confessions. When the centurion exclaimed: "Truly, this was the Son of God," he uttered words which, although not an express revelation of Christ's peculiar sonship, yet have fitly formed the basis of many a sermon. But we should always explain such utterances, not as an immediate testimony from heaven in favor of their correctness, not as the direct and inspired proof-texts of a doctrine, but rather as evidences that the doctrine was commonly received as true when the biblical record was penned, or as indications of the influence which inspired men had exerted on the uninspired, or as examples of the virtues or vices which the prophets and apostles have delineated. "My punishment is greater than I can bear" (Gen. iv. 13); "But I hate him; for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil" (1 Kings xxii. 8); "We will not have this man to reign over us" (Luke xix. 14); "Never man spake like this man" (John vii. 46); "I have betrayed innocent blood" (Matt. xxvii. 4); — scores of sentences (true or false) like these are graphic exhibitions of

¹ Besides the texts already alluded to, see all or parts of Genesis xlii. 36; xlvii. 9; Matt. ii. 8; xx. 30, 31; Mark ii. 7; ix. 24; Luke vii. 20; xi. 1; vii. 19; xix. 38; xxiii. 47; xxiv. 32; John i. 45, 46, 49; vi. 68; vii. 15; xvi. 30; xviii. 14; xxi. 17; Acts v. 38, 39. Some of the most powerful sermons in the language have been delivered on these themes.

doctrine, and may be easily explained as illustrating what the Author of the Bible has inspired men to teach. Although the Holy Ghost did not indite those sentences, yet he did move holy men to record them for our admonition.

2. Another question arises, similar to the preceding: Should a minister preach on a text which he believes or suspects to be improperly inserted in the sacred canon?

There are, for example, three verses which were formerly discoursed upon as proofs of the divinity of Christ: "The church of *God* which he hath purchased with his own blood" (Acts xx. 28); "*God* was manifest in the flesh" (1 Tim. iii. 16); and "*There are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one*" (1 John v. 7.). These passages are now regarded as interpolations, in whole or in part. If a minister dissent from the critics, and if he consider the words here italicised to be not interpolations, but the genuine words of inspired men, his conscience may allow him to make them the basis of his discourse. If he disbelieve in their genuineness, he has no more right to preach upon them, than to preach upon the chapters of the Apocrypha. Perhaps he has less right; for these three passages, as they stand in King James' translation, would appear to have more authority than any three passages in the books of Esdras or Judith; therefore to preach upon the spurious words as having this authority may be more deceptive than to preach upon the Apocryphal words which do not appear to have it. Similar remarks may be made on the closing sentence of our Lord's prayer in Matt. vi. 13: "For thine is the kingdom," etc.; on the saying in John v. 4, that "an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water," etc.; on the last twelve verses of Mark's Gospel; on the verses between John vii. 52 and John viii. 12; on John xxi. 25, and on various other parts of the received text. They are rejected by the most recent critics; we ought to examine the reasons for the rejection; if we believe or suspect that the reasons are valid, we diminish the authority of the sacred office by preaching

on the interpolated or doubtful passages. On the same principle, if the time should ever come in which the book of Daniel, the last twenty-seven chapters of Isaiah, the Second Epistle of Peter, or any other considerable part of the Bible can be proved to be spurious, it ought not then to furnish the texts for sermons. We presume that the time will never come; but even if it should, the scriptures will remain a rich storehouse of themes for the pulpit.

We must have the precaution, however, to remember that all the genuine readings of the Bible are not yet determined; and that a phrase which is abandoned in a critic's last edition of a Gospel may be re-instated in his next edition. Tischendorf, in his seventh edition of the New Testament, gave as the reading of John i. 18, "No one hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten *God*, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." This amended text was made the theme of at least one discourse in proof of the divinity of Christ. In Tischendorf's eighth edition he returned to the old reading: "the only-begotten *Son*, who is in the bosom of the Father." Here we perceive that the old rule respecting pure words may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the preacher's use of improved readings:

"Be not the first by whom the new are tried,
Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."

3. Still another question arises: In order to recognize the authority of the Bible, should a minister always cite his text as it stands in King James' translation?

A. He should not misrepresent the English Bible. He should repeat his text in a way to promote in himself and others a love of accuracy. He should be correct in things little as well as great; should practise *exegesis* rather than *eisegesis*. Careful laymen have said of more than one minister: "He preached from a text which is nowhere in the Bible"; "He makes his own texts." Many a sermon has been delivered on the words: "neither *hath it* entered the heart of man *to conceive*," etc., (1 Cor. ii. 9); "I know *in* whom I have believed" (2 Tim. i. 12); "Ye do show *forth* the Lord's death until he come" (1 Cor. xi.

26). The better mode is to read the text as it stands in our translation ; then, if need be, to give the true version. For example, after the text Philippians ii. 6 has been recited as King James' translators have left it, let the more approved version be read : " Who, though existing in the form of God, esteemed not his being on an equality with God a prize to be seized on." The rule which we are now considering condemns the careless or reckless change of the commonly received translation, but does not condemn a change which the preacher distinctly acknowledges, and for which he gives his reasons. Dr. Orville Dewey introduces one of his sermons thus : " ' He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ; but he that believeth not shall be condemned ' (Mark xvi. 16). I have translated the last word in the text ' condemned ' in conformity with the best English versions and all the foreign ones, and with the undoubted sense of the original ; but the change does not materially alter the meaning of the passage. I think it best to relieve the text from a word, which, from its association with the language of the profane, shocks us ; but still this passage teaches us, undoubtedly, that with faith are connected God's favor and our safety and happiness ; and with unbelief, condemnation, rejection of heaven, and the soul's perdition." ¹

B. If a text do not mean *really* what it does *apparently*, a minister has no right to discourse upon it as if it did. Truth is better than falsehood. The real import of a scripture is of more worth than the acceptance of any particular

¹ Controversial Discourses, p. 318. Mr. Albert Barnes made it a rule, during one period of his life, to write his text with great care on the first page of his sermon, not only in English, but also in Hebrew, if it were from the Old Testament ; and in Greek, if from the New. His object was to encourage in himself a habit of accurate citation, and also a nice regard to the meaning of the verse on which he discoursed. Julius Augustus Hare, in his first volume of " Sermons to a Country Congregation," pp. 289, 305, 321, has three discourses, one on the whole text : " Thou art gone up on high ; thou hast led captivity captive, and received gifts for men ; yea even for *thine enemies*," etc. ; the second, on one part of the same verse : " *Thou hast* received gifts for men " ; the third, on another part : " *Thou hast* received gifts for men, yea even *for thine enemies*," etc. See the text, in King James' Translation, Ps. lxxviii. 18.

version. The authority of the Bible is the authority of its ideas, not its English phraseology. "Does it not conflict altogether with the evangelical spirit of our [Lutheran] church to use, as the basis of our religious service, words of the Bible which do not at all belong to it?"¹

The objector asks: Did not the writers of the New Testament quote such passages of the Septuagint as are incorrect translations of the Hebrew? We answer: The Oriental style must not always be interpreted by Occidental rules. The apostles were understood to cite these passages as illustrations, not as previously inspired declarations of the truth; or else to cite them as involving the same principle with that involved in the teachings of the New Testament, or else to cite them as conveying their own idea in words which were most happily suited to commend it to their readers. They may have been sometimes looked upon as inspired to use for *one* purpose language which had been originally used for a *different* purpose. A modern theologian may cite the words of Shakespeare as peculiarly felicitous for expressing a truth which perhaps never occurred to the mind of the dramatist. Men who are supernaturally inspired may be authorized to speak as ordinary men may not be; they may have known meanings of the Old Testament which ordinary men do not now detect. Besides, the design of a quotation, made incidentally by the apostles in their writings, was not always the same with the design of a text chosen by a pastor for his sermon. One chief aim of the latter is to honor the Bible as an authority for our faith; one aim of the former was to express a truth in words which would ingratiate it into the hearts of men. The rules for fashioning the cornice, are not the same with the rules for shaping the corner-stone, of a temple.

Again the objector asks: Did not our Lord and his apostles adopt the *argumentum ad hominem* and the *argumentum ad ignorantiam*? Do not such passages as Matt. xii. 28, Mark x. 17-31 contain a process of reasoning from premises which the speaker neither affirmed nor denied to be true, but which

¹ DeWette's Preface to the second edition of his Translation of the Bible, p. v.

were reasoned from mainly for the purpose of convicting his hearers of inconsistency with themselves, and thus inducing them to abandon their error? May there not, then, be a dilemma in which a divine may reason in behalf of a doctrine from a text to which his hearers attach a particular, but a wrong signification, and may he not convict them of inconsistency with themselves, if they reject his doctrine, and if they still attach that particular signification to his text? We reply: There may be occasions on which a reasoner may resort to the arguments *ad hominem* and *ad ignorantiam*.¹ These occasions, however, are not such as a clergyman meets in selecting his text. There is a perceptible distinction between the use of such arguments in the beginning of a discourse which is understood to be authoritative, and the use of them in the progress of a discussion which is understood to allow them in an exceptional way, and as a kind of diversion from the main process of reasoning. If a preacher resort to these arguments, he should make it plain to his hearers that he is not expressing his own opinion; but even then his process will be circuitous; he can far more easily, as well as more safely, reach his goal by a straight path.

Once more, the objector asks: Will not the hearers be shocked if their pastor give up their favorite interpretations of a text? We reply: He must be discreet. There are emergencies in which he may refuse to *take up*, before he proceeds to *give up*, the popular interpretations. He should prepare men as rapidly as possible to receive the truth, for this is always better than falsehood. He may surprise the unthinking, if he do not allow their inaccurate renderings; he will grieve the judicious if he do. He is to honor the Bible by commenting on its paragraphs; and the Bible is dishonored by being misinterpreted.

IV. One fact which tends to fit a passage to be a text for sermons is the fact of its referring, as it stands in the Bible,

¹ See this mode of reasoning stated and defended in Watts' *Logic*, Part iii. chap. ii. § 8. v., and Watts on the Improvement of the Mind, as cited in Gilbart's *Logic*, pp. 123, 124.

to the same object which it refers to in the sermons. So far forth as it has this correspondency, just so far has it *one* peculiar fitness to be used as a text, and so far forth as the use of the passage in the Bible does not correspond with the use of it in the sermon, just so far does it lose *that one* peculiar fitness. If the minister applies the text to the same thing which the Biblical writer applied it to, he may be said to use the text with directness; if he applies it to a different thing, he may be said to use it in the way of accommodation.

1. When used with directness the text is specially adapted to make the sermon solid and authoritative. This is perceptible in didactic and doctrinal, but more particularly in controversial discourses. The discourses of such men as Dr. Samuel Clark and Dr. Joseph Butler would, in some degree, lose their apparent soundness and instructiveness, if they were prefaced by Biblical passages diverted from their original application.

2. Although an accommodated text is deficient in one kind of fitness to a sermon, it may have another kind, and that in a marked degree. The rule requiring directness should not be pressed to an extreme. It is not an exclusive rule. Different texts have different adaptations. We must remember that there are some duties, as that of family prayer, which are not expressly named in the scriptures. There are some exigencies which cannot be met exactly by any scriptural paragraph. There are states of modern society so different from the states recognized by the prophets and apostles, that we must either accommodate our texts to them, or not preach distinctively upon them at all. When thus accommodated, a biblical epigraph, while it wants some, possesses other and the following, fitnesses for a text: It suggests a new analogy. It discloses a previously unnoticed resemblance. Thus, like a species of wit, it may excite and fascinate the mind. It may give a special liveliness to the sermon. The correspondence of the inspired words with the new and present subject is often solemn and impressive. The farewell sermon, delivered to his weeping church by a

pastor on the Sabbath before his anticipated, and, as the event proved, his actual decease, was on the words: "It is expedient for you that I go away" (John xvi. 7). "How old art thou" (Gen. xlvii. 8) has been the text of many a New Year's sermon, in which the life of Jacob has been held up as a mirror to the audience. So on many a New Year's Sabbath have preachers discoursed on the words: "This year thou shalt die" (Jer. xxviii. 16), and have felt safe in predicting that the prophecy would be fulfilled on some one, at least, who listened to it.¹ Scores of sermons have been preached on Psalm lxxx. 8-13 as applicable to the churches of the Pilgrims and Puritans in New England. The learned Professor George Lawson, hearing that on the day previous to that of his discourse one of the beams that supported the gallery of the edifice in which he was to preach had fallen, and had seriously injured some of the persons who were sitting under it, spoke on the text: "And David was displeased because the Lord had made a breach upon Uzzah" (2 Sam. vi. 8). At another time a wall fell down near his own church, and injured several of his parishioners. On the following Sabbath, he preached from 1 Kings xx. 30: "But the rest fled to Aphek, into the city; and there a wall fell upon twenty and seven thousand of the men that were left."² Perhaps

¹ It is recorded of President Jonathan Edwards the father, and President Jonathan Edwards the son, that "both were settled in the ministry as successors to their maternal grandfathers; were dismissed on account of their religious opinions, and were again settled in retired country towns, over congregations singularly attached to them; where they had leisure to pursue their favorite studies, and to prepare and publish their valuable works. Both were removed from these stations to become presidents of colleges; and both died shortly after their respective inauguration, the one in the fifty-sixth, and the other in the fifty-seventh year of his age, each having preached on the first sabbath of the year of his death on the text, "This year thou shall die." — Works of President Edwards the younger, Vol. i. p. xxxiv.

² The Memoir of Dr. Lawson (who is supposed to be the Rev. Josiah Cargill of Walter Scott's St. Ronan's Well) records various instances of his accommodating general texts to special occasions. In these accommodations he sometimes forgot the dignity of the pulpit. Called to preach in a vestry which was filled with smoke, he suddenly chose for his text Ps. cxix. 83: "For I am become a bottle in the smoke: yet I do not forget thy statutes."

the celebrated Dr. John Howe had as great a facility as any one in accommodating his texts to the exigencies of his times. "In the year 1690, Howe published his funeral sermon for Esther, the wife of Dr. Henry Sampson (physician), who was a member of his church. The lady died on a *Sabbath*, after a lingering illness of *eighteen* years—a circumstance which suggested to Howe the following appropriate text for the funeral sermon: "Ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, to be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath-day" (Luke xiii. 16)?¹

3. There are various rules which ought to be observed in the accommodation of biblical texts.

A. If it be practised at all, it should be practised in a rational and manly way. It should not descend to the puerility of a mere verbal resemblance between the original and the accommodated use of the biblical passage. "I was charmed with my preacher," says one of the interlocutors in Fenelon's Dialogues. "The text was this: 'I have eaten ashes like bread' [Ps. cii. 9]. Now, could any one make a happier choice for a text for *Ash* Wednesday?" When John Sobieski (John III.), the Polish warrior and king, had in 1683 defeated the army of the Grand Vizier, Kara Mustafa, and had made his triumphal entry into Vienna, there was a religious celebration of the victory in the principal church of Vienna, and the sermon of the day was on John i. 6: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John."²

B. The text as accommodated should involve the principle which characterizes the passage as originally spoken. At the basis of each there should be seen to lie the same good thought. There are three noted verses the accommodation of which, although justified by some eminent preachers, has been condemned by many critics.³ One is Judg. v. 28:

¹ Rogers' Life of John Howe, p. 388.

² Von Ammon's Handbuch, u. s. w. § 38.

³ The remarks which follow are designed to meet the *general* objections against

“Why is his chariot so long in coming?” This is sometimes made the basis of a funeral sermon. An intense sufferer, waiting on his death-bed for the coming of his Lord, utters the same exclamation which the mother of Sisera uttered while waiting for the coming of her absent son. The words in their original and in their accommodated application develop the same principles. They are such as these: The influence of love to excite a desire of seeing the beloved person, and of being ‘with him where he is’; the tendency of such a desire to make the delay in gratifying it appear long, and to prompt the seemingly impatient cry: “Why so long?” The objector says: Take for your text the direct words: “Having a desire to depart and to be with Christ” (Phil. i. 23). The reply is: These are not the words actually uttered by the saint whose funeral is solemnized; they are not the words which fit the excited imaginations of the mourners. There is a solemn poetry in the occasion. If a preacher introduce a hackneyed text, the hearers will *feel* the question: “Why tarry the wheels of his chariot?” The “direct” words are more instructive in a calm discussion; they are not always so graphic in an impassioned appeal.

The accommodation of another text has been criticised: (1 Cor. xiii. 11) “When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child; but when I became a man, I put away childish things.” This passage has been made the basis of discourses, and is frequently repeated in familiar converse, on the duties of the middle aged. It was originally applied to the fact that the heavenly state is superior to our present apprehensions of it. Still as first written, and also as accommodated, it infolds the principle that a more advanced condition leads the mind to look above the objects that engross it in a less advanced condition. The text is a symbol of a heavenly truth; we may dilate upon

the accommodation of those three texts, not the particular objections offered by critics like Campbell and Porter against *particular* sermons, as those of Dr. Hawker and Dr. Blair.

the symbol in illustrating the duty of a full-grown man to rise above the pursuits of a small child. But why not choose some such text as Eccl. iii. 1 sq.: "To every thing there is a season," etc.? We reply: Such a text does possess some fitnesses which the criticised one does not; but on the other hand, the criticised text has special fitnesses of its own; it is more vivid, attracts more attention, will be more durable as a memento of the duties of manhood.

Another accommodated text is Ex. xiv. 15: "Speak unto the children of Israel that they go forward." One idea imbedded in this command is: The duty of men to make progress, in despite of difficulties and dangers. As first spoken it announced the duty of the Israelites, when hemmed in by the mountains on either side, and by the Egyptian army in the rear, to march on although the Red Sea was in their front. But several ministers have discoursed on it as proclaiming the duty of Christians to press forward in the service of their Maker, even when they are pursued by spiritual foes, and dismayed by seas of trouble before them. The objector asks: Why not discourse on the text "Grow in grace" (2 Pet. iii. 18)? We reply: There are occasions when we need a text which is like the voice of a trumpet.

C. If you accommodate a biblical text, let it be apparent that you intend to do so. A quaint rule is: If you blunder, let your hearers see that you blunder knowingly. Never quote a text as if it were designed by the prophet or apostle to prove a particular doctrine, or enforce a particular duty, when it was not so designed. If you intend to guard your hearers against their danger of grieving away the Holy Spirit, do not preach on the text: "My Spirit shall not always strive with man" (Gen. vi. 3), unless you explain it as involving the same principle with that involved in the Holy Spirit's abandoning sinners forever. If you preach on the piety of children, and select Prov. viii. 17 for your text, explain it as diverted from its original meaning: "Those who seek me *earnestly* shall find me."¹

¹ Several sermons have been preached on Ps. xlix. 8: "For the redemption of

V. Completeness is a quality which gives to a biblical passage one kind of fitness to be the basis of a sermon.

1. The text is especially felicitous if all its suggestions be correspondently noticed by the preacher; if its complete idea be the complete idea of the sermon. Some rhetoricians, as Claude, are inclined to prescribe that every text have this peculiar felicity. But such a prescription is too strict. It would exclude from the preacher's use some of the most important passages of the Bible, or else would condemn him to dispense with unity and logical order in his sermons.

2. The text is a sufficiently felicitous one if it be complete in its grammatical construction, and express the idea of the sacred penman, even although it fail of expressing his *complete* idea. It should be a full sentence, having a subject, predicate, and copula; one which without any reference to the sentences preceding or succeeding it, suggests a definite thought. If, standing by itself, it has no precise meaning, it fails to serve one of the purposes of a text. An obituary notice of an office-bearer in the church states that at his funeral a sermon was delivered from Job "without any order."

Some rhetoricians are not satisfied with the remark that an incomplete sentence wants *one* kind of fitness, they say that it is *altogether* unfit, for a text of sermons. They condemn Robert Hall for preaching his beautiful discourse at the interment of Dr. Ryland on the words: "That disciple whom Jesus loved"; they condemn more than one eminent clergyman for preaching a discourse at the funeral of a venerable Christian on the words: "An old disciple";¹ they

their soul is precious and it ceaseth forever," and have been devoted to the proof that the eternal salvation of believers has been purchased at great expense! A sermon on 2 Tim. ii. 25: "In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves" is devoted to a statement of the different methods in which men oppose their own interests, etc.! Such blunders show the importance of the rule that the preacher examine his text in the original Hebrew or Greek.

¹ A member of Robert Hall's "church died in one of the almshouses at Leicester, at the extraordinary age of a hundred and seven, when he selected for the motto of his discourse the appropriate words in Acts xxi. 16, 'an old disciple,'" A gentleman who heard the discourse wrote: "It was a funeral

condemn several splendid sermons on "The power of an endless life," also on "The glorious gospel of the blessed God." *Ne resecandum ad vivum*. Clauses like those are so well known that they suggest at once, while they do not directly express, a complete and definite idea. The infelicity of some such texts should, indeed, be mitigated by the minister's reciting, in connection with them, the whole passage in which they occur. "Past feeling" is a clause on which many a sermon is founded. The clause may be twice read — once by itself, and once as it stands in the entire verse: "Who, being past feeling, have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness" (Eph. iv. 19). "Without natural affection" is a common text. Immediately before or after its announcement, the whole verse Rom. i. 31, may be recited. In a similar way the infelicity in verses beginning with a relative may be relieved; as, "And were by nature children of wrath," etc. (Eph. ii. 3); "Which were born not of blood," etc. (John i. 13). For the one defect in the use of incomplete sentences as texts for sermons, there may be some compensation in the pith and point which the brevity of the sentences gives them.

3. The text is not allowable, if by means of its failing to form a complete sentence, or to express the complete idea of the inspired penman, it become undignified. Sensational preachers are apt to degrade the pulpit by texts which, when insulated from their contexts, lose their sobriety. For the sake of replenishing the empty seats of a Scotch kirk, the minister placarded, every week, such texts for the coming Sabbath as: "What fear! yea, what vehement desire!" "Nine and twenty knives," "A time to dance," "Alas, Master, for it was borrowed," etc., etc. It is recorded that,

oration; the subject of it was an obscure old woman. Here the splendor of his poetical imagination burst forth, and he poured out such a torrent of eloquence on the head of indigent worth, as delighted all who could hear and understand him. The chapel was full, but not crowded, and the preacher was extremely animated. I thank you for sending me thirty miles on foot out of my way to hear him." — Morris's Recollections of Rev. Robert Hall, pp. 237, 238.

on a Sabbath forenoon during our last war with Great Britain, a minister, eminent for his genius and learning, was engaged in his pulpit services, and was informed that three ships of the British navy were coming near the port where he resided, and imperilling one of our own men-of-war. He instantly suspended the morning worship, left the pulpit, hastened to the neighboring fortification, offered his military services to the commander, was ordered to stand by one of the guns, remained at his post until the three ships of the British line had sailed away; then he returned to his church in season for the afternoon sermon, which he delivered extempore from the triumphant words: "There go the ships" (Ps. civ. 26). The text as quoted is entirely different in its meaning from the text as first written. The sentence was complete, but when severed from its adjuncts became ludicrous, though patriotic.

(To be continued).

ARTICLE VII.

JOHN REUCHLIN, THE FATHER OF HEBREW LEARNING IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

BY REV. SELAH MERRILL, ANDOVER, MASS.

THAT was a most interesting period in history when Germany was awakened from a long mental sleep. She seemed to become suddenly conscious of her condition and needs, and at once set herself resolutely to work to remedy her defects. It was within the period of deadness and darkness that Reuchlin was born at Pforzheim, in 1455, — when Germany lacked libraries and books, learned men, efficient teachers, and respectable schools, and, most deplorable of all, the consciousness that such things were at all necessary to the completeness of national life and character. But all this was changed; and when Reuchlin died, in 1522, in his sixty-seventh year, the national mind was characterized by a passionate eagerness for truth in both education and religion. Learned men had arisen; character had been given to the schools; education had been established on a sound basis; printed books had accumulated; Latin, Greek, and Hebrew had come to be studied according to scientific methods; a fair critical spirit had been developed; and, withal, light had begun to dawn

on the spiritual world. The subject of this brief sketch was one of the most prominent actors in these rapidly shifting scenes. He was pre-eminently a man raised up by God to do a great work for the race. His works have now no value, and are quite forgotten; but his life and labors form an epoch of great moment in the history of the human mind and spirit. Reuchlin was a man of rare gifts. He was an eminent jurist, a master of pure Latin and Greek, the great light of his age and country (in the Christian church) in Hebrew, a man of liberal culture, a polished gentleman, the ambassador and companion of kings, a writer who commanded respect in his own age, a man of indomitable energy, of plodding perseverance, of exceeding fairness and soundness of judgment, a most earnest seeker for truth, who said of himself: "I worship truth as God," and whose name was praised and whose advice was sought by the scholars of every nation, both on account of the degree of his attainments, and also on account of the integrity and purity of his character. We have to do, certainly, with a rare man, and the complete story of his life is one of exciting interest. But, in this sketch, we must consider him chiefly in the department of *Hebrew learning*, to which the book before us confines its notice of him.¹

1. *His struggle to master the Hebrew, and his attainments in the same.* — During the first half of Reuchlin's life manuscripts were expensive, and printed books did not exist. Also, capable instructors in Hebrew were quite as non-existent as books themselves. Reuchlin was thirty-three years old when the first complete Hebrew Bible was printed (that was in Italy, in 1488), and it was some time, perhaps several years, before any copies reached Germany. Besides, there was no demand for a knowledge of Hebrew. What possible incentive or motive was there to lead a student to apply himself to this study? Two theologians at Tübingen, Conrad Summenhart and Paul Scriptoris, are mentioned as having known a little Hebrew; but they left neither books nor pupils. Conrad Pellican also made some progress in this study; but as late as 1500 he was obliged to apply to Reuchlin for the solution of difficulties which appear now very trifling. Rudolf Agricola learned the rudiments of Hebrew in early life, and then laid aside the language altogether, making no use of it until a year or two before his death, when he resumed the study of it, which amounted, of course, to commencing it anew. Perhaps the most familiar name, in this connection, is that of John Wessel. Probably he taught Agricola what the latter knew of this language; but he left no records as to his own attainments in it, and that he had other pupils is not at all certain. Agricola is authority for saying that Wessel *dissuaded* Reuchlin from studying Hebrew. Yet he may have taught Reuchlin the rudiments

¹ Das Studium der Hebräischen Sprache in Deutschland vom Ende des xv. bis zur Mitte des xvi. Jahrhunderts. Von Ludwig Geiger. Breslau. 1870. pp. viii, and 140. — Reuchlin, pp. 23–40.

of it. These men are named as the predecessors of Reuchlin, so far as he had any; but it is easily seen that such knowledge of Hebrew as they possessed would not be entitled to any great respect. We mention these facts for the purpose of showing that to master Hebrew under such circumstances, and to create among the students of Germany a universal enthusiasm for the study of it, was no small task, and deserves no small praise. Besides the obstacles already mentioned, public opinion in many quarters was very bitter against the study of Hebrew. In the eyes of the strict party of the church, "the Greek language was the mother of all heresies, and the study of the Hebrew was an unquestionable apostasy to Judaism."¹ Pfefferkorn said: "The Jews injure the Christian religion more than the devil himself."² Later, Reuchlin, because of his enthusiasm for Hebrew studies, was charged with having been "bought up" by the Jews.³ In a letter to Cardinal Hadrian, Reuchlin says: "I devoted myself to Hebrew partly for the pleasure it gave me, but chiefly for the great service which I foresaw a knowledge of it would be to religion and truth." And further: "Neither a thirst for gold nor a desire for fame have driven men into this study. On the contrary, I have been obliged to keep my studies a secret, and as to the expense of learning Hebrew, I assure you it has cost me much money." If Reuchlin learned the rudiments of Hebrew of Wessel at all, it must have been in 1475, after his return from the Paris schools, when he resided for a time in Basel, where he met Wessel. This was in his twentieth year.

There is evidence that by 1480, he had learned a little Hebrew. In 1483 Agricola (Reuchlin was then twenty-eight) speaks of his knowledge of Hebrew. But when the best has been said, the knowledge of it which he then possessed was very limited. In 1487 he sent to his friend, Sebastian Murrho, to get him a copy of the Pentateuch, *but in a translation*; which, however, Murrho could not find. In 1489, Leontorius, in a letter praising Reuchlin's learning, speaks only of Greek and Latin. Reuchlin could make no great progress in Hebrew without a teacher; and a teacher, what Reuchlin himself afterwards became, could not at that time be found. He had been in various universities, — Freiburg, Basel, Paris, Orleans, Poitiers, — but they were alike poor in this respect. In 1481 he went to Würtemberg to reside. Here there was a considerable number of Jews, but none sufficiently educated to help him. And it was not till 1492, in his thirty-seventh year, when he was sent to the court of the emperor Friedrich III., that his desire to find an instructor in Hebrew was gratified. A Jew, Jacob Jehiel Loans, the private physician of the emperor, was also master of Hebrew, and at once became Reuchlin's teacher. This fact marks an important epoch in Reuchlin's life. Perhaps.

¹ Hase's History, 329.

² Libell. de Confess. Judaica. See Meiners, Lebensbeschreibungen, I. 103.

³ Meiners, I. 81.

also, it marks an important moment in the history of learning in the Christian church. During this and the following year Reuchlin received instruction, at intervals, from Loans. In 1498 he was sent from Heidelberg, where he had settled, to Rome as ambassador. While at Rome he sought a second time for a Hebrew instructor, and obtained the services of a Jew named Sforzo. This Obadiah, or "Abdias" Sforzo, Reuchlin paid "one gold crown an hour" for his instruction.¹ It will be noticed that it was not till this late date, 1498, Reuchlin's forty-third year, that he was able fully to stand on his own feet in this department of learning in which he became so eminent. And as late as 1516, six years before his death, we find him seeking means to perfect himself in Chaldee.² Through the friendship and influence of Loans, Friedrich III. presented Reuchlin with an elegant manuscript of the Bible, valued at three hundred gold crowns. To Doctor Streler, tutor of a brother of Reuchlin, Reuchlin wrote, in 1491, for a copy of the Bible. After much fruitless searching, Streler replied: "Books are not so plenty here in Florence as you imagine. I have found no Hebrew Bible yet, except one owned by a man in Bologna, and to which several books are wanting."³ In 1492 Streler wrote again: "No Hebrew Bible yet; and about it I can say nothing further till Holzhafer returns from Naples." Although Reuchlin had infinite trouble to collect books, yet he was able to collect, for the times, quite a fair library. Besides many other literary works, Reuchlin published, in 1506, his "Rudiments of Hebrew"; in 1512, a "Grammatical Interpretation of the Seven Penitential Psalms"; and in 1518, his "Hebrew Accents and Orthography." He also translated into Hebrew one or more small works, and wrote several letters in Hebrew. We find him making constant use of his knowledge, in the way of assisting or instructing others. We have space only to mention the fact that the Elector of Saxony invited him to occupy the chair of Hebrew in Wittenberg, which he was obliged to decline.⁴ In 1520, he was invited to a professorship of Greek and Hebrew in Ingolstadt, at a salary of two hundred gold crowns a year, which offer he accepted, and at once he began to lecture on Kimchi's Hebrew Grammar and the *Plutus* of Aristophanes. Upwards of three hundred students crowded into his lecture-room to hear him. It is a fact worthy of note that among his pupils here were John Forster, and John Eck, the famous opponent of Luther. Later he was called to Tübingen, as Professor of Greek and Hebrew, where he labored till the summer of 1522, when he died in Stuttgart, where he had been carried.

There are many facts illustrating the thoroughness of his scholarship. His bitter enemy, Pfefferkorn, the converted Jew, was regarded as a man of learning; and yet Reuchlin showed him Hebrew books which he (Pfefferkorn) could not read. Later in the famous Pfefferkorn-Hochstraten-Reuchlin controversy, Reuchlin's "Eyeglass," in which were many quota-

¹ Meiners, I. 66.² Geiger, 29, note.³ Meiners, I. 88.⁴ Geiger, 33.

tions in Hebrew in rabbinical character, was to be examined by the church officials. But to be read it had to be first translated into Latin. Both parties appointed men for this purpose. When the work came to be examined, Reuchlin's attorney showed that the church party had made three hundred mistakes in their translation. The church party were at last obliged to yield, and take the Reuchlin translation as the correct one. This was certainly a triumph for Reuchlin's scholarship. One point in the famous controversy just alluded to was that the Talmud should be burnt. It had not then been printed, except a few single tracts. Reuchlin said he could not speak of this from personal knowledge. He had never been able to get a copy, although he would have gladly paid twice its value for one. Further, he had never in any German country met a Christian who had read the Talmud. And among all the baptized Jews, he knew of but a single one who could read it. And Reuchlin argues: "Why condemn a book which no one is able to read, and which no one in Germany is able to tell us anything about?"¹

One other incident will illustrate the candid spirit of Reuchlin, in contrast with the narrow spirit of his opponents Pfefferkorn, of whom Erasmus said, "This one half-Jewish Christian has injured Christianity more than the entire Jewish rabble,"² made a plan for converting all the Jews and annihilating Judaism, as follows: 1. All books were to be taken away from the Jews, except the Bible; 2. Government was to compel all Jewish children to be trained up in the Christian religion; 3. The adult Jews who would be converted were to be kindly received; 4. But the rest, who should harden themselves in their errors, were to be driven away as incorrigible knaves. His plan may have looked well on paper to himself and to those of his party. But Reuchlin said: "The gospel, the church Fathers, and justice are all against such a thing. Much wiser would it be to put two professors of Hebrew into each of the universities in the land, and let them train the young men thoroughly in the knowledge of this language. And thus, after ten years, perhaps, there will be a body of men who will be able to meet the Jews fairly, mildly, and reasonably, on their own grounds, and in that way convert them."³ Nothing could better illustrate the spirit of the two parties into which the Christian church was now dividing itself—the party of progress and its opposite—than the incident or fact just related.

2 If we had time, it would be interesting to show, as our second point, *the exceeding liberalness and fairness of Reuchlin's judgment*, of which the facts just related are illustrations.

3. *Reuchlin never left the Catholic church.*—It seems as if Providence had a special object in retaining him there. He did a great work as a forerunner of the Reformation. Luther said: "I thank the grace of God

¹ Meiners, I. 111.

² See Graetz, *Gesch. der Juden*, ix. 89.

³ Meiners, I. 104, 122.

which has been revealed in thee, dear man, and which has enabled thee to stop the mouths of the ungodly." Others said, on account of his great services for the Bible: "Hieronymus is born again."

4. *Reuchlin deserves notice as a man of general culture.*— This hardly belongs to the limits of our sketch. Yet as a promoter of Roman and Greek literature, by his lectures, translations, and other works; as the author of several dramatic pieces, and the first to introduce dramatic representations into the colleges of Germany; as a jurist, in which capacity he spent many years of his life— he has given abundant evidence that his general culture was of the most liberal kind.

5. *Further, he is an example of constant and persevering labor.*— If he was the father of Hebrew learning, he was also the father of that patient, plodding, yet cheerful method of study for which German students have been so long renowned. While in the service of emperors or princes, every hour when he was not engaged in his regular duties he devoted to study. Sebastian Brant "regrets deeply that a man with Reuchlin's abilities should be so occupied with all sorts of affairs, and even military affairs, as to have no time left for learned labors." "No portion of my life," he says, "has passed when I have not applied myself to advancing the interests of learning and religion." At another time he speaks of toiling day and night to accomplish a certain task. His constantly laborious life could be illustrated by many facts.

6. *After Reuchlin had created a place for himself in the world, his services were in great demand.*— Melancthon, Schilling, Oecolampadius, and many others from many quarters, came to him to enjoy his instruction. Universities, abbots, and private individuals sent to him for advice in procuring Hebrew instructors. In Latin, Greek, and theology he passed everywhere as authority. His advice was sought in difficult matters pertaining to learning. Stoffler wants to know if *bobel* and *bovel* are Hebrew words. Peutingner, if the word rendered "eagle," in Deut. xiv., means really an eagle, or some four-footed animal. Amorbach is editing Hieronymus, and needs Reuchlin to assist him with his knowledge of Hebrew. Others ask for other favors, so that Reuchlin, besides his own duties, was often employed in aiding eminent scholars.

7. *Reuchlin's contemporaries had the highest respect for him.*— Budaëus, Ruellius, Copus, and Faber all write from France, "No name is more renowned here than that of Reuchlin." Whatever Reuchlin wrote was called a "masterpiece." In Italy and England, and France also, "men kissed the letters of this famous man, and preserved them as precious relics." Erasmus puts him among the saints, and associates his name with that of St. Hieronymus. The stream of praise setting towards him is swollen to a perfect flood. "The learned world owe him everlasting thanks." "The Jews are outdone in the knowledge of their own language." "Theologians must put upon his head the crown." And the learned men who succeeded Reuchlin spoke of his time as the golden age.

We must now close this incomplete sketch of one whose name marks an epoch in history; who gave character and significance to an entire age; whose influence changed infinitely for the better the whole tone and sentiment of a nation in regard to learning; whose rare attainments, combined with great purity and integrity of character, won for him the admiration and esteem of all the learned world.

And in these days, when in our country good Hebraists are alarmingly rare, when in the minds of many students there is a feeling that a Hebrew scholar can be little more than a mere fossil of a man, it is refreshing, and ought to be stimulating to all ministers and theological students, to consider that the father of Hebrew learning in the Christian church was not only an eminent scholar, but a polished gentleman, of courtly manners, of remarkable sweetness of voice, of agreeable and perhaps commanding personal address, of good habits and perfect health, and withal possessed of a wonderful talent for application and patience—qualities which in any age, and under almost any circumstances, will create genius, or at least achieve success.

It seems as if the work of Geiger, which has suggested this Article, ought to be put into an English dress. In our sketch, perhaps the very excellent work of Meiners, "*Lebensbeschreibungen*," etc., Zürich, 1794 (vol. i. 44–212), has been of more service than the work of Geiger. Mayerhoff has also a volume, with an Introduction by Neander, "*Johann Reuchlin und seine Zeit*," Berlin, 1830, which we have used. At the end it has a list of Reuchlin's works, with their different editions and running remarks. It contains, also, an excellent portrait. Then much valuable matter on Reuchlin and his times is contained in the first few chapters of vol. ix. of Graetz's, "*Geschichte der Juden*."

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE THEOLOGY AND THEOLOGIANS OF SCOTLAND, chiefly of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. By James Walker, D.D. 8vo. pp. 187. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1872.

In this instructive volume Dr. Walker says of John Livingston: "He knew Hebrew and Chaldee, and something of Syriac. He had tried his hand, he says, at Arabic. He was sufficiently acquainted with French and Italian to be able to make use of French and Italian books. He could read the Bible, too, in Spanish."—p. 21. Of Thomas Boston he writes: At the time he came to Ettrick "he borrowed a 'piece of the Hebrew Bible containing the books of Samuel and Kings,' and with that set himself to the study of the 'Holy Tongue.' After a while he bought for

himself the whole Hebrew Scriptures. 'This,' he says, 'was the happy year wherein I was first master of a Hebrew Bible.' And now he 'plied the Hebrew original close and with great delight.' I need not tell at length how he ran the course of his Hebrew scholarship till he became an enthusiast on the subject of Hebrew accentuation, and wanted to publish on it. The learned men in his own country gave him slight encouragement; but he had now devoted admirers who would not let a work of the Ettrick scholar fall out of sight. The manuscript was submitted to competent judges out of Scotland. An Englishman, Sir R. Ellis, sent it to Holland; and you can think how the heart of the simple minister was gladdened, or rather, what battling experiences he had, when he read that the two learned Hebraists, Schultens and Grenobius, had examined what had been put into their hands, and gave as their judgment: 'The author has given surprising instances of the usefulness of the accents to settle the meaning of the text; and in the supposition that the rest of the book is equal to this sketch, it will, on the whole, be the best book that has been written on the subject.' — pp. 29, 30.

Dr. Walker has recalled many suggestive facts illustrating the progress of theological speculation in Scotland. He says: "Among our own divines Rutherford took the view that the atonement has no necessity save in the free decree of God. Sin he held, indeed, to merit punishment. It might have been justly punished even more severely than God has ordained, and is ever the object of his infinite displacency. But punishment might either have been less, or might not have been at all, if God in his sovereignty had chosen; it comes from no holy necessity of the divine nature. 'God,' he says, 'would not be God if sin did not displease him, for holiness is essential to God; but the punishment of sin is not formally included in the essence of sin, but is something posterior in nature to sin, already constituted in its entire essence; and therefore God punishes sin by no necessity of nature; nay, if he chose, he might leave it altogether unpunished' (*Apol.* 296).

"This doctrine absolutely possessed him. There is not a single one of his doctrinal works in which he does not assert and defend it. If *justitia punitiva* be essential in the divine nature, then he argues: Just as the fire burns when it is brought into contact with its proper object, so must such a justice go forth in its destroying energy upon every transgression, even as it appears. 'Yea,' he says, 'if by necessity of justice God cannot but punish sin, this justice shall cause him to follow the law of works without any gospel moderation; which is, that the same person that sins, and no other, should die for his sins. If there be such a connection *objective ex natura rei* between sin and punishment, it must be between sin and punishment in the very same person that sinned. For this is justice — *noxa sequitur caput*.' That is, you must have a divine freedom in the whole matter, or you overthrow Redemption." — pp. 35, 36.

RATIONAL THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. By John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of St. Mary's College in the University of St. Andrews. One of her Majesty's Chaplains for Scotland. Author of "Leaders of the Reformation," and "English Puritanism and its Leaders." In two volumes. Vol. I. Liberal Churchmen. 8vo. pp. 463. Vol. II. The Cambridge Platonists. 8vo. pp. 500. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1872.

In nearly all the great contests of the church we are apt to imagine that there were only two parties, and to forget that there were disputants differing from both those parties and perhaps equal, if not superior, to both in intellectual and moral character. The two classes of divines who are most conspicuous in the controversies of the seventeenth century in England are the Laudian and the Puritan, but there were contemplative and powerful minds who did not harmonize with either of these classes, and were not cemented with each other in any distinct organization. Dr. Tulloch, in the present volumes, vividly sketches the life and character of several men who belong to this intellectual class, and were too comprehensive in their aims to be denominated a party. His first volume is devoted to a consideration of the Spirit of Rational Inquiry in Protestantism, to the Course of Religious Opinion and Parties in England (1500-1625); to Sketches of the life, labors and opinions of Lord Falkland, John Hales of Eton, William Chillingworth, Jeremy Taylor, and Edward Stillingfleet. His second volume is devoted to the Historical Portion of the Cambridge School; to sketches of the life, labors, and opinions of Benjamin Whichcote, John Smith, Ralph Cudworth, Henry More, Culverwell, Worthington, Rust, Patrick, Fowler, Glanvill, Norris. The characters of these men are drawn with a clear outline, and in a fascinating style. We have been particularly interested in those which are at the present day least known. The portraits of Whichcote and Smith are remarkably distinct. The account of the "ever-memorable Mr. John Hales of Eton" is rich and fresh. Hales, as is well known, was present at the Synod of Dort, and wrote letters in regard to it, which exerted no little influence on the church of England, were translated into Latin by Mosheim, and were much read in Germany. Dr. Tulloch quotes the account which Hales gives of the dismissal of the Arminians from the Synod. The Praeses of the Council, "Mr. Bogermannus," to whom Hales had letters of recommendation, publicly and formally addresses the party of Episcopius thus: "'I will dismiss you,' he said, 'with no other elogy that one of the foreigners gave you — *quo coepistis pede eodem cedite* — with a lie you made your entrance into the Synod, with a lie you take your leave of it, in denying lately that ever you protested yourselves provided to give answer on the articles, or to have had any such writing ready, which all the Synod knows to be false. Your actions all have been full of fraud, equivocations, and deceit. That,

therefore, the Synod may at length piously and peaceably proceed to the perfecting of that business for which it is come together, you are dismissed. But assure you, the Synod will make known your pertinacy to all the Christian world; and know that the Belgic churches want not *arma spiritualia* with which in time convenient they will proceed against you. *Quamobrem vos delegatorum et Synode nomine dimitto, exite.* So with much muttering the Remonstrants went out; and Episcopus going away, said, 'Dominus Deus judicabit de fraudibus et mendaciis'; Sapma, 'Exeo ex ecclesia malignantium.' And so the Synod brake up."—Vol. i. p. 186.

Dr. Tulloch cites from Hales various accounts of individuals who appeared before the Synod. For instance: "Martinius of Breme, having, after the departure of the Remonstrants, ventured to state some scruples 'about the manner of Christ's being *fundamentum electionis*, Gomar started up and exclaimed, 'Ego hanc rem in me recipio,' and therewith cast his glove, and challenged Martinus with the proverb, 'Ecce Rhodum ecce Saltum,' and required the Synod to grant them a duel.' The Synod was glad by fair words to pacify the combatants; and, according to custom, the session was concluded with prayer. But, slyly adds our author, 'zeal and devotions had not so well allayed Gomarus his choler, but immediately after prayers he renewed his challenge, and required combat with Martinus again; but they parted for that night without blows.' Hales plainly felt himself less and less at home amidst such scenes of polemic violence."—Vol. i. p. 188.

A COMPENDIOUS HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND, from the Discovery by Europeans to the first General Congress of the Anglo-American Colonies. By John Gorham Palfrey. In four volumes. 12mo. pp. 408, 426, 469, 476. Boston: H. C. Shepard. 1873.

The first two volumes of this work were published in 1865; the third volume appeared in 1872; the fourth, now first published, completes the work. Each volume is prefaced by a full table of contents; the second contains an Index to the first two volumes; the fourth contains an Index to the third and fourth volumes. Dr. Palfrey's diction is clear, chaste, spirited, often remarkably apposite. It is a good specimen of the historical style. His entire History is pervaded by good sense, philosophical insight, and a truth-loving spirit. His estimate of the character of the North American Indians, of the Pilgrims and Puritans, of the ante-Revolutionary patriots, is fair and just. His descriptions of personal character and individual scenes are sometimes highly interesting; see, for example, Vol. ii. p. 113. He is candid in his account of the movements by which the church and States of New England were early agitated. It does not become him as an historian to express his opinion of the theological controversies which disturbed the peace of the New England churches, and he evidently intends to narrate the facts as they actually occurred. It is very difficult to

write such a narrative without incurring a suspicion of one-sidedness in the selection of materials. One class of facts needs to be balanced by another class. Expressions made in one set of circumstances have a meaning different from that which belongs to them when made in another set. Take a single example. Dr. Palfrey's account of the "Great Awakening" in New England is graphic, but we think is not sufficiently discriminating. The general style of his narrative gives an inadequate view of the character of Whitefield. That remarkable man had grave faults, but these appear in the present History much more prominent than his excellences. His "histrionic" power is made more conspicuous than his simple-hearted piety. Such remarks as that Whitefield regarded a favorable change of wind and the offer of hospitable lodging, etc., as "*due* to his prayers"; that after preaching unsuccessfully to the inhabitants of Portsmouth, he on a second trial "*subdued* them, and recovered his *self-satisfaction*," might have been fair if offset by remarks of a more commendable character, but insulated as they are, they fail to make the right impression. Dr. Palfrey does not make a sufficiently broad distinction between the labors of Dr. (?) Edwards, as he styles the President, and those of James Davenport. One great effort of Edwards was to counteract the influence of Davenport. When Davenport was tried at Boston for slanderous speeches against the clergy, the jury acquitted him on the ground that in uttering these speeches he "*was non compos mentis*." At his trial by the Connecticut Assembly, it was decided that "as he was under the influence of enthusiastical impressions and impulses, and thereby disturbed in the natural faculties of his mind," he was "therefore to be pitied and compassionated, and not to be treated as otherwise he might be." We think that the general style of President Edwards's discourses, and the general spirit of his ministerial life ought to have been set off in more decided contrast to those of the fanatics who sympathized with Davenport. Dr. Palfrey's picture of the Great Awakening has not perhaps too deep a shading, but it has not the light which shone in upon the darkness. His History, however, is, on the whole, a work of signal merit, and deserves, as it will receive, the general confidence of its readers, who we trust will be numerous.

THE RISE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES. By Richard Frothingham. 8vo. pp. 640. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1872.

Mr. Frothingham is the author of "The History of Charlestown," the "History of the Siege of Boston, and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill," "The Life and Times of Joseph Warren," and various historical articles published in periodicals. His present work has a sphere of its own. It is a concise history of the Republic, gives numerous statistics describing the rise and growth of the Colonies, presents to our view the action of Towns, Committees of Correspondence, Provincial Assemblies; delineates the influence of particular individuals, of various books,

pamphlets, newspapers, etc. The perusal of the History astonishes us, as it presents in one view the rapid progress of our country. "Nothing in the history of mankind is like" it, said Edmund Burke. Dealing in facts rather than in declamation, in figures of arithmetic rather than of rhetoric, Mr. Frothingham leaves upon his readers a deep and durable impression that the country is fitted to make in the future, as it has made in the past, an unprecedented advance in wealth and power.

THE ENGLISH IN IRELAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. By James Anthony Froude, M.A. In two volumes. Vol. I. 12mo. pp. 638. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1873.

We have very faint hopes, we confess, that the question of the treatment of Ireland by the English government will ever be determined to the satisfaction of the great body of those qualified to judge. Nothing is plainer, we think, than that many and grievous wrongs have been committed by both parties. We know enough of the course pursued by the English government in other cases — cases, too, in which the inducements to a righteous policy were much more forcible than have existed in reference to Ireland — to make us willing to believe that its treatment of Ireland has been to no small extent faulty. On the other hand, we know enough of the peculiar traits of character of the Irish to convince us that they are to a high degree accountable for the wretchedness which, now for more than seven hundred years, since the conquest of the island by Henry II., they have endured. We are willing to assent to the following statements of Mr. Froude on this point: "If the Irish possess some virtues, they possess the counterfeits of a hundred more. Passionate in everything — passionate in their patriotism, passionate in their religion, passionately courageous, passionately loyal and affectionate, — they are without the manliness which will give strength and solidity to the sentimental part of their dispositions; while the surface and show is so seductive and winning that only experience of its instability can resist the charm" (p. 21). Dark as this picture is, it is not on the whole any darker than that given by such writers as Sydney Smith, who, unlike Mr. Froude, condemn in the most pointed terms the policy of the English government towards Ireland.

But, if such descriptions as these are just; if, as Mr. Froude maintains, the Irish are disqualified for self-government; if the right of a nation to independence is graduated altogether by its ability to assert and maintain its independence, we are confident, on Mr. Froude's own showing, that the English government is verily guilty for much of the misery to which the Irish have been subjected. On the one hand, he asserts that "the Norman barons who conquered Ireland were a military aristocracy, whose peculiar mission was to conquer men. . . . They were born rulers of men. . . . The true justification of the conquest lay in the character of the conquerers. In occupying Ireland, the Normans were but fulfilling the work for which they

were specially qualified and gifted" (pp. 15-17). On the other hand, the Irish have shown themselves, at all times and in all places, capable of the most loyal devotion to any one who will lead and command them.

Now, it would seem that when the English, thus peculiarly qualified to govern, were placed in control of a nation so peculiarly disposed to be governed as are the Irish, an altogether better state of things should have been the result than that which the world has seen. Such teachers should have been able to exhibit better pupils. It will be seen, then, that Mr. Froude has not, in our view, made out a very strong case in favor of the English. It is hardly necessary to say that no book which Mr. Froude would write would be otherwise than well-written, and deserving of a careful reading.

WORDS AND PLACES; or, Etymological Illustrations of History, Ethnology, and Geography. By Isaac Taylor, M.A., Vicar of Holy Trinity, Twickenham. Third edition, revised and compressed. With maps. 16mo. pp. 375. London: Macmillan and Co. 1873.

We do not know whether this volume is most useful to the geographer, the historian, or the philologist. It is a treasure to each. It proves that the English language is indeed a "well-stored antiquarian museum." The psychologist and the theologian will find ample materials for thought in this truly remarkable book.

AUTOLOGY; an Inductive System of Mental Science, whose Centre is the Will, and whose Completion is the Personality. A Vindication of the Manhood of Man, the Godhood of God, and the Divine Authorship of Nature. By Rev. D. H. Hamilton, D.D. 8vo. pp. 701. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1873.

This volume discusses the doctrine of the will, the affections, the intellect, the conscience, and personality. Under the doctrine of the will, it examines the nature of choice, which it distinguishes from the sensation, the cognition, the craving or loathing, the judging, the moralizing, the selecting—all which acts precede choice. The author's definition is: "*Choosing is giving the consent of the self to the object of choice.* In other words, and more fully, *choosing is that act of the will, or self, which first announces and then disposes of itself to the object of choice; or, choosing is an authoritative act exercised in disposing of the author of that act. Self-disposition is, therefore, the essence of choice*" (p. 52). On the power of contrary choice the author says: It is "identical with the power of direct choice, or the power to choose at all; as the power to dispose of the self in one direction is identical with the power of self-disposition in any direction whatever, or of self-disposition at all" (p. 92). Direct choice and contrary choice "are equally and simply the power of self-disposition."

Dr. Hamilton has evidently reflected much on psychology and its relation

to theology. He has adopted a peculiar style, has not hesitated to coin new words and adapt old words to new uses. His classifications, too, are peculiar and original. Some of them fail to secure our approval. We think that he should have devoted either more space or less to some discussions; as, for example, those on Demonology, Miracles, Divine Providence, Prayer. These are subjects on which, at the present day, a psychologist needs to explain and defend the theories which he advances; else he will be apt to be misunderstood, perhaps unreasonably condemned.

THE APOCALYPSE TRANSLATED AND EXPOUNDED. By James Glasgow, D.D., Irish General Assembly's Professor of Oriental Languages, late Fellow of the University of Bombay, and late Member of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay. 8vo. pp. 611. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1872.

Dr. Glasgow defines a symbol: "That which represents or suggests to the mind something else." He insists on uniformity in the interpretation of a symbol. "Get at its application in one place, and this will carry you through all places. And to find this application [in the New Testament] we must search for the origin of the symbol in the Old Testament" (p. 55). The symbols in the Apocalypse "are settled and defined terms, each having its uniform meaning" (p. 56). Dr. Glasgow regards this principle of interpretation as fundamental in explaining the Apocalypse, and is very confident in the results of the principle. Rejecting the views of the "preterists" (Stuart and others), and of the "futurists" (De Burgh, Todd, and others), he contends that "various intimations of a speedy coming of Christ were fulfilled in the beginning of the gospel age"; that Christ is now present with his church, the day of the Lord has already come; that Hades is the invisible state of man, which will continue until the *second* resurrection; that the *first* resurrection (Rev. xx. 5, 6) is spiritual, "the production of a spiritual nature by the Holy Spirit"; consequently that in this first resurrection not only martyrs, but all regenerated men have participated, or will participate. From such statements one might be led to conjecture that the author of this Commentary adopts the spiritual method of explaining the Apocalypse, and does not attempt to give particular and definite explanations of John's symbolical language. But one finds, in other parts of the Commentary, that a horse is a symbol of a messenger from God, and in Rev. vi. 2 the white horse is the Christian ministry, and the bow which the rider carries is not the military bow, but the rainbow, "the type which first spoke peace to man"; that Rev. xvi. 3 ("*And the second angel poured out his vial upon the sea,*" etc.) "began to receive its accomplishment in A.D. 1529, when the Protestant princes and theologians presented their famous protest to the emperor"; that the outpouring of the fourth vial (Rev. xvi. 8) "may be dated in general from about the rising of the Tridentine Council, in 1564,"

etc., etc. In the exposition of Rev. xvi. 16, we read : " Before the close of the seventh messenger's outpouring we shall read of hail of astounding dimensions, indicating, as formerly expounded, war coming from a northerly direction, which may be exemplified in the federal war of the United States, and succeeded by the Prussian hostilities against Denmark, and afterwards against Austria." Then we find allusions to the needle-guns, chassepots, and sniders, the ironclad ships, mitralleuses, the Franco-Prussian war, etc., etc. Dr. Glasgow's theory of the Millennium is that of the *magno-millennium*, limited not to a thousand years, but extended to three hundred and sixty thousand. But how can the earth sustain the number of inhabitants who shall then, in the ordinary method of calculation, exist upon it? Great changes may take place on the earth's surface; more land may be made; mountains may be levelled (Matt. xvii. 20); the rate of the increase of population, or the longevity of the race may be diminished. We think that some discussions in this volume might have been wisely omitted; also many incidental expressions which are too crude. See, for example, pp. 65, 537, 552, 576. The author is doubtless a man of extensive reading, especially in Oriental literature.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS. A Posthumous Work. By George Steward. 8vo. pp. 444. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1872.

Mr. Steward supposes Paul to be the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and discusses the various principles which the Epistle unfolds in regard to the Sonship of Christ, his Priesthood, the Covenants, the Nature of the Atonement, etc., etc. The style of Mr. Steward is not very perspicuous; but his thoughts are profound. His volume demands, as it will reward, a thorough study.

BIBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. By C. F. Keil, D.D., and F. Delitzsch, D.D., Professors of Theology, The Books of the KINGS. By C. F. Keil. Translated from the German by the Rev. James Martin, B.A. 8vo. pp. 523.

The Books of the CHRONICLES. By C. F. Keil. Translated from the German by Andrew Harper, B.D. 8vo. pp. 516.

The Book of the Prophet DANIEL. By C. F. Keil. Translated from the German by the Rev. M. G. Easton, A.M. 8vo. pp. 506. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark; New York: Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1872.

Dr. Keil has laid the clergy under new obligations to him by these volumes. They are written with his wonted learning. The fact that so voluminous and excellent an author was a pupil of Hengstenberg, illustrates the early, as well as great, influence of the latter exegete. Dr. Keil is equal to Hengstenberg in erudition, like him in the power of will, and

superior to him in logic. He does not always respect the claims of science, but means to be always loyal to the word of God.

THE HOLY BIBLE ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORIZED VERSION (A.D. 1611) ; with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary and a Revision of the Translation, by Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. Edited by F. C. Cook, M.A., Canon of Exeter. Vol. I., Joshua—1 Kings. 8vo. pp. 624. New York : Scribner, Armstrong, and Co. 1873.

The first volume of this Commentary has been already noticed in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. The second is equal to the first. We cannot say that the Commentary is, or promises to be, adapted to the most learned of our divines ; neither is it accommodated to the most ignorant. It is judicious, cautious, and reverential. The style of it is better than the style of the German commentaries, although it has not their originality nor their extensive learning. It is destined not to produce a great excitement among, but to exert a wholesome influence upon, ministers of the gospel and literary laymen.

WOMAN IN THE BIBLE ; being a Collection of all the Passages in the Scriptures which relate to Women ; with brief Notes, Explanatory and Suggestive. By Aaron Williams, D.D. Genesis—Songs of Solomon. 12mo. pp. 315. Philadelphia : Alfred Martien. 1872.

Dr. Williams does not pretend to express his thoughts with any special grace or wealth of style. His thoughts, however, are sound and timely. He suggests many lessons which he does not expand. It is a great convenience to have the biblical portraiture of women presented in a form so accessible. Some of the passages quoted in the volume might have been more pleasantly illustrated by allusions to Oriental manners.

THE ANTI-PELAGIAN WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Bishop of Hippo. Translated by Peter Holmes, D.D., F.R.A.S., Domestic Chaplain to the Right Hon. the Countess of Rothes, and Curate of Pennycross, Plymouth. Vol. I. pp. 431. Edingburgh : T. and T. Clark ; New York : Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1872.

LETTERS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE, Bishop of Hippo. Translated by the Rev. J. G. Cunningham, M. A. 8vo. pp. 440. Edingburgh : T. and T. Clark ; New York : Scribner, Welford, and Armstrong. 1872.

These works of St. Augustine will form a valuable accession to the library of any educated clergyman. They have a great historical value, in addition to their dogmatic worth. We regret that any of the letters of Augustine have been omitted in the translation. The omitted letters may be of more value than they appear to be. Some of the letters in this volume are really charming as well as instructive. The epistles from and to Jerome afford matter for much study, and illustrate the character of

the monk, as well as that of the bishop. Particularly interesting are the letters on pp. 78 sq. 129 sq. 254 sq. 264 sq.

THE PERFECT LIFE. In twelve Discourses. By William Ellery Channing, D.D. Edited from his Manuscripts, by his Nephew, William Henry Channing. 16mo. pp. 311. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1873.

The pulpit of the present day is in great danger of losing its dignity. For this, as well as other reasons, we welcome these Discourses of Dr. Channing. They are written in a fresh and pure style, and express lofty thoughts in simple yet noble language. We marvel that they have not been previously given to the public.

The favorite theme of Dr. Channing is the Dignity of Human Nature. The present volume contains some passages which illustrate the Depravity, rather more than the Dignity, of man. On page 147 is a paragraph which might have proceeded from Dr. Wayland as appropriately as from Dr. Channing: "That we do thus depend on the Divine Spirit, that we do thus need heavenly influence in the work of attaining to the perfect life, none who enter on this upward course can long doubt. You, who never attempted to reach this sublime end, may question or deny. To you it may seem no great task to become what you call good; for your standard of goodness is low. You never lifted your eyes to the heavenly height to which conscience and Christianity summon you. And in the next place, you never seriously undertook to master your passions. You are unable, as yet, to measure their might. You know not how formidable appetite, ambition, avarice, are; for you have been all your life in league with these foes of your virtue. Never will you learn what sway they have usurped over you, and the strength of the chains they have bound around you, until you strive to shake them off. Then will these tyrants start up in giant form, and laugh to scorn your faint resistance, and appall your feeble will."

LIFE LESSONS FROM THE BOOK OF PROVERBS. By William Stevens Perry, D.D. 16mo. pp. 361. New York: T. Whittaker.

These lessons were originally delivered in the form of sermons, and are well-fitted for popular impression. They exhibit the singular riches of the Book of Proverbs.

THE SAYINGS OF THE GREAT FORTY DAYS BETWEEN THE RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION, regarded as the Outlines of the Kingdom of God. In Five Discourses, with an Examination of Mr. Newman's Theory of Developments. By George Moberly, D.C.L., Bishop of Salisbury. Fourth edition. 16mo. pp. 312. London, Oxford, and Cambridge: Rivingtons. 1871.

Dr. Moberly has long held a high rank as a preacher and scholar. The present volume is by no means equal to some others which he has published.

He does not here present his thoughts in a form sufficiently compact. He sometimes fails in nice discrimination. We are rather disappointed in the results of his confessedly great learning.

SACRAMENTAL ADDRESSES AND MEDITATIONS. By the late Henry Belfrage, D.D., Falkirk. Eighth edition, complete in one volume. 12mo. pp. 411. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1873.

This unpretending volume had reached a sixth edition in the year 1860, and might, therefore, be presumed, even on that ground alone, to possess substantial merit. Conceding, for the present, — what we are very reluctant to do, — that it is in keeping with the purpose of the Lord's supper that it should be accompanied by anything like formal addresses, we do not hesitate to say that these addresses are pre-eminently well suited to the occasions which called them forth. One does not look for any special literary merit in such addresses; but these are by no means destitute of this merit. What is of still greater importance, no Christian can give himself up to their proper influence without his whole character's being most favorably affected.

WILD TIMES: A Tale of the Days of Queen Elizabeth. By Cecilia Mary Caddell, Author of "Blind Agnese," "Never Forgotten," etc. New edition. 12mo. pp. 311. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1873.

The aim of this novel is to describe the persecutions endured by the Roman Catholics during the reign of the British queen — persecutions which were continued by some of her successors, and bore heavily upon gentlemen and priests. It appeals occasionally, with much power, to the common sympathies of the race. The abuses endured by any church always reflect discredit upon the party from whom the abuses originate. As honesty, so charity, is the best policy.

MY CLERICAL FRIENDS, and their Relation to Modern Thought. 12mo. pp. 324. New York: The Catholic Publication Society. 1873.

This republication of an English work is divided into four chapters, entitled: The Vocation of the Clergy; The Clergy at Home; The Clergy Abroad; The Clergy and Modern Thought. It is well, in some parts beautifully, written. Its main design appears to be to assail what is called the "advanced thinking" of our times, and to recommend the Roman Catholic church as a safeguard against it. This church stands like a bulwark against the infidelity, pantheism, atheism of the day. Some of the arguments in the volume are well put. The propriety of praying to the blessed Virgin is ingeniously defended on pp. 179-184. "Human liberty" is ingeniously defined on p. 289. In various passages the power and the progress of the Roman Catholic church are painted in glowing colors.

THE ROMANCE OF THE HAREM. By Mrs. Anna H. Leonowens, Author of "The English Governess at the Siamese Court." Illustrated. 16mo. pp. 277. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1873.

Few persons can read this volume without deriving from it both pleasure and instruction. It gives us remarkably clear and impressive views of the character, habits, and manners of the Siamese. Its author has enjoyed special facilities for comprehending the genius of that peculiar people. The theologian will derive much profit from this work as giving vivid revelations of Brahmanism and Buddhism. On p. 192 is a good illustration of the tendency, not of the Orientals only, but of all men, to ascribe to their divinity everything in which they themselves are interested. One of the prayers from the Hindoo liturgy begins thus: "O thou who art the life in all things, the eternal seed of nature, the understanding of the wise and the weakness of the foolish, the glory of the proud, and the strength of the strong, the sacrifice and the worship, the incense and the fire, the victim and the slayer, the father and the mother of the world, gird thy servants with power and wisdom to-day to slay the slayer, and to vanquish the deceiver," etc. Theodore Parker, in his public prayers, was wont to address the Deity as the Father and Mother of men.

THE PENNSYLVANIA PILGRIM, and other Poems. By John Greenleaf Whittier. 12mo. pp. 129. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1872.

Comparing this volume with others which Mr. Whittier has written, we are obliged to say that we think it unequal to several of them. We speak more particularly of the Pennsylvania Pilgrim, the principal poem in this beautifully printed volume. It is an attempt to do for the Quakers — the original settlers of Pennsylvania — what has so abundantly been done for the New England Puritans — to give a picture of their life and times. But neither the Puritan nor Quaker life, as we conceive, furnishes a very promising theme for a poem; and perhaps Mr. Whittier has succeeded as well in his task as the nature of it would allow.

THE DAYS OF JEZEBEL; an Historical Drama. By Peter Bayne, Author of "The Christian Life, Social and Individual," "Essays in Biography and Criticism," etc. 12mo. pp. 240. Boston: Gould and Lincoln; New York: Sheldon and Co. 1872.

So far as we are aware, this is Mr. Bayne's first appearance as a poet; at least, if he has written any other poems, it has not been our fortune to see them. He is a prose writer of more than usual force; though his style, in our judgment, is excessively elaborate and ambitious. This fault, he says in the Preface to the work before us, he meant carefully to avoid, and in this attempt he has been quite successful. His purpose in this drama is to give a correct view of the character and actions of Jezebel,

such, as he thinks, all writers on Jewish history hitherto, from one motive or another, have failed to do. He represents Jezebel as a character of a much higher order, of more intellectual power, and more thorough culture than she is usually supposed to have been. She is described, also, as entertaining very extensive political schemes, — as wishing to unite the Israelitish kingdom with that of Tyre, so that by this means it might reach a much higher national glory than its hitherto insulated situation had rendered possible. Such an alliance would have involved, of course, the substitution of paganism for the Mosaic religion; and it was the knowledge of this design of Jezebel which made her the object of such intense dislike and abhorrence with the prophet Elijah and other devout Jews. It is the avowed aim of this drama to develop this plot. The expectations which we were led to form, while reading the Preface, we cannot say were fully realized. The execution does not quite equal the original conception. Still, it is a work of much power, and will be likely to start trains of thought which all students of the Bible will do well to follow out.

PANSIES "FOR THOUGHTS." By Adeline D. T. Whitney. 18mo. pp. 111. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1872.

We imagine that some persons, on reading the title-page and dedication of this volume, will feel tempted to lay it down and go no further, repelled by the affectation therein displayed. Should this temptation, however, be overcome, the reader will, we think, be rewarded for his patience, as he will find in this volume many quite choice specimens of poetry. Several of the pieces were written during the late civil war, and in addition to their poetical merit breathe a spirit of vigorous patriotism.

Cheap Editions of Three Valuable Works. — DISCOURSES UPON THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. By Stephen Charnock, B.D., Fellow of New College, Oxford. With his Life and Character, by William Symington, D.D. Two volumes in one. 8vo. pp. 543. — SERMONS AND DISCOURSES BY THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D., LL.D. Now completed by the introduction of his Posthumous Sermons. Two volumes in one. 8vo. pp. 463. — THE WORKS OF REV. ROBERT MURRAY MCCHEYNE. Complete in one volume. 8vo. pp. 618. — It is needless to say a word in commendation of works so well known as those of Charnock, Chalmers, and McCheyne. Since the days of Charnock great advances have been made in natural theology, yet the majority of clergymen may derive more profit from his work than from any other devoted to this science. The three volumes are published in good style by the enterprising House of Robert Carter and Brothers, No. 530, Broadway, New York.

THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

LAW, PROVIDENCE, AND PRAYER.

BY PROF. J. E. WELLS, M.A., CANADIAN LITERARY INSTITUTE, WOODSTOCK,
ONTARIO.

THE Christian believer will not readily surrender his faith in the reality and the absoluteness of the divine government of the world in which we live. To do so would be to abandon a fundamental article of his creed, to ignore one of the clearest and most prominent doctrines of his great text-book, to cut adrift from the sheet-anchor of his most precious faith, and commit himself to the darkness, the billows, and the storm, with chance instead of beneficent Providence as pilot, and, in place of infinitely intelligent purpose, naught but blind, inexorable force at the helm.

The belief in an ever-present, all-controlling Omniscience is of the very essence of the Christian faith; because that, and that alone, can explain the inception, the unfolding, the consummation, and the personal application of the great redemption. And certainly no other truth is more clearly taught or more constantly illustrated in the Bible. On every page it reveals a "God near at hand, not afar off," the great source and centre of all life, all government, all love. No event is so trivial, no creature so insignificant, as to escape his notice; no force so mighty, no influences so complicated or so far-reaching, as to put at fault for an instant his infinite

prescience, or turn aside a hair's breadth from its aim his eternal, all-embracing purpose. Nay, rather, all being, all life, all action, all development, all change, are but an infinite series of expressions of his omniscient thought, or manifestations of his omnipotent will. And this God is the Christian's Friend and Father, his refuge in danger, his solace in sorrow, his light in darkness, his all in all. All language fails to convey any adequate conception of the certainty, the completeness, the ineffable blessedness of the divine care and love upon which the child of such a Father is taught that his filial heart may rely, without presumption and without misgiving.

We place side by side with such a faith as this the cold, dark creed—for creed it likewise is—which aims to demonstrate with scientific precision that all beings of whatever order, all events of whatever nature, are but so many products of certain blind, inexplicable, and inexorable forces, operating upon, perhaps inherent in, particles of matter of whose origin no account can be given; which either claims to have reached, or promises soon to reach, a stage of scientific discovery whose effect must be to “quench all possibility of belief in the divine interposition under the overwhelming pressure of a changeless law of evolution from the time when the globe was a chaos of nebulous matter”; which logically concludes either that it is equally “unscientific”—cruel word—to affirm or to deny the existence of a God, or, condescending to assume his existence, that we can know nothing of his attributes, seeing that he has so put the universe of which we form an insignificant part out of his hands—so given over the motions of atoms and of worlds, the destinies of men and of nations, to the operation of non-intelligent forces and laws, that he can no longer modify their action to succor a saint or save a nation. Thus coolly and cruelly is man, with all his instinctive and historic faith in a “Divinity that shapes our ends” relegated down to the position of a wretched denizen of a “forsaken and fatherless world,” or, at least, compelled to relinquish utterly all the joy of a filial trust in a great All-Father, and to satisfy his

aspirations "with cherishing the noblest and most human of man's emotions by worship, for the most part of the silent sort, at the altar of the Unknown and the Unknowable."

Looking on this picture and on that, can we wonder if the Christian disciple is prepared to cling as for life to his faith and his God; refusing to relinquish them at the bidding of anything but the clearest, most unanswerable demonstration?

We do not put the case too strongly. Few thoughtful minds can doubt that the issue between the faith of the Christian and the teachings of an influential class of modern scientists is thus broad and vital. "The natural" is striving, as the Duke of Argyll has said, "to cast out the supernatural." True, there are not wanting those, both within and without the pale of the Christian church, who are casting eagerly about to find some golden mean, some neutral territory, or place of compromise. But upon a question so tremendous in itself and so vital to our most precious interests, there can be no compromise and no neutrality. If the Bible teaches anything, it surely teaches that the omniscient sovereignty which notes the fall of a sparrow, or a hair, is absolutely unlimited, and that the prayer of faith lays hold upon the hand of Omnipotence. And, on the other hand, Science herself, whose whole course is but a perpetual gliding from link to link of an infinite and infinitely involved chain, and who is thus continually tracing back to events the most trivial, the most stupendous issues, must no less emphatically affirm that if the influence of the superhuman upon the earth is not absolutely *nil*, human thought can set no bounds to it.

And here it may be worth while to observe that this issue so fraught with intensest interest to mortal — perhaps immortal — men is no new one. It is but a new form of the "conflict of ages." The metempsychosis of rationalism itself, its Protean facility in change of shape and garb, is one of the many curious phenomena which rationalism will find it difficult to explain, unless upon the assumption that each form of it has its own peculiar orbit in the universe

of thought, in which it is certain at regularly recurrent points to intersect again the plane of philosophic inquiry. The human mind, untaught by, or unsubmissive to, revelation, seems to have ever been more or less in a state of oscillation between irrational religion and irreligious rationalism. Comte's law of the three states has no historical basis. As Professor Huxley has shown: "It is absurd to say of men in a state of primitive savagery that all their conceptions are in a theological state. Nine tenths of them are eminently realistic, and as positive as ignorance and narrowness can make them." Nor, on the other hand, need we go back to the infancy of the race or the individual, or even to that of philosophic thought or scientific method, to find the human intellect in its theological stage. The devout worshipper of the Invisible, in the dim foretime of the race, whose soul thrills responsive to every grander sight and sound of nature, and who stands awe-struck in the presence of the majesty and the mystery in which the great mother constantly enshrouds her operations; to whom every flutter of her robes is instinct with supernatural influence, and every tone of her myriad voices prophetic of coming woe or weal; whose all-personifying faith never for a moment questions both the ability and the willingness of the deities it worships to be touched with the sorrows and moved by the prayers of mortals, is not without his counterpart in the latter half of the nineteenth century. To-day, in this era of intense intellectual activity, are to be found many men, the peers of any others in mental breadth and culture, and even in successful devotion to science proper, who cherish a belief in the constant agency of superhuman intelligences and in the personal and all-embracing rule of a Supreme Intelligence, as strong and unswerving as any which lives in epic song or Oriental tradition.

But if the question cannot be decided by the *argumentum ad verecundiam*, no more can it by the *argumentum ad judicium*. It can no more appeal to the common sense of the many than to the authoritative opinions of the few. We

cannot for a moment admit the *a priori* superiority tacitly assumed for the so-called positive mental stage by both Comte and his reviewer. In the first of the three states, we are told, an immediate "supernatural origin is sought for all phenomena, and the *Deus ex machina* is the only explanation of events." The second deals with certain "abstract forces, or entities, supposed to inhere in various substances, and to be capable of engendering phenomena." In the third, the mind abandons as vain and hopeless all search after causes and essences, and "restricts itself to the observation and classification of phenomena, and to the discovery of the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things have to each other, in a word, to the discovery of the laws of phenomena." Now, if it be true, as so many acute minds of the present day seem to have become convinced, that this last statement adequately describes the sphere and bounds of all our actual and possible knowledge, and indicates correctly the goal towards which the cultivated intellect of the nineteenth century, casting aside the fetters of a useless metaphysics and an effete theology, is rapidly tending, the fact is certainly a most humiliating one. To the human soul, hungering for a knowledge of realities, yearning to discover or be taught what matter, life, thought are, and what their destinies, it is but a poor consolation to be cited in reply to a "mere ticketing and orderly assortment of external facts," which can but aid it in understanding and remembering how they exhibit themselves. It asks for bread, and is given a stone. If this be indeed the sum of all attainable knowledge, it will be found difficult to account, either on scientific or on moral principles, for this intense longing of which every awakened mind is sometimes conscious, for some deeper insight into those great mysteries. The positivist, it is clear, cannot attempt to account for it without serious danger of being betrayed into some of those philosophical "Hibernicisms" which Argyll so pithily describes. And truly, if there be anywhere in the great universe some brighter sphere, whose inhabitants, by virtue of higher

endowments, are enabled to get but a single step behind mere phenomena, and so one step nearer to the mysteries of essence and origin, of real being and real causation, and if these favored intelligences, in the exercise of their wider scope of vision, are able to look down upon our little globe, and study the intellectual states and operations of its inhabitants, — taking in at a glance the long, long history of the ambitious, but abortive past of human philosophy, and comparing it with the narrow domain and small ambition of the scientific present, — the spectacle cannot fail to awaken in their bosoms mingled feelings of pity and amusement. It is by no means clear that they would be so ready to recognize the extent and value of the progress indicated by the alleged change of mental processes. Possibly, from the point of view of those loftier intellects, the first and simplest mode of thought, with all its grandeur of conception and wealth of imagery might be seen to be, after all, but the more immediate product of an acuter intuition, and so but a short cut to a higher generalization, than any within the reach of the physiological and experimental methods of later days. Nay, it might even be manifest to such intelligences that the human mind in its second or so-called metaphysical stage, intensely alive to the constant and ever-potent action of unseen agencies within and without, and striving by sheer force of introspection on the one hand, or hypothesis on the other, to reach some definite, harmonious conceptions of the modes and attributes of the unseen, was really delving for deeper truths and cherishing loftier aspirations, or, at least, sharpening for the revelations of the future, keener appetites, than are possible to the scientific intellects of those who, with a shrug and a sneer for the blindness of the past, resolutely turn their backs upon what they have labelled “the unknowable,” and, in the exercise of a kind of conscious selection, smothering at birth all cravings after the supernatural, set out to explore the realm of all possible knowledge with the lens, the balance, and the crucible.

It will be seen that it is by no means the correctness within

its own large sphere, or the immense practical utility of the "scientific method," that we impugn, but the exclusiveness claimed for it by some of its votaries. The disposition to search after real causes, and to refer phenomena to underlying substances, is as deeply ingrained in our mental constitutions as our fondness for assorting and generalizing facts. The child of nature in his primitive simplicity is, no doubt, more attracted by the manifestation itself than its mode. His attention may be so absorbed by the exhibition of power that he fails to trace the all-pervading method. But may it not be said that the tendency of the modern scientist, on the other hand, is to regard exclusively the manner of the manifestation, and, absorbed in the work of studying, analyzing and classifying the *phenomena*, to lose sight of the originating *noumena*?

In any case it is clear that it is phenomena, or in other words, facts, accessible to observation and experiment, which form the basis and starting-point of all our knowledge. Without further discussion of the proper mode of using these facts, we propose now to consider for a little the question to what extent the method of investigation which restricts itself and all true philosophy to "the discovery of the laws of phenomena," is capable, on its own principles, of affording complete results. Admitting, for argument's sake, that the human mind can learn nothing of the nature of causes and essences, and that the only explanation, or rather substitute for explanation, of things and events, to which it can properly aspire, is that reached by processes of generalization, the inquiry naturally arises, to what extent is this process applicable to the facts of nature and of human life?

We must, however, premise one remark more. That of which we are in search, and which the mind craves with an intensity that refuses to be turned aside, is *explanation*. Hence it is useless to deal with any statement, or theory, which begs the whole question by striving to steer clear of any attempt at this, and to shut us down to the mere "assortment and ticketing" of the dry facts themselves, ignoring

even such conceptions as those of law and force and cause. Such attempts, although always and necessarily abortive from the very nature of the mind, have in themselves, it must be confessed, a logical consistency. They foresee the objection which might be urged, that there is of necessity in every act of generalization a metaphysical element. For as in every transition from observed facts to the underlying law, the law reached is more extensive than the sum total of the facts, it is clear that the basis and pillars of the extension are to be found in some process of inference, grounded upon some internal conviction. This conviction, albeit it may be in itself an induction, must nevertheless have some of its prime factors or constituent elements in the mind itself—in some innate power or tendency having more or less of the nature of intuitive cognition. Else we are inevitably drawn in a vicious circle, to seek the origin of our power of generalizing in an act of generalization.

The word "law" has been exalted to an unwonted, possibly an undue, eminence, in modern science. It is the concise expression of the aim and end of the positive philosophy. We cannot doubt that the large class of able and distinguished men who have accepted with more or less reservation and deviation the fundamental principles of Comte's system—whether they regard him as the originator of that system or not—would unhesitatingly give in their adhesion to his thesis, as a correct statement of the aims and limitations of true scientific inquiry. It must henceforth, in their opinion, "restrict itself to the observation and classification of phenomena, and to the discovery of the invariable relations of succession and similitude which things have to each other; in a word, to the discovery of the laws of phenomena." The sway of law is, in their esteem, universal and absolute. They find it in every region of the great domain of nature; in the deposition of the clay; the crystallization of the mineral; the growth of the plant; the development of physical, intellectual, and moral life. It balances the clouds, rules the tempests, controls the mighty natural

forces, holds and moves the unerring spheres in their orbits, determines the characters and destinies of men. In every region of inquiry they discover law behind law, law interlacing with law, law modifying or over-riding law, until at length the whole universe of things existing, growing, moving, feeling, thinking, and willing, reveals itself to the keen second-sight of the scientific seer, springing like an exhalation, at the omnipotent fiat of law, from some primeval chaos of stardust, and gradually and grandly unfolding and developing itself, ever under the influence of some newer and higher phase of law, into the glorious cosmos of the nineteenth century.

Now, however unwilling we may be to accept the fundamental principles of the positive school, or the narrow limits it assigns to philosophic investigation, it is by no means the aim of this Article to disparage either the methods or the results of modern science. No candid mind can affect, no thinking one can afford, to despise the one or the other. Rich, almost exhaustless, and yet constantly accumulating stores of the most interesting and suggestive facts, culled from a thousand fruitful fields of inquiry, are already treasured up for our inspection, while such broad and magnificent generalizations as universal attraction, the absolute indestructibility of both matter and force, the correlation of physical forces and, we might add, evolution, were there any probability of its ever being established, reveal to us a harmony, a unity, and a simplicity in the operations of nature, which would have come to the wisest of our ancestors as a revelation. Both the patiently assorted facts and the grand inductions make large demands upon our admiration and our gratitude, and the meed is cheerfully accorded.

Our present aim is simply to inquire, and to inquire from a single point of view, how far the "discovery of the laws of phenomena" constitutes not merely a legitimate and highly important, but the only true, end of scientific investigation. We shall, of necessity, pass by many aspects of the question, suggestive of difficulty and defect in this postulate of pos-

itivism, which have been frequently and forcibly presented. Admitting, for argument's sake, that the human mind can learn nothing of the nature of causes and essences, and that science should attempt to deal with phenomena only, the question seems to us still pertinent: Is it true that *all* the complicated phenomena of the world in which we live are susceptible of reduction to law? Is there sufficient reason for believing that this is the one master-key upon which we may confidently rely for ultimate admission into the innermost penetralia of the great temple of Nature's mysteries?

We think we may venture to expect assent to the following proposition. A scientific induction, or generalization, is complete and satisfactory only in so far as it embraces all the facts or phenomena for which it is intended to account. Just in proportion as all the individual cases which come within the range of the special inquiry can be shown to fall into order and harmony under the supposed principle or law, just in that proportion has a satisfactory scientific solution of the problem been reached. And, on the other hand, just so far as it can be shown that certain facts are left unexplained by, or at direct variance with, the supposed principle, just so far does the latter fall short of a complete result, or verge towards entire failure. It may, or it may not, be valuable so far as it goes, but it evidently cannot be accepted as the final goal of inquiry upon the subject. And hence, by an easy and manifest induction, we reach the general conclusion, that in so far as any philosophic system or method can be shown to fall short of affording an actual or conceivable explanation of all the natural phenomena which form the subject-matter of its investigations, it fails to meet the necessary conditions, the manifest requirements, of the fundamental principle of modern science. This being admitted, if it can be shown that a large and interesting mass of undoubted facts, facts patent to all observation and experiment, not only refuse to fall into order at the bidding of any known law, but actually exhibit in their very nature features utterly irreconcilable with every scientific conception of the meaning

of the word, it is evident that either these facts must be shown to lie entirely beyond the scientific pale, or the philosophic theory which fails to account for them stands sadly in need of enlargement.

The Duke of Argyll, in his "Reign of Law," has defined with scientific precision the various meanings and shades of meaning attached to the word "law" in its usage by men of science. Without attempting a nice observation of any of those distinctions, it will be sufficient for the present purpose to note that the essence of the term, in all its wide range of application, may be found in the idea of *uniformity*. We use this latter word in one of its legitimate senses, as denoting conformity to a pattern or rule. The notion of uniformity may be attached simply to the observed characteristics of the phenomena themselves, or to the order of their occurrence, or to their relations as sequences of similar antecedents, or products of the action of so-called forces, but in each case it will be seen that the uniformity is either itself the law, or is the indication and proof of the existence of the law. Hence it is manifest that the scope for the discovery of "laws of phenomena" must be exactly co-extensive with the existence of features of uniformity in the visible or experimental characteristics of natural objects. This uniformity may, it is clear, be regarded as either perfect and absolute, or as admitting of degrees. For convenience' sake we may use the words "resemblance" and "similitude" as synonymous with it in the latter sense.

To say that the phenomena of nature afford unlimited scope for the study of uniformity in its restricted sense, or the "discovery of relations of succession and similitude," would be to utter a mere truism. It would be the trite enunciation of a fact which is the basis of all classification, and so co-extensive not only with the vast area of the physical sciences, but with the material of all those broader generalizations in the spheres of politics and ethics which constitute the corner-stones of the fabrics of modern civilization. The "invariable relations of similitude" constitute the basis of

scientific classification. From those of succession we get by means of original suggestion, or induction, or some other agency, our notion of cause and effect. The former enables the explorer to construct those elaborate systems of steps and terraces which render comparatively easy to his successor the ascent of the vast slopes and acclivities of natural history. The latter prompts him to the more arduous but fascinating task of attempting to thread the intricate and mysterious labyrinths of natural philosophy, and to lay down clues for the guidance of those coming after him. With regard to the latter of these subdivisions of the realm of science we care not now what speculative views may be held of the origin of our notion of causation. John Stuart Mill's definition of the law of causation, "that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it," will do as well as any other. "To certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe, always will succeed." "*Let the fact be what it may, if it has begun to exist, it was preceded by some fact or facts, with which it is invariably connected.*" We emphasize this last statement, whose truth is obvious, for the sake of calling attention to the following corollaries. First. If in a given case in which the physical antecedents are, so far as scientific observation can determine, precisely similar, the consequent facts are found to vary, the variations must be due, in every instance, to some other unknown cause or antecedent. Second. If, in the given case, the varying facts are found to exhibit features individually distinct and peculiar, each fact must have a distinct and peculiar cause or antecedent. In other words such facts cannot have their origin in any common cause having the nature of a law.

Holding in mind these principles, we pass to notice a great fact which seems to us to have an important bearing upon the subject of discussion, and to be utterly incapable of being harmonized with the assumption that all natural phenomena are explicable by law.

There is no such thing as absolute uniformity in nature. Prominent amidst the ever-present, ever-abounding similarity there is also an ever-present, intense individualism. Probably no two objects in all the realm of nature are precisely alike. Could the existence of rare exceptions be demonstrated they would but prove the rule. Let the student of science make his subdivisions co-extensive with the existence of *differentiae* on which to found them, and the work of classification will stop, in each instance, only with the individual. In the overlooking or ignoring of this fact inheres, it seems to us, the radical defect, the want of universal applicability, of the modern scientific method. The fact itself is too obvious to need argument or admit of dispute. A little illustration, the material for which everywhere abounds, may render clearer its bearing upon our present position. For the purpose of such illustration the phenomena of nature may be conveniently grouped into three classes; viz. the facts of the physical world, the events of human life, and mental and spiritual manifestations.

We turn our eyes to the crust of the globe upon which we live. Here Science, in her search after relations of succession and similitude, has been abundantly successful. She can point with unwavering confidence to evidence which cannot be gainsaid of the operation of mighty natural forces upheaving, disrupting, fusing, disintegrating, depositing, levelling, through long ages. Up to a certain point the action of these forces—we use the word “force” in its modern acceptation, as denoting the unknown but uniform cause of observed effects—affords an explanation, satisfactory on scientific principles, of the phenomena. But whence the infinite diversity in the effects of these single or combined causes—a diversity co-extensive with the effects themselves? Where on all the broad surface of this fair earth can we find two hills or valleys or plains or lakes or seas or streams, nay, two boulders or crystals or grains of sand, the exact counterparts of each other? The operating cause or causes must, according to science, have been in countless instances absolutely

uniform. But striking resemblances in general features, coincident with most striking varieties and peculiarities in detail, is all that can be affirmed of the effects. The question of varying conditions as distinct from operating forces will presently be considered.

We mount a step higher. We turn our attention to the vegetable products which beautify this crust, and fit it to sustain animal life. We stay not now to inquire how the origin of these endless varieties of genera and species can be accounted for by any theory of law, pure and simple, i.e. by any combination of forces or agencies which must be blindly uniform in their operations, and utterly incapable of any kind of selection; but we descend through the bewildering and almost interminable series of divisions and sub-divisions, classes and sub-classes, order and sub-orders, genera and sub-genera, species, sub-species, and varieties, not without ardent admiration of the talent, skill, and patience with which the system has been elaborated. But no matter which of the thousand branching paths we take in our descent, our guiding genius of classification can find us no natural resting-place, no dead level, however small, of absolute uniformity, until we reach the individual. Every constituent unit, in all the countless tribes of vegetable products, exhibits features of external form and internal structure more or less distinct from those of every other.

We mount higher still, and enter the regions of animal life. Still the same unending variations everywhere wrought with infinite skill into every pattern. The trite remark that no two human faces are exactly alike, is but the expression, in regard to a particular class, of a fact as broad in its manifestation as the whole range of the animal creation — a fact so patent in the case of the larger animals that it would be idle to offer illustration or proof. And what is true of the mere outer form and expression holds, with ever increasing force and distinctness, when we ascend to the sphere of mental activities and endowments. To the existence of different grades and shades of mental capacity in the lower animals

of the same species, Darwin, the prince of observers and experimentalists in this region — in compliment to whom we use the word “mental” in this connection — bears ample testimony. The marked and marvellous individuality in intellectual and moral features which characterizes the whole human family is proverbial. Could one look down from the tower of St. Paul’s in London, with some optical instrument capable of piercing to the thoughts, feelings, and intents of each heart amidst the teeming millions, he would discover in all the vast throng no two the exact *fac-similes* of each other in the “inner man.” “The heart of each knoweth its own bitterness, and a stranger intermeddled not with his joy.”

Now, we ask, what has that scientific system whose fundamental principle is the all-prevalence of law to say to this? Take the very lowest view of the sphere of philosophy. Confine its operations to mere classification. Nothing can afford a more incomplete or unsatisfactory result, inasmuch as the last analysis of similitudes leaves still a residuum of phenomena, a thousandfold more numerous than the individual objects of study, which obstinately refuse to be classified. What shall be done with these? What remains for the philosophic system which deals wholly with similitudes when all similitudes are exhausted, and a large mass of unused and unexplained material is left behind? Shall it not summon to its aid some other more flexible hypothesis? Or shall it simply stop short in its researches, and relegate every fact which will not submit to its conditions down to the dark realms of the vast unknown? Our perceptive faculties seem quite as well adapted for the observation of individual peculiarities, as for tracing class resemblances. Shall, then, all that vast mass of facts which, for want of a better word, we shall call *individualisms*, be passed by unobserved, or thrown aside as inexplicable, simply because they fail to submit to the requirements of a system or the exigencies of a dogma?

But let us take the higher view of the functions of science, in which she traces “invariable relations of succession,” as well as of “similitude,” and ascribes observed uniformities in

effect to the operation of uniform, though unknown, causes, which she calls "forces" or "tendencies." It is manifestly inseparable from the scientific conception of these causes that, the conditions being the same, they must give rise to precisely similar results. They are blind. They are unipotent. In whatsoever plane they operate, whether physical, mental, or moral, they are adapted each to the production of one, and but one, result. When, for instance, we harness one of the great natural forces to machinery we confidently expect uniformity in its operation. Our very power of utilizing those forces depends upon this characteristic. The only source of possible variety in the results must be found either in natural differences in the material operated upon, or in changes and adjustments of the machinery. The same is true, the positive philosophy teaches us, even in the higher region of morals, insomuch that when the power is brought to bear in the shape of motive, the conditions external and internal remaining unchanged, uniformity is inevitable and the result can be surely predicted. We shudder at the conception of such a world as would be the legitimate product of such a *modus operandi*, pure and simple. Admit the most complicated interactions and adjustments for the sake of variety — although it is difficult to see how law could account for these — and yet, after taxing to the utmost our powers of conception in this direction, what can we possibly reach but a cosmos in which the types and shades of difference between class and class shall be uniform and constant somewhere? In the lowest sub-classes, at least, we must find a region of tiresome *fac-similes*, of drear uniformity. The idea of law, or any congeries or network of laws, in themselves utterly destitute of power of choice or conscious selection, giving forth myriads of products, so that each individual product shall exhibit manifest idiosyncrasies, is, we hold, utterly inconceivable, apart from the re-adjusting agency of something akin to a superintending intelligence.

But the conditions. These, we shall be told, make all the difference. We have been obliged to postulate that these

shall remain unchanged, in order to reach our conclusion, while, in fact, they are ever shifting and so giving rise to all the varieties in question. We reply,

First, is there not here a vicious circle in the reasoning? The reign of law, universal law, is predicated as an induction from observed similitudes. Must not, then, the induction logically stop or fail when the similitudes, or the ability to trace them, ceases? Can the inductive logic be permitted to belie its own principles by resorting, in its straits, to a hypothesis to help it out? Might not, for instance, one who attributed every effect in nature to the direct, immediate operation of an infinite will, just as logically attempt to account for all the striking similitudes in phenomena by ascribing them to "accident," or the "nature of things," whatever those expressions may mean? We have sometimes thought a curious problem might be propounded to the advocates of evolutionism, somewhat as follows: Given, so many elementary substances as chemistry can discover — not to say such a threefold unity as is found in the microscopic protoplasm — to construct from these a world containing as many individuals as our own in its three kingdoms, each individual as well adapted to its own particular sphere and functions, with less of similarity in plan and structure than that which constitutes the basis of the theory of evolution. We doubt if large demands would not be made upon the philosopher's powers of permutation and combination before the solution was reached. The point we here make is this. Admitting, as the logic of facts must compel us to do, the existence side by side, throughout all the world of nature, of similitudes and individualisms, the one suggesting law, the other, something the very antipodes of law, why select the one class to the exclusion of the other, as the basis of a philosophic system?

Again, the question of conditions only removes the difficulty a step, or rather step by step, backward. Are not the conditions themselves both the subjects and the products of law? Mr. Mill, in his treatise on Logic, shows clearly that our

selection of one antecedent and calling it the cause and all others conditions, is to a great extent arbitrary. We might with equal propriety, and do where it suits our purpose, remand this cause back to the rank of a condition, and raise some other condition to the dignity of a cause. Hence, it is clear, we are led back to the complicated network of laws which, as above shown, must at the last inevitably land us in a region of absolute uniformity. To take the other horn of the dilemma, and assert that the conditions are not themselves laws, would be, of course, to give up the whole case, by introducing some foreign agency distinct and different from that of law.

Thirdly, this plea of changed conditions is nugatory, inasmuch as, in multitudes of cases, it cannot be proved by observation, or experiment, i.e. by true scientific methods. Twin acorns grow side by side upon the same twig. They fall into the same soil at the distance of a few feet from each other. Yet ten years after the resulting trees will present ten thousand distinctly marked peculiarities in height and length and angle of branches, in number, shape, and size of twigs and leaves. Where shall we find the causes? In the germs, or in the soil, or in the situation? And if found in the one or the other, or elsewhere, what were *their* causes, and what the causes of their operating just as they have done upon the respective plants? May we not, in strict accordance with scientific principles, thus go back from one physical cause to another until we reach a point at which some antecedent cause radically different from and independent of our law-abiding forces, some seemingly voluntary, often seemingly capricious, *vis viva* reveals itself in individualisms from which originated all the peculiarities in question? This point is well illustrated in Darwin's theory of the origin of species. The starting-point of each species must be sought for in some original accidental variation. But what is this accident? Whatever it is, Science evidently has no place for it in her creed, unless it be regarded as a synonyme for the unknown cause to which the same writer, in other places, attributes

similar phenomena. But may not this unknown cause, which occasionally produces striking variations, anomalies, be identical with that which constantly gives rise to the slighter individual peculiarities of which we are speaking? And if so, why may it not be the chief and constant agent in gradually effecting those permanent results for which his theory is intended to account? That those peculiarities play a very important part in the economy of nature, no matter through what philosophic lens it is viewed, is abundantly manifest. Professor Huxley, in one of his published addresses, has shown, "the advisableness of improving natural knowledge" from a view of its practical utility in revealing the laws which govern the ravages of such agents as fire, disease, etc. Illustrations of that utility abound. Science is even now rendering immense benefits to society, by noting the starting-place and predicting the course of storms and hurricanes. But there is evidently a question for philosophy behind all this. The barometer has fallen suddenly in a certain district. Why? What has caused the sudden rarefaction of the atmosphere and determined it to that particular spot? In short, what scope is afforded under the regime of uniform natural laws for such variations and peculiarities as are of daily and hourly occurrence all over the globe? Is the vast machinery so set that all these fluctuations, small and great, come round in constantly recurring cycles? Will not true science rather frankly ascribe them to unknown but ever operative causes akin to those already referred to?

We have, perhaps, no right to complain that modern science does not attempt to explain the nature of those unknown agencies whose presence and potency it may not deny. But should it not take more account of them in framing its system? To base a verdict upon a moiety of the evidence is certainly not in the interests of truth. There is manifestly still needed some complementary philosophy of the other side of phenomena — not necessarily of the supernatural, for as the individualisms are as much natural as the similitudes, so we see no reason why the unknown causes of the former

should be regarded as less natural than those — as a matter of fact equally unknown — of the latter. In other words we see no reason why, to beings conscious of volition, an alternative cause, a cause capable of producing varied results, should be regarded as more inconceivable than one producing simply uniform effects. We need an explanation of peculiar and anomalous, no less than of normal, phenomena. Law, in its scientific acceptation, must still and ever retain imperial sway over a large domain, but its apotheosis must be deferred. At any rate it must be content to take a seat in the Olympus of science subordinate to that occupied by that mysterious agency which is ever controlling and modifying all its operations, an agency which seems to have its best analogue in the human will, not the will as conceived by certain positivists, a mere automaton, pulled hither and thither by wires of motive, but the will as it exists in the vulgar conception, which is the firstborn of consciousness, a real cause in itself, with powers of independent choice — a cause, moreover, whose nature and operations are only in degree more difficult of conception than those of any of the physical causes with whose operations science is so conversant.

We have thus far attempted to show that the theory of law utterly fails to account for a very large and important part of the phenomena of the physical world — that, even granting its advocates and worshippers the existence both of the original “world-stuff” and of those unknown forces whose operations they call law, in any number and variety, they yet are quite unable to account for myriads of facts patent to all observation and experiment. Let us now turn, for a moment, to human life in its abounding forms and phases. We have already alluded to the boundless diversity in mental and moral features so characteristic of our race. We glance in thought over the world with its teeming millions. Each has not only a cast of character and a type of mind, but also a place, a responsibility, and a destiny peculiarly his own. Each sustains relations to persons and to things distinct and different from those of every other.

Each has, in short, not only a personality, but an individuality. Now, it is evident that on the theory which ascribes every result to the operation of uniform and unintelligent forces, all the difficulties already pointed out in other spheres reappear and demand solution. How have blind natural laws ever been able not only to produce each individual as such, but also to fix for individuals, as well as nations, "the appointed seasons and limits of their abode"? But let us now waive all these preliminary objections. Let us grant all these existing conditions and relations, as so many postulates to the believers in the sway of law, and turn to another problem, of necessity a very complicated one, from the very fact of the presence of all these elements of variety. That problem is to account, on the theory we are discussing, for the events of a year, or a day, in the life of any one individual, thus excluding all room and necessity for the presence of any superintending intelligence.

Here it may be proper to observe, even at the risk of repetition, that the question is not whether law exists, whether its operation cannot be seen and traced ever and everywhere. The most unswerving faith in the most absolute sway of an Overruler is quite compatible with a belief in uniform, unchanging law. Nay, uniformity is inseparable from the very notion of a perfect Ruler. There can be, in a consistent conception of the operations of such a being, no room for any of the weaknesses and imperfections which mar the harmony of all human character and action — no nice balancings of conflicting motives — no troublesome doubts on questions of the wise and the unwise, the right and the wrong — no struggles between self-interest or depraved inclination, and conscience — no hesitating council between "the genius and the mortal instruments." On the contrary, such a conception must embrace the most perfect adjustment of means to ends, the most complete control of necessary agencies, but at the same time the most absolute foreknowledge and pre-arrangement. But tiresome uniformity is no necessary element. Omniscience need by no means be tied down to any one set of

agencies, or any one mode of operation. A thousand courses of events in respect to the individual might all be seen to be equally right, equally in accord with both absolute justice and goodness, and thus ample scope be afforded for that love of infinite variety which we find abounding in all nature's handiwork.

The question whether all events in the lives of individual men and women are simply the products of a network of unchanging, unchoosing laws, or whether all are under the direct supervision and control of superhuman agencies and a supreme intelligence, is one of the most intense interest to all. It naturally resolves itself into two divisions; the one touching events entirely beyond the control of the person affected; the other, those arising out of his own character and conduct. The former involves the alternatives of law and providence. The latter suggests the question of the abstract ability to predict human actions, or, in other words, the nature of the will. But, in regard to the whole subject, it is evident that here, too, there can be no middle ground. We often hear language used, even by firm believers in a superintending Providence, which would seem to imply a conviction that the general course of human affairs has been given over largely to the operation of uniform natural and moral causes, but that the Almighty has reserved to himself the right to interfere in special cases, interrupting or modifying those laws as occasion demands, and thus giving rise to what are sometimes called special providences. The man who has had a hairbreadth escape from destruction by pestilence or fire or sword, is called upon to return thanks for his preservation. Of course, if we are hourly dependent upon the untiring care of a benevolent All-Father, it is well that we should be occasionally startled into something more than a mere general and hazy recognition of the fact. But it would seem to require but a little patient reflection to convince any one that if God rules personally at all, he must rule over all and always. If he takes cognizance of the loss of a thousand lives, he must also note the fall of a hair. If

the terrible railway disaster, which in an instant brings desolation and death to a thousand homes, be not beneath the notice of an all-seeing eye, that eye cannot but have previously been cognizant of the flaw in a bit of steel, or the momentary inadvertence of a switch-man, which led to it. If the wail of the heart-broken widow and the homeless orphan, ascending to heaven amidst the ruins of a desolated city, reaches the ear of the Eternal, that ear cannot have been regardless of the first crackle of the tiny flame in which the conflagration originated. If the sufferings of one of his children, condemned through some trifling accident (?) to life-long darkness and misery are not beneath his notice, then he must stoop to regard the movements, and the causes of the movements, of a grain of sand or a jet of steam capable of producing such a catastrophe. Ten thousand incidents from history and every-day experience will instantly occur to every thoughtful mind, to prove that the most important and momentous events in the life of men and of nations, are often pivoted upon what are to human eyes events as trivial as can be conceived of. The machinery which moves the world of mind and matter, and regulates all the phenomena of human life, is vast and complicated beyond all finite conception. Either an infinitely wise and mighty hand must be ever upon the hidden springs and regulators, or all its operations must be blind and uniform alike. Any middle hypothesis must inevitably leave room for the absurd and startling anomaly that something might some time occur for which he was unprepared, and so the infinite Ruler of the universe be taken by surprise.

In attempting to show that the facts of human life and conduct are such as emphatically forbid the assumption that blind law is omnipotent, we might repeat the argument already used in another connection, from the absence of uniformity. What student of history or biography, or of human life, can point us to the two individuals amidst the myriads who now people the earth, or who have gone down to the silent cities of the dead, whose lives were marked by

precisely the same events, or moulded by precisely similar influences? We simply touch the problem, and leave each to find his own solution.

Again we might refer to the prevalent belief of all the ages. This belief so widespread, so deeply rooted, in the rule of supernatural intelligences and agencies, whether regarded as a product of intuition, or an induction from experience, or both, should surely count for something. If all events are the offspring of deaf, inexorable forces, every man's history and destiny must be unalterably shaped by those forces in one of two ways. Either the laws of their operation must be discovered, and they manipulated by him, or he must be the sport of forces which he is powerless to understand or to control. In either case the origin of any form of religion must be as inexplicable as its cultivation is irrational. Fatalism and egotheism must be the mutual and sole complementary elements of sound philosophy. Surely, one would think, if this be truth, it is truth of such a nature that the observation and experience of all the centuries could scarcely have failed to discover it, or at least to recognize and hold it fast whenever it was from time to time revealed by some keen-sighted Leucippus or Lucretius. But no; those apostles of Positivism who have appeared at intervals along the ages are but the exceptions which prove the rule. Swiftly and surely the human mind has reverted to its deities and its hecatombs. The victims upon ten thousand heathen altars, and the voices from ten thousand mosques and pagodas and Christian fanes, unite in declaring how the teachings of nature and of fact have ever been read by the masses of our race.

We may try the experiment in another way. Let us go into quiet hamlet or crowded city, and taking any thoughtful common man by the hand, let us lead him aside and ask him to look back carefully and calmly over his past life, to scan closely its whole history, and say whether it appears to him to have been mainly moulded either by uniform laws, or by the energy of his own will. Will he not tell us that, while

on the one hand, he has been conscious of acting every moment as a free agent in accordance with his own volitions, and while on the other he has ever felt himself hedged in on the right hand and the left by great moral and social laws, every retrospect yet forces upon him the conviction that his course has, after all, been chiefly shaped by circumstances and influences which his utmost sagacity was utterly powerless either to foresee or to control; that here his way was walled across and a new path marked out for him; that there the currents of thought and feeling were mysteriously turned into a new channel; that just at this point an unforeseen event, a trifling accident, left its mark upon his whole life, while again some insurmountable obstacle or terrible catastrophe brought confusion to all his plans? Hence he is ready to endorse the sentiment of that great student of human conduct who pierced the mysteries of the heart, and held up the mirror to life, as, perhaps, no other uninspired man has ever done, and exclaim: "There's a divinity that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we may."

We are well aware that very different degrees of value will be attached by minds of different constitutions and habits to the testimony of plain common sense and shrewdness upon such subjects; but those who make observed facts, physical, mental, and moral, the basis of all philosophy can hardly object to a little experimenting upon this class of phenomena. Nor can it be considered strange that the conclusion of the masses should be so unanimously against the rationalism of the day. Take, for instance, that which is to the common mind the most impressive and terrible of all phenomena — death; that dark, mysterious thing which is ever and anon looming up on the horizon, and like a black, impassable wall, cutting short the narrow *cul de sac* of life's hopes and aspirations, casting its gloomy shadow upon the brow of thoughtlessness, freezing in its chill atmosphere the sneer upon the lips of the scoffer, and mocking the utmost penetration of the sage. What boots it to remind us that "the solvency of great mercantile companies rests on the

validity of the laws which have been ascertained to govern the seeming irregularity of that human life which the moralist bewails as the most uncertain of things"? In vain the actuary collates his facts and figures, constructs his tables and computes his averages. He may prove clearly enough the existence of general laws and broad principles, but these are just what the rational believer in a divine government never doubted. Just what he longs to know, and just what no statistician can tell him, is, how these laws are guided in their operation so as to snatch one of a city and two of a family, or how and when and where will they select their next victim. Until something like this can be done, the common observer must fail to be convinced that the multitudinous messengers of the grim enemy, his plague and pestilence and famine, his flood and fire and sword, are not all under the control of will and intelligence.

In order to attain a more vivid conception of the intricacies of the problem which positivism proposes to solve by the application of simple, uniform principles, let us suppose a case. Any one will do about as well as another, if it but have verisimilitude. Here are three young men, reared in the country, the children of neighbors. They have had very similar advantages and influences and are about equal in mental endowments and moral susceptibilities. They resolve to see the world. They arrange to set out together in a ship about to sail from a neighboring port. The day arrives. They leave their respective homes in good time to reach the harbor at the appointed hour. Two of them arrive safely. The third is being driven rapidly by a friend to the appointed place when a stray bit of newspaper is borne by a passing breeze under the horse's feet. The animal rears, plunges, and oversets the vehicle. The young man is borne home with a broken arm and other severe injuries. A long illness is the consequence, in the course of which he has leisure and scope for thoughts and feelings such as he has never indulged before. He comes forth from his bed of pain with totally changed views of life and duty, prepares for college,

becomes an earnest and enthusiastic student, and eventually a useful and influential preacher. Meanwhile the ship, with his two friends on board, sets sail. Shall she safely reach her destination? Shall those young men complete their contemplated journey and return in safety to their friends? Or shall they, ship and crew, prove to be included in the percentage annually swallowed by the greedy Atlantic? Who will study the law, compute the averages, and tell us? At about the same time another ship is setting sail for the Western world from a port in Europe. Winds and tides carry both to and fro. Skilful hands hold the wheels and trim the sails. Breezes freshen into gales, gales rise to shrieking hurricanes, and hurricanes subside into calms, and both float still in safety upon the glassy deep. Day by day, hour by hour, they approach each other, now by direct courses, anon by circuitous routes. At length in the depth of a dark, stormy, midnight, while the outward bound vessel is struggling gallantly on in the teeth of a powerful gale, the man on the watch is suddenly startled by a huge, black, apparition to windward, dashing down upon the ship like a destroying fiend. He has scarcely time to shout "Down helm"! when there is a terrific crash. The vessel from the old world, guided with unerring precision,—shall we say by chance, or law, or an unseen hand, or what?—strikes the other amidships, cleaves her at a stroke as the axe the faggot, and passes in an instant over the shattered and sinking hulk. Where are now those two young men? Ask the foaming grave which yawns for a moment to receive the huge coffin, and then closes over it forever. But no, it has not swallowed both. One of them, distant a few feet from the other when the crash came, found those few feet of separation broad enough to span the gulf between time and eternity. He rises to the surface beside a floating spar; clings to it for long, agonizing hours, and is eventually picked up by a passing vessel bound to Australia. Destitute of money and friends he is put ashore at the Antipodes, is forced by sheer necessity to the diggings, falls into the companionship of

rowdies and vagabonds, becomes soon degraded to their level, and dies after a brief, wretched, worse than useless life. Now what genius presided over those three lives? Not their own wills, for those all impelled them at the outset, in the same direction? Was it chance? Who or what is chance, that it should be the arbiter of human life and hope and destiny? And if chance, then chance overrides and frustrates law, so that no longer law, but chance, is the omnipotent ruler. Was it law? Some of those who claim to stand in the front rank of the philosophers of the day will answer, yes. We call upon them for some explanation, some unravelling of all those simple yet mysterious complications, which could bring about from conditions so similar, results so unexpected and so diversified. Let them thread their way backward through the maze, the shifting winds, the sailing qualities of the vessels, the influences which prompted every turn of the wheel by the hand of the helmsman where a single inch of motion a day or a week before might have changed the whole current of events, the origin of the idiosyncrasies of mental character which caused him to be just so affected by such influences, the origin and history of the ships and of those who built them, the previous history of the young men respectively, of their parents, of the events which placed them just where they were and made them just what they were; nay, even the minutest facts connected with the production and movements of the bit of paper which was so potent in changing the whole life-course of one of the parties concerned. Let any unbiassed mind attempt thus to follow back step by step the interminable chain of effect and cause, ever remembering that the slightest change in the most trifling of ten thousand apparently trifling antecedents would have changed the whole history — let him try to explain all the phenomena by the hypothesis of a network of forces utterly destitute of choice or volition, until his brain reels, and see if he will not be glad, in sheer despair, to resort to the simple and more intelligible system, which regards all those forces as so many agents under the direction

of infinite mind and purpose. It is no explanation to assert that every link, small or great, in the chain can be traced to its legitimate antecedent. For, in the first place, no finite thought can trace the succession backwards beyond a certain point, while it is manifest that somewhere away in the infinite unknown beyond that point, lies the first event of the series in which first event was contained the germ of the whole. And in the second place the coincidences in time and place, no less than the successions, must be equally taken into the account, and traced to their causes. Hence, even if every separate thread in the fabric, whether we regard that fabric as a tangled mass, or a mysterious fragment of a wondrous and perfect pattern embracing the ages, could be traced back to its — what shall we say, origin? — yet the cause of every turn and loop in the interweaving would yet remain amongst the unexplained phenomena.

Professor Huxley, in his essay on the physical basis of life, lays down the principle that in order to the performance of one's duty in this world of misery and ignorance "it is necessary to be fully possessed of only two beliefs; the first, that the order of nature is ascertainable by our faculties to an extent which is practically unlimited; the second, that our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." To whatever conclusion the following out of the foregoing train of thought may lead us, in respect to the first of these beliefs, no one, certainly, can long busy himself with such inquiries without being fully possessed of the second. The subtle yet powerful agency of the human will counts for very much indeed as a condition of the course of events. The whole tenor of our views upon the great questions of law and providence must be largely affected by our conceptions of the nature of the will. Many, we dare say, like ourselves, would be right glad to have a fuller statement of the views of so eminent a thinker as Professor Huxley upon this point. Especially we should be glad to learn how he would rescue the statement above quoted from the dilemma it suggests. Are our volitions themselves but

so many factors in the eternally continuous progression? Then the second of the two theses must be nugatory, as included in the first. Is our volition a condition standing outside and independent of that ascertainable order of nature? Then is the second manifestly inconsistent with and contradictory to the first. If there is a third possible assumption capable of harmonizing the two statements, we have failed to discover it.

It would be entirely beyond the scope of the present Article to enter, at all fully, into the vexed question of the will. We simply venture a remark or two in passing. That it is a real power, does actually "count for something as a condition of the course of events," we need not stay to prove, as none will question the fact. This is one of those beliefs which, as Professor Huxley again says, "can be verified experimentally as often as we like to try," and therefore, "stands upon the strongest foundation upon which any belief can rest." Those who seek elsewhere than in experiment for highest truths will reach the same conclusion.

The main question in respect to the will, pertinent to our present inquiry, is: Is it, too, subject to ascertainable laws in respect to its volitions? The affirmative answer is the only one open to the advocates of the theory of natural law we are discussing. To admit the contrary, to concede the existence within the sphere of those natural laws which determine the order of events, of a force or agent not subject to any ascertainable law, would, as already shown, be to undermine the whole fabric. And further, if the course of events is shaped or affected by any human agent, independent of and above natural law, the course is clear for inferring, *a fortiori*, the interposition of superhuman agents and an infinite will. The question then assumes momentous importance. Probably the most consistent and plausible view, from the positive stand-point, is that which regards the will as a real agent, but one which acts invariably and of necessity from motive, insomuch that in the presence of certain influences or ends a man, being what he is at the moment,

must inevitably choose or will as he does. Hence, given at any point in a man's history, on the one hand, the exact motives or influences brought to bear upon him, and, on the other, the exact knowledge of his mental and moral character, and his course can be predicted with infallible certainty.

Were we not desirous of keeping our arguments, as far as possible, within the reach of experimental tests, we might stay to point out the fatalistic tendencies of such a view: Given, the data of a man's present character and his future surroundings, and not only his future life, but his eternal destiny, could be deduced with mathematical exactness. But a man, as a logical consequence of this theory, does not and cannot, in any proper sense, either mould his own character, or choose his own surroundings. Where, then, is the basis of real responsibility?

But we venture to question the correctness of this widely prevalent view on experimental grounds. We deny that it tallies with the facts of consciousness. We claim that the will reveals itself to the consciousness of every man not prepossessed with a theory, as a power not simply of obeying the strongest motive, or motive at all, if there is any difference in the two statements, but as a power of choosing and selecting motives to obey, or, in other words, ends to pursue. Or, if it be objected on metaphysical grounds that consciousness can only testify to an act, not to the nature or possession of a power, we appeal to it in another form: Is not every man conscious, every day of his life, of making choices, in matters trifling and perfectly indifferent, in regard to which it would be utterly beyond the utmost power of analysis to discover any possible reason for the preference? He must take one footpath or the other, select a volume from the uniform row, or a pen from amidst a hundred fellows in the box. Were his will the slave of motive, which it is often represented, and he obliged to remain inactive until grounds of preference were discovered, he might remain motionless till doomsday.

We question whether much confusion is not inadvertently

introduced into our notions of will by our habit, to some extent a necessary one, of speaking of it as one of the faculties of the mind. May it not rather be, like thought, of the very essence of mind itself? Is a power of choice and of action independent of motive more difficult of conception to a being conscious of willing, than a power of attraction as a universal quality of matter, to one familiar with the fact of attraction? The one is but in degree, if at all, more wonderful or mysterious than the other. Those who talk glibly of unipotent forces as something co-extensive with or inherent in matter, should not stumble at the idea of an alternative force, not ruled, but ruling; not controlled, but controlling; not affected, but effecting, as a prime characteristic of mind. Those who believe in the ever-present activity of an omniscient and omnipotent Will — a Will which either is or creates its own ends, should be well assured that truth requires the admission, before they play into the hands of a rationalistic positivism, by advocating or assenting to views so entirely in harmony with the fundamental principles of that system, and tending so strongly to reduce the human agent, with all his wondrous powers, to the position of a slave in the thrall of circumstances. They should not find it difficult to conceive of the finite will as a faint yet faithful transcript of that Infinite one, in its image and after its likeness.

Such a view of the nature of the human will, subordinate still as it must ever be to the Supreme will, leaves, if we mistake not, a freer scope for the exhibition of those spiritual manifestations to which we have time barely to refer, but which constitute some of the most interesting and important of all phenomena. This class of phenomena, embracing a large and most interesting mass of facts, equally within the range of observation and experiment, and so equally susceptible of proof, has not, it seems to us, been sufficiently insisted on by the opponents of materialistic philosophy. Take that which we call conversion. Deal with it, not as a religious dogma, but as a question of fact, and so a proper subject of philosophic investigation. We can scarcely conceive that the thing itself,

even in its more marked and striking forms, the occurrence of great and radical changes in all that constitutes the groundwork of character and makes a man what he is morally, can stand in need of proof to any man of observation, brought up in a Christian land. But if so, the proof is readily forthcoming, and good service might, we think, be rendered even to philosophic truth by collecting and putting it into a tangible and indisputable form. We have but space to put a single case, or two, to the believer in the omnipotence of natural law. Here stands before a shop-window, in a village in Bedfordshire, England, a young man of coarse exterior. Some trivial provocation has aroused his anger, and he is pouring forth a volley of oaths so fearful and blasphemous that even the woman of the shop, herself an abandoned wretch, comes forth and tremblingly reproves him. We wish explained, in harmony with natural laws ascertainable by our faculties, the influences which transform this selfish, half-savage boor into a pure and peaceful citizen, an intelligent defender and martyr of soul-liberty, and a self-sacrificing philanthropist. Again, here, in a Prussian town, is a boy who at ten years of age is a practised thief, stealing repeatedly from his own father, and who when he reaches manhood is an adept in vice and an impersonation of meanness, descending even so low as to betray the trust reposed in him by his travelling companions, and purloin from the common purse with which he is intrusted. For the last forty years a wonderful work of philanthropy has been carried on in Bristol, England. Building after building has been erected, in which hundreds and even thousands of destitute orphans have been housed, fed, clothed, and educated; snatched from vortices of guilt and misery, and fitted for lives of honorable usefulness. The one man who is the life and soul of this great and constantly enlarging work, whose philanthropy originated it, by whose persistent and unbounded self-denial it has been fostered, and to whose unimpeachable integrity the hundreds of thousands of pounds necessary for carrying it on are cheerfully and spontaneously intrusted by people all over

the world, is the boy thief and the base young man above described. The lives of John Bunyan and George Muller, and of thousands of other regenerated men, are *facts*, as patent and as worthy of study and explanation as any revealed by microscope or spectroscope.

We had intended to close this paper with some reference to the scripture doctrines of faith and prayer, as illustrating the existence of law in the world of spirit, as well as in that of matter. Want of space compels us to dismiss the subject with a word. The unusual, possibly undue, devotion of philosophers of the day to the study of natural science has not been without its influence upon the minds of many devout believers in a world of spirit, as well as of matter. It would not be difficult to find, even amongst Christian believers of some culture, those whose minds have become so impressed with the wide domain and uniform operation of natural law that they hesitate to see in any physical occurrence the influence of anything but natural forces. They shrink from reading a lesson in the divine government in any event which can be traced to physical causes, and sometimes fear to plead the plain and unqualified promises of scripture in prayer for temporal good, lest in some way they should, as has been said, "impale the Almighty upon the horns of a dilemma." The aim of this paper has been to show that natural law, pure and simple, utterly fails, and must from its very nature utterly fail, to explain a single individual peculiarity in men or things, or a single unusual occurrence in the course of nature. It is only by resort to unseen and unknown causes that the simplest of these can be explained. How, then, can it be shown that the scripture doctrine of a spiritual universe, surrounding, enfolding, permeating, and governing the material, is not the reasonable and true explanation of these unknown causes in which, we have seen, are enwrapped the germs of all varieties and individualisms in phenomena? But who, believing in the reality of spiritual intelligences and forces can set limits to their operations? If the agency of spiritual forces and an Omniscient Will count

for anything in the course of events, they must be supreme. Nor is it in the slightest degree necessary to suppose any antagonism, or even interference, on the part of these with natural law. On the contrary, we have only to conceive of them as behind and above physical law, comprehending, directing, and controlling all its action, in full accordance with an infinite and all-embracing purpose, in order to have a key not otherwise furnished to the mysteries of nature and life, and even of miracles.

And such spiritual forces must doubtless be subject to laws of their own sphere as invariable as those of the natural world, though on a higher plane than these. We are not translated to a sphere above law, but to one of higher law. May we not reverently find an illustration in the teachings of Christ in respect to prayer? Prayer is omnipotent in proportion to the degree of faith. Herein is revealed a law of spiritual causation by virtue of which the finite human spirit is enabled to lay hold upon the might of the Infinite, and use it, not for selfish or worldly, but for just and holy purposes. The security that a power so wondrous can never be prostituted is found in the very nature of the faith which brings it. Such a faith, lifting the poor child of humanity into the very presence of the High and Holy One, bringing him into so intimate union and communion with the Father of spirits, must by its very operation subdue every selfish and unworthy thought, and bring every desire and affection into sympathy with the high and holy purposes of the infinite love.

ARTICLE II.

TAINÉ'S ENGLISH LITERATURE.¹

BY REV. JOHN BASCOM, PROFESSOR IN WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

MANY works on English literature have appeared within a few years, varying from the large volumes of Craik and Morley to brief manuals. None of these have excited so much attention, or received so favorable criticism, as Taine's *History of English Literature*, a work of more than a thousand compact octavo pages. The generous reception of these volumes is justified by their merits. They are certainly more interesting, if not more instructive, than any other history on this topic. As a storehouse of facts they do not rival some other works; but in their interpretation of facts, and in the clearness with which they present the spirit of the persons and times discussed, they are unsurpassed. We gratefully acknowledge the excellence of this work, and glance at its leading merits before we offer any qualifying criticism.

The style is clear, animated, highly figurative. It is one that flows from a vigorous imagination, sustained by sharp insight. It tends to short snatches of assertion, often in a metaphorical form. When the sentences are lengthened, their members are gathered into them, as persons, in procession, that march briskly, each with varying devise. There is so much to please the fancy, one can hardly fail to be interested, whatever one may think of the final philosophy which marshals these figures, and explains their purpose. The work has also primary characters, leading events, controlling forces, and sinks the mass of persons and events into their shadow. It thus secures composition, proportion, and decided effect.

¹ *History of English Literature*. By H. A. Taine. New York: Holt and Williams, 1871.

This is with it a chief merit. The writers of an epoch are not delivered in tale, as so many bricks; nor marched before us as a regiment of scarcely distinguished soldiers, each labelled with his name, moving on into the distance. Wise neglect is a first condition of interesting and instructive history. Absolute justice is not to be thought of. Significant forces, typical persons, are to find bold relief, and the mind is to be left under the clearness of an anatomy whose complexity is something less than that of the facts. Every writer overlooks much; the difference of merit lies in the things overlooked. Grand outlines are to be first drawn, and left for each to fill up, as his leisure and taste may enable him. Taine has philosophy in him; he is in search of controlling natural forces, that these may give unity, form, impression to his work. He does not collect material, he uses it. We are not left to lose our way amid secondary facts, or to stumble over them. The edifice, according to his idea, is finished, and the rubbish cleared away.

A third merit, allied to the last, and the ground of excellence in the work, is the position assigned to moral forces. Taine does not attempt to write a history of English literature with only passing reference to that influence which has been central in it. He fully recognizes the relation of morals to English character, and treats each period in its dependence on fundamental, national features. This impression comes to us with more freshness, boldness, and interest, because it belongs to a Frenchman, receives a new coloring from his nationality, and gives us the satisfaction of knowing how others look at us. Exactly the same truths told us by a foreigner, by a sprightly penetrative Frenchman, have more influence than when they come from a countryman: but these are not the same truths. Taine does not altogether sympathize with the sentiments he strives to understand; he gets an outside view of them, and this, to us who are chiefly familiar with inside impressions, is especially valuable. Taine is fair; when he mistakes, as he sometimes does, it is because the facts are too foreign, rugged, and unfamiliar for

him, and he is unduly repelled by first effects. There is something of this in his criticism of Shakespeare. He exaggerates his immorality, his lawlessness, affirming his master faculty to be "an impassioned imagination, freed from the fetters of reason and morality"; that "the metaphors are all exaggerated, the ideas all verge upon the absurd"; that Falstaff is but "the dash and immorality of Shakespeare." So this powerful, free movement might present itself to one approaching it from the side of art, closely circumscribed and severely fettered; as the English landscape garden may seem wild, untamed, half-completed, to one accustomed to the trim circumspection of French and Italian taste.

It is not, however, these partial misapprehensions that we wish to criticise. The point of censure is as fundamental as that of praise, and one with it. Taine is always dealing with the moral element; yet we shall venture to say, that he understands neither the origin nor the nature of the ethical sentiment, nor its relation to art. Of course this misapprehension is not complete, and does not destroy the value of what he says in this connection. Yet it is so great as to call for grave exceptions to his views, and a constant modification and enlargement of them. What we have further to say will bear on this assertion. We shall consider the origin and nature of the moral sentiment as discussed by Taine, and its relations to art. First then we turn to the origin assigned it.

We can only give brief, pregnant passages, but shall strive to select those in the current and drift of the work. Neither do we wish to be understood as saying that there are not cross-lights, partial compensations, here and there a recoil of the moral nature, by virtue of its innate force, from the severe flexion to which Taine subjects it. This fact does not take the other fact, that the moral sentiment is misconceived, and greatly narrowed in its nature and influence. Taine, in his Introduction, proposes the study of facts in their causes.

No matter if the facts be physical or moral, they all have causes; there is a cause for ambition, for courage, for

truth, as there is for digestion, for muscular movement, for animal heat. Vice and virtue are products, like vitriol and sugar; and every complex phenomenon has its springs from other more simple phenomena, on which it hangs." Thus in this first, and in the main acceptable, enunciation of his philosophy, he puts a pressure upon the word *cause*, and gives it a coarseness and severity of bearing that prompt dissent. "Three different sources contribute to produce this elementary moral state—the *race*, the *surroundings*, and the *epoch*." This statement may seem at first sufficiently inclusive, but in its expansion the author betrays a tendency both to oversight and undue emphasis. The independent and powerful activity which falls to the moral nature, in its individual and national action, under the sudden stimulus of the truth, is not pointed out; while climate, soil, and secondary physical causes, efficacious indeed, but of very limited power, are dwelt on and magnified in their effects. "The profound differences which are manifest between the German races on the one side, and the Greek and Latin on the other, arise, for the most part, from the difference between the countries in which they are settled: some in moist lands, deep in black, marshy forests, or on the shores of a wild ocean, caged in by melancholy or violent sensations, prone to drunkenness and gluttony, bent on a fighting, blood-spilling life; others, again, within a lovely landscape, on a bright and laughing sea-coast, enticed to navigation and commerce, exempt from the gross cravings of the stomach, inclined from the beginning to social ways, to a settled organization of the state, to feelings and dispositions such as develop the art of oratory, the talent for enjoyment, the inventions of science, letters, arts." This set of causes, thus early announced, is disproportionately urged throughout. In his first chapter, he speaks thus of the Saxons and their English home:

"A rude and foggy land, like their own, except in the depth of the sea and the safety of its coasts, which one day will call up real fleets and mighty vessels; green England—

the word rises to the lips and expresses all. Here also moisture pervades everything; even in summer the mist rises; even on clear days you see it fresh from the great sea-girdle, or rising from vast but ever sloshy moorlands undulating with hill and dale, intersected with hedges to the limit of the horizon. The overflowing water straightens the flabby stems; they grow up, rank, weak, and filled with sap; a sap ever renewed, for the grey mists creep over a stratum of motionless vapor, and at distant intervals the rim of heaven is drenched by heavy showers. There are yet commons, as at the time of the Conquest, deserted, abandoned, wild, covered with furze and thorny plants, with here and there a horse grazing in the solitude. Joyless scene, poverty-stricken soil! What a labor it has been to humanize it! What impression it must have made upon the men of the South, the Romans of Caesar! I thought, when I saw it, of the ancient Saxons, wanderers from West and North, who came to settle in the land of marsh and fogs, on the border of these primeval forests, on the banks of these great muddy streams, which roll down their slime to meet the waves. They must have lived as hunters and swine-herds; grow, as before, brawny, fierce, gloomy. Take civilization from this soil, and their will remain to the inhabitants only war, the chase, gluttony, drunkenness. Smiling love, sweet poetic dreams, art, refined and sensible thought, are for the happy shores of the Mediterranean. Here the barbarian, ill-housed in his mud hovel, who hears the rain rustling whole days in the oak leaves — what dreams can he have, gazing upon his mud-pools and his sombre sky? Huge white bodies, cool-blooded, with fierce blue eyes, reddish flaxen hair; ravenous stomachs, filled with meat and cheese. Heated by strong drinks; of a cold temperament, slow to love, home-stayers, prone to brutal drunkenness; these are to this day the features which descent and climate preserve in the race.”¹ There is in this a poetical exaggeration of the facts, and an ascription of them with undue certainty and force, to soil and

¹ Vol. i. p. 25.

climate. Later, he says of the people of the North: "They must work to live; be attentive, exact, close and repair their houses, wade boldly through the mud behind their plough, light their lamps in the shops during the day. Their climate imposes endless inconvenience, and exacts endless endurance. Hence arise melancholy and the idea of duty."¹

We believe the true view to be rather, that the central impulse, the most pervasive sentiment in man is the ethical one; and that this, gaining but a rude inadequate manifestation in savage life, is sure to come more and more into authority with advancing civilization, to manifest itself in government, art, and religion, and according to the control that is granted it by the freedom of the individual and the nation, to give the leading features of character. In other words, there is always in human action and character a residue of reference to personal power, to liberty, to a perpetuated or newly assumed bias, to the action and reaction that are ever going on between truth and the devices of men; and this balance, which stands in contrast with the effects of merely physical causes, is always on the increase as personal powers enlarge under cultivation. External conditions of ease or hardship, of joy or sombre aspect, are able to impress upon this inherent, free, living force only minor characteristics; to give it the circumstances under which it shall disclose itself, the forces wherewith it shall measure its own force, and in the results chronicle its power. Natural conditions are to the moral element what winds are to a steamer, circumstances which affect, but do not control, its speed and direction. To dwell upon them, to point out their various and shifting influence, and ascribe the result of the voyage to them, is philosophy, yet very partial and insufficient philosophy. When we say of English conditions of life: Here are fogs and rains and mud, hence an idea of duty, we might as well say: Here are mountains and clouds and far-reaching prospects, and hence an eye to see them. If we had said, instead of "hence an idea of duty," hence patience and per-

¹ Vol. i. p. 101.

severance, we should have drawn attention to results, which, with a certain force of moral character, would have followed from those conditions; with another degree of courage, the result might have been feebleness and squalor.

That climate is not a controlling element in national character is shown by a great variety of facts. There are conditions on either banks of the Rhine much the same in their physical force; yet cities and provinces are quite diverse, according to their French or Germanic affinities. German cities differ, each from each, according as Protestant or Catholic influences prevail. The cantons of Switzerland show, for the same reason, startling diversities. Ireland and England lie under one mantle of fog, yet are very unlike. Canada and New England have much the same climate, but utterly different populations. French Huguenots quickly separate themselves in character from the French nation; while the English, one in faith, retain essentially the same traits in every quarter of the globe. What have the Greek and Italian of to-day in common with the Greek and Roman of two thousand years ago?

This first error arises from the second — a wrong apprehension of the nature of morality. Taine seems to conceive it as possessed only of formal, preceptive force; as a social regimen, a minor economy, which may exist in very different forms and in very unequal degrees in communities of much the same measure of intelligence. Like commercial law, it is a product of given circumstances, and is involved in the existence of the traffic, the actions, it controls. If men will be prudent, thrifty, free, with steadfast social order, then they must be moral, since morality is the law of this sort of conduct. If men are gay, careless, indifferent to gain, sensitive to the pleasures of taste, then they may be immoral, since morality is too practical and homely a principle to apply to these tendencies. Hence, according to Taine, an Englishman in his useful, commercial bias, is a moral being; and a Frenchman in his refined and delicate tastes, an æsthetical creature.

Taine says of the English: "The only part of philosophy which pleases men of this kind is morality; because, like them, it is wholly practical, and only attends to action."¹ Again: "Stern dignity, self-command, the need of domination, harshness in dominion, strict morality, without compromise or pity, a taste for figures and dry calculation, a dislike of facts not palpable and ideas not useful, ignorance of the invisible world, scorn of the weaknesses and tenderesses of the heart—such are the dispositions which the stream of facts and the ascendancy of institutions tend to confirm in their souls."² We give these passages to show that Taine conceives morality in a very partial way, on its formal, preceptive side; that he looks on it as a vigorous rule for certain actions, and not at all as an indwelling, inspiring spirit. This presentation is one that follows very naturally from a utilitarian philosophy of morals. If ethical precepts are the aphorisms of experience, bearing on the utilities of life, then, of course, they will have an external, formal, coercive force. If, also, the notion of utility to which they affiliate takes to a low plane of pleasures, as it is quite liable to do; if it comes into contrast with beauties, tastes, inspirations, instantly we have that with which Taine presents us,—a rugged, severe, coarse character, opposed to philosophies, spiritualities, and built upon cold calculations and overbearing precepts. That morality in English character, and with all its devotees, sometimes lapses into this, we admit; but no conception is more alien to its true nature. As this point is so cardinal, we quote further, lest we shall seem to mistake our author:

"Change a virtue in its circumstances, and it becomes a vice; change a vice in its circumstances, and it becomes a virtue. Regard the same quality from two sides: on the one, it is a fault; on the other, a merit. The essential of man is found concealed far below these moral badges. They only point out the useful or noxious effect of our inner constitution; they do not reveal our inner constitution. They are

¹ Vol. ii. p. 406.

² Vol. ii. p. 366.

the safety-lamps or railway-lights attached to our names, to warn the passer-by to avoid or approach us; they are not the explanatory table of our being. Our true essence consists in the causes of our good or bad qualities; and these causes are discovered in the temperament, the species and degree of imagination, the amount and velocity of attention, the magnitude and direction of primitive passions.”¹ He then proceeds to affirm that the English are, in criticism, philosophy, and religion, without insight or speculation; ‘always moral, never psychological’; that they reduce man to “an aggregate of virtues and vices, and lose sight of him on all but the exterior and social side.”

Nothing can be plainer, therefore, than that morality is, with Taine, a derived art, secondary to nature, and often in sore conflict with it; that it is, moreover, restricted in the field to which it applies. As a consequence of this unflinching law which English tendencies have developed, the English above all, he thinks, are hypocritical. “The first-fruits of English society is hypocrisy. It ripens here under the double breath of religion and morality. . . . It is a needful coin. Those who lack good money, coin bad; and the more public opinion declares it precious, the more it is counterfeited. This vice is therefore English.”² If we are to understand by hypocrisy unfounded claims or appearances in religious matters, then, doubtless, an irreligious country will be without hypocrisy; as one lacking a true currency will not have a false one. If, however, we give the word the generality which belongs to its spirit, and understand by it all hollow pretensions, then we doubt whether any society or country is so hypocritical, so diverse on and under the surface, as polite society; as, for instance, that of France. The aesthetical law is still more liable than the ethical law to a merely superficial application, and thus to the essence of hypocrisy. The only reason why the hypocrisy is more offensive in the one case than in the other is that the law to which obedience is feigned is higher. The only way to

¹ Vol. ii. p. 401.

² Vol. ii. p. 359.

completely escape religious hypocrisy is through perfect religion, or the utter poverty of irreligion.

This we observe merely in passing. Our main point is, that Taine does not understand the nature of morality. This we hold to be an original, intuitive apprehension by man of moral excellence in action, and to receive expansion from his entire intellectual and social growth. This growth gives to him new conditions for its application, new consequences of obedience, new revelations of its beauty. Morality is the very spirit and force of his higher nature, and hence of his entire nature. He is gathered up into it, and ruled by it, and progress is simply the impressment of this law of powerful and perfect life on every action. Knowledge, civilization, utilities are all instrumental to it; since the moral manhood needs them all, and can use them all. Nothing pertaining to man is a matter of indifference to this hidden spirit of his being; since, as supreme architect, it has occasion to enlarge, retrench, and shape all. No part of the body is foreign to the life that builds it up; no part of the man is overlooked or neglected by the moral force when truly dominant. Nor is this government achieved by precepts, by rules. These, like criticism, may subserve a limited purpose; but the high art of morality is brought out by a living, loving, pervasive impulse, which delights in its own products as truly, and is guided by a divine insight as certainly, as any art whatever. This brings us to the third point, the relation of morality to art. Failing to apprehend morality, Taine has, of course, missed this, one of its latest, most subtle, and most important relations. We are willing to concede that few, very few, of the most moral and religious of the world have practically or theoretically grasped this dependence. If, therefore, the theory of morality were to be derived by mere induction from the lives of the moral, the limited presentation of Taine would have much to sustain it. But the ideal can never be so constructed, the ultimate never so reached, the goal of progress never be thus forecast. We must inquire into the nature of forces, and trace the slight tendencies which they

have impressed here and there on individual minds, or on society, if we wish to know whither the stream of moral influences is bearing us. We shall strive, first, to show that Taine does not — nay, he cannot, from the very nature of his conception — understand the relation of morality and art. Morality is to him a certain stage of obedience to partial, conventional laws, grounded at best in a limited circle of uses; with us it is the profound law, the self-executing impulse, of our spiritual life, of which this obedience is the most partial and incipient result.

“In France,” says Taine, “criticism has a more liberal gait; it is less subservient to morality, and nearer akin to art. When we try to relate a life, or paint the character of a man, we consider him very readily as a simple subject of painting or science. We only think of displaying the various feelings of his heart, the connection of his ideas, and the necessity of his actions. We do not judge him; we only wish to represent him to the eyes, and make him intelligible to the reason. We are spectators, and nothing more. What matters it that Peter or Paul is a rascal? That is the business of his contemporaries; they suffered from his vices, and ought to think only of despising and condemning him. Now, we are beyond his reach, and hatred has disappeared with the danger. At this distance, and in the historic perspective, I see him but a mental machine, provided with certain springs, animated by a primary impulse, affected by various circumstances. I calculate the play of his motives; I feel with him the import of obstacles; I see beforehand the curve which his motion will trace out; I experience for him neither disgust nor aversion; I have left these feelings on the threshold of history, and I taste the very deep and pure pleasure of seeing a soul act after a definite law, in a fixed groove, with all the variety of human passions, with the succession and constraint which the inner structure of man imposes on the external development of his passions.”¹

This passage is so clear and explicit as scarcely to leave

¹ Vol. ii. 407.

occasion for any further quotation. It plainly shows that the author looks upon morality as a thing of transient, practical application; as so alien to the constitutional forces that these can only be studied successfully by its oversight; and that the real, the true interest of art lies in neglecting morality as secondary, and in freely portraying native forces in their fixed, necessary development. This view of art is consistent with his philosophy, and, therefore, we venture to believe that we do not misinterpret him, limited and partial though the attitude be which is thereby assigned him. Other passages abundantly sustain the representation: "What is a novelist? In my opinion, he is a psychologist, who naturally and involuntarily sets psychology at work; he is nothing else, nor more. He loves to picture feelings, to perceive their connections, their precedents, their consequences; and he indulges in this pleasure. In his eyes they are forces, having various directions and magnitudes. About their justice or injustice he troubles himself little. . . . A genuine painter sees with pleasure a well-drawn arm and vigorous muscles, even if they be employed in slaying a man. A genuine novelist enjoys the contemplation of the greatness of a harmful sentiment, or the organized mechanism of a pernicious character. He has sympathy with talent, because it is the only faculty which exactly copies nature. Occupied in experiencing the emotions of his personages, he only dreams of marking their vigor, kind, and mutual action."¹ On the following page he adds: "These old moralities, though useful and well-spoken, smack of the paid pedant, so common in England, the clergyman in the white tie, standing bolt upright in his room, and droning for three hundred a year daily admonition to the young gentlemen whom parents have sent to his educational hothouse." We are to remember that it is Dickens and Thackeray, not a veritable clergyman, who have drawn out this theory and these reflections. Thus he adds this criticism of Thackeray's presentation of Rebecca Sharp: "Under this storm of irony

¹ Vol. ii. 390.

and contempt, the heroine is dwarfed, illusion is weakened, interest diminished, art attenuated, poetry disappears, and the character, more useful, has become less true and beautiful." That is, Thackeray has destroyed the artistic value of his creation by introducing too strongly the moral element.

In these particulars, he contrasts vigorously the French and the English. The French are 'men of wit,' a 'lively people,' who must be amused. "You may speak of human wickedness, but on condition of diverting them. If you get angry, they will be shocked; if you teach a lesson, they will yawn." "To please a gay people, be gay. Be polite; that is the second commandment, very like the other. You speak to sociable, delicate, vain men, whom you must be careful not to offend, and flatter."¹ With these, his countrymen, the balance of the author's artistic sympathies and judgments is found.

The English, on the contrary, but partially please him. They are 'practical minds,' 'lovers of the useful.' They assemble together 'to be taught,' and 'you owe them solid truths.' "Their mood requires strong emotions; their mind asks for precise demonstrations. To satisfy their mood, you must not touch the surface, but torture vice; to satisfy their mind, you must not rail in sallies, but by arguments."² Their injunction is: "Be moral. All your novels must be such as may be read by young girls. We are practical minds, and we would not have literature corrupt practical life. We are Protestants, and we have preserved something of the severity of our fathers against enjoyment and passions." As a result of this disposition, he affirms: "The element of the English character is its want of happiness."

This, then, in short, is the author's theory. Beef in superfluity has begotten grossness; fog still more abundant has bred melancholy. These two tendencies have been the parents of morality. Morality, a spiritual atmosphere not unlike the physical one with which it stands in genetic association, has shaped a sombre, serious, earnest nation, good for a great

¹ Vol. ii. p. 372.

² Vol. ii. p. 373.

deal, apt in labor, serviceable in commerce, but scarcely capable of enjoyment, nearly destitute of philosophic and artistic intuitions, and quite below the gay, sparkling sentiments of their neighbors across the channel, born to less beef and more sunshine. We do not deny to all these representations a partial, sometimes a very partial, truth; but we do regard them as constituting a most superficial and misleading philosophy.

For morality, in its inner essence and power, in its final outgrowth and fulness, there is put a most limited notion of its nature, and those very partial manifestations of it which seem to justify this narrow conception. A mere moralist, a bigot of precepts, of most restricted and conventional views, a blind rehearser of traditions, may, in the form of his life, his art, and his personal character, justify the contrasts and criticisms of Taine; but an intelligent, cultivated mind, thoroughly and finally awakened to the ethical principle in its individual, social, and religious applications, in its physical and spiritual government, in its abiding and elevated impulses, affords no ground for this disparagement. Such an one in life and art will show preeminence over all less fortunately endowed, or less obedient to the divine inspiration. This point we wish to establish, in English fashion, by solid argument, and clear statement, which is the equivalent of argument.

In a true system of philosophy, the ethical intuition is a primary power of mind, and hence, as a mere power, demands in a psychological novel a primary place. It is this impulse that unites man to man in rights and duties, man to God in hopes and fears, man to himself in approval and condemnation, in peace and in remorse. To overlook such a power, and still speak of psychology; nay, to do it in behalf of psychology, is absurd. It is not till we have mangled and dwarfed our mental science, that we can do this thing. Let us go back to psychology, or if not to that, to the arena of life wherein its powers are seen at play, learn these powers and their respective value, and then come and write our

novel. English life is one of more intense humanity than French life; because it is one in which profound questions are more constantly cast to the surface, making the thoughts of men to boil and seethe under them. There is here not less, but more power; not inferior, but superior humanity. Minor sentiments may suffer some eclipse, we grant, but superior ones more than take their place. Moreover this ethical impulse is not merely a primary one, it claims to be a ruling one, a constitutional and final and all pervasive law; and that too a law not in bondage but in freedom. Men may deny that we are free, but if we are free, this rule of reason in and through the right, none can deny, presents the highest, most intellectual life, the clearest, most resplendent autonomy, and hence the highest art. Mere forces, simple, dependent, inlocked causes pale before it; and to deal with these and neglect manhood is as if the painter should give us landscape alone. If philosophy has denied liberty finally and forever, then it has correspondingly humbled art. No man can justly expound art who does not thoroughly recognize the highest, freest forces with which it has to do. We object *in toto* to Taine's philosophy, and therefore must object to his art. They seem, both of them, to us to have fallen, fallen from the very heavens, and now he professes himself able to take the same pleasure in a devil as an angel; hence the same in misrule, unlife, struggle, and defeat, as in complete rule, conquering life, a high and holy impulse fulfilled. Apply this to animal life, to vegetable life, and the principle becomes absurd. Deformity, disease, and death should have no advantage over perfection, health, and physical beauty. A moral being with this superior form and law of life can not be dealt with as if he were a compound of mere forces of certain magnitudes and tendencies. This mechanical conception is not sufficient to comprehend the facts, and excluding that which is highest in them, it degrades them. Deliver us from an art that stoops to this theory. No art ever does it. French art is far beyond this view by which it is expounded.

Again, morality is, at all events in every civilized state, a fundamental and pervasive fact. Society is interlaced by it. What may be, and what may not be, done is settled each instant by it. Our passions are in constant contact, often in conflict, with it. Even its gossamer threads are entangling our feet. The novel cannot therefore overlook it, if it would. It is the opposition of this sentiment that oftenest carries passion into frenzy, and we shall have nothing deep, profound, human in our characters if we are divested of the ability to see and feel moral relations — the attractions and repulsions, the commands and prohibitions, of our ethical nature. There is, on no other condition, a field even for passion. It is only as it ranges up and down society, so bound together, that its victories and submissions, its lawfulness and lawlessness, and thus its power and its weakness, interest us. We care not for brutes whether they rage or are quiet. The struggles of men engross us because they transpire under moral law, in the intellectual atmosphere of spiritual affinities and truths. An art that should forget this would unspeakably debase itself.

An increase of intelligence only makes more clear and pervasive these moral forces, this interlock of spiritual dependencies. It is as the light running before the heat, which, following apace, reaches out and renews every living thing. What light is without heat in the physical world, that is intelligence without moral quickening in the world of mind. All lively, subtle and growing influences, hence those of combination and beauty, spring from the sources of our moral life. The barbarian is a barbarian because he is destitute of that knowledge which unfolds and spreads abroad over his actions this net-work of proprieties, responses, and duties, which belongs to an enlarged and developed nature. He, far more than the enlightened man, corresponds to the language of Taine; is an organized mechanism, a bundle of limited and close-bound forces.

The relation, then, of morality to art is obvious. It is the office of art to render nature, keyed to its highest execution,

under the play of its most significant powers, with the fullest record of life in it. This it cannot do in neglect of the moral element. This moral element like moisture in the atmosphere, must often yield to life its deepest, richest coloring; like electricity in the clouds, it must put the most definite force in them, and voice their interplay to a startled world. Any other view enfeebles and disparages art, and leaves it outside the pale of the noblest impulses of our being. Morality is no military drill, no catch-book of social recipes, no cheap guide to the comforts of existence; but is the inspiration and insight of the soul, in view of its present possibilities, its future destinies, — the noble structure of its individual life, and the manifold pleasures, the exalted sympathies with which it is united to others. It is the wings which lift the feet, yet plant them on tree-top or mountain as occasion offers. It complements the slow toil of our physical being with the rapid sweep of the soul, by which it hastens on to a good a thousand years in advance, and feeds upon it as if it were the fruit of the hour. Poor and mean must be the art, which, without wings, travels on all fours, and grazes, with eye prone, on the latest pasturage of the senses.

On his own principles, Taine can scarcely find fault with the English novel. He has no right to the censure he bestows on Thackeray and Dickens as over-moral. They belonged to a moral community. This was the kind of life in which they moved, and which they had occasion to represent. Here was a fact, a kind of phenomenon; Taine should have been content, with his appetite for facts, definite forces, to have seen its portrayal. An Oriental novel is of course Oriental; an English novel, English. To wish it different is to desire a departure from truth. Taine may not relish English character, but, as an artist, he should desire its complete rendering in a picture of English life. Thus these critics who set up the theory of presenting facts, coldly tracing causes, do not adhere to it. Here is a veritable force, that of morals, shaping a great nation, yet Taine

speedily wearies of it in a novel, and would push it into the background, though it confessedly underlies the facts and characters delineated. This shows conclusively that Taine, like the rest of us, has an ideal, and defines by his own standard the office of the novel, determines by his sympathies what should and what should not find place in it. Hence we and he must settle our ideals by our psychology, our conceptions of the elements of human character; and the one or the other will be correct, not as we start our criticism from this or that side of the channel, but as we round out and complete our inventory of human qualities, and set over against each its true value. We are content with the French novel so far as it represents French life, yet we think that that life and novel both may grow in depth and stability of beauty.

We do not, however, believe, comparatively little though we know of French literature, that Taine's implied description of it is the entire truth. The moral element must be in it, and deeply in it; it cannot well be otherwise. It is also manifestly in it. *La Fadette*, by George Sand, is one touching record of the struggle of moral against conventional forces; *Le Conscrit*, by M. M. Erekman-Chatrion, a protracted criticism on the immorality of the French military spirit as exemplified in Napoleon. In the same disposition are their other works written.

The world, human society, history, are moral products, are moral in their lessons. They are so because self-executing moral laws have shaped them. The drama, the novel, therefore, so far as they cling to facts, and the spirit of facts, are also moral; as moral as God is in his works. Immorality is moral in its lessons, provided it be the whole of immorality — its beginning and its end. There are three ways in which the novel may be immoral. It may uncover actions which moral instincts lead us to conceal, and thus become licentious; it may give a partial rendering of vice, and thus hide its true issues; it may present it falsely, and thus combine it with virtues and enjoyments that do not belong to it. Truth,

broad and deep truth, is the first and last requisite of the moral novel, and the work of fiction which lacks this may often be immoral in the very intensity, yet superficiality, of its moral purpose. The claim of art on morality is — and it is also the claim of morality on itself — that it shall not curdle on the surface, that it shall not separate as a thin cream to be skimmed off, while the remainder of life is only fit for swine. The fable is good, and if it be very good, we can dispense with the moral; not because the moral is worthless, but because we already have it. It belongs to art to yield morality not as an extract, an essence, but as a fluid circulating in living cells, and imparting flavor and aroma to the entire plant.

Taine repeatedly speaks of Shakespeare as immoral. He is occasionally so on the side of vulgarity and licentiousness, but he is often, very often, profoundly moral in the vigor and truth with which he portrays the struggles of the human soul under the distracting forces of good and evil. Hamlet is immoral in mere dribblets, and moral in the full flow of its mighty stream. Byron is immoral not simply as licentious, but because he will not let forces have their way. He is bound at the same instant to sustain and damn his hero; to make him vicious and to redeem him by virtues and sentiments more or less incompatible with his selfish and perverse passions. Let sin have its way, let it reach its issues within and without, and it is the highest lesson of morals, the fearful lesson which God has written over and over again in human history.

We close this review with two general considerations. It is impossible as critics to meet in conclusions unless we start from the same principles; unless our psychology is the same. Taine has his psychology, and his results are those we have given; to us very wide of the truth. They can only be met by a new psychology, by a better understanding of the moral nature. This materialism dwarfs our spiritual nature, and hence almost wholly eliminates it from art. He is even ready to criticise Macaulay because he discusses the Massacre of

Glencoe so exclusively in its moral features. It would seem that the Frenchman would be more pleased with a quarrel of tigers in their cage, the words right and wrong omitted, than with the deeds of men, if they must be called misdeeds, and censured. Herein is the influence of philosophy. If our mental science is no better than his, then our criticism is likewise no improvement on his. If it be superior, it owes its superiority to a more profound psychology. This ultimate basis Taine recognizes and earnestly maintains. Here we join hands with him.

The English deserve in part the criticism they have received. With all their morality they have been inclined to give it a practical, empirical tendency merely, and have rarely settled its foundations in philosophy. They have been taken at their word, and utilitarian ethics has been held at its true worth, and discarded as bad art, bad religion, and no science. As long as men will wear their morality as a comfortable social garment, they must expect to have it from time to time stripped off, and to be left in a cold and ridiculous plight. Taine is welcome to the plunder he has made of utilitarian precepts; but we trust that he and others will not think that these are the imperial, ethical aegis.

ARTICLE III.

TEMPTATION NO EXCUSE FOR TRANSGRESSION.

BY REV. L. P. HICKOK, D.D., LL.D., AMHERST.

To TEMPT is, primarily and most comprehensively, to hold to or press toward a specific result. More commonly it applies in a bad sense, as urging to an evil result. But an examination of the particular case can alone determine the character of the issue intended.

Sometimes it is used as opening an intended occasion for eminently virtuous action, while the severity of the self-denial requisite opens also a dangerous liability to disobedience. In such cases it proves a test and trial of character, training and disciplining the disposition. The master may mean it for good, while the disciple must decide on his own responsibility whether the occasion shall not be perverted for evil. In such sense "God did tempt Abraham," in commanding the sacrifice of Isaac (Gen. xxii. 1). Such, also, is the meaning of the apostle James, when he says: "My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations, knowing that the trial of your faith worketh patience" (James i. 2, 3); and of the apostle Peter, in writing to "such as are in heaviness through manifold temptations, that the trial of your faith, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise, honor, and glory" (1 Peter i. 6, 7). So parental and tutorial discipline is administered strictly and often severely for virtue's sake, but when wisely tempered to condition and capacity the needed trial can be no excuse for any delinquency and perversion. When the training is selfish and malignant, exacting what is cruel and unjust, it becomes tyranny and oppression, and has itself no excuse for its exactions. Yet, even then, when deliverance cannot

righteously be found, patient endurance of the persecution and martyrdom has its compensations, purifying the character and dignifying the disposition. The magnanimity which persists in its integrity while patiently enduring its imposed sufferings has within itself its own reward. Even the cruelty of the persecution cannot excuse an apostasy from truth and righteousness. The approbation of conscience and of God is more than deliverance by wrong action.

At other times the trial may be made to assume quite another form, and give an entirely new meaning to the temptation, as when the subject of the discipline turns back and puts the master himself to the proof. This may be done in various ways — by fretful complaints of his dealings, rash tests of his truth, or insolent arraignment of his faithfulness, and by covert attempts to expose him to the charge of self-contradiction and duplicity or absurdity. In either of these ways the trial is in the bad sense of temptation from the inferior to the superior. So, in the first way, Israel often provoked God, “in the day of temptation in the wilderness: When your fathers tempted me, proved me, and saw my works” (Ps. xcv. 8, 9). A marked case was that in the thirsty desert, — the chiding with Moses, and insolently demanding water as the test of God’s faithfulness, saying: “Is the Lord among us or not” (Ex. xvii. 7); and which induced the standing commandment: “Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God, as ye tempted him in Massah” (Deut. vi. 16). The second mode was Satan’s tempting Jesus Christ rashly to tempt God by presumptuously testing God’s faithfulness to save him while he should cast himself from the pinnacle of the temple (Matt. iv. 7). The third mode was that of the Pharisees, who came to Christ that they might “entangle him in his talk,” and asked: “Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?” — and which he effectually rebuked, by replying: “Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Show me the tribute money” (Matt. xxii. 15–22).

There is a reasonable and reverent way of testing God’s truth and faithfulness, which he permits and encourages,

sanctioning the trial by substantiating the proof. He allowed Abraham's appeal, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen. xviii. 25). He himself appealed to the conscious convictions of his people: "O house of Israel, are not my ways equal?" (Ezek. xviii. 29); and also answered Elijah's appeal by fire in the trial between him and the false prophets of Baal (1 Kings xviii. 21); and he himself propounded the test to bring all the tithes, and see if the blessing do not come (Mal. iii. 10). But curious or arbitrary demands for a sign he refused (Mark viii. 11-13). He directs to the test of his prophets by the fulfilment of their message, as in Deut. xviii. 17-22; Jer. xxviii. 9; and would have us expect speedy answers to importunate prayer, as in the parable of the unjust judge (Luke xviii. 1-14). But proposed testings of answers to prayer by seeing if they in special cases break in upon the uniformity of nature will consist neither with the right spirit of prayer, nor with a reverent regard for a personal, divine Author of nature.

Passing by the above forms of temptation, we come to the only remaining specification, where the stress and pressure is both of evil and to evil. The tempter is himself a transgressor, and he intentionally urges another to transgress. This is the more familiar meaning of temptation, and that about which it is the more important that we consider, carefully and thoroughly enough to find the exact truth, whether, in case of the transgression of the tempted, the temptation can be any excuse for it. It was in this form the devil tempted Eve, through appeals to sensuous gratification, and Job by sudden and severe afflictions, and Jesus Christ by selfish and ambitious considerations, and very generally the human race by going about as "a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour"; or as "transforming himself to an angel of light," the more effectually to deceive and destroy. And so many wicked men are tempters to others, and as the children of the devil they are doing the works of their father. Such tempters are on every hand, and multitudes heedlessly or presumptuously put themselves within the influence of

the temptation, and allow themselves to be led captive by Satan at his will. The stress of the tempting influence may be through excited appetite or malicious passion, and the evil to which it urges may be to any degree of enormity; but in all ways the very common propensity is manifested to excuse and palliate the sin by the pressure of the temptation under which it has been committed. If, however, this be only from the deceitfulness and desperate wickedness of a depraved heart, while in truth God holds the transgressor fully responsible, notwithstanding the force of temptation, it is of momentous importance to every tempted man, especially to every man consenting to temptation, that he know his true accountability, and get ready to meet it. And in this time of unwonted crimes and aggravated speculation and corruption in both private and public stations, the danger that popular conscience shall be silenced, and the vindication of law and justice be neglected from familiarity with temptation and guilt, makes this question of the moral bearing of temptation upon criminality eminently urgent for thorough investigation and final decision. We propose here to give, at least, an outline of the considerations which must determine the true conclusion.

GOD DOES NOT TEMPT TO EVIL.

The first requisition is to show that God does not tempt to evil. We have noticed a form of temptation in which God is directly said to participate. He puts men on trial, and makes them pass through long processes of severe discipline, and incur liabilities of perverting the designed end of the trial; and in such testing of character and disciplinary experience there is one mode of temptation that God himself employs. Only by such trial can character be formed, and an obedient disposition be secured and confirmed. From the necessities of the case, the moral agent is so to be dealt with, and can neither come to know himself nor be known by others as virtuous and trustworthy, except by sustaining the test and profiting by the discipline. It will be weakness

and misplaced tenderness in any master that shall withhold the training or spare the needed rigor and severity. The trial should be as favorably ordered as the completeness of the discipline will permit; but all complaint of such form of temptation must be unreasonable, and all attempted excuse for misimprovement aggravates the disciple's delinquency, with no disparagement to the master's fidelity.

But, though God so tempt in the ways of trial and discipline, without prejudice to his integrity or benevolence, and giving no opportunity for excuse if in time of such temptation some refuse to be corrected, and fall away into sinful practices, the case would be quite changed under the supposition that God in any way worked directly for evil upon any mind, and tempted in the sense of intentional influence to induce sin. A depraved disposition is already prone to charge its iniquities to hard conditions and unfavorable circumstances, and the pressing urgency from outer nature upon inner constitutional temperament is often pleaded in extenuation for a wicked life. In many ways men make excuses for their sins directly reflecting back upon God, as in some manner arranging his providences or constituting nature so as to facilitate and almost necessitate their transgressions. If, then, experience or revelation could be brought in to favor the conclusion that God designed or desired the sinner's disobedience, this would go far to encourage and strengthen the old Jewish cavil: "Why then doth he find fault; for who hath resisted his will?" What God wishes, and works in or upon me to induce my doing, cannot be sin, at least cannot be all my sin; and for an irreligious life, under such inducements from a divine source, I surely cannot be greatly to blame. But all such attempted palliation of sin must be, and in truth clearly can be, utterly excluded. No practical experience warrants it; no rational speculation sustains it; and scripture declaration expressly and emphatically denies it.

"Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted of evil, neither tempteth

he any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed" (James i. 13, 14). Here is more than mere assertion that God does not tempt to evil; the declaration has an ample reason given for it. A tempter to evil must himself have been tempted with evil, and this cannot be of God. God cannot so be tempted, and thus demonstrably God cannot tempt any man. If God entice to sin, he must have come to wish sin; and, as the latter is impossible, the former is necessarily excluded.

So categorical a denial of God's temptability to evil, for the sake of excluding him from all complicity with the evil, and shutting out all excuse for sin from the assumption that God tempted to sin, demands careful consideration, if we are clearly to apprehend the reasons which authorize it.

God is pure Spirit, and hence cannot be tempted as man is through a sentient soul. Man is sense and reason, and so soul and spirit, and thus open to carnal appetites and spiritual inclinations. We now look to man's sentient soul, and find it liable to temptation through sense-gratification and sense-suffering, the common avenue to tempting impulses being in the direction to sense-indulgence. The rational spirit knows in itself what is due to its own honor, and thereby is conscious of claims to keep every sense-appetite subordinate to its own true dignity and integrity. In this is human freedom and the source of moral responsibility. Perpetual inducements come in through sense upon the spirit to yield its claims to their impulses; and so disposing its executive agency is a renunciation of its righteous sovereignty and debasing itself in servitude to the flesh, and such disposition is "the carnal mind," which is "enmity against God." Temptations to this find their inlet with every longing for pleasure and reluctating of pain by the sentient soul, if in conflict with the claims of the spirit. So humanity is constantly liable to be "tempted with evil."

But so God cannot be tempted. His purely spiritual being knows nothing in his own experience of sense-craving or sense-reluctating. Neither the pleasures nor the pains

of a sentient soul belong to God, and it does not pertain to his spirit that it should have consciousness of the longings and loathings of animal nature. No "law in the members" wars against "the law of the mind," that it should bring the spirit in captivity to "the law of sin." No inner sensibility is open to outer appliances, whereby a perverting bias can be thrown upon the source and spring of executive sovereignty. The divine essence is not in a perpetually militant state of watching and defence against constitutional propensities which at any hour may be immoderately excited. Essential and eternal Reason has nothing intrinsic on which unreason can fix and fasten there internal disquiet and disturbances.

Only as God incarnate, "the Word made flesh," can Deity open itself to these forms of temptation. This "Word was with God and was God," taking in unity the man "born of a virgin," can be "tempted in all points like as we are." It is an essential condition of his perfect mediation that temptation become a part of his suffering. Forty days' solitary self-discipline in the desert beyond Jordan, weary and hungry, there opened the occasion for direct assault, through the sentient soul upon the spirit, from the same adversary who had tempted the first human pair. And all through his sorrowing life, destitute, deserted, derided, who had not "where to lay his head," he learned in his own conscious experience how to be "touched with our infirmities," and how to "succor those that are tempted." Yet so tempted with evil, he did not become evil. He was "without sin," and so ready not to tempt, but to help the tempted.

Except as thus conditional to the service the Divine Word humbled himself to accomplish, the pure, Eternal Spirit can have no tempting of sentient enjoying or suffering, and in no way does he yield to forbidden self-indulgence that may make him the tempter of evil to any man. Sin is the abomination he hates, and he never puts his soliciting agency through any sense upon the spirit that it should dispose its agency in the end of any sinful indulgence.

God is absolute Spirit, and so cannot be tempted of evil as created spirits may be. Life is from God; but life cannot be manifested in itself, and only in the forces which embody it. It holds these elemental forces in unity, binds them together by its diffusion through them and assimilation of them into one indivisible organism, and thus constitutes a proper individuality, concrete in itself and separate from other individualities. Its impartation and superinduction upon the forces it assumes and uses is its expression or manifestation; and in this is the true and proper creation of a living individual. Life, separate from individualized forces, cannot be thought into individuality, and this individualizing of life in force from God is that outer expression of life which is thereby a created living being. The created life-individual may be such in its original constitution as shall spontaneously develop into unconscious plant organism, or through a nervous system into conscious animal sensation; but neither the created individual plant nor animal is life separate from its elemental forces, but life expressed in force, and developing or conserving its individual organism. The plant or animal individuality is lost in the dissolution of the organic forces.

Even so, in the higher human sphere, the rational spirit is from God; but reason cannot be manifested in individual being, except as holding together the constituent elements individualized in an organism which is inclusive of itself, and exclusive of all others. The reason as finite comes from the Absolute Reason, but no human individual is created except as force and life and sensation are individualized by the finite reason expressed in them and holding them in organic unity. The human individuality differs from plant and animal individuality, in that the higher bond of imparted reason holds material and living and sentient elements all individualized in the human organism, and the individual organism is inclusive of its own elements and exclusive of all others. The human individual has thus a conscious, sentient life bound up in unity with a rational life; and man, as before said, is

animal and rational, soul and spirit, in one individual. The sentient life is immortalized by the imparted spiritual life which comprehends it, and does not go out in the dissolution of the earthly body, as in animal individuality, but becomes an immortal soul by virtue of the immortal spirit's union with it and claims upon it.

Through this sentient soul, as already considered, many temptations reach the rational spirit, and when the spirit consents the disposition of the man has become "earthly" and "sensual," and when acting out its malignity in its own spiritual self-hood he is "devilish." Man, thus, and angel, whatever elementary varieties may be individualized by each one, is liable to peculiar assaults which may be more directly spiritual. Purely as reason the spirit has self-knowledge, and therein the capability of true self-estimation and the recognition of what is due to the spirit itself. In this is the capability to recognize both personal rights and reciprocal duties, claims of itself from others and duties from itself to others, and it thus opens the occasion for mutual respect in relative degrees through all ranks in social communion. The intuition of these rights and duties carries in it the claim of reverence to superiors, ingenuous frankness to equals, and kind condescension to inferiors. These are peculiarly spiritual virtues, begotten of and in the spirit; and their counterpart vices of irreverence, arrogance, and insolence are also of and in the spirit, and which in exercise through varied relations become sins of pride, envy, malice, revenge, etc., and are more heinous in guilt than the forbidden gratifications of fleshly lusts. Men and angels are open to these spiritual temptations, and in being overcome in their assent they become fallen men and fallen angels.

But these temptations in the spirit come through the necessary subordinations in social communities. Every spirit is held in obligation to the rights of all, and owes duties to the community, and none may leave his proper sphere and invade another's. The selfishness which pushes against another's right is sinful, and personal interests and

ends are to be sought only in consistency with what is due to all; and yet each is where he may be prompted to demand more than is his due, and to give less than is due to others—arrogate prerogatives not his, and abrogate rightful demands of others. In the purely spiritual sphere such assumed antagonisms may be introduced into actual experience, and the demoniac passions of hate, revenge, and scorn may in such a manner be unloosed among finite personalities.

But God as absolute Spirit cannot so be assailed by temptation. In his supreme excellence essentially, he stands beyond all possibility of these tempting assaults which subordination occasions. The throne and sceptre of universal dominion are his in the right of his own absolute dignity and excellence, and all subordinate spirits are most blessed as he is most honored and adored. He cannot put out claims more than his excellency calls for, nor receive homage and service beyond what is due to his majesty and authority; and thus no occasion can arise for selfish ambition to exact more or less than is his due. It cannot be conceived that God may win any advantage to himself by any way turning aside from persistent integrity and exact and strict adherence to his own honor and right. God must do right, and cannot do wrong, not as destitute of the powers of free-agency, but from his perfections excluding inducement to act toward any other end than that most worthy of himself.

One occasion was once given for the Deity to be tempted in spirit; but it was when in the persons of the Godhead one was voluntarily subordinated to another. The divine Logos not merely took our humanity, but he took official rank and dignity in the work of our redemption inferior to the Father. The work demanded just this self-sacrifice and willing condescension, that he who did not at all rob God by his equality with God should take rank and service subordinate to God. Opportunity was so given to the divine Redeemer's spirit for self-seeking, regardless of superior claims. There was here an opening for pride and ambition and presumption, in prompting to action against higher

authority; and, with most malignant audacity and intrepidity, the devil seized the occasion of forty days' fasting to tempt Jesus to act for himself in his own right and on his own authority and in his own interest, aside from the Father, to make the stone to become bread for him; and then changed the temptation to the opposite spiritual perversion of presumptuously trying the superior Authority if he would send angels to save him in casting himself from the pinnacle of the Temple; and, at last, to discard the superior Authority entirely, and worship his enemy. So the divine mind and spirit of the Saviour could be tempted with evil; but his indignant rebuke, "Get thee behind me, Satan," left no possibility for the obedient Mediator to become a tempter.

But, aside from voluntary subordination in official mediation, no occasion can open for the absolute Spirit to be tempted. No suggestion can reach him, in his fulness, that any deviation from perpetual integrity can turn to any good to him or to his creatures. And, as God cannot in any way be tempted with evil that he himself may become evil, so God cannot tempt any one to evil.

Special Divine influence is for holiness, and not for sin, and thus no excuse for sin. There is a special divine influence in regeneration and sanctification, securing in some a change to holiness and growth in holiness; and it may conversely be supposed that there is a like special influence in man's apostasy and increase in depravity. To such supposition it would be competent and conclusive to answer, that the special agency of the Holy Spirit in regeneration and sanctification is in strict accordance with the free and responsible agency of the new-born and the sanctified, and no beginning nor increase of holiness in any man is without the concurrence of his own free disposing. And thus, what the Holy Spirit does is not a matter of credit for the sinner in his obedience; and if, according to the supposition, the Spirit works in the same way in man's fall and growing iniquity, it will be in full accord with the sinner's free disposing; and so what the Holy Spirit does will not be to the

sinner's discredit, and can be no excuse for his concurrence with such supposed depraving influence of the Holy Ghost. The Spirit's agency and the man's agency, if concurrent toward sin, are still distinct in origin and responsibility, and each must take for himself the accountability of his own.

But, though such supposition might be so answered, and the answer cut off all excuse for sin through the whole mystery of the Spirit's working to secure it, yet is there a shorter and better answer. There is no such official work of the Spirit to secure sin, as in the plan of redemption there is to secure holiness. God is said to have "hardened the heart of Pharaoh," and that "whom he will he hardeneth"; but such declarations are to be interpreted in agreement with the divine oath, "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live" (Ezek. xxxiii. 11); and with the apostle's declaration of "God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth" (1 Tim. ii. 4), but which cannot be, if God wishes and works on some to be sinful and lost. God's truth and providences result in depravity by man's perversion, not by God's co-agency. It may be insisted on that God's Spirit works directly on the human spirit, and so affects the whole mind as intentionally to secure its free obedience, and that such is the Spirit's office-work in salvation; but nothing countenances the unworthy assumption that the Spirit's official mission is directly and intentionally to work upon any mind to deprave and ruin it.

In no way, thus, will the sinner encounter temptation to evil from God. He would that all sinners be of their own free consent obedient, and he does what of right he can to have them so; and if they transgress and perish they are inexcusably their own destroyers.

THE PROCESS OF SUCCESSFUL TEMPTATION PRECLUDES ALL EXCUSE FOR TRANSGRESSION.

Temptation as an influence designed for evil may come

from varied sources, through varied means, and under varied conditions. Still, in some respects, all temptation to evil is necessarily restricted to a specific process, and can attain its end only in fixed and definite ways of operation. The temptation can come only from a finite source, and the tempter must stand external to us, and work on us through intervening media, and can make no immediate changes in either the constitution or moral disposition of the tempted subject. He can know the heart of the tempted one only as disclosed in overt action. God only can make constitutional changes, and work immediately upon mind, and read directly the human heart; and God, as shown, does not tempt with evil. There must also be at least two distinct personal agents,—the tempter and the tempted,—and under any temptation the tempted must himself consent to the tempting influence, and by his own agency execute the tempting intent, or he cannot be made the guilty victim of the tempting assault. All temptation to sin will be harmless to the tempted, except as his spirit disposes its agency to the ends of the tempter, and so the man be “led away of his own lust and enticed.” We shall be further helped to clear views of unmitigated guilt in transgression under temptation by keeping in mind these persistent conditions in all processes of temptation, and thus specially considering the two distinct agencies in all possible cases of successful tempting. We need to contemplate separately what the tempter does, and then what the tempted must do.

The tempter can work only in the application of seducing motives. He may use his constitutional faculties and acquired capability of discernment in apprehending peculiarity of temperament and habitual inclination and state of predisposition in the tempted, as these shall have manifested themselves in outward acts and experience, and may so learn very exactly the susceptibility to be excited, and determine more cunningly his motives and the manner of their presentation. The subtlety and skill in using the most specious ways of delusion and solicitation will measure the force of

the temptation, and also aggravate in its degree the wickedness of the tempter ; but in reference to accountable agency all this originates and terminates in the tempter, and he only stands blame-worthy for it. He cannot make his agency reach any further, nor accomplish any more. He cannot physically touch the sensibilities addressed, nor modify the constitutional temperament he is dealing with, nor can he alter the natural qualities of the tempting objects presented, and still less can he efficiently fix the disposition and direct the executive will of the tempted. He may apply motives, as they are, to the susceptibility as he shall find it, and must leave motive and susceptibility to excite and be excited as from their intrinsic natures they must ; but he can make no essential changes in either. The sentient soul may so be made to lust against the dictates of the spiritual conscience, but at this point is the terminus of the tempter's work. He must stop there, and wait the issue, which is to him wholly uncontrollable, and as yet indeterminate and unknown by him. The tempter has here filled his sphere, and he cannot go over and invade that of another personality.

The fiercest assaults of any tempter may be wholly put aside by any one tempted. The tempted is in an impregnable fortress, and completely safe, until his own treacherous hand shall unbar the gate. There is no sin in merely being tempted, and the man *then* only becomes the sinner when he puts his own voluntariness in alliance with the tempting influence. Whatever apology on the score of human sympathy with human infirmity we may be disposed to make for a much tempted fellow-creature, it must be in consideration of our conscious weakness and fear of what we should be liable to do in the trial, and not that a strictly righteous verdict can take anything from the sin of consenting, to put over with the sin of tempting. The two kinds of sin in their respective criminalities stand separately, each in its own enormity, and neither can take anything of or from the other, nor make any aggregate diminution. Whatever the temptation, the tempted might and should have resisted ; his

consent to the temptation was his own, and is wholly inalienable. No other can divide and share his guilt, and so it must forever stand inexcusable.

But, up to this point, the sin of all that has been done is in the tempter alone, and nothing of disobedience has yet come from the tempted. His sensibilities have been awakened and the appetitive impulse excited; but in such constitutional working of sentient nature there is nothing of spiritual disposing and moral doing. Had the first temptation of our race stopped at this point, in only awakening appetitive impulse to the forbidden fruit, "as good for food and as desirable to make one wise," the tempted would have stood sinless, like the second Adam, to whom the temptation to make bread came "when he was very hungry and would have eaten." The tempter's sin was here finished, and his guilt as heinous as it could have been in the success of his tempting work; but the sin was of the devil only, and in the case of the first parents, as of Jesus, the sin would have been all the devil's, and not theirs, if, as Jesus did, they had said, "Get thee hence, Satan."

In all processes of tempting, the first thing is the preparation for and the applying of the tempting motive, and in fully accomplishing this the tempting work is consummated, and the overt deed stands out for God to judge and punish; but if the tempted has not assented, and put his own will in execution of the appetitive impulse, the moral guilt is the tempter's alone, and the tempted has as yet no sin to excuse, nor criminality that needs palliation.

The tempted must act in voluntary execution of the tempter's design, in order to his transgression. The temptation was finished in the tempter's finished work. If there is, then, to be any advance in the process, the agency of the tempted must begin, and mingle in accordant concurrence with the agency of the tempter. When here the tempted stands firm, and refuses all complicity with the soliciting influence, he is not, and only the tempter is, a sinner. And if he yield assent, and put his spirit in subserviency to the excited sense-

impulse, this is of his origination, and the transgression is his sin; and he only, and not the tempter, must stand chargeable for it. Each agent has his own intent and executive act, and in these his own sin, and for precisely that which is his must each be answerable — the tempter for tempting, and the tempted for concurring.

COLLATERAL CONSIDERATIONS RATHER AGGRAVATE THAN EXCUSE TRANSGRESSION UNDER TEMPTATION.

Beside the exclusion of God from all temptation to evil, and the inalienable guilt of the tempter and the tempted, respectively, there are still some collateral considerations carrying the evidence even further than mere inexcusableness of transgression under temptation, the very temptation rather heightening the guilt.

The tempted are thereby put under peculiar obligations to resent the insult and rebuke the tempter. No sin is more obvious and detestable than that of inducing another to sin. As if his own transgressions were insufficient to satiate his spirit of disloyalty and rebellion, the tempter seeks directly to involve others in the same guilt and ruin. Whether from encouragement to himself in having companions in iniquity, or the gratification of a malignant desire to ruin others, or so deep hate to righteous authority that he will seek to spread and intensify the hatred, or perhaps a combination of all these selfish and malicious designs, nothing can be more abhorrent to all virtuous sentiment than the disclosure of such base motives in the very fact of the tempting. A solicitation to any vicious indulgence, or a plausible pleading for any disobedience as justifiable or excusable, should at once arouse the suspicions of the tempted, and awaken sharp discernment to detect the most subtle tempting designs. That heedlessness or credulous weakness which permits the imposition to work out its deception is inexcusable; and when the ensnaring purpose further opens, no sterner imperative can come to any man than that, for virtue's sake, he resent the insult, and rebuke the insolent presumption.

Our Saviour's example is more than a warrant, and imposes on us the duty to mark our detestation by his own indignant "Get thee behind me, Satan."

Nothing becomes that manly valor which is the essence of virtue but such prompt resentment; and if, instead, we listen and lean to and at last fall in with the base allurement, it can only augment our disgrace to put the insult of the temptation as an excuse for the pollution of our assenting. "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you."

Temptation repelled elevates character and confirms integrity. It would be foolhardy rashly to run within the influence of the tempter. Knowing the liabilities to yield and be overcome, it will be presumptuous to dare the dangers of tempting positions. Yet if, in the course of natural occurrences, and especially in the fulfilment of the claims of benevolence or of duty, we encounter temptation in enticements to indulgence or threatenings of danger, it may not be our misfortune, but a fair offer for attaining thereby a higher excellency. Temptations overcome discouragement and drive off the tempter; the tempted becomes the victor, and the tempter the vanquished. By his manly firmness, the assailed one triumphs, and successive victories elevate him to become the veteran conqueror. Courage is gained on the side of virtue, and despair settles upon the deceitful and presumptuous assailant. As the victor gains new resolution, and rises in conscious worthiness, his integrity of character becomes confirmed, and he is more surely and more safely to be trusted. "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he is tried he shall receive the crown of life" (James i. 12).

On such account, one need not regret the occurrence of temptations in his providential experiences; for they give to him their opportunities of magnifying his love to truth and righteousness and manifesting more fully his loyalty to God. The carelessness which perverts, or the cowardice which deserts such occasions of trial, and yields to the tempter, or runs from his assigned post, loses all the offered advantage,

and subjects himself to reproach. He might have foiled the tempter, and brought honor to God. The chastity of Joseph and the patient firmness of Job were the more pure and precious by their triumphant fidelity in the hours of temptation; and whoso falls in such assaults upon his virtue is both excuseless in his sin, and also blameworthy in losing the greater magnanimity and dignity he might have attained. As the Captain of our salvation was made perfect through sufferings, without which he could not have been so complete a Saviour for us, so in this he has left to us an example, that we follow in his steps, taking bravely the temptations which must needs be met in the ways of providence and duty, and standing firm to the end. The severity of the conflict will add its proportional hardihood for coming battles, and secure victory in future assaults, and neither the avoidance of such incidental temptations, nor the yielding to their influence, can make their occurrence an excuse for either the pusillanimity of the desertion or the ignominy of the fall.

Listening to temptation will bring, first, transgression, and then the tempting of others. When the tempting insinuation first arises, it will be inexcusable to give the least favor to the solicitation. So far to listen to the tempting suggestion as to hold it in meditation of anticipated indulgence is already an admitting of the poison and a beginning of assistance towards its deadly diffusion. The appetite is awakened into an impulse towards forbidden gratification, and this is now cherished by the tempted as a welcome topic of thought and fond imagination. It may be an appeal to the mind in any form of sense-enjoyment, like an acquisition of wealth or power or pleasure; but the longing for it has been excited, and the will now so far actively assents as to hold and cherish it, and so the temptation has actively struck in. The next step soon follows in casting about to see what means there may be for the execution, and then quite readily comes, with perhaps some hesitancy and misgiving, the assenting agency of incipient arrangements toward ultimate accomplishment. The man has already become an actual sinner, and the sin

will soon finish itself with a full and fixed disposition in the way of transgression, and so bring forth moral death in the spirit. Prompt rebuke and resistance at the start would as surely have led to ultimate victory and spiritual integrity and life; but the consenting dalliance with the offered temptation was the opening inlet to the actual transgression.

When, now, the transgression has been consummated, the easy and sure consequent is, that this actual transgressor begins himself to be a tempter, and throws influences over others to induce their transgression. No man consents to sin, and passes along in practices of iniquity, but he soon becomes a direct agent in destroying more victims in the same way. The mischief spreads like a pestilence, and each new transgressor is straightway a new tempter, and in every case the "one sinner destroyeth much good." The burning brand is lighted, and will not quench and put out the fire of itself; it stands in the midst of other combustibles, on which it seizes, and we are soon forced to witness "how great a matter a little fire kindleth." If the temptation cannot excuse your consenting to transgress, how much less so your going over to the tempter's side, and joining him in doing the devil's work! The last was as a moral certainty involved in the first, and by so much aggravates the guilt of the first parley with the tempter.

Special divine strength is offered to the tempted. Not only has the man the native powers of free-agency whereby the spirit may control the sense, and hold every appetite and passion in subjection to reason, however strongly these may be influenced by temptation, but, beyond this, special spiritual help is graciously offered to every tempted soul. The rule proposed by divine revelation, on which God will deal with all men, is this: "God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it" (1 Cor. x. 13). Of "our merciful and faithful High-Priest" it is said: "For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted"

(Heb. ii. 18). And, on this account, we are all exhorted to "come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in every time of need" (Heb. iv. 16). No tempted man is left to the necessity of meeting any tempter alone. There are always more helps in every spiritual conflict offered than there are tempting influences applied, and the spiritual eye may always see mountains "full of horses and chariots of fire round about him." We may have often to wrestle not only with flesh and blood, but against "spiritual wickedness in high places," yet we do not go to the warfare on our own charges. Full armor is given, and available defences offered, and strong auxiliaries are close at hand. All fleeing from or yielding in the conflict must be an ungrateful rejection of this expensively provided and graciously offered help; and this, instead of excusing, enhances the guilt of complying with the tempter's design.

CONCLUSION.

The conclusion now attained and established has important practical bearings of a theological, personal, and social character. It will be for the completion of our discussion of this subject, if we here note some of the more important of these practical matters as they stand related to the facts of temptation to evil.

Theologically, no body of divinity can be sound which has running through it the doctrine that God wishes his creatures to sin, and works in or upon them to induce it.

There is sin, there long has been, and ever will be sin, within the moral government of God. The truth of God's being and the fact of sin may both be recognized with no manifested apprehension of any disagreement between them; or, if noticed, the seeming disagreement may be left with no attempt at any philosophical reconciliation; or very strenuous efforts may be made to harmonize, in speculation, the facts of God's omnipotent and universal sway with his permission of sin; we say nothing here of the comparative proprieties or possibilities of the three cases, but design most emphatically

to affirm, whether philosophical speculation be applied in expounding it or not, that the true creed on this point must be, Sin did not originate in God. He had no complicity of solicitation or approbation with its beginning in any of his creatures.

Somehow, sin has come into God's system of government against his authority; and its continuance, as well as its origin, leaves the sin to be abominable in his sight; and it cannot consist with this that he wishes for it and works to secure it. All theorizing or teaching subversive of this truth, or obscuring its clearness, should be rejected without ceremony or apology, no matter how ingenious the speculation or earnest the teaching may be. Sin at the centre of a theological system must exclude reason from the centre, and the entire sphere must then be unreasonable. No theology is preferable to the most labored system of doctrines which makes sin desirable at the source of all moral agency. Better atheism, even, than belief in a God who wishes and works to get disobedience to his commandments.

Personally, the transgressor has nothing to do with excuses. Having sinned, no matter under what tempting inducements, it is only a result of the heart's deceitfulness that an attempt is made to interpose apologies and excuses, and thus avoid responsibilities. It is the witness of its love for delusions and "trust in lies." There is ever in such palliations an aversion to standing out and taking to himself what is his own, and a seeking to throw on others the burdens which are not theirs. No such alienation of personal guilt is possible; since, no matter what the tempting source may have been, there was the open way for escape. And so every sinner is held by a just claim to ingenuously admit his responsibility for exactly that which is his, and confess his guilt in it, and to expect a settlement of it in some way himself, both with his own conscience and with God, and excusing the sin is no part of his business. It adds immensely to his already incurred disgrace to attempt the baseness of somehow shuffling off upon another the

demerit which belongs alone to him. He listened to the tempter, and consented to his designs, and this agency was his, and not the tempter's; and the only honest, righteous course is frankly to own it, and stand himself alone in bearing what is his due. The tempter must stand for his tempting agency; but the tempted must as exclusively stand for his consenting act, and what the tempter has done and must answer for cannot have an excusing efficacy for what the tempted has done. One thing only is in place for the tempted transgressor, as either satisfactory to his own conscience or to God, which is, to evince a reformed disposition in honest confession of the fact and the guilt of his sin, and henceforth stand in resistance to all coming temptations. The very least is the best in the way of apology and excuse, and the most prompt in the way of acknowledgment and reformation.

Socially, there are two directions in which we are to turn our practical consideration: First, how shall we treat the tempted transgressor? The tempted ones who have sinned and fallen are all around us. We must needs go out of the world, if we would refuse to "keep company" with the tempted and fallen; yea, we ourselves are in just the condition of having sinned under some tempter's influence. How shall the social intercourse of such a community be regulated? Compassion for the tempted is right, and our pity should be proportioned to the stress of their temptation; for to this extent has been their misfortune, and not their fault. Their sin has come with their assenting, and therein transgressing, and even in their sinning, though disapproving, we may still have pity for them. So God pities us his sinning creatures, and "remembers that we are dust." He takes fully into account our weak, frail, sensuously susceptible constitution, and proportions blame in that direction, as well as in reference to the strength of the tempting influence. But, compassionate as God is toward tempted transgressors, he yet holds each to his just accountability. He bates no jot of deserved blame and disapprobation for any man's sin. His pity never

overruns his righteousness, nor does he ever allow the guilty to run away with his pity. He measures the desert accurately, and makes the response to follow exactly. God puts nothing to our account which is not ours; but what is ours he neither overlooks nor permits us to put off from ourselves upon others. Just what the guilt is he puts back upon the transgressor, and makes the sinner confess and repent and forsake, or no measure of his pity for that sinner makes God to forgive. Pardon without such reformation would involve the integrity of the divine character in the issue, and damage his kingdom in a way that no considerations of compassion could repair.

In like manner as God pities, so should we; carrying the apology for sinners so far as to secure full exemption of blame and exclusion of evil from them for that which is not theirs. But for just what is theirs we must manifest our disapprobation and hold to full account, despite all sympathy, whether the account is to be settled with us or with the law of the state or with the law of God. The exposure of appalling corruption and weak and wicked prevarication, falsehood, and perhaps perjury, to escape from manifest complications in the iniquity, tell how wide and powerful temptation has spread even in the high places of our nation, and it becomes the sterner duty for every honest man to stand firm, although he stands alone, and "in any wise rebuke his neighbor, and not suffer sin upon him." The virtuous man becomes himself the tempter, when he holds his peace and keeps back rebuke in times of abounding iniquity. The strongest claim on all the good is that they hold all transgressors to their full and fair account.

Finally, how treat the tempter? It is, doubtless, the part of humanity to pity even the tempter; but in the light of his tempting agency, it must be pity either for unmitigated selfishness or for unmingled malevolence. The tempter sins beyond his own ruin in seeking the ruin of others, inducing them to become instruments to his forbidden indulgences, or, still more wickedly, from sheer malignity and malice

aforethought, he leads the other into crime with the depraved intent of a demon. His sin, any way, is of vastly deeper guilt in tempting than that of his victim in consenting, and for just this deeper guilt he should be held to account. The aggravated guilt is his, and no part of the sin of the tempted. No success in his selfish or malicious intent, nor any advantage from power or position which his success may have gained, and with which he may be seeking to defend himself, should be allowed to screen from full exposure, or shield from full responsibility. Public sentiment and penal law should ever hold the seducer to any sin amenable to a sterner account and a sorer infliction than the tempted transgressor.

The tempting influence may have been flattery or bribery, the preparation and appliance of favoring occasion, or the pressure of harsh constraint; but, in any case, our pity for the tempter has done all it should, when it has turned from him such blame and censure as is undeserved; and our deep disapprobation of his selfish or malignant criminality should lead us to hold him responsible to the full extent of all the guilt proved upon him. Any sympathetic impulses which may be allowed to interfere with this full measure when the day for penal execution has come, will be cruelty to the innocent and treachery to social safety. When public sympathy or public laxity of moral sentiment leaves the corrupters of society in impunity, the certain dissolution and speedy destruction of that community are inevitable.

ARTICLE IV.

EL MOHRAKAH, OR THE PLACE OF ELIJAH'S SACRIFICE.

BY REV. C. M. MEAD, PROFESSOR AT ANDOVER.

AMONG the interesting sites in Palestine, few are better identified than the place on Mt. Carmel where Elijah repaired the altar of Jehovah and defeated the priests of Baal. Tradition fixes the spot, and it is a tradition in which there is no disagreement among the various sects in Palestine. Stanley pronounces it "unusually trustworthy."¹ Dr. Thomson gives six reasons for having confidence in the tradition, and concludes by saying: "Why, therefore, should there be a doubt about the matter? I confess, with hearty good-will, that I am troubled with none."²

The first among modern explorers to visit the place and publish an account of it seems to have been Van de Velde, who found the spot, March 2, 1852.³ Besides his account, the only original sources of information with which I am acquainted are the narratives of Dr. Thomson, Dean Stanley, and Mr. Tristram.⁴ Prof. Porter, in his *Hand-book for Palestine* (Murray's Series) also gives an account of the place, but leaves us in doubt whether his description is derived from personal observation or from the publications of others. Having recently had an opportunity to visit the place twice, and finding the above-mentioned descriptions somewhat unsatisfactory, I venture to undertake a criticism of these, and to make some additional contributions to the topography of the place, and to the exposition of the narrative given in 1 Kings xviii. My object will be accomplished, if any traveller shall be saved from the vexatious disappointment which many have experienced. Having read, in the guide-book,

¹ Sinai and Palestine, p. 346.² Land and the Book, Vol. ii. p. 225.³ Syria and Palestine, Vol. i. p. 316 sq. ⁴ Land of Israel, p. 117.

that everything in the place corresponds perfectly with the sacred narrative, one climbs the mountain in the full expectation of having nothing to do, on reaching the place of sacrifice, but easily to reproduce in imagination the biblical scene. Arriving there, however, he finds himself perplexed by the disagreement between the books and the locality, and spends the time, which might be pleasantly occupied in meditating on the sacred events, in vain attempts to reconcile the statements in his books with the Bible and with the appearance of the place. Let us, then, first notice the principal features of the locality.

As to the spot now called el-Mohrakah (or, as others write it, Mokhrakah, Mohhrakah, Mukhrakah, Muhrakah, or Maharakah), it is situated on the top of the Carmel range, at the southeastern extremity of it. On this point, all except Tristram seem to be agreed. The name itself (signifying the *burnt place* or *place of burning*) is supposed to be derived from the circumstance that here the fire descended and burned the sacrifice of Elijah. The exact spot is assumed to be marked by the ruins of a stone building, mentioned by Van de Velde, Stanley, Thomson, Porter, and Tristram. I may add that there now stands, close by the ruin, on the south of it, an oratory said to be used by the Latin monks. It is about twenty-five feet square, and is divided into two compartments, at the inner extremity of one of which is a rude altar. This building, I was told, has been recently erected.

The summit on which el-Mohrakah is situated, though a part of the range, is somewhat isolated by a deep depression running on the north and northwest side of it. On the west and south the ground also slopes away, but somewhat more gently; but on the east the descent is almost precipitous. From the summit a wide view of the Mediterranean is obtained, there being nothing to obstruct it, except in the northwest, where, of course, the mountain range itself, a part of which is even higher than the point of view,¹ hides the sea for a

¹ Stanley (p. 345) speaks of the eastern extremity as "the highest point of the whole ridge." But the highest point is at Esfieh, some four miles from the ex-
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considerable distance. On the south and southwest one looks upon the hills of Samaria and the plain of Sharon. On the east is a splendid view of the whole plain of Esdraelon, with Mt. Gilboa, Little Hermon, and Mt. Tabor; and in the northeast are seen the hills around Nazareth.

Under this summit, on the east, is a sort of basin on the mountain side, an open space partly cultivated and sprinkled over with olive-trees. I should roughly estimate it to be about two hundred rods in diameter. This is the "wide upland sweep" of Stanley, the "glade" or "amphitheatre" of Tristram. The western half of it, especially the part immediately under the cliff, is very steep. As one descends further, it becomes more nearly level. Still further, at the lower extremity of this amphitheatre (not the upper part, as Tristram affirms) is the fountain from which Elijah is generally supposed to have got the water to fill the trench. It is situated on the northern side of the wady, or ravine, into which the basin here contracts. And at this point, or a little below, the descent to the plain of Esdraelon again becomes more rapid. Stanley says that an old olive-tree marks the place of the fountain (which, however, he did not himself see). Tristram, who was there ten years later, says that it is "overhung by a few magnificent trees." As trees are mutable things, both these statements may be correct; but in the spring of 1872 the fountain was overhung only by a fallen tree-trunk, about nine feet long, lying directly over it. There is a magnificent oak-tree growing over a rocky ledge, a very few rods west of the fountain, under whose shade parties of travellers are fond of resting and taking lunch. Van de Velde speaks of the fountain as "vaulted" and "in the form of a tank." When I was there, little of the vault could be seen. Indeed, except upon a close examination, one would have noticed nothing but a well about six feet in diameter; the wall built of unhewn stones,


tremity. There the height is given by Grove (Smith's Bible Dict. Am. ed. p. 389), as 1728 feet; by Porter (Kitto's Cycl.), as 1750 feet. El-Mohraka, according to Van de Velde, is 1635 feet high; according to Grove, 1600 feet.

and standing about eight feet out of the water on the north-western (upper) side, and about five feet on the opposite side. But under the upper side of the wall, close to the water, almost covered by it, I observed what might be a part of an arch or roof, made of hewn stones eight or ten inches square. The water extended under this arch; how far, I could not tell. I tried to measure the depth of the water; but, finding nothing better than a tall celery-stalk to use for a plummet, I can only say that I found no bottom, though I put it in as deep as nine feet. The water is clear and good, but not very cold. An Arab, who happened along, stated to my companion that the spring is never dry. Tristram seems to have been more fortunate in getting a view of the vault. He says: "The reservoir of the spring is stone-built and square, about eight feet deep, and the old steps which once descended to it may yet be traced. The roof partially remains. The water is of some depth, and is perennial." Tristram visited the place on the sixteenth of December, and it is not strange that he should have found the water much lower than when I was there (April 25).

The ridges which inclose this basin on the north and south are not very commanding. They are hardly more than gentle swells, except at the eastern part of the southern side. One may ascend to the Mohrakah from the fountain by three different ways. The bridle-path leads to the right, over the ridge on the northern side of the basin, and makes a circuit quite around the northern side of the summit of the mountain, so that the first approach to the Mohrakah is the same as for those who come to it from Esfieh along the mountain ridge. A horse occupies twenty-five minutes or more in going up this path. If one walks, however, one can go much more directly, either by climbing up the precipitous eastern side of the summit, or by passing around a little to the south and coming up on the southern slope. The time required to pass between the two points in either of the two latter ways is from twelve to fifteen minutes. At present the southern slope of the summit is very rough, being thickly covered

with large, angular rocks, and overgrown with brush-wood. The same is true of a considerable part of the more level portion of the summit. As to the east side, Van de Velde's statement that "the rock shoots up in an almost perpendicular wall of more than two hundred feet in height on the side of the vale of Esdraclon," gives an erroneous impression. The rock is not so steep but that I clambered directly up it to the Mohrakah. A little further north, however, on the same side, the rock is quite precipitous; but the precipitous part is not more than thirty feet high. Below this, as already remarked, the ground formed by the debris is very steep, but ought not to be called part of the precipice.

A word respecting the ruins on the Mohrakah. There can be no mistake as to their location. The "rocky, level space" on the summit, of which Van de Velde speaks, is, as he says, "of no great circumference," and it is quite certain that there is only one ruined building on it. Van de Velde describes it as "an oblong, quadrangular building, of which the front wall and door and both side walls are still partially standing. The large hewn stones suggest an older date than that of the Crusades." Stanley calls it a "square stone building,"



and then quotes Van de Velde for the rest. Dr. Thomson says: "There is only a 'spot' on a natural platform of naked rock, surrounded by a low wall, which, from appearance, may have been there in the days of Elijah, or even before." Tristram tells only of "hewn stones." These accounts are only partially correct, as a description of the *present* appearance of the ruins. The shape is, as Van de Velde states, quadrangular, if we except a slight projection on the south-

west corner. The accompanying diagram will best give an

idea of its form and size. Portions of *all* the walls are standing; but the remains vary from one to six or eight feet in height. The stones are not large, however; they are, on the average, hardly more than a foot in diameter; and, although I cannot profess to judge of the age of buildings, I should sooner think the building to have been erected during the last half century than in the time of the Crusades or of Elijah. Not many of the stones are even hewn. Some of the foundation-stones are hewn, however; and it may be that the superstructure was taken away to build into the oratory before spoken of, and that the walls now standing have been recently built to take the place of the older ones. I cannot otherwise account for the above-mentioned descriptions. The walls, as they now appear, very much resemble a farmer's stone wall. No mortar is seen in them, and the chinks between the larger stones are only loosely filled with smaller ones.

Let us now attempt to picture to ourselves the biblical scene. We first naturally ask where the altar was which Elijah repaired. This has been already virtually answered. The tradition implies that it was on the summit; and in this the above-mentioned writers seem to agree. Van de Velde identifies el-Mohrakah with the site of the altar (p. 326), and says of it: "There is not a more conspicuous spot on all Carmel than the abrupt, rocky height of Mohrakah, shooting up so suddenly on the east" (p. 322). Stanley, also, says: "There, on the highest point of the mountain, may well have stood, on its sacred 'high place,' the altar of the Lord which Jezebel had thrown down" (p. 347). Dr. Thomson is less explicit, but seems to imply the same. Tristram, also (p. 117), after saying, "We were standing on the edge of a cliff, from the base of which the mountain sank steeply down a thousand feet into the plain of Esdraclon," adds, in reference to the same place, "The hewn stones among which we stood mark the site of the altar of the Lord which Jezebel overthrew." So far there is perfect agreement. Tristram, however, immediately adds: "No site in Palestine is more

indisputable than that of the little hollow in the knoll, three hundred feet below us, where the Lord God of Elijah manifested his divinity before Ahab and assembled Israel." And again: "We remained here [on the edge of the cliff] for an hour, and then, leaving our horses, descended by a slippery path to the Mohrakah, or place of sacrifice" (p. 119). This is all very obscure. What does Mr. Tristram mean by "the place of sacrifice," if not the place where the altar was? But he distinctly puts the two places at least three hundred feet apart, in reality (if he puts the Mohrakah near the fountain, as he seems to do, p. 119) more than half a mile apart. What other "sacrifice" can be referred to, I cannot conceive. Certainly, not the slaughter of the priests of Baal, which took place in the plain, nor the sacrifice of the bullock chosen by the priests of Baal. It is quite impossible, therefore, to reconcile this writer with himself. There is, then, no ground in what he says for questioning the tradition which puts el-Mohrakah on the summit of the mountain, and identifies it with the place where Elijah repaired the altar.

We are next led to ask whether we are to conceive the scene described in 1 Kings xviii. 30-39 to have taken place on the summit, or in the basin below. This question is almost identical with the last, and would not need to be raised, were it not that some of the writers seem to locate the scene wholly in the lower place. This is not true of Van de Velde, who says: "The place of sacrifice, according to verses eighteenth and nineteenth, must have been ample enough in size to contain a very numerous multitude. El-Mohrakah must at that time have been quite fitted for this, although now covered with a rough, dense jungle." Dr. Thomson, too, though not specific on this point, in general indorses Van de Velde's description. Tristram, however, as we have seen, pictures the transaction as occurring in the amphitheatre below the summit. And Stanley, too, though unequivocally locating Elijah's altar on the summit, yet, after expressing this opinion, immediately adds:

“Close beneath, on a wide upland sweep, under the shade of ancient olives and round a well of water said to be perennial, and which may therefore have escaped the general drought and have been able to furnish water for the trenches round the altar, must have been ranged, on one side the king and people, with the eight hundred and fifty prophets of Baal and Astarte, and on the other side the solitary and commanding figure of the prophet of the Lord.” This is quoted and indorsed by Porter.¹ It is difficult to understand this representation. According to it, the whole multitude were assembled around the fountain, Elijah with the rest. And yet the fountain is, as has been already noticed, more than half a mile from the place of sacrifice. The *central* part of the scene must certainly have been around the altar of Jehovah. Still, we can hardly suppose that the whole multitude could have been on the very summit and immediately around the altar. The “rocky, level space” (Van de Velde), or “natural platform of naked rock” (Thomson), or “terrace of natural rock” (Porter), is not large enough to accommodate such a gathering as the narrative warrants us to suppose to have been there. The level part is hardly more than twenty rods in length, and somewhat less in width. Those who could not conveniently have been congregated on this space itself may have come near, remaining on the southern, western, and southwestern slopes of the peak. Or, a great part of them may have remained in the “upland sweep,” east of the cliff, where they could at least see the fire descend and consume the sacrifice. To borrow Van de Velde’s words: “The rock shoots up in an almost perpendicular wall of more than two hundred feet in height on the side of the vale of Esdraelon. On this side, therefore, there was no room for the gazing multitude; but, on the other hand, this wall made it visible over the whole plain and from all the surrounding heights, so that even those left behind, and who had not ascended Carmel, would still have been able to witness, at no great distance, the fire from

¹ Hand Book, Vol. ii. p. 354.

heaven that descended upon the altar." So obvious is it that those who locate the altar of Jehovah on the summit must conceive this same place to have been the centre of that part of the scene in which Elijah most prominently figured, that one is forced to conclude that Stanley (who did not himself go down to the "upland sweep," but returned to the convent on the other end of the range) must have misconceived, or forgotten, the exact configuration of the ground, and especially the distance of el-Mohrakah from the fountain. Otherwise, he could hardly have described the principal actors in the scene as grouped around the well, rather than around the altar. At all events, the last part of the drama must have been enacted (the correctness of the tradition being assumed) on the very summit of the mountain. For we read : " And Elijah said unto all the people, Come near unto me. And all the people came near unto him. And he repaired the altar of the Lord that was broken down " (xviii. 30).

It may still remain a question whether the altar of the prophets of Baal was also on the same summit. But this, also, there is no reason for disputing. We are told (vs. 19, 20) that the people of Israel and the prophets of Baal were gathered "unto Mount Carmel." This language of itself leaves it undetermined how far the people ascended the mountain, or, indeed, whether they ascended it at all. But it is implied that they went up some distance, at least ; for it is said, in vs. 40, that Elijah "brought the prophets *down* to the brook Kishon." And there is nothing to imply that the altar of Jehovah was situated on a higher place than that of Baal. The language of Stanley and Tristram leads one to conjecture that they may have had this conception of the scene. At least, this is the only plausible explanation of their descriptions. But, as one reads the biblical narrative, the impression derived is that the people, the false prophets, and Elijah were all together during the whole occurrence. Elijah addressed the people, after they were assembled (vs. 21, 22) ; he addressed also the prophets of

Baal (vs. 25, 27). And when the prophets had failed to call down the fire, Elijah, who had been present with them, simply says to the people, "Come near unto me"; not "Come up with me," or "Follow me," as might be expected, if the altar of Baal had been in the amphitheatre below, instead of on the summit itself. In one sense, they must have been near him before; but until now they had not given special attention to him; the altar and prophets of Baal had constituted the centre of interest and attraction. When, therefore, Elijah says: "Come near unto me," he means nothing more than to invite the people now to give their attention to him, to gather more closely around him, and observe all that he is about to do.¹ Without evidence to the contrary, therefore, it seems most natural to assume that both altars were on the summit, though, of course, not on precisely the same spot. "It is well known," remarks Van de Velde, "that such altars were uniformly built on very conspicuous eminences." The heathen, more than the Jews, were inclined to select such eminences for their altars. It is certainly improbable, therefore, that the worshippers of Baal built their altar lower down than the altar of Jehovah.

A few words respecting the water used by Elijah. Van de Velde, Stanley, Tristram, and Porter agree in supposing that the water was obtained from the fountain described above. Dr. Thomson, however, whose opinion on such a matter is perhaps worth more than that of any one else, dissents. He says (p. 225) that the fountain was nearly dry when he saw it, and thinks it could not hold out through the dry season even of one ordinary summer, still less through a drought of three years and a half. We have, it would seem, no more positive evidence than this. The statements of the natives, though they may ever so strongly affirm that the spring is perennial, can hardly be regarded as decisive

¹ This explanation is made all the more probable, if we adopt the reading of the LXX, who insert, before the 30th verse, the following clause: "And Elijah, the Tishbite, spake to the prophets of the idols, and said, Retire now, and I will prepare my whole burnt-offering. And they retired and went away."—Josephus (*Ant.* viii. 13, 5) makes the same representation.

against Dr. Thomson's opinion. Still, it is only an opinion, and may be erroneous. Or, even if it be correct as to the *present* state of the case, does it follow that it correctly represents what was true in the time of Elijah? May there not have been a change in the abundance of the supply of water from the spring since that time? Dr. Thomson's theory that the water may have been brought from some of the permanent sources of the Kishon at the foot of Carmel may not be inadmissible; yet the time required for bringing it must have been rather long. Thomson himself says that it is doubtful whether any of these sources, except the great one of Saadiéh, could stand such a protracted drouth. But this water is only about three miles east of Haifa. From Haifa to the Mohrakah the distance cannot be less than fifteen miles. I was four hours and a half in passing over it, though my horse galloped a considerable part of the way. In order, therefore, to bring water from this source to the Mohrakah, a distance of twelve miles would have had to be twice traversed — a process which would occupy more than six hours. Now, we must remember that there is no intimation that the water was brought before Elijah's bullock had been slain; and this, probably, did not take place earlier than three o'clock in the afternoon. It is, therefore, strange that Dr. Thomson can say that the distance to the Saadiéh "is not great enough to create any difficulty." To my mind, there would be some difficulty in supposing that the water was brought from the marshes east of the Tell Kussis, where he thinks there might also have been water. For even this would have required two or three hours. I am inclined, therefore, to adopt Van de Velde's theory that the water may have been obtained from the fountain below the Mohrakah. Of course, however, it is conceivable that water was carried up from some distant place, early in the day, not merely to be used in the way mentioned, but to be drunk. It is probable that the occurrence took place on a summer day, when there would be need of such a provision. If this conjecture is adopted, it will not be necessary to assume that

water was first fetched after Elijah had called for it late in the afternoon. Possibly this is Dr. Thomson's conception of the case. At all events, we have no need of resorting to Thenius's easy settlement of the question. He says: "The author seems, for the moment, not to have thought of the frightful drouth in which, doubtless, even the numerous fountains of Carmel and the brook Kishon must have been dried up."¹ It may here be remarked that this apparent difficulty is magnified by the Authorized Version, which renders פָּהֲרִים by "barrels," whereas it should have been rendered by "buckets," or, as elsewhere, by "pitchers."

We are here led to inquire concerning the trench which Elijah dug. Josephus calls it "a very deep trench." In the original narrative, however, we read, "a trench as great as would contain two measures of seed," literally, "a trench according to the capacity of two measures of seed." This is interpreted by Thenius and Keil to mean a trench the digging of which removed as much soil as would have been sown with two measures of seed. In favor of this exposition might be adduced the circumstance that the word "seeds" is added, which seems unnecessary, if the writer meant merely to designate the capacity of the trench as equal to two measures (סָאִתִּים, two seahs). But, on the other hand, this would be a very singular method of designating the size of a trench. It is, at the very best, rather indefinite as descriptive of the superficial area of the space dug up. Moreover, it tells us nothing as to the depth, the real capacity, of the trench. And, finally, this interpretation would make the trench incredibly large. A seah, according to one estimate, is nearly equal to twelve quarts; according to another, to about six quarts. Two seahs, then, the smallest estimate being adopted, would be equivalent to a peck and a half. This would be sufficient to sow over a space of thirty square rods. The other (and perhaps more probable) estimate of the size of a seah would require us, on this hypothesis, to assume sixty square rods to have been dug up in making

¹ Kurzgefasstes Exeg. Handbuch, ix. s. 224

the trench! The most of the whole level part of the summit would have thus been devoted to the altar and trench. The supposition that Elijah could have undertaken such an enterprise borders on the absurd. To refute it, we hardly need to adduce the argument that, according to the narrative as most probably to be understood, the twelve bucketfuls themselves filled the trench, after running over the sacrifice and round about the altar. Our version reads: "And the water ran round about the altar; and he filled the trench also with water" (vs. 35). But we *may* render the Hebrew of the last clause, "And the water filled also the trench." Leaving this, however, undecided, we ask, What was the object of digging a trench at all? Evidently, to make it obvious that there could be no deception in regard to the fire. But this could as easily be accomplished by a narrow, as by a broad trench. The statement of the sacred writer, interpreted in the most natural way, is, therefore, quite in accordance with the probabilities of the case. A trench dug around the altar would answer the above-mentioned purpose, if large enough to contain twelve quarts, certainly if, as is perhaps more probable, large enough to contain twenty-four quarts. The fact of the water remaining in the trench, even though it were a small one, would prove that there was no secret way of letting it off. What did not remain in it, or soak into the ground before reaching it, may have run over it.¹ But how could a trench have been dug at all on that "terrace of natural rock"? I was at first staggered, as this question occurred to me; but a closer observation showed that there is now soil enough for a shallow trench, at least; whether there was more or less in Elijah's time cannot be said. But if

¹ Bähr (in Lange's Bibelwerk), while rejecting the interpretation of Keil and Thenius, and while apparently adopting the explanation given by Gesenius in his Lexicon (under פֶּחַיִּים) and above defended, yet seems to misrepresent that interpretation by adding: "The ditch, therefore, was as deep as the measure containing two seahs." This is only one degree less objectionable than the view which he rejects. If the writer wished only to describe the depth of the trench, he could have found some term more appropriate to his purpose than this. What evidence have we that the Jews had a measure containing two seahs? If they had, what evidence have we that it was always of one shape and of uniform depth?

we are required to believe that "a very deep trench" was dug, or that sixty square rods of earth, more or less, were thrown up in the operation, then we must certainly throw up the tradition which puts the altar of Jehovah on that rocky summit. If the trench was comparatively small, there is no difficulty. One might even believe that a trench could have been dug out of the rock itself. I myself observed, close to the Mohrakah, a rocky surface, artificially smoothed, about eight feet square, around the edge of which had been dug a groove an inch or two in depth. One might almost be tempted to find in that the foundation and trench of the very altar itself.

It remains now to examine the latter part of the narrative (vs. 40-46) in connection with the natural features of the Mohrakah and its surroundings. Elijah's sacrifice having been consumed, he commanded the people to take the prophets of Baal; "and Elijah brought them down to the brook Kishon, and slew them there." With regard to the place where the slaughter took place, there is general agreement. The path down the mountain, after passing the fountain and leaving it on the left (north), turns somewhat to the left, crossing over the ridge which runs down from the Mohrakah, and continues, with no great windings, almost directly towards Tell Kussis, a commanding hill on the opposite (northeast) side of the Kishon, but very near it. It is a spur from the hills which bound the plain of Esdraelon on the north, close by where the plain contracts into the narrow valley which connects it with the plain of Akka.¹ Its name, signifying *hill of the priests*, not improbably derives from the fact of the slaughter of the prophets of Baal, which must have taken place near it. For it is at this point that the Kishon would be first reached in descending from the Mohrakah. Here, then, the false prophets were slaughtered.

¹ Closely resembling this tell is another, on the Carmel side of the Kishon, at the other end of the valley, i.e., where it opens into the plain of Akka. This tell is a spur from Carmel, and commands the entrance of the plain of Akka, as Tell-Kussis does that of Esdraelon. Thomson (Vol. ii. pp. 143, 218) calls it Tell-Harothieh, and plausibly identifies it with the Harosheth of Judg. iv. 2.

The people now, we must assume, returned to their homes. But Elijah and Ahab, with their attendants, went again up the mountain. Ahab, at Elijah's behest, went up "to eat and to drink." Whether we are to understand this to be the so-called sacrificial feast which used to accompany certain offerings, may be doubted. Dr. Thomson (p. 226) says that the feast "always formed part of these sacrifices." Stanley also calls it the "sacrificial feast." But the sacred writer calls the offering *עֹלָה*, a burnt-offering. The sacrificial feast followed the peace-offering (Lev. vii. 15 ; xxii. 30), but not the burnt-offering. The feast certainly could not have consisted in eating the flesh of the bullock which Elijah had offered ; for that was wholly consumed. Yet Elijah, in summoning Ahab to ascend the mountain once more, instead of returning at once to Jezreel, must have had for his object to bring him again into close association with the place where the glory of Jehovah had been manifested, in order that he might be less easily tempted back into the worship of Baal. That he should be asked to eat and drink was natural enough, inasmuch as it is not probable that, during the exciting contest which had been waged on the mountain, any time had been found for partaking of food. "So Ahab went up to eat and to drink. And Elijah went up to the top of Carmel" (vs. 42). This is thus paraphrased by Stanley : "From the slaughter by the side of the Kishon the king 'went up,' at Elijah's bidding, once again to the peaceful glades of Carmel to join in the sacrificial feast. And Elijah, too, ascended to 'the top of the mountain.'" This description is characterized by that vagueness in which Stanley is apt to indulge when he is more intent on presenting a smooth picture than on giving a clear statement of facts. "The peaceful glades" must be the same as "the upland sweep" ; and Stanley, therefore, seems to conceive Ahab as eating near the fountain. But Elijah, "too," we are told, went — where ? To the same peaceful glades ? If so, why not say so ? If not, what is the force of the word "too" ? Stanley afterwards says : "Each from his separate

height, the king and the prophet descended." From which we gather that he conceives Ahab and Elijah not to have been at the same place. But where, then, was Elijah? Not on the very top of Carmel, according to Stanley, though he has just declared that he went there; for he tells us that, while he was praying, "his servant mounted to the highest point of all." Then, in a foot-note, we are told that "from the place where Elijah must have worshipped, the view of the sea is just intercepted by an adjacent height." But we are left wholly in doubt where the place is in which Elijah *must* have worshipped. It seems to be a very definite place in Stanley's mind; for he says that from it the view of the sea is "just" intercepted, and adds that "that height, however, may be ascended in a few minutes, and a full view of the sea obtained from the top." The truth is, Stanley has evidently no clear recollection concerning this point, and borrows his description from Van de Velde, without, however, using quotation-marks. Van de Velde says: "The place of Elijah's offering behooves to have been so screened by a rising ground on the west and northwest as to intercept a view of the sea; for he said to his servant, 'Go up now, and look toward the sea.' Moreover, the distance to that height must not have been great; for the passage runs, 'Go again seven times.' Now such is the position of el-Mohrakah that these circumstances might all quite well have been united here. On its west and northwest side the view of the sea is quite intercepted by an adjacent height. That height may be ascended, however, in a few minutes, and a full view of the sea obtained from the top" (p. 326). Porter also tells nearly the same story, saying: "The sea is not visible from the place of sacrifice, the view being intercepted by a shoulder of the mountain. That shoulder, however, can be ascended in a few minutes, and then a full view is obtained." Now, what shall we make of all this? Porter says that the sea is not visible from the Mohrakah, leaving us to understand that *none* of it is visible. Van de Velde tells us that the sea was screened by a rising ground on the west and northwest side,

leaving us in doubt whether it may still have been visible in the southwest. Stanley, however, while drawing his language from Van de Velde, yet seems to have had a vague consciousness of the inconsistency of it with what he has before said respecting the view from el-Mohrakah. He has said (pp. 346, 347) that it is "on the highest point of the mountain"; and again, that it commands "the last view of the sea behind, and the first view of the great plain in front." Having made these declarations, he seems to avoid Van de Velde's statement that from the *place of Elijah's offering* the sea is invisible, and substitutes the phrase, "place where Elijah must have worshipped." But he saves himself from flat self-contradiction only by taking refuge in vagueness. Dr. Thomson, whose description of the locality, though more meagre, is in general more accurate than the others, seems, on the point in question, to agree with Van de Velde; for he says: "If Elijah returned to the place of sacrifice after the slaughter of the priests, his servant would have to go but a short distance to obtain an extensive view of the sea, both toward Caesarea, and also over the plain of Acre to the northwest" (p. 226). Now, this statement is not palpably incorrect, but it makes a false impression. One would infer that *at* the place of sacrifice the sea is not visible at all; whereas the sea *is* visible in the west and toward Caesarea in the southwest. Having seen it with my own eyes, and my experience being confirmed by that of a half-dozen other intelligent travellers who were with me, I do not need to collate authorities to settle the question. But even any one who has not visited the place must be able to see that from the inland *summit* of a range of mountains which, running inward from the sea, makes a very acute angle with it, the sea *must* be visible. Confessedly the range is nowhere higher than at the Mohrakah, except in the neighborhood of Esfieh, which is in the northwest. In the west, and especially the southwest, where the mountain falls away into undulating hills, there is nothing whatever to obstruct the view. Van de Velde's account of the matter is

also somewhat vague, if not incorrect. Why did the place of the offering "behoove" to have been screened on the north and northwest any more than on the south and southwest? Did Elijah tell his servant to go up and get a view of the sea in the north and northwest? The rains in Palestine generally come from the southwest, rather than from the north or northwest. If we may infer anything from Elijah's words, it is that the servant needed to "go up" in order to view the sea at all. We have no right to understand that the servant was to go where he could get an absolutely uninterrupted view of the sea. This would have occupied him two hours, to go and come, each of the seven times that he went. For, in order to accomplish this purpose, he would have had to go to Esfieh, four miles distant. It is true, he might have got a view of the sea in the northwest by going a shorter distance, though even to gain this unimportant end more than a "a few minutes" would be needed.

The case seems, then, to be clear enough; and the wonder is that any one who has ever visited the Mohrakah could have fallen into the confusion and inaccuracy which to a greater or less extent characterize all the above-mentioned writers. The "adjacent height," in Van de Velde's description, must be the whole range, stretching directly away from the spectator for a distance of more than four miles. The "adjacent height" in Stanley's description can be nothing but the height on which the Mohrakah itself is situated. For from there, according to Stanley himself, the view of the sea is *not* intercepted. But if so, where was Elijah when he was praying? And why should this height, which by this time has become so familiar to us, be described so vaguely as "*an adjacent height*"? And as to Porter's statement, that from the place of sacrifice the sea is not visible, but may be seen by ascending a shoulder of the mountain, nothing intelligible can be made out of it by any one who visits the spot. We must, then, reconstruct the narrative as well as may be, without depending on these authorities.

Ahab and Elijah both went up the mountain. Elijah, in

particular, is said to have gone to the *top* of the mountain. This of itself would lead to the conjecture that he went up higher than Ahab, and would seem to lend probability to the hypothesis that Ahab ate and drank near the fountain. But it is not necessarily implied that Ahab remained lower down than Elijah; and that this was not the case is made absolutely certain by the language of vs. 44, where we read that Elijah said unto his servant, "Go *up*, say unto Ahab,"¹ etc. From this we see that Ahab was not in a lower, but a higher, place than Elijah. If Elijah went to the top of the mountain, then Ahab went also to the top. How far apart they were, when Elijah was praying, we have no intimation; but from the foregoing it is evident that they could not have been widely separated. Dr. Thomson says: "I suppose that both Elijah and Ahab did return to the Mukhrakah"; and, adopting this supposition, we must conceive them as near together. There is no ground whatever for assuming that either of them remained in the basin below. The fountain is not more than two thirds of the way to the top, and that place could with no propriety be called the top of the mountain. Besides, if, as has been abundantly shown, we have not the slightest evidence that the scenes of the former part of the day were enacted here, there is also no reason for supposing that Ahab and Elijah on their return stopped at this place, instead of going to the same place where they had been before.

The only remaining point, then, needing to be cleared up, is that which relates to the circumstance concerning the servant of Elijah going up to look towards the sea. If Elijah was already on the top of the mountain, where the sea is

¹ This circumstance seems to have been overlooked by Van de Velde, who says (p. 326), "The king was still standing near Elijah. Not quite close, but so near that the servant could take the message to him, while the wind was rising and the clouds gathering. Perhaps he was near the fountain quenching his thirst." Yet Van de Velde supposes Elijah himself to have been on the Mohrakah, several hundred feet higher than the fountain. If the conjecture concerning Ahab were true, Elijah should have said to his servant, "Go *down*, say unto Ahab," etc.

visible, why did the servant need to go up at all? In view of this representation, we might be tempted to assume that Elijah himself did not go to the Mohrakah, but remained somewhere in the basin below. He might have been just under the cliff on the east side; or, he might have been on the same side, but further south, where one would need to climb but a very short distance in order to reach either the Mohrakah itself, or else a point south of it, lower down on the ridge, where yet the sea is visible. But, after all, there is no need of any such supposition. The express statement that Elijah went to the top of the mountain, taken in connection with the fact that, the sacrifice having been offered there, he would most naturally return to the same place, makes it altogether more likely that both Elijah and Ahab returned to the Mohrakah.¹ We have, then, only to suppose that Elijah, while he was praying, withdrew himself from the very highest point of the summit, leaving Ahab to take his meal at the place where the sacrifice had been consumed. Elijah needed to retire only a short distance to the west, and there, on the slope just below the summit, sequestered by bushes or trees, such as are still to be found there, poured out his petitions for rain. Probably, though no "adjacent height" or "shoulder of the mountain" intervened between

¹ Bähr (in Lange's *Bibelwerk*), following Thenius, propounds this solution of the question: "ראש, v. 42, does not here mean *peak, summit*, but designates the furthest promontory in the direction of the sea. Both Elijah and Ahab went 'up' from the Kishon; the former went to the promontory, which was not so high as the place where the altar stood and Ahab had his tent; hence Elijah could say to his servant (v. 44), Go up, and say to Ahab, etc. He went to the promontory, because from there one could have a wide view of the sea, and could soonest detect the formation of rain-clouds in the distance." A most remarkable conception! To say nothing of the fact that, of the forty-one instances in which ראש is applied in the Old Testament to hills or mountains, there is only one (Judg. ix. 7) in which it can with any probability be taken otherwise than as equivalent to "summit," we need only observe that, according to this hypothesis, Elijah must have travelled four or five hours in order to reach the extreme promontory; and, after reaching it, would not have had so distant a view of the sea as from the Mohrakah itself. Moreover, including the time spent in prayer, his going thither and returning to Ahab must have occupied ten hours!

him and the sea, yet the trees so obstructed the view that, in order to look over them, one may have been obliged to mount to the very highest point. This hypothesis satisfies all demands, and has the special advantage of requiring little time to be occupied by the servant in going seven times and back to look for rain.

We may now appropriately consider how the foregoing description of the biblical scene is to be harmonized with the probabilities respecting the time which would be requisite for the whole transaction. We are informed (vs. 29) that the prophets of Baal prophesied from midday "until the time of the offering of the evening sacrifice." And in vs. 36 we read that "it came to pass at the time of the offering of the evening sacrifice that Elijah the prophet came near," and invoked Jehovah. Inasmuch as there had intervened the repairing of the altar, the digging of the trench, the preparation of the victim, and the pouring on of the water, it seems strange that no time is allowed for these operations. But, in vs. 29, *עַד לַעֲלֹת* should be rendered, "until towards [the time of] offering." At this time all these preparations had been made, and the fire descended on the altar. But when was the time of the evening sacrifice? It is fixed in Ex. xxix. 39, 41 and Num. xxviii. 4 as *בֵּין הָעֶרְבַּיִם* "between the two evenings." It is a much disputed question whether this means between sunset and dark, or between noon and sunset. Not to enter upon a minute investigation of this question here, it may be sufficient to say that, though the majority of modern commentators support the former view, it is by no means established, as a reference to the Article on "Passover," in Kitto's Cyclopaedia, by Ginsburg, and to Dr. Abbot's Note to the Article on the same subject in Smith's Bible Dictionary (Am. edition), will show. Moreover, whatever may be said respecting the apparent meaning of the Old Testament passages which contain this phrase, it is certain that rabbinical interpretation favors the other view; and usage may have conformed to this, even if the original precept, strictly interpreted, fixed the later point

of time. The narrative before us, certainly, may itself be adduced, as Thenius says, in favor of the rabbinical interpretation. It is not probable that the prophets of Baal kept up their ravings from noon till towards sunset. And the time requisite for the concluding events of the day was more than the current interpretation can easily be made to yield. We may, then, fairly suppose that the sacrifice was consumed not later than three o'clock in the afternoon. Immediately there followed the slaughter of the false prophets. The distance from the Mohrakah to Tell Kussis cannot be more than three miles. My horse carried me from near Tell Kussis up to the fountain in thirty minutes. From the fountain to the Mohrakah, by the direct way, the distance is only about half as great. In descending, especially in the excitement which must have prevailed, certainly not more than forty-five minutes would have been needed. Nor need we suppose that the slaughter of the prophets of Baal occupied much time. It is making ample allowance to assume an hour and a half to have elapsed from the time of the beginning of the descent to the time when Ahab and Elijah started back for the Mohrakah. Another hour would have brought them to the top. At half-past five o'clock, therefore, Ahab may have begun his meal at the place of sacrifice, while Elijah, near at hand, was engaged in prayer. Not more than an hour need be supposed to have been thus spent. By half-past six the cloud may have been seen, and Ahab have received the summons to prepare to return to Jezreel. His chariot was, doubtless, standing at the foot of the mountain, probably not far from the hill on which is now the ruined village of el-Mansurah, and which is situated about S.S.W. of Tell Kussis, on the opposite side of the Kishon. The rain-storm overtook Ahab, however, before he reached Jezreel; yet he probably gained the upper part of the plain before the rain had made the ground impassable for his chariot-wheels. The distance from Carmel to Jezreel is about fifteen miles. Going over a smooth plain, — Ahab riding in his chariot, and Elijah running before him, — both

hastening to escape from the rain, they could not have been much more than two hours on the way. If they spent half an hour in their descent from the summit, they may therefore have reached Jezreel by nine o'clock, or soon after.

There is an element of uncertainty in this estimate, growing out of our ignorance of the exact time of the evening sacrifice. If we follow the other view, above mentioned, we shall have to put these closing scenes each considerably later. There would, perhaps, be nothing inconceivable even in this. If the sacrifice had been consumed as late as six o'clock, Ahab and Elijah *might* have gone down to Tell Kussis, witnessed the slaughter of the false prophets, and returned to the Mohrakah in an hour and a half. This is, to be sure, an hour less than the time allowed in the other estimate; but it is not impossible, or even improbable, that this time was sufficient. Then, if we assume half an hour, instead of an hour, for the time spent on the summit before Ahab was summoned to descend, it follows that the cloud was seen at about eight o'clock, and Ahab reached Jezreel at half-past ten. In the evening of a long summer-day, the western sky would be still bright enough at eight o'clock to enable one to detect a cloud on the water's edge. But, on the other hand, it is possible that the fire descended upon Elijah's sacrifice considerably earlier than three o'clock, in which case the subsequent occurrences would have taken place so much the sooner. At all events, we come to the conclusion that there is nothing against the tradition concerning el-Mohrakah to be derived from considerations respecting the time requisite for the several scenes described in the biblical narrative.

It may not be amiss, in conclusion, to consider the question whether, after all, we can feel certain that the tradition concerning el-Mohrakah is trustworthy. Dr. Robinson, who seems never to have visited the place, makes no reference to it in his "Biblical Researches"; but in his "Physical Geography of the Holy Land" (foot-note, p. 31), he makes the following remark: "A recent hypothesis assumes as the

place of the sacrifice the summit of the southern point of the ridge of Carmel, distant two or three hours (or at least five miles) from the permanent sources of the Kishon. One writer thinks the water might have been brought from a fountain two or three hundred feet below the summit; but this fountain the Rev. W. M. Thomson afterwards saw nearly dried up, during the heat of an ordinary summer." He says, furthermore, that "the direction of Elijah was to 'gather to him all Israel *unto* Mount Carmel,' not to the summit, where there was no standing-place for such a multitude, and no water either for them or for the sacrifice. All these circumstances go to show that the transaction took place at the foot of the mountain, perhaps at some Tell near the permanent fountains of the Kishon. It was also at the part of Carmel nearest to Jezreel, and therefore near the southeastern quarter of the mountain."

Perhaps these are the weightiest objections that can be urged against the tradition. But they are far from conclusive. Indeed, they have been, for substance, already refuted by the foregoing discussion. There is no good reason to suppose that "all Israel," in the strictest sense of the term, was gathered to witness the scene. It is not likely that many, if any, came from such a distance that they would have had to travel during the day or days preceding the one appointed for the trial. It is most natural to suppose that the multitude consisted of those who resided in and around Jezreel. The plain of Esdraelon and vicinity must have been thickly populated. A large assembly could have been convoked in a short time. And, as we have seen, there is standing-place, if not immediately around the Mohrakah, yet immediately under it, very near it, and in full sight of it, quite sufficient for all who can be supposed to have come together. No place, even in the plain, can be conceived better fitted for the spectacle than the one fixed upon by tradition. The objection drawn from the want of water, which Robinson derives from the testimony of Dr. Thomson, is not one which has seemed insuperable to Dr. Thomson

himself. The biblical statement, that the people were gathered *unto* (כֶּלֶס) Mount Carmel, does not, it is true, prove that they ascended the mountain; but neither does it prove that they did not ascend it. When Isaiah says, "The mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains" (ii. 2), and then adds, "And many people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up *to* (כֶּלֶס) the mountain of the Lord," it is evident that the latter clause means more than an exhortation to go to the foot of the mountain. Or, again, when it is said (Num. xxxiii. 38) that Aaron "went up into (כֶּלֶס) Mount Hor, and died there," it is evident that he died on the mountain, not at the foot of it. That the drama was enacted near the southeastern end of the Carmel range, Robinson himself assumes. That is the part of it which is nearest Jezreel; it is in itself an imposing height, and it is more central than any other. If, then, the only question is whether the altar was on the top of the mountain or at the foot of it, we cannot hesitate long in coming to a decision. There is a strong presumption against the theory that the altar of Jehovah had been made at the foot of a mountain. Any hill, it is true, might have been used for such a purpose; but, unless it can be shown that the altar had some special commemorative purpose, it is exceedingly improbable that a hill would be chosen which was overhung by such a commanding height as el-Mohrakah. At all events, the presumption is strongly in favor of a tradition which not only has no rival traditions to oppose it, but which so well corresponds with the biblical narrative and with all the probabilities of the case. The burden of proof rests with him who rejects the tradition; and it is not too much to say that such proof yet remains to be given.

ARTICLE V.

THE STRUCTURE OF A SERMON. — THE TEXT.

BY PROF. EDWARDS A. PARK.

[In the present Volume of the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, pp. 534–573, is the first part of this Article, devoted to the definition of the words, “Sermon,” “Preach,” “Text;” the Advantages of Preaching from Biblical Texts; Objections to the Use of Texts; Different Methods of Selecting Texts; the Fitnesses of Passages of the Bible for Texts of Sermons. Under the last-named head it is stated that passages of the Bible have a fitness to be used as texts, when the passages, I. involve a moral principle; II. most aptly represent the spirit of the Bible; III. have a divine authority; IV. refer, as they stand in the Bible, to the same object which they refer to in the sermon; V. are complete in their grammatical construction and express a complete idea which is the complete idea of the sermon.]

VI. The appropriateness of a biblical passage to the subject, the writer, the hearer, and the occasion¹ of a sermon gives it a fitness to be used as a text. This remark may seem tautological; but a passage may be entirely appropriate in some of its relations, while it is, on the whole, unfit to be used as the basis of a sermon.

1. The text should be appropriate to the theme of the discourse.

Where other reasons allow it should be co-extensive with the subject; general, if the subject be so; specific, if the theme be specific. Bishop Latimer was fond of preaching on the words: “Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning” (Rom. xv. 4), and of introducing under these words a large variety of particular discussions for which he might have found particularly adjusted texts. Devoting his entire sermon to a reprimand of his auditors for their demeanor in the house of worship; their habit of sitting upright with their eyes open in the time

¹ Ferguson’s sermon on the day before the battle of Sedgemoor was from a text singularly appropriate to the subject, preacher, hearers, and occasion, all united. — See Macaulay’s *History of England* (American ed.), Vol. i. p. 561.

of public devotion ; of standing with the face to the choir and the back to the pulpit in the time of singing ; of conversing aloud and on secular themes, as soon as the benediction was uttered, a youthful preacher took for his text the imposing announcement : “ Yea, I think it meet, as long as I am in this tabernacle, to stir you up, by putting you in remembrance ” (2 Pet. i. 13). The speaker’s physical aspect gave promise that he would remain a long time in his fleshly tabernacle ; but he introduced his discourse with words which sounded like the dying words of an aged counsellor. He was commenting on the minor improprieties of worship ; his text was distinctively appropriate to the most solemn duties of our probationary state. He might have found a more fitting epigraph in 1 Cor. xiv. 40 ; or, on such a familiar topic, he might have imitated some of the church Fathers, and given to his audience, not a distinctive sermon, but a lecture without a text (see § 2. I. above).

Where other reasons allow, a verse appropriate to one relation of truth should not be applied to an opposite relation. “ The Lord hardened Pharaoh’s heart ” (Ex. x. 20). This clause is designed to suggest a doctrine which nearly all theists, heterodox and orthodox, admit as valid. If a man intend to preach upon it, he should unfold some such truth as that by the laws of nature, which are the laws of the Creator, the iniquity of a man indurates his moral sensibilities. One clergyman, however, chose this text for a sermon, the main proposition of which was : The Lord did not harden Pharaoh’s heart. “ Which are we to believe, your text or your sermon ? ” was the query addressed to him by a bewildered hearer. Moses declares that the Lord *did* produce a certain result ; the preacher’s whole design was to declare that the Lord did *not* produce a certain result. The design of the preacher should have been to maintain a positive statement, and to prove that the statement is entirely harmonious with the truth that God is not the author nor the abettor of sin. Discoursing on Heb. x. 26, 27 : “ If we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the

truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation which shall devour the adversaries," Bishop Hoadley proposed to show the absurdity of the doctrine that pious men who sin wilfully are denied all hope of pardon. In a sermon on Eph. ii. 8: "By grace are ye saved through faith," he denounced the error of relying on faith alone for salvation.

But does not this method of discussing a text arrest attention? Is it not like the collision of flint and steel, emitting hidden light? We reply: all the startling observations which the minister may need to make on the incongruity between the apparent meaning of his text and the real truth, he may make in his introductory explanation. That is the place for arousing his hearers to meditate on the real import of the Biblical words. But may there not be a text on which a minister may startle his hearers by seeming to controvert it? Yes. It has been said already that inspired men have recorded the sayings of men who were uninspired. These sayings may imply an ignorance of the truth, or a disbelief of it. If a minister discoursing on one of these sayings come out in opposition to it, his discourse may be appropriate to his text viewed in some of its relations. "Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth?" (John i. 46), is the question prefixed to the sermon. "Come and see" may be the answer; and the proposition of the sermon may be: The duty of fair investigation, or the worth of a candid spirit, or the sin of prejudice. "If a man die, shall he live again?" (Job xiv. 14) is a question propounded by a person who had not learned the doctrine of the resurrection. "Yes," may be the preacher's response; and the prominent aim of his sermon may be to show that, improbable as the resurrection of the body may have appeared to a man living under the old economy, it appears certain to a man living under the new. The gospel has brought life and immortality to light, and a sermon may arouse men by the contrasts between the gospel and the law. Here, as elsewhere, *exceptio probat regulam*. "*Where other reasons*

allow," then, and then only, need the words of the text be synonymous with the phraseology of the main proposition of the discourse.

While a minister should look for the pertinency of his text to his theme, he should never be satisfied with a merely verbal pertinency. A well-known clergyman delivering a discourse on Eccl. ix. 10 "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might," proposed to explain the anatomical and physiological properties of the hand. His sermon was an epitome of Sir Charles Bell's Treatise on that subject. In Judg. iv. 20 we read of Sisera and Jael that "he said unto her, Stand in the door of the tent; and it shall be, when any man doth come and inquire of thee, and say, Is there any man here? that thou shalt say, No." These last four words: "Thou shalt say No," formed the text of an American sermon on the importance of decision of character. Dr. Campbell had previously condemned such an application of the words to such a theme. It may seem incredible, but it is true, that another clergyman, perhaps aiming to imitate this fantastic use of a text, preached a sermon on the same virtue, decision of character, from the words: "In those days they shall say No." The entire passage is (Jer. xxxi. 29): "In those days they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape and the children's teeth are set on edge." One of the most remarkable instances of the text selected on the ground of a mere verbal suggestion is found in a sermon printed by an eminent pulpit orator on the question, "May I go to the theatre?" The sermon advocates the theatre, gives various reasons for attending it, but is prefaced by the text (Acts xix. 31), "That he would not adventure himself into the theatre." In the introduction the preacher says: "The text and its incidents have nothing to do with my subject. It simply affords me the canonical handle without which many think there is no sermon." The scholastic writers on Homiletics were wont to say that such a proposition derived from such a text is an instance of the *Themata synthetica arbitraria*, as they applied the phrase *Themata*

synthetica naturalia to such propositions as are evolved directly and naturally from the text.¹

2. The text should be appropriate to the minister himself. He must know his own character and position, and should cultivate that sense, which is better than a proof, of what is fitting. He cannot be easily taught what he does not instinctively feel. One minister may do what another may not. A divine of large experience and venerable age may discourse upon a text which a young man would seem to be presumptuous in choosing. The youthful pastor whose stature was small, and his voice feminine, and who discoursed before an assembly of clergymen on one of the most intricate verses in the Epistle to the Romans, and attempted to make his clerical fathers understand the metaphysical implications of that Epistle, was advised to preach his next sermon from Ps. cxxxi. 1, 2. A pastor who had endeared himself to his people by his faithful and affectionate services to them, while he had been afflicted in a degree which awakened their tenderest sympathies, preached on his forty-first birth-day from Deut. viii. 2: "And thou shalt remember all the way which the Lord thy God led thee these forty years in the wilderness to humble thee and to prove thee, to know what was in thine heart, whether thou wouldst keep his commandments or no." If a robust man, on reaching his forty-first year in outward prosperity, had signalized his birth-day by discoursing from this text before a congregation who had never detected his special worth, he would have been justly deemed egotistical. The occasions are rare on which it is appropriate for a man to choose a text suggesting his own history. In the general

¹ Dr. James Dana of New Haven, who was well versed in the ante-revolutionary history of Massachusetts, was fond of describing the commotion produced by a Massachusetts pastor discoursing to an assembly of which the Provincial Governor and other British officers were members. The text of the discourse was Job xx. 6-9: "Though his *Excellency* mount up to the heavens, and his head reach unto the clouds; Yet he shall perish for ever like his own dung: they which have seen him shall say, Where is he? He shall fly away as a dream, and shall not be found; yea, he shall be chased away as a vision of the night. The eye also which saw him shall see him no more; neither shall his place any more behold him."

it is the more becoming, at least the safer way to let himself alone. He should avoid the semblance of "the one man power." Under the guidance of a cultivated taste, however, and of a true humility, he may give a liveliness to his ministrations by deviating from the general rule, and choosing a text which intimates his own record. President Edwards in his "Farewell Sermon, preached at the First Precinct in Northampton after the people's public rejection of their minister, and renouncing their relation to him as pastor of the church there," introduces the following remarks: "The prophet Jeremiah (xxv. 3) puts the people in mind how long he had labored among them in the work of the ministry; *'From the thirteenth year of Josiah, the son of Amon, king of Judah, even unto this day, (that is, the three and twentieth year,) the word of the Lord hath come unto me, and I have spoken unto you, rising early and speaking.'* I am not about to compare myself with the prophet Jeremiah; but in this respect I can say as he did, that *I have spoken the word of God to you, unto the three and twentieth year, rising early and speaking.* It was three and twenty years, the fifteenth day of last February, since I have labored in the work of the ministry, in the relation of a pastor to this church and congregation. And though my strength has been weakness, having always labored under great infirmity of body, beside my insufficiency for so great a charge in other respects, yet I have not spared my feeble strength, but have exerted it for the good of your souls. I can appeal to you, as the apostle does to his hearers (Gal. iv. 13), *'Ye know how through infirmity of the flesh, I preached the gospel unto you.'*"¹ The President had such a reputation that he would not have been immodest if he had introduced the words of Jeremiah as the text of the farewell sermon; still it was more appropriate to intercalate them into the series of his remarks than to make them prominent as the prefix of his entire discourse. On the twenty-fourth of January, 1819, Dr. Edward Payson, intending to leave his parish in Portland for a few weeks,

¹ Edwards's Works (Dwight's ed.), Vol. i. p. 641.

and to labor in behalf of the American Education Society in the Counties of Essex and Middlesex in Massachusetts, delivered a discourse on Rom. xv. 30-32: "Now I beseech you, brethren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me in your prayers to God for me; that I may be delivered from them that do not believe in Judaea; and that my service which I have for Jerusalem may be accepted of the saints; that I may come unto you with joy by the will of God, and may with you be refreshed." This text awakened the deep interest of Dr. Payson's hearers; but, had he not been the object of their special veneration, it would have been wiser for him not to magnify the importance of his journey by so public and biblical an allusion to it.

3. The text should be appropriate to the hearers, as well as to the preacher. It thus makes the impression that the sermon is alive, and, instead of wandering about in the air, is searching the hearts of real men. When Providence directs the attention of hearers to a particular topic, it is opportune for the preacher to choose a text relating to that topic. He thus coincides with the intimations of the Spirit of God. There have been times when an entire community have been aroused by some ruinous and scandalous crime, and when some of the imprecatory Psalms have appeared to be appropriate themes of discourse. At such times the meaning of those Psalms can be detected more accurately than in days of peace and quiet. In 1688, when James II. of England ordered his clergy to read from the pulpit, on an appointed Sabbath, one of his obnoxious Declarations, and many of his clergy refused to violate their consciences in reading it, Samuel Wesley, a curate in London, one of the recusants, and father of John and Charles Wesley, "took for his text that day the noble answer of the three Jews to the Chaldaean tyrant: 'Be it known unto thee, O king, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up'" (Dan. iii. 18).¹

¹ See Macaulay's History of England, Vol. ii. p. 327. Soon after this event,

It must always be remembered, however, that there is but a single step from the sublime to the ridiculous. Between a marked propriety and a marked impropriety the line is often almost imperceptible. Several preachers, on the Sabbath after their church edifices have been burned, have interested their audiences by sermons from Isa. lxiv. 11: "Our holy and our beautiful house, where our fathers praised thee, is burnt up with fire, and all our pleasant things are laid waste." Such texts are appropriate. The dignity of the occasion warrants them. But when the Commissioners of a city in Great Britain had been compelled by economical reasons to extinguish nearly all their street lamps, and one of the city clergymen devoted the next Sunday to a sermon on Matt. xxv. 8, "Our lamps are gone out," he violated the proprieties of the pulpit.

The very attempt to be appropriate often leads to the grossest indecorum. A preacher may choose a text which is pertinent, which is even pointed, which individualizes a congregation or a particular member of it; but when he merges the individualism into a personality, his pertinence easily sinks into impertinence. The distinction between a text which individualizes the hearers and a text which can be charged with personality is this: The former is selected in order to improve the character of the people, without injuring the character of the persons who are individualized, or exposing them to public censure; the latter is chosen with the aim of subjecting a congregation, or some member of it, to public reproach. This aim *may* be combined with the governing motive of doing good to the community by blaming one member of it. Some ministers appear to think that a text is appropriate if it hits an auditor; but if it hurts and harms him more than the public welfare demands, it is signally inappropriate. In striking at

on the evening of "Black Friday," when the seven prelates were committed to prison, "they instantly hastened to the chapel" and united in the divine service. It chanced that in the second lesson were these words: "In all things approving ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in afflictions, in distresses, in strifes, in imprisonments. All zealous clergymen were delighted with this coincidence," etc. — Macaulay's History, Vol. ii. p. 332.

one person, we may slay more than one. We may design to probe a wound, but in probing may simply inflame it. Our sermons while aiming to give an exact description of a man, may lose all harmony with the general aim of the pulpit, with the general sense of honor which may adorn the community. "Up, get ye out of this place," was the text, cited from Gen. xix. 14, for a sermon preached in a town which was peculiarly sensitive because its neighbors termed it Sodom. The preacher and his family were doomed to obey the mandate of his text forthwith. We do not mean to assert that no pastor is ever allowed to individualize auditors so far as to bring down upon them the censure of the community. One pastor can do what another can not.¹ Sometimes there is wisdom in boldness; there is imprudence in caution. Sometimes a minister can reprove, and still be trusted as a parent rebuking a child in public. One exigency may demand a personal intimation in a text, when nearly all other exigencies may dispense with it. Just here is needed the wisdom of the serpent, as well as the harmlessness of the dove. It is a tradition that a strong-minded young man, a ringleader in the irreligious plots of the community, was struck down as if an electric shock had prostrated him, and was prevented from executing one of his mischievous schemes, by the *tone* in which Dr. Emmons repeated, and by the *pointed* comments with which he accompanied, the words: "Then Saul (who also is called Paul), filled with the Holy Ghost, *set his eyes on him*, and said, *O full of all subtlety*, and all *mischief*,—thou CHILD OF THE DEVIL, thou enemy of all

¹ A young English clergyman, in the time of James I., was called to preach before the Vice Chancellor of Oxford who was well-known to be a somnolent hearer. The youth hit upon the text Matt. xxvi. 40: "What! could ye not watch with me one hour?" At the conclusion of every lengthened paragraph he repeated the question, waking up the Vice Chancellor too often. That dignitary complained to the Archbishop; but the young man defended himself so wittily that the Archbishop was pleased with him, and procured for him an invitation to preach before the King. James I. was noted then for his instability. The text which the youth announced was James i. 6: "Nothing wavering." "He is at me already," exclaimed the King as soon as the words were uttered. Still the gifts of the young man were so rich that James was pleased with him.

righteousness, — *wilt* thou not cease to pervert the right ways of the Lord?"¹

4. The text should be appropriate to the occasion on which the discourse which it prefaces is delivered. We are sometimes unable to account for the influence of particular sermons. When they were preached they produced a great effect, but years afterward, when they are read, they have but little power. Other sermons, as published, appear to be far more attractive, yet as delivered they failed to gain attention even. One among other causes of this disparity is, that the former class of sermons were, and the latter class were not, carefully fitted to the circumstances in which they were spoken. Two octavo volumes of John Newton's discourses, published in the year 1786, contain paragraphs which in themselves have not, but in the circumstances of their delivery must have had, an extraordinary power. They were preached in 1784 and 1785 at and near the time of the great national tribute paid to Handel "by a musical commemoration at Westminster Abbey, in which pieces, selected exclusively from his works, were performed by a band of five hundred instruments in the presence of the royal family," and the principal nobility and gentry of the three kingdoms."² In the first sermon of this series Mr. Newton says: "Conversation in almost every company for some time past has much turned upon the commemoration of Handel, and particularly on his oratorio of the Messiah. I mean to lead your meditations to the language of the oratorio, and to consider, in their order — the several sublime and interesting passages of scripture, which are the bases of that admired composition."³ It is easy for a reader to imagine how thoroughly the paragraph at the commencement of the sermon on Mal. iii. 1-3, if preached on the Sabbath after the words of this text had been sung at the Oratorio, must have thrilled the auditors. The occasion was eloquence. — When a church in Scotland was expelled from its time honored sanctuary, and driven to

¹ Memoir of Nathanael Emmons, D.D., pp. 329, 330.

² Gorton's Biographical Dictionary, Art. Handel.

³ Cecil's Memoirs of Rev. John Newton, pp. 148, 149.

hold its Sabbath worship in the open air, the pastor preached a melting discourse from Heb. xiii. 13: "Let us go forth, therefore, unto him without the camp, bearing his reproach." The scene itself was an exposition and a peroration for the sermon.

VII. Those passages of the Bible which excite an expectation of excellence in the discussion of them may, or may not, be fitted for texts.

1. It is not a wise rule that a minister should always abstain from discoursing on those verses which give promise that his sermons will be interesting. He should aim to illustrate the whole Bible, and therefore to discuss the texts which promise more, as well as those which promise less. He may add variety to his ministrations by speaking on the more splendid, as well as on the more homely, verses of scripture. There are texts which on ordinary occasions promise more than the preacher will fulfil, but which on extraordinary occasions meet the exact wants of the preacher.¹ We sometimes criticise him by saying that he had a good text; but at other times he needs little more; the occasion is itself a discourse; the text and the occasion form as impressive a sermon as the hearers will attend to. There are some themes, also, which can be precisely fitted by only such texts as awaken an expectation of impressive remarks. Wise men have said that a young preacher ought never to discourse on such a topic as the day of judgment. They would have been more wise, if they had said that a young

¹ Robert Hall sometimes discoursed on texts which few men could discuss without painfully disappointing their auditors. A prisoner was executed at Cambridge for uttering forged paper on the Bank of England. Attempting to pass a five-pound note, and observing that he was suspected by the shopkeeper, who was on the point of taking it, he abruptly seized the note and swallowed it. After the execution, Mr. Hall gave notice that he would speak in reference to the sad event from Job xx. 12-16. "Though wickedness be sweet in his mouth, though he hide it under his tongue, though he spare it, and forsake it not, but keep it still within his mouth; yet his meat in his bowels is turned, it is the gall of asps within him. He hath swallowed down riches, and he shall vomit them up again; God shall cast them out of his belly. He shall suck the poison of asps: the viper's tongue shall slay him."

preacher ought never to write a sermon on such a theme without spending on it weeks of prayer and study.

2. But, although a minister may discourse on a passage which gives promise of excellence in his sermon, he should guard against the perils which attend the use of such a text. He is in danger of disappointing his auditors.¹ They may apply to his sermon the words of Sir Fowell Buxton: "Bible and water." There may be a wide difference between a sermon which *ends* with poetical citations from the prophets and a sermon which *begins* with them. At the conclusion of the sermon, they may prevent its being remembered as prosaic and bald; at the introduction, they may cause it to appear more prosaic and bald than it really is. If a preacher aim to outshine the brilliancy, or out-thunder the power, of his text, he will be unnatural. By his fondness for the sublime or rapturous verses of the inspired poets, and by an attempt to imitate, if not equal them, he may cultivate an inflated style.

A minister is in peril of defeating his own end, when he announces a text which gives a special promise of interest. This, for example, is the fact when he raises the expectation that he will make a vehement appeal to the feelings of his auditors. The hearers prepare themselves for the onset, and guard themselves against it. "Forewarned, forearmed." In the most effective expostulation there is an element of surprise. The hymns to be sung before a hortatory sermon should not be themselves in the hortatory vein. If a preacher read in the morning lesson the most glowing scriptures on the happiness of heaven, and if he select for his introductory hymns the most seraphic stanzas on that theme, and then preach a discourse upon it, there is danger that his hearers will be weary, if not ashamed, of him.²

¹ One of the most eminent of American divines was in the habit of selecting very simple texts for his most trenchant discourses, and he once remarked: "I should never dare to preach on Psalm xlv. 10: 'Be still and know that I am God,' for I could not write a sermon which would correspond with the expectations awakened in the hearers by so sublime a passage."

² "In the church men continue to be *men*; and what rouses their spiritual life sooner and more directly, than that which is suggested to them in some unexpected way?" — Alt's *Andeutungen*, etc., § 21.

3. The more promising his text, so much the more certain should the minister be of his ability to sustain himself in his remarks upon it. He should have reason for trusting, if it be a difficult one, that he can make it plain ; if it be a peculiarly beautiful one, that he will not soil it by slovenly words. Jeremy Taylor, with his pen like the laurel, ever green and ever varying, may be safe in discoursing on the words : " Although the fig-tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be in the vines ; the labor of the olive shall fail, and the fields shall yield no meat ; the flock shall be cut off from the fold, and there shall be no herd in the stalls ; yet I will rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation " (Hab. iii. 17, 18). When an ordinary minister would discourse on the same theme he would be safer in taking for his text such words as " Rejoice evermore " (2 Thess. v. 16). A passage which is excessively hackneyed, and also one which is peculiarly sublime, may be discoursed upon with the least peril by the man who is the most richly endowed.

4. When a text raises high expectations that the speaker will be interesting, it is well for him to allay, but not rudely to balk them. By a modest exordium he may convince his hearers at once that he does not aim to swell himself into an equality with the inspired words which he has read. By stating the principles which lie at the basis, or the truths which are hidden in the folds of the poetic imagery in his text, he may at last awaken the emotions and enkindle the resolutions for which that imagery was designed. The rule that a sermon should breathe the spirit of the words which introduce it, does not require that the whole tenor of it should be exactly like the tenor of those words. Sometimes the rule is satisfied if the body of the discourse prepare the way for the final influence of those words, and the permanent impression of it be the exact impression which they are fitted to leave. The full resemblance of the grafted branches to the parent tree may not be seen until they bear their blossoms and their fruit.

VIII. Those verses of the Bible which at once associate

themselves with some interesting truth, and impress themselves on the memory, have a fitness to be used as texts of sermons.

An American minister preached on the words: "That was, and is not, and yet is" (Rev. xvii. 8). Such words do not at once associate themselves with any moral truth. There are other texts which convey an important idea, but not in such a style that they will awaken the special interest of the audience. There are others which excite brilliant expectations in regard to the sermons, but hide the truth behind the person of the preacher. There are still others which may be strictly appropriate to the subject of the discourse, but fail to impress it, or themselves, on the memory. In order to secure a facility and permanence of moral impression various rules have been given, which although excellent in some respects, may yet sometimes gain *one* good quality at the expense of a *better* one.

1. Texts which are plain in themselves have some advantages for making an immediate and abiding impression. They free the speaker from the temptation to display his philological lore; from the necessity of delaying the moral lesson of his sermons. They give him time for practical appeals, and for such a repetition of his text as stamps it indelibly on the mind and heart.

A. Sometimes, however, a verse which is at first obscure arouses a peculiar interest in it. Its very obscurity fascinates one class of hearers. Dr. George Campbell discountenances the use of such a text as Isa. xxi. 11, 12: "He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman, what of the night? watchman, what of the night? The watchman said: The morning cometh, and also the night; if ye will inquire, inquire ye; return, come"; "on which," adds Dr. Campbell, "I once heard a sermon."¹ This passage is indeed enigmatical and its meaning uncertain; it is often repeated, however, in prayers and songs; in its very style it is fitted to awaken a sleeper; it may be accommodated to various uses, may suggest in a

¹ Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence, p. 410.

poetical and dramatic way some truths which will remain associated with it in the memory. A preacher may do good by stating all that he knows, even if he know but little, about a verse which is often repeated. He should not choose a text which intimates no moral lesson, but he may choose one which needs to be explained before it becomes instructive.

B. Sometimes a text which is at first obscure, awakens an interest in the Bible as a whole, and impresses the general system of truth on the memory. There are some hearers who desire to make progress in biblical knowledge. Shall not they, as well as the uninquisitive, have their portion in due season? Their attention to the whole system of truth is aroused by an obscure scripture; they are stimulated by a difficulty. While unravelling before them an intricate texture, a man may not only satisfy their inquisitive spirit, but may also wake up the curiosity of more torpid hearers. He may make thinking, out of sleeping men. Shall our hearers never learn the meaning of those words which "are hard to be understood"? If not, then 'the unlearned and unstable will wrest these words to their own destruction.' A part of the Bible will be useless to some persons, unless their pastor explain it at length. He confers a signal benefit on them by inciting them to "search the scriptures daily," and inquire "whether those things were so" which they had heard. He elevates his own standard by striving to elevate the standard of his parishioners, and inducing them "to grow in grace and in knowledge." Not seldom are they exposed to hurtful errors by their superficial views of the Apocalypse, of certain prophecies in the Old Testament, of proverbial and conversational phrases in the New.¹ No one, perhaps, would object to discourses on texts like the following; yet they

¹ Among the passages which Von Ammon (Handbuch, etc. §§ 26, 39) regards as unsuitable for texts of sermons are the 22d chapter of Genesis, the 15th chapter of 1 Samuel, the Book of Canticles, the Apocalypse, also Job xix. 25-27 as referring to the resurrection of the dead. Infidels have derived from such passages objections against the inspiration or the utility of the Bible. Shall such objections be unanswered? Von Ammon disapproves also of Matt. xxvii. 46, 51; Ps. lxviii. 31; Gal. iii. 20; iv. 24 as texts, on account of their obscurity.

often seem obscure, and occasion mysticism, fanaticism, or scepticism: "I come quickly," "This generation shall not pass away until all these things be fulfilled," "Ye ought also to wash one another's feet," "This is my body," "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you," "Swear not at all," "Whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." In the general, what men learn by hard work, will be fastened in their memory. To a layman as well as a clergyman is the maxim applicable: "*Te totum applica ad textum; rem totam applica ad te.*" True, we may become pedantic in our expositions of dark scriptures; so we may become indolent in avoiding them. We may reflect new honor on the Bible by developing its hidden treasures. The truths of astronomy are now more clearly understood by boys in our schools than they were understood a century ago by many graduates of our colleges. By a wise management of the pulpit there may be an analogous advance in the popular acquaintance with the word of God. Illumine what is dark: Draw fresh lessons of duty from what has been supposed to be antiquated in the Bible,—these are principles as important for the choice of texts as the more agreeable prescription: Let the texts be plain.

2. Texts which are brief, have some advantages for making a facile and permanent impression. If the verse be plain as well as brief, it enters the mind at once, takes full possession of the memory, and sometimes becomes a compressed memento of the entire discourse. The scholar who wrote over his study-door the laconic lesson: "Doce, Disce, aut Discede," made short work with his visitors. Canon Melvill's habit of repeating his text at the close of the more important paragraphs in his sermon, depended on his habit of taking short as well as perspicuous verses for his theme. In fifty-five of his published discourses, forty-two have brief texts. Some preachers when they do not find a Biblical passage which is at the same time short, complete, and appropriate to their theme, insulate a particular clause of their text and repeat

that clause at the conclusion of their emphatic paragraphs. Thus, when they preach on the vice of Detraction, and preface their sermon with the first two verses of the third chapter of Titus, they abbreviate their text by detaching and reiterating the phrase "Speak evil of no man," as if this were the substance of those two verses.¹

There are lengthened passages, however, which need to be explained and enforced. They exhibit the order in which inspiration has arranged varying truths. An idea acquires a new force from its relation to other ideas. There are extended paragraphs of which a minister can no more give an adequate view by discoursing on each of its isolated verses, than an artist can give an adequate view of the Transfiguration by exhibiting each figure alone and apart. The architecture of a cathedral cannot be learned by examining its stones when separated from each other. If all lengthened texts be neglected for the sake of having a compendious motto for the sermon, the pulpit will lose solidity. It becomes monotonous when it uniformly devotes itself to brief sayings. A loss of dignity is sometimes conjoined with a loss of variety. There were circumstances which rendered it proper for Dr. Raffles of Liverpool, to preach a sermon on the single word, "Forward," and for William Jay of Bath, to preach on the word "Ebenezer."² There was, however, a puerility in the feats of clergymen, who still did not intend to trifle with the sacred volume, when they discoursed, one on the phrase "O wheel," one on the word "Mighty," one on the word "But," one on the uninspired word "Selah," another on "Aha;" still another, when he delivered three or four sermons on the word "Amen;" and another yet, when he delivered eleven long discourses on the interjection "O."

¹ See for an abbreviated text, ix. 4 below.

² Mr. Jay selected this text for a discourse at the Jubilee of the London Missionary Society, in Surrey Chapel, where he had preached on a somewhat similar occasion fifty-six years before. There was a peculiar significance in his repeating, at the age of seventy-six years, before his fellow-laborers in the ministry, a word which drew from them the response: "Hitherto hath the Lord helped us" (1 Sam. vii. 12).

3. Biblical passages which, *as texts*, are fresh and novel have some advantages for making an easy and lasting impression. When a verse is often repeated as the theme of a discourse, it becomes so familiar as to lose its meaning. It is like a globule of quicksilver rolling over a plate of glass. So many sermons have been delivered on it that, as soon as it is repeated, it invites a comparison of the different sermons with each other. Three clergymen have been known to preach three discourses from the same text to the same congregation on three successive Sabbaths. Two clergymen have preached two sermons from the same text to the same congregation on the same Sabbath. The text was a very common, as well as a very plain one; its very phraseology suggested the fit plan of treating it; and so, in fact, all these sermons had substantially the same order of thought. Coincidences like these have exposed ministers to the charge of plagiarism. — Still, the search for novel texts is attended with peril.

A. It often ends in sacrificing the welfare of the hearers to the ingenuity of the preacher. Theological candidates in Germany were once accustomed to choose for their trial-sermons such texts as 2 Sam. x. 5; Mark ix. 49; 2 Tim. iv. 13.¹ A theological candidate in England, who has been imitated by at least one candidate in America, when called to preach a sermon before the clergymen who were to decide upon his fitness for the ministry, discoursed on the words: "Ye are spies; to see the nakedness of the land ye are come" (Gen. xlii. 9).

B. The fondness for novel texts leads the preacher to discourse on words suggesting ludicrous or repulsive associations. "Pelatiah the son of Benaiah died" (Ezek. xi. 13), was the passage selected for a forenoon's discourse containing some assertions repugnant to the views of a clerical hearer, who replied to them, in the afternoon's discourse of the same day, from the words: "Pekahiah the son of Menahem began to reign" (2 Kings xv. 23). John Foster commenced one

¹ Von Ammon's Handbuch, § 38.

of his sermons with the remark: "Now, I dare say, some of you may think that I am going to preach a very odd sermon from such an odd text." "A minister of no ordinary celebrity once preached from 1 Kings x. 22: 'Gold and silver, ivory and apes and peacocks.'" ¹ Several Puritan divines have delivered analogical discourses on Psal. lx. 8. Massillon has been imitated by more than one clergyman, selecting the text: "Loose him [the colt] and bring him hither" (Luke xix. 30), for a sermon on the duty of fasting for sin, and thus reducing the animal appetites. The preacher defends such a sermon by pleading that it arouses men from their listlessness. But it often awakes them from sleep only to encourage them in levity. "In the choice of the text care is to be taken not to choose texts that seem to have humor in them." ² — German writers on homiletics proscribe, as the bases of sermons, several verses in the Old Testament, — in the book of Judges and the Canticles, for instance, — because they are associated with repulsive ideas. Vinet goes so far as to proscribe 2 Peter ii. 12. There is, however, at the present day, little danger of erring in this direction.

IX. A passage of the Bible has one fitness to be used as a text, when it introduces an attractive variety into the methods of presenting religious truth.

1. Its phraseology may lead the mind into a distinctive and peculiar train of thought. It may not be novel as a text, yet the style of it may suggest a novel course of remark. A new emphasis may be laid upon a very common word, and give a peculiar freshness to an entire discourse. When Dr. Steinkopf was taking breakfast at the house of Henry Venn Elliott, a member of the host's family remarked that they had begun their meal without saying grace. The guest arose at once, and prayed: "Lord, pardon thy servants, who can begin to enjoy any of thy mercies without first thanking thee. Bless the Lord, O our souls, and *forget not*

¹ Lectures on Preaching. By S. T. Sturtevant (3d ed.), p. 1.

² Bishop Burnet, on the Pastoral Care, chap. viii.

all his benefits.”¹ This use of Ps. ciii. 2 was as novel as if the verse itself had been an unfamiliar one.

The textual sermon has been compared to a tree springing up from the seed. The text, like the seed, germinates according to its own laws; has an organic relation to the discourse evolved from it, the sap of the text reaching “the furthest twig of the sermon”; the variety of the texts developing a like variety in the homilies which are started and fostered by them. ‘All the varying influences of experience, observation, reading, and reflection, should minister to the sermon growing up from the text, as the influences of the air, dew, rain, and sunshine, minister to the tree, growing up from the seed.’²

It is well said by a class of critics, that for a discourse proving the duty of prayer to God, the text 1 Tim. ii. 2 is more appropriate than Acts viii. 15; because the former passage contains an apostolic exhortation to pray, the latter passage contains only a record of an apostolic example; for a sermon on the sinfulness of misusing the tongue the first clause of Lev. xix. 16 is more pertinent than 1 John iii. 18, because the former passage is a direct command of Jehovah, relating to nothing but wrong speech, the latter passage is an apostolic exhortation relating to wrong speech and other topics as well; for a sermon proving the duty of living a holy life, the text 1 Pet. i. 16, 17 is more suitable than Isa. vi. 3, because the former passage contains both a divine and an apostolic injunction, the latter contains only an exclamation of the seraphim.³ These criticisms are important; but they overlook the fact that when a pastor needs to add a refreshing variety to his discourses, he may describe a practice of men with prominent reference at one time to its distinctive character, at another time to its connection with other practices; now to its inherent goodness or badness, and then to its good or bad results; here to the law of God,

¹ The Life of the Rev. Henry Venn Elliott, p. 148.

² See Dr. Kidder's Christian Pastorate, pp. 351, 352.

³ D. Siegm. Jacob Baumgarten's Anweisung zum erbaulichen Predigen, § 9.

there to the opinions of society. The use of texts may contribute to the unity of single discourses, also to the variety of a series. The text is called the rudder of the sermon, and as various passages of the Bible have indefinitely various forms they may diversify the course of the sermons indefinitely.

2. A text may consist of parallel, or of mutually illustrative scriptures, and thus variegate the services of the church. So far from confining himself to a single verse, or even a single chapter, of the Bible, a pastor may discourse on an entire book, as for example, the book of Job, Ecclesiastes, etc. He may discourse, not always on a text as associated with its context, but sometimes on parallel verses culled from different parts of the Old and New Testaments, on narratives, for example, in the Old Testament describing the type, conjoined with narratives in the New Testament describing the antitype. More than one interesting sermon has been written on Lev. xvi. 2-19 united with Heb. vii. 25-28; the former describing the entrance of the Jewish high priest into the holiest part of the temple, and the latter alluding to the entrance of the Redeemer into the immediate presence of him who occupieth the mercy-seat: also on Num. xxi. 7-9, conjoined with John iii. 14, 15; the former detailing the circumstances of raising the brazen serpent in the wilderness, and the latter pointing to him who was lifted up for our spiritual healing: also on Gen. xxii. 1-14 connected with John iii. 16; the former giving a history of Abraham preparing to offer his only son, and the latter teaching the grace of the Father who did offer his only begotten.

3. For the sake of variety, a text may consist of scriptures apparently inconsistent one with another.¹ Sometimes a deeper interest is awakened by examining two or more

¹ John Newton would not have endorsed this remark. "I shall preach," he says, "perhaps very usefully upon two opposite texts, while kept apart; but, if I attempt nicely to reconcile them, it is ten to one if I do n't begin to bungle."—Cecil's *Memoirs of Newton*, p. 200.

passages which appear to contradict each other, than by examining two or more which resemble each other. Men are eager to learn the meaning and force of a text, one part of which is John xv. 15: "All things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you," and the other part is John xvi. 12: "I have yet many things to say unto you; but ye cannot bear them now." Why did our Lord utter the first part of this text *after* the second part, yet in the same hour with it? The Bible rouses the mind from its torpid state by declaring that man dieth and is not, and yet lives forever; that man is a worm of the dust, and yet is made little lower than the angels; that he must love, and yet hate his father, mother, brother, sister; that every man must bear his own burden, and yet each one bear the burdens of his brethren; that man's body will be raised from the grave, and yet not the same body; that Christ was ignorant of some things, and yet knew all things; that he could not hold up his own cross, and yet upholdeth all things by the word of his power. When two classes of passages stand in apparently hostile array against each other at the opening of a sermon, the somnolent hearer is kept awake in order to see how the conflict will end. He may be raised by the discourse from his natural love of learning the truth to a gracious love of the truth which is learned.¹

4. In order to relieve the monotony of the pulpit, a text may be chosen for its merely indirect and analogical references. It may excite a new interest, if it suggest a train of thought which the sermon does not distinctly specify. A biblical narrative may be so elucidated that it will intimate truths not noticed explicitly by the minister. Of a Saturday evening,

¹ Valuable hints on the treatment of texts which may vivify and brighten a discourse by the contrasts which they present are given in the various works (named in the note at the end of *Bibliotheca Sacra*, Vol. xxx.), on "Biblical Contradictions," especially in the very elaborate volume entitled "The Discrepancies of Scripture. An Examination of Texts which are said to conflict with one another. By John W. Haley, M.A. With an Introduction by Alvah Hovey, D.D., President of Newton Theological Institution, and Professor of Theology and Christian Ethics." 1873.

several young men in the parish of Rev. Dr. Emmons were drowned, and only one member of their party was saved. On Sabbath morning he preached a sermon from the text: "And I only am escaped alone to tell thee." It was not necessary to make the slightest allusion to the casualty of the preceding day. Seldom has a more intense (even if unwarranted) interest been awakened among a congregation than by the discourse in which the same divine painted the character of Jeroboam, and made his text (2 Kings xvii. 21) loom up as a portrait of Thomas Jefferson.¹ Before a class of men who were beginning to deny the doctrine of future punishment, a severely logical, as well as analogical, discourse was once preached on Gen. xix. 24, 25. The inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrha were represented as going through a certain process of reasoning to prove that the predicted ruin of their cities could not be allowed under the fatherly care of a kind, merciful, and gracious God. The preacher made no attempt to refute the reasoning, but left it to be overwhelmed by the simple words of his text: "Then the Lord rained upon Sodom and upon Gomorrha brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven; and he overthrew those cities," etc. With these words the preacher abruptly closed his discourse. "Why did he not apply it?" was the question asked by men who saw that the argument seeming to prove that Sodom would not be destroyed was the very argument seeming to prove that the finally impenitent would not be punished. The hearers felt the pertinence of the sermon to their own speculations. The sermon, however, did not allude to them, but prompted the restless inquiry: "Why did he not apply it?" No proof is so convincing as that which a hearer is led to work out by his own logic.

On a Sabbath evening, near the pyramids of Egypt, after his hearers had spent several days in exploring the sites of Memphis, Heliopolis, and the old villages along the Nile, an English minister culled out for his text a few phrases from

¹ See Duyckink's *Cyclopaedia of American Literature*, Vol. i. p. 247; *Memoir of Emmons*, chap. viii. § 3, pp. 138-142, and chap. xv. § 1, p. 321.

the first eight verses of the sixth chapter of Exodus ; and, as these familiar phrases were explained, it seemed as if the Lord were speaking audibly to men oppressed by their sinfulness, just as the same Lord spoke centuries ago on that Egyptian plain to men groaning under their taskmasters ; “ And God said I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob [and saved them], and I have also established my covenant with them [and their spiritual children], and I have also heard the groaning of the children [mourning for their sins] ; and I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians [the slavery of sin], and I will redeem you with a stretched-out arm [the arms extended on the cross], and I will take you to me for a people [a spiritual church], and I will be to you a God [the Almighty Comforter], and I will bring you into the land [of freedom, of everlasting rest, where all of you shall be kings and priests unto God].” A critic remarked : “ In that entire sermon there were not many, if any, ideas which *were* new to me ; and also not many which did not *seem* new.”

X. Those verses of the Bible which appear to have suddenly suggested themselves to the preacher at the time of his discoursing upon them, are fitted, in at least one particular, to be used as texts.

The sermons of a minister are sometimes regarded as the dried preparations of the botanist. He appears to be artificial, to have searched laboriously for some biblical verse with which he might associate his predetermined train of thought. We read of one German divine preaching on the utility of turnpike roads as free from robbers, and taking for his text the parable of the good Samaritan ; of another discoursing on the importance of men’s restricting themselves to only one article of food at a meal, and the text for his preachment was : “ One thing is needful ” ; of still another enforcing the duty of walking into the country for exercise, and his text was : “ Behold, two of them went that same day to a village called Emmaus, which was from Jerusalem about threescore furlongs.”

When his hearers *can* not, and also when they *do* not, perceive a natural connection between the minister's text and his other religious services, he is in danger of losing sympathy with his congregation. In order to avoid the appearance of stiffness and isolation, he may discourse on such passages as *seem* to have occurred to him spontaneously, instead of having been searched for wearily. He gains this *appearance* of naturalness when he discourses on a passage which has a marked pertinence to the scenes of the day, or which has the charm of novelty, or which does, in fact, come of itself into his mind at the very hour of his beginning to deliver his sermon. When he refreshes himself with a new thought, he refreshes his hearers likewise. He speaks extempore on a verse which occurs to him extempore, and the fact of such an occurrence has a talismanic power over him and his auditors. Perhaps he has written his discourse, but a new exigency induces him to build a new portico for the old edifice. The unexpected choice of his text stimulates him to fresh effort in delivering what he had antecedently prepared. He moves onward the more vigorously, because he was excited at his starting-place. He was to describe the beneficence of the Messiah, in a sermon from Ps. lxxii. 13: "He shall spare the poor and needy, and shall save the souls of the needy"; but just before the speaker announced these words, a shower began to fall upon the parched harvest-fields, and he at once changed his text to the sixth verse of the same Psalm: "He shall come down like rain upon the mown grass, as showers that water the earth." He was expecting to describe the divine omnipotence, in a discourse from Ps. lxii. 11: "Power belongeth unto God"; but a violent thunder-storm arose after the congregation had assembled, and the text was changed to Job xxxvii. 5: "God thundereth marvellously with his voice; great things doeth he which we cannot comprehend." The latter of these two verses suggests the same idea with the former; but it came like lightning into the mind of the preacher, and electrified the audience. In the hottest part of one of the hottest days of a recent summer, a

sermon on the happiness of heaven was preached from Rev. xxi. 25 : " The gates of it shall not be shut at all by day ; for there shall be no night there " ; and the beautiful verses of Doddridge were repeated :

" No midnight shade, no clouded sun,
But sacred, high, eternal noon."

If the preacher had attained the fitting command over his own powers, and in particular over his memory of the inspired volume, he might have relieved the sultriness of that afternoon by substituting for his text two verses of his context : " And he showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God and the Lamb, and on either side of the river was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations " (Rev. xxii. 1, 2). On one day a brilliant light, on another day a cooling stream, is the most expressive symbol of the upper paradise.

It seems to have been a favorite remark of Lord Chesterfield, that in a ' numerous assembly everything depends upon *instantaneous turns*.' There are many exemplifications of this truth in the history of the pulpit. A New England parish was once distracted by a quarrel among the singers ; an eminent divine was privately requested to address the parish on the evils of discord ; before he began his sermon the two choristers had led the two factions of the choir in singing for the same hymn two different tunes, and the audience were confounded by this music of Babel ; the preacher thought at once of 1 Cor. xi. 18 : " For first of all when ye come together in the church, I *hear* that there be divisions among you, and I *partly* believe it " ; the sudden choice of this text, the pertinence of it, the seeming delicacy of it, put the speaker and the hearers into the right humor, and brought the choir, as well as the parish, into harmony. Another divine was called to preach a sermon on a week-day at a time of special religious interest. The men of Belial in his parish had formed a secret plan to interrupt the religious

service by a barbecue; and as soon as the service had begun they paraded their roasted ox before the church edifice. When the minister understood the meaning of the noise and the march, his mind darted upon Ps. lxix. 30, 31: "I will praise the name of God with a song, and will magnify him with thanksgiving. This also shall please the Lord better than an ox or bullock that hath horns and hoofs." Such a readiness in the choice of a text gives to a minister a factitious as well as a real power, and keeps his hearers on the alert, expecting some quick or ingenious turn. The *apparent* extemporization does not always lose its power if it be the *actual* result of premeditation.

Here, however, as elsewhere, an excellence readily slides into a fault. Here, as elsewhere, we may easily overstep the line between propriety and impropriety, and if we remain a rod from this line on the right side of it, we are wiser than if we go an inch beyond it on the wrong side. Sound sense, a cultivated taste, and simple piety will recognize the exact line. When a pastor regards himself as divinely called to speak on a verse merely because it has suddenly occurred to him, or because it chances to tally with some minor event of the day, he is in peril of degrading his office. One minister has been known to stand in the pulpit as a schoolmaster at his desk, and adapt a text to some individual whom he espies in a pew, as a pedagogue directs a reproof to some idle boy at the bench. "What meaneth, then, this bleating of the sheep in mine ears, and the lowing of the oxen which I hear?" (1 Sam. xv. 14) was a text chosen by a clergyman after having been disturbed, and expecting to be again disturbed, by the members of his congregation noisily leaving the sanctuary. "Should such a man as I flee?" was the remark made by a minister, who saw that when he rose to preach several men in the assembly rose to escape from him. The remark detained the fugitives until they perceived that it was the text (Neh. vi. 11) of the sermon which they were determined not to hear. Several rhetoricians, Von Ammon for example, have condemned Archdeacon Paley for selecting

a text which pointed at the diminutive stature, the immature age, the official power of one of his hearers; the ambition, avarice, selfishness of others.¹ The younger Pitt had solicited the votes of the University of Cambridge for a seat in Parliament, and been repulsed. A few months afterward he obtained the desired votes, and very soon became Prime Minister of England. After his elevation the Premier, only twenty-five years of age, visited his Alma Mater, and was received with such a degree of adulation as betrayed the desire of the gownsmen for places of honor and profit. The common report has been that, at his first appearance in St. Mary's church, he was obliged to hear from Dr. Paley a discourse to sycophants from John vi. 9: "There is a lad here which hath five barley loaves and two small fishes, but what are they among so many?" When asked whether he did come down to this personality the Archdeacon said: No. "I was not at Cambridge at the time; but I remember that, one day when I was riding out with a friend in the neighborhood of Carlisle, and we were talking about the bustle and confusion which Mr. Pitt's appearance would then cause in the University, I said that if I had been there, and asked to preach on the occasion, I would have taken that passage for my text."² It is easier to say what one would do than to do it. A verse may be *naturally* suggested, and yet be, on the whole, improper for a text.

§ 6. *Methods of Announcing the Text.*

In many churches the text is announced in a peculiarly formal, dignified, and solemn manner. It is prefaced with an Introduction, sometimes as long as the Introduction of the sermon, is occasionally preceded or followed by a short prayer, and, when it is recited, the congregation reverently

¹ Handbuch der Anleitung zur Kanzelberedsamkeit von Dr. Christoph. Friedrich von Ammon. § 38. Von Ammon does not name Dr. Paley as the object of his criticism, but alludes to the preacher as "one of the most learned theologians of the University." He derives his narrative from Hüttner's Eng-lisch. Miscellen. Band III. St. 1. s. 50.

² Paley's Works, Vol. i. pp. 43, 44.

rise. The occasion is not infrequent, when, at least, some parts of this method are eminently proper. They add an emphasis to the discourse. The Introduction to the text calls particular attention to it. Some peculiarity of the biblical verse may demand a few prefatory words. Two or three very interesting sermons, for example, have been preached on the law: "If a bird's nest chance to be before thee in the way in any tree, or on the ground, whether they be young ones or eggs, and the dam sitting upon the young or upon the eggs, thou shalt not take the dam with the young: But thou shalt in any wise let the dam go, and take the young to thee, that it may be well with thee, and that thou mayest prolong thy days" (Deut. xii. 6, 7). The moral significance of such words is so recondite that they may appear inapposite for the pulpit, unless the minds of the hearers be led insensibly and gradually to perceive that the greatest truths lie hidden in the smallest phenomena. The universal providence of God is revealed in the fall of a sparrow. "A bird of the air shall carry the voice, and that which hath wings shall tell the matter."

The ancient formality in announcing the text is often reduced, in our land and age, to the simple request, that the audience duly consider the truths which are to be presented. Sometimes the minister breaks the silence of the church by abruptly naming the chapter and verse which contain the words on which he is to speak; or still more abruptly by reciting the words before he names the place where they are to be found. Not infrequently he may exhibit the dignity of these words by this isolation of them. When the people are still and expectant he utters the verse on which he is to comment, and which first of all he desires to lodge in the memory of his hearers: "Our help is in the name of the Lord, who made heaven and earth" (Ps. cxxiv. 8), or "The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him, to all that call upon him in truth" (Ps. cxlv. 18), or "God is a spirit; and they that worship him, must worship him in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 24), or "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive

ourselves, and the truth is not in us ; if we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" (1 John i. 8, 9), or "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous" (1 John ii. 1). The utility of a text and the importance of an impressive elocution were once illustrated by a minister who, with a majestic voice, and without any previous reference to chapter and verse, overawed his hearers by the words: "Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 28, 29). He reiterated these words with such pathos and authority that his sermon was long remembered, yet no part of it except the text could be specified. It was but a string on which the diamond hung. It was rich indeed, but its chief wealth was in the verses which introduced it.

Still, every occasion and every text do not allow this abruptness. A minister must have his thoughts about him. He may seem to be well nigh blasphemous when he rises, and without a single introductory word proclaims: "I am the Lord; I change not" (Mal. iii. 6). He may appear to be indulging in a trivial personality when he calls the attention of the hearers and spectators to "My leanness, my leanness; woe unto me" (Isa. xxiv. 16). An audience in an American city were once convulsed with laughter by a clergyman who was, like Baron Hardenbroke, "of a circumference which looked as if eating, drinking, and sleeping were his sole occupation," and who, before he began his sermon, surprised his people by declaring, without a preface, "If any other man thinketh that he hath whereof he might trust in the flesh, I more" (Phil. iii. 4). The clergyman was ignorant of any reason for the levity of his hearers; his innocence made him guileless; but he learned from the incident that when a minister discourses on a text which will be associated with his own physique, or any marked

event of his life, he should not omit the precautionary formula.

When a preacher delivers an address in behalf of some missionary society or charitable institution, some needy college or church, he may deliver it in the form of a Statement, rather than that of a Sermon. He may, now and then, introduce a novelty into the hour of divine service by founding his remarks on the facts of present history, instead of founding them on a passage of the Bible. If, however, he preface his remarks by a biblical epigraph, he should never treat that epigraph as a mere motto (because texts of sermons are distinguished from mottos for essays), but he should introduce it, and make subsequent allusions to it, as an expression of principles involved in his eleemosynary plea. Then, it is often graceful for him to preface his text by some explanatory or apologetic remarks, in order that his hearers may not be startled by the violence of the transition from his comment on inspired words to his statement of pecuniary needs. Beginning his discourse with 1 Sam. xiv. 6: "It may be that the Lord will work for us; for there is no restraint to the Lord to save by many or by few," an unskilful pleader first describes the thrilling scene which occurred in the valley between Michmash and Gibeah, and secondly, plunges his hearers into a "Statement of the wants of the Tract and Book Society," or the "Society for the relief of Discharged Convicts." A more expert orator saves his audience from a shock, by saying, at the outset, that he does not intend to preach a regular sermon on any doctrine or any general duty specified in the Bible; but he merely designs to make certain statements in regard to the Tract and Book Society; and these statements will illustrate and be illustrated by the words which Jonathan uttered to his armor-bearer; words breathing the lowly, yet brave spirit, the zeal and the faith, by which we may hope to rise from small beginnings to great results; words which are recorded in 1 Sam. xiv. 6, and which will often suggest themselves to the hearer by the facts narrated in the address.

If a preacher aim to introduce his text in easy and natural methods, consonant with its peculiar spirit, and with the occasion on which he speaks, he will be apt to free his other services from monotony. One source of the interest which Professor Lawson excited was the appropriate variety of the modes in which he began his discourses. He did not allow his pulpit to resemble

“A sleepy land, where, under the same wheel,
The same old rut would deepen year by year.”

We read that on one occasion, a clergyman, who had finished his discourse, and had forgotten that Dr. Lawson was to deliver another immediately afterward, pronounced the benediction, and thus dismissed the assembly. But the ever-ready preacher rose at once, and began his sermon, with the words: “My friends, you will, no doubt, think it strange that the apostolic benediction has been pronounced before the close of the services; but in the sixteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and twentieth verse, you will find that Paul pronounces the blessing, and, after adding some important truths, he pronounces it a second time, verse twenty-fourth.” Once he was expecting to preach the second sermon, immediately after one of his persevering brethren had finished the first sermon, on an important occasion; but his tenacious brother hung upon the first discourse so long as to leave no time for the second. Dr. Lawson rose, repeated the inspired words: “For brass I will bring gold, and for iron I will bring silver, and for wood, brass, and for stones, iron,” and then announced that he should omit his own wooden discourse, and read what is much more precious,—a golden chapter of the Bible. Having recited it, he dismissed the assembly. His manner of introducing the chapter made the chapter itself a sermon. A novelty is often an emphasis. Still, we must remember the legal maxim: “*Privilegium non transit in exemplum.*”

ARTICLE VI.

SIN AND SUFFERING IN THE UNIVERSE, AS RELATED TO
THE POWER, WISDOM, AND LOVE OF GOD.

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I CANNOT persuade myself to enter upon this subject without frankly testifying to a deep sense of its difficulties, of its magnitude, and of its demand for profound humility and reverence toward God. Undeniably the subject has tasked the human intellect; has brought a painful strain upon human sympathy; and a stern moral trial upon man's confidence in God's wisdom and love. If these points are true in regard to a title of mankind, how immense is the interest involved in this subject, and how assiduously, and withal prayerfully, should we seek whatever light upon it God may in kindness bring within our reach.

My interest in this great question has been painfully deepened by the confessions of some good men who say in substance: "This subject is utterly dark to me; the study of it for a lifetime has given me not the first ray of light, not the first sensation of relief."¹ I cannot say this. My

¹ On the subject of "Sin and Suffering in the Universe," and speaking of its difficulties, Rev. Albert Barnes writes: "I confess for one that I feel them, and feel them more sensibly and powerfully the more I look at them and the longer I live. I do not understand these facts, and I make no advances toward understanding them. I do not know that I have a ray of light on this subject which I had not when the subject first flashed across my soul. I have read to some extent what wise and good men have written. I have looked at their theories and explanations. I have endeavored to weigh their arguments, for my whole soul pants for light and relief on these questions. But I get neither; and in the distress and anguish of my own spirit, I confess that I see no light whatever. I see not one ray of light to disclose to me why sin came into the world, why the earth is strewn with the dying and dead, and why men must suffer to all eternity. I have never seen a particle of light thrown on these subjects that has given a moment's ease to my tortured mind, nor have I an explanation to offer, or a thought to suggest, which would be of relief to you." "When I

reflections on this subject have given me relief, I may truly say, great relief. I will not presume that I shall bring like relief to all, or even to many of my readers. I will not promise this for any of them; it must suffice me to set forth with great brevity, and with whatever clearness and simplicity I may be able, the points which afford this relief to me. I propose to treat the subject in the following method:

I. State what the difficulties are, and are assumed to be:

II. Refer to the sources of testimony and argument available to us on this subject:

III. Then meet the difficulties: first, severally and in detail; modifying some of the assumed facts, and looking for the reasons of the actual facts: and secondly, in general, by advancing sundry hypotheses which may account for the existence of sin and suffering in worlds made and governed by God.

I. The difficulties, actual and assumed, may be put thus:

1. That suffering should so constantly follow sinning.
2. That in the case of the infants of our race, suffering should precede sinning; and, in the case of the lower animals of our world, should fall upon the unsinning.
3. That, with infinite power to prevent it, God should suffer sin to exist at all.
4. That he should permit *so much* sin and suffering, whether considered absolutely, or relatively to the amount of holiness and happiness in this world or in the universe.
5. That the human race should become sinners without their own fault, under an economy virtually constituted by God himself.
6. That the question, How many and who of the race shall be saved, should be determined irrespective of their own agency.
7. That the penal consequences of incor-

look upon a world of sinners and sufferers; upon death-beds and grave-yards; on the world of woe, filled with hosts to suffer forever; when I see my friends, my parents, my family, my people, my fellow-citizens;—when I look upon a whole race all involved in this sin and danger; and when I see the great mass of them wholly unconcerned, and when I feel that God only can save them, and yet he does not do it, I am struck dumb. It is all dark, dark to my soul, and I cannot disguise it.” — *American Presbyterian Quarterly*, Oct. 1869, p. 648.

rigible sin should, under God's law, be remediless and eternal, amounting to an utter wreck of well-being.

II. What sources of testimony and argument are available and legitimate on this subject?

Answering this point very briefly, I would say: (a) Our own experience and observation in this sinning world; (b) The voice of our own moral nature; (c) The holy scriptures accepted as God's revelation; (d) The course of God's actual administration over this world throughout the various epochs of its history.

So far we are in the realm of *facts*. But in a subject of this nature which, by universal admission, stretches away in some of its bearings beyond our actual knowledge — beyond the sphere of knowledge possible to us, at least as yet — there is legitimate place for *hypothesis*. We may make *suppositions* in regard to God's plans and purposes. In doing this we do not undertake to affirm absolutely what *is*; we only say what in our view *may be*. Of course it is properly required that any hypothesis should be, apparently to us, possible, and even probable. Certainly it must be one which cannot be proved impossible. Within these restrictions hypotheses may avail to relieve us very materially of the difficulties which invest this subject.

I. Taking up now the specific points of difficulty, we name:

1. That in the present world *suffering should so constantly follow sinning*.

Perhaps this point cannot be treated better than in the short method of asking, *What if it did not?* Suppose this great fact of our sinning world reversed, so that suffering follows sinning no longer. All sin being in its nature violation of law, we may get more definite views of the case if we analyze the comprehensive fact; suppose thus: (a) No suffering shall follow the violation of physical law; (b) No suffering shall follow the violation of the law of conscience; (c) No suffering shall follow the violation of the preceptive law of God.

Where are we now? (a) The drunkard, the glutton, the debauchee, are no longer confronted with pain, prostration, wasted nerve-power, premature disease, delirium-tremens, a death of horrors! Not one of this legion of woes—heretofore treading close on the heels of transgression—fastening its fangs into these violators of physical law, shall be felt or feared any more. The reign of sensuality is unrestrained by this troop of terrors. Its power at once becomes omnipotent; the masses rush fearlessly and headlong down into bestiality! (b) To heighten the impulses downward, or rather to let off the brakes, there is to be no more remorse, or even compunction for any sort or degree of sin. No sense of conscious wrong-doing brings trouble, fear, unrest. Now what is this but man with his moral nature dropped out? What looks like a man—what we have been wont to honor as a being of noble moral capabilities, has now suddenly sunk down into bruteness! You might as well reason of right and wrong with the swine. (c) Finally, to sweep away the last restraint upon sinning, carry out the supposition to its full length. There is to be no more rebuke of sin from even God himself. His law must be shorn of all penalty, whether in this world or the world to come. There must not remain even the *fear* of God's displeasure; for the legitimate way to manifest this is by the infliction of suffering. Then let the last, even the faintest, rebuke against sin be suppressed! Lift the flood-gates and let the torrents sweep, let depravity run riot in the universe!

Would this be an improvement upon the present and past order of things? If with all these restraints in full force sin yet wields a power over human souls so terrible, what a world of demons incarnate should we have at once without them! Judging from the limited efficiency of suffering to restrain from sinning, as things are and have been, how much of its influence could well be spared?

2. The second difficulty is, that in the case of the infants of our race suffering precedes sinning: and, in the case of the lower animals, falls upon the un sinning. It is claimed

that death reigned on this planet long ages before Adam fell.

First, *as to infants*: (a) It should not be assumed that we are in a condition to know and estimate all God's reasons for establishing a general, rather than an exceptional, law over the human race in respect to suffering and mortality. We can, however, see that the presumptions are greatly in favor of general law. (b) So far forth as the suffering of infants comes of the sin of parents, violating physical law either before the infant's birth or after, it stands related to the moral trial of the parents. Such suffering may be, and ought to be, a powerful motive to restrain them from these sins. We may often have occasion to suggest that moral trial and restraint upon sinning are matters of so great moment, in fact, and in the eye of God, that we may well afford to justify him for any expenditure of a thing so cheap as suffering for an end so infinitely valuable. (c) In the case of infants who live into years of moral accountability, their early sufferings may send down a wholesome influence into their responsible moral life. (d) In the case of those who die before moral accountability there is a group of precious testimonies which strongly favor the belief of their salvation in Christ. Foregoing, as we must, all extended discussion of this point, let it be suggested that the testimonies come from the general character of God, from what may be supposed to be one point in the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, as to his reward for his sufferings; and from various intimations which fell from the lips of Jesus touching his relations to children.

Secondly, *as to the unsinning animals*. (a) The remark made above as to a general law of mortality, rather than an exceptional one, in the same world, is pertinent here also. (b) The amount of suffering relatively to enjoyment in the unsinning races is probably very small, except so far as they suffer from the sins of men. (c) So far forth as the welfare of these unsinning races is made dependent on man, their creation and this dependence constitute no insignificant means for man's moral trial. Think of the sin and brutality

involved in hunting them down and murdering them for mere sport; and also in provoking them to fight each other for the excitement, the gratification, and the brutalizing of souls scarcely less brutal than they. Over against this, think of the culture of kindness and affection provided for in thoughtful and sympathizing care for their welfare. Here again the remark is in place, that, appreciating the value of suitable surroundings for the development of our entire nature, especially in infancy and childhood, our Maker has brought these lower animals into close relations to our race, and must be justified, therefore, even though the arrangement involve some liability to suffering on their part. (*d*) As to God's justice towards them personally, we really know too little to affirm or deny, on the basis of our knowledge of their destiny. But it is certainly due to God that, in view of all the revelations he has made of himself, we should trust him for this.

3. Far more grave and difficult is this assumed fact—that, *with infinite power to prevent sin, God should permit it in his moral universe at all*. Here the assumption, “with infinite power to prevent,” demands our most careful and discriminating attention.

No one can rationally doubt that God might have forbore to create moral beings at all. Then there would have been no sin in the universe. So, likewise, there would have been among created beings no holiness. And what a waste were a universe with no intelligent moral beings in it, capable of knowing, loving, serving, adoring the ever-blessed God! Such a mode of forestalling all sin is obviously not to be thought of, unless it be assumed that a moral universe would be utterly unmanageable, and God powerless to bring good out of its possible evil.

Yet, again, it is equally clear that with infinite foreknowledge and power, God, having created moral beings, might annihilate any individual or any race at some point prior to their foreseen sinning. But who can tell how sweeping, on this system, such annihilations would need to

become? Who can safely assume that God could justify himself before finite intelligences for such annihilations of his creatures, because of something anticipated by him, but not done by them—not done in the presence of those who are to consider and judge of God's ways, and who, by the supposition, have never seen sin and its consequences? Or who can say that such annihilations would accumulate any moral force against sinning, such as the presence of sin and its consequences is now actually accumulating in the universe? In fine, who can say, or believe, that this supposed policy would be any better than the one which God has adopted?

But a more difficult point yet remains. It is assumed that, with no light before created minds from existing sin and its consequences, God might have prevented all sin. In support of this position, appeal is made: (a) To the sinless angels; (b) To saints from earth kept holy in heaven; (c) To saints on earth, kept by grace from utter apostasy; (d) To a cherished belief that the material universe, except the abodes of fallen angels and fallen men, is filled with sinless moral beings.

Replying to these points in their order, I remark: (a) Some angels, once holy, have fallen. Who can say that the un-fallen are not held and confirmed in holiness through influences coming from *their* sin and doom? (b) Saints from earth in their eternal heaven have had a most impressive personal experience of the miseries of sin; they have felt the constraining, melting power of a Saviour's love; they have before them the woes of the lost. How illogical, therefore, is the reasoning which would prove from their case that *without* the moral force begotten of the facts of sin, punishment, and redemption, God is morally omnipotent to prevent the first sin and all sinning! (c) But God keeps his saints on earth from falling fatally. Yes; but he warns them solemnly against the known doom of the lost. (d) As to the assumption of countless orders of holy beings filling the material universe, the first condition precedent to the argument from their case will be to ascertain the fact of their existence; the

second, to show that they are sinless; the third, to show that they have never heard of Satan and his doom. We need *all* these three points proved; we have proof of none of them. This argument, therefore, from existing or supposed facts, fails in the vital point, viz. power to prevent all sin *without the moral influence afforded by known sin and its known consequences.*

But, entirely apart from any argument, and independently of any support from facts, real or supposed, devout minds are prone to assume that God must have infinite natural power to prevent all sin. Many of the best of men recoil from the thought of any limitations of any sort, under any circumstances, to God's power, or to its exercise, *as against sin.* This feeling may become so strong as almost or quite to preclude a candid examination of facts bearing on the case. Yet our only legitimate course is to study whatever facts God has brought within our knowledge, and weigh their bearings upon our main question.

It may be asked: Why disturb or question at all the assumption that God is omnipotent to prevent sin in free moral agents? The demand for serious inquiry on this point comes of the following facts: (a) There is a large amount of sin and suffering in our world, and some, at least, among fallen angels; (b) Admitting that God is the infinite Maker and Lord of the universe, this fact of sin and suffering must have very important bearings, favorable or unfavorable, upon his reputation before his intelligent creatures; (c) God righteously expects it of us that we justify his ways in regard to the existence of sin and suffering, so far as it lies within our power to do so; (d) In searching for the reasons why God permitted sin to enter the universe, we are utterly forbidden to assume any limitation or finiteness in his *love.* We *know* that sin and suffering have not come in because God was indifferent to their evils, and therefore became negligent of due precautions, or remiss in his endeavors to withstand sin; (e) Nor may we think of any short-comings *in wisdom.* It was not that he lacked skill to devise the best possible

methods of doing what was in its nature and relations possible, and what it was best on the whole for him to do.

But there must be *some reasons* why sin and suffering exist. If we cannot locate them precisely, perhaps we may narrow the possible field within which they must lie, and thus approximate toward the true solution of the problem. (1) Perhaps we have not duly estimated the difference between a morally acting mind and dead matter considered as a something to be acted upon. (2) Consequently, the problem how to prevent all sin may involve more inherent difficulty than we have been wont to consider, and of quite another sort. (3) Perhaps we have not sufficiently considered the necessity of *truth* as a means of morally influencing free, intelligent mind—mind created of God, as to its intelligence and free-will, “in his own image”; nor yet the necessity, especially in the infancy of created mind, of having truth *illustrated* and *made plain in act*—in the developments of real life. (4) We may not be so well able as the Infinite One is to judge how far, in ruling countless races of free moral agents, it may be wise for him to leave them to bear their own responsibilities, uncontrolled by himself, and within what limits he may wisely interpose a controlling influence upon their moral activities. (5) To apply this comprehensive fact to our own race definitely: Since the Holy Spirit condescends to plead with sinful souls, it may be quite beyond our province to judge under what laws and limitations he may wisely exert his influence, and, on the other hand, what measure or kind of resistance it may be inconsistent with his honor and with the best influence of God’s moral government over the universe, for him to forgive and overcome.

Thus the problem of preventing sin (and also the kindred one of converting sinners) is obviously one of which we *can know something*, but *cannot know everything*. We can know something, because we consciously have the powers and functions of free moral agents, and because we are in the midst of a world in which God is employing himself before our eyes in counteracting sin and in converting

sinner; but we cannot know everything, for the problem has relations and bearings which stretch away indefinitely beyond our utmost vision. Let us, at least, learn all we can from the legitimate sources of knowledge which God has opened to us.

If we study this great problem in the light of God's actual work in our world, as set forth in the scriptures, we shall meet these two apparent facts :

1. The work of salvation is carried forward *against obstacles; under limitations and restrictions.*

2. *It progresses and becomes more effective age after age,* with the increase of light, with the advance made in the development of truth, and with the increasing materials of moral power.

Are these apparent facts real?

1. As to the *point of limitations* :

(1) The scriptures seem to affirm it very explicitly. It is declared respecting a class of men specially enlightened, but supposed to fall away, that "it is *impossible* to renew them again to repentance" (Heb. vi. 4-6). Does not the divine agency for their salvation work under some sort of limitations? The scriptures also teach (Matt. xii. 31, 32) that a certain sin against the Holy Ghost shall never be forgiven, and certainly imply that some do or may commit it. Does not this sin carry with it a certain sort of limitation as to the power that saves? It is said of a certain city and its people that Jesus "could there do no mighty works," etc., and assigns as the reason, their unbelief (Mark vi. 5, 6). What shall be said of this "*could not*"? Of ancient Israel God said: "What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it?" (Isa. v. 4.)

(2) It is assumed that the work of the Spirit on men's hearts is prosecuted under some limitations. Stephen charged it upon the Jewish Sanhedrim: "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye" (Acts vii. 51). Paul (1 Thess. v. 19) exhorts: "Quench not the Spirit," implying, doubtless, the possibility of this sin. Need we be

reminded that this sin, in some form or degree of it, precludes the soul from salvation? Can we, then, be mistaken in assuming that the Spirit works for the salvation of men under certain limitations, growing out of their free moral bearing toward him?

(3) The scriptures teach that sinners perish because they resist God's effort to save them. Jesus said of the Jews: "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life" (John v. 40. See also John iii. 19; Acts xiii. 46; 2 Thess. ii. 10). Such declarations (neither few nor vague) imply that God's work of saving men operates under certain limitations, growing out of their voluntary perverseness and resistance.

(4) God protests most solemnly that the perishing of sinful men in their sins is *not* due to *his* will and pleasure, but to *theirs*. Thus, with the solemn oath, as if his feelings were outraged by their imputations against his loving heart, he said, through Ezekiel (xxxiii. 11): "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die?" To the same purport is Ezek. xviii. 31, 32, and 2 Pet. iii. 9, etc. Thus God's will and pleasure respecting the repentance and salvation of sinners meet with resistance from their will and pleasure; and this resistance works a certain limitation upon his efforts to save them.

(5.) Not only in the negative form ["no pleasure"], but in most positive forms and in most touching words, the Lord expresses his earnest desire that sinners would hear, believe, obey, and live. Thus: "Oh, that there were such a heart in them that they would fear me and keep my commandments always, that it might be well with them, and with their children forever" (Deut. v. 29. See also Deut. xxxii. 29; Ps. lxxxii. 13; Isa. xlviii. 18; Matt. xxiii. 37). Such sincere utterances (let their sincerity never be questioned!) prove that the lack of success in God's efforts to save sinners comes not from any lack of love for their souls. The limitations come in upon the side of their free-will and moral perverseness, not

on the side of his paternal love. As if to make this point doubly strong, the Lord testifies to his deep pain and grief when he is compelled to desist from further effort and see them perish. Thus, by Hosea (xi. 7, 8): "How shall I give thee up, Ephraim? How shall I make thee as Admah? Mine heart is turned within me; my repentings are kindled together." So Christ, weeping over Jerusalem: "If [Oh that] thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes" (Luke xix. 41, 42).

The passages referred to on these several points are familiar to all Bible readers. I cite them to show that God's work of turning sinners from their sins labors against obstacles, and is carried forward under limitations; that these limitations come upon it, not on the side of God's love, but on the side of the sinner's free agency, and of his power to resist the appeals of God's truth and the influence of his Spirit. Now must we not assume that free agency is essentially the same thing in all moral agents throughout the universe, and that the case of turning the sinners of our world to repentance may be taken to illustrate the nature of the obstacles that were to be encountered in any effort which God might make to prevent sin in the moral universe?

Deferring further remarks upon the validity of this method of argument, I proceed to certain other facts which bear upon both points above indicated, viz. (a) *limitation* of some sort; and (b) *progress* in the development of moral power.

(1) For some reasons there were certain limitations to the giving of the Holy Ghost before Jesus was glorified (in his ascension), which were removed by and after that event. "This spake he of the Spirit which they that believe on him should receive; for the Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified" (John vii. 39).

(2) In the ages before Christ's incarnation the main appeals from God to men were designed and adapted to inspire *fear*; in the ages after the incarnation, to inspire *love*. In the former, "the fear of the Lord" was the first element of

piety, the most prominent; it was even another name for piety itself. But in the latter, "the love of Christ constraineth." Love to Christ became the test of piety, its prominent and paramount feature. Why is this? What hindered the same prominence to love in the former age as in the latter? Why were the moral appliances to withstand sin and beget piety so unlike in these two ages? Not to discuss this point exhaustively here, let it suffice to have alluded to this obvious and wide diversity, and to suggest that the fact indicates an advance from weaker elements of moral power to stronger; the weaker, however, being a natural necessity in their place, but the advance manifestly implying certain relative limitations of effective moral power in the former age, which were much less stringent in the latter.

(3) As one method of estimating proximately the moral forces in action at various periods of our world, we may compare the probable ratio of the saved to the lost. In the age before the flood, at its minimum; improved, yet still small, in the age from the flood to the coming of Christ; much greater in the Christian age thus far than in the ages preceding the Christian era; but by far the greatest of all in those "latter days," when "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord," when all the nations shall come up to Zion to become her sons and daughters, when "thy people shall be all righteous—the branch of God's planting, the work of his hands, that he may be glorified" (Isa. lx. 21). Certainly, this looks like an advance in the efficiency of applied truth, or, perhaps we should rather say, an accumulation of the *materials* of effective moral power, i.e. of truth so illustrated as to be available readily for moral influence on finite minds. But the very conception of growth, advance, carries with it the idea of more and less; in other words, the idea of certain limitations of effective moral force, which limitations are in process of time gradually overcome. To compare the antediluvian with the millennial age, and attribute the difference in manifested moral power to divine sovereignty, pure and simple, irrespective of the light of truth and the advance

made in its revelation before finite minds, is to quite ignore the Bible and the great facts of our world's moral history.

Recurring to the point of the validity of this method of argumentation, it would seem undeniable that the counter-action of sin in our world must be the same thing, *in its nature*, as the prevention of sin in a universe of moral agents, even as a part bears the nature of the whole. Now, it must aid us essentially in solving the great questions, *Wherefore* is sin? *Why* did not God always prevent it? if we can ascertain *where the difficulties lie*; and particularly, if we can legitimately withdraw them from the *moral character of God*, showing that they evince no lack of perfect love; and if we are able to narrow them down to the essential nature of intelligent, free, morally acting minds. This broad field includes the necessity of *truth* as a means of morally influencing intelligent mind; also, the necessity, especially in the infancy of created beings, of having truth *manifested* — made palpable — illustrated in act, so that it may be apprehended impressively; also, the question at what point the best interests of a moral universe will be subserved by leaving moral agents to bear their own responsibilities; God's effective control being withheld; or, — to put this point in the practical form which it assumes in our world, — at what point God is bound, in honor, and for the best interests of his moral universe, to say: My Spirit shall be no longer insulted and blasphemed with impunity.

Here let it be distinctly understood that our argument by no means requires us to assign the amount of influence coming in from each one of these several points. No being but God is competent to set off the several amounts. It should suffice us to see that the reasons why sin exists in the universe are essentially the same in kind as the reasons why so much sin has existed in our world, despite of God's real and constant efforts to withstand it and to convert men from it.

Thus it appears that we must essentially modify the very common assumption that God has permitted sin in his moral universe, *having infinite power to prevent it*. This assump-

tion — “infinite power to prevent” — has begotten the main difficulties of the sin-problem. The sensitiveness of many good men touching this whole question hinges around this point. It seems to them derogatory to the infinite God to admit any sort of limitation to his power as against sin and as toward its prevention, or the recovery of sinners from its dominion. To all such sensitive thinking and feeling, let it be suggested, that it is in no sense derogatory to God’s power to say that he cannot save sinners of our race without an atonement, cannot save them without their personal faith in the atoning Redeemer, cannot save them without their repentance. Such a “cannot” should startle no one; should never be thought of as involving any dishonorable limitations of God’s power. Indeed, such limitations in God’s plans and principles as to human salvation are to his infinite glory. Nor is it any impeachment of God’s power, or of his moral character in any respect, that he should recognize the nature of intelligent, free, and morally acting minds, and adapt his agencies upon them accordingly, that is to say, that he should assume the necessity of truth as a motive to right moral action; nor, considering the finiteness of created minds, and especially in the infancy of their existence, that he should recognize the need of truth *illustrated in act*; nor, considering the importance of developing the personal responsibilities of moral agents, that he should see it wise (at some point known only to himself) to leave their freedom to bear its own responsibilities, and that he should set limits to his controlling influence upon their free-will; nor, considering how vast his moral universe is, or at least may become, that he should bear himself toward its fallen races with a large and wise regard to the best interests of all the yet-unsinners and yet-to-be-created moral races of the universe. With profoundest reverence, it behooves us to assume that God’s wisdom in managing this whole moral system is simply perfect. Never let us derogate from his wisdom or from his love. The scriptures represent the Most High as being keenly sensitive to the least imputation against his justice,

his wisdom, or his love (See Ezek. xviii. 2, 3, 23, 29-32; xxxiii. 10, 11, 17, 20). No similar sensitiveness appears in his word on the point of limitations in the line of actually saving sinners. There seems to be never a thought of its being derogatory to God's power to say: "It is *impossible* to renew them again to repentance"; or, to say that sinners whom he labors and longs to save, yet *will* resist his Spirit, and forever die.

To this entire train of remark upon the limitations incident to the saving of men, it may, perhaps, be objected that the words of our Lord, "With God all things are possible" (Matt. xix. 23-26; Mark x. 23-27), lie squarely and fatally against it. A careful attention to this case will show that the thought of the disciples was this: If rich men cannot be saved, who can be? That is, their point was not the question whether God could save all men, nor the question *why* he does not, but whether he could save a particular class, viz. the rich. Now, legitimately, Christ's answer should be construed in the light of the disciples' question. So construed, it would seem that Christ did not intend to speak of God's power to save all men, but rather of his power to save men of *any class* in society. It would have been exceedingly disastrous to have left on their minds the impression that any given class of men are necessarily beyond God's power to save. Christ would have us beware not to set limits of our own to his power to save men in such a way as to block our efforts for their salvation. Of these limitations, in any particular case, let him alone be the judge.

4. A fourth point of perplexity involved in the ways of God respecting sin, is that he permits *so much* sin and *so much* suffering, whether considered absolutely, or relatively to the amount of holiness and happiness.

Replying, first, to the point of suffering, let it be noted that suffering is to be charged entirely to the account of sin. But for sin, it would (so far as we can see) have no place in the universe. Any measure of suffering, however terrible, is cheap as an antidote for sin, or a moral warning against

it ; that is, if it turn sinners from the error of their ways, or warn the yet unsinning against so dire an evil. Wise men count suffering a small price to pay for life in its low sense of earthly existence. How much more is the price cheap as paid for life everlasting. If we do not see the truth and force of this now, we shall (all scripture and reason conspire to show) when the suffering is past, and only the glory remaineth.

Next, as to the great amount of permitted sin. Here it will be seen that the suggested distinction between the amount viewed *absolutely*, and the amount viewed relatively to the resulting holiness and happiness, is practically of no account ; the relative amount being the only real question. For whether the amount be absolutely great or absolutely small, it is certainly permitted to fall upon the offspring of an infinitely holy and compassionate God, only for the sake of greater holiness and happiness to be secured in the end by means thereof. This must be true, if God be indeed wise and good. Consequently, the only real question should be, whether the price paid for the holiness and happiness of his universe is too great — a question which infinite wisdom is (to say the least) much more competent to decide than any finite wisdom can be. However, one element in this estimate is indicated for us in the view which the scriptures give as to the relative numbers of the saved and of the lost in our own fallen race. On this point, the somewhat common assumption that, in the grand antagonism between Christ and Satan for the souls of men, Satan bears off the greater spoils of victory, is squarely against the doctrine of the scriptures. Wherever they touch this point, — the relative issues of this mighty conflict, — they show us the serpent snapping at the heel of his opponent, but coming out of the fight with his own head “bruised,” or, as Paul would say, “trodden under the feet” (Rom. xvi. 20). In the showing of Isaiah (liii. 10–12) the Messiah shall “see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied,” because in the division of the spoils, he has the “great” share — “the many” — for his portion. A result

which is satisfactory to the world's Great Sufferer — the compassionate, the sympathizing "Man of Sorrows" — should satisfy all other reasonable minds. And it is surely very kind in the great Disposer to bring within our reach one element of calculation bearing so naturally upon the solution of this great problem. For if the effort to turn sin and suffering to account toward a greater salvation — may we say, toward a remunerating, a paying result of salvation — were to be in our world a failure, the trial to human faith would be sharp indeed. We ought to be devoutly thankful that God spares us this trial. The results of glorious victory on this field of conflict are not only joyous in themselves considered, but ineffably glorious when taken as a unit of calculation, a sample product, to indicate what we are to expect on the great scale of the universal conflict against sin in God's moral universe.

5. A fifth point is that *the human race should become sinners without their own fault, under an economy virtually constituted by God himself.*

It is unfortunate that good men should sometimes put this point in a way to bear with unjust severity against the economy of God. In his vindication it should surely be held that, inasmuch as all sin is voluntary, according to his own definition is "transgression of law," therefore no human being ever sins, or even begins to sin, save by his own fault. The first sin as truly as the last, and every other, is voluntary transgression of law, and therefore is the fault of the sinner. Again, it is vital to a fair understanding of this subject that we become familiar with the distinction between sin and its antecedent temptations or occasions; i.e. between what is really sin and what are only the antecedent occasions or temptations inducing it. The scriptures recognize this distinction; so does the common-sense of mankind. Applying this distinction to the relation of the race to Adam's sin, it must be obvious that it is not the sin itself which is transmitted, a thing naturally impossible, but only the occasions, the antecedents of sin. But some one will say, These oc-

casions, these antecedents, of sin exist under an arrangement of which God is the supreme author. In part this is true; and the defense to be set up in his behalf may be this; that the general laws under which the race are born are wise and good — the best possible under all the circumstances of the case. The fundamental point in these laws (touching the question in hand) may be expressed on this wise: *Like produces like*; the offspring, at least as physically considered, follow the parent. But is not this provision wise and good? Suppose it were set aside, and were the law no longer. Then the most careful observance of physical law on the part of parents would no longer conduce toward health or beauty in their offspring. No fond mother would any more look for the lineaments of parentage in her babe. It might be a Hottentot. It shall bear no trace of being her own, no trace of its father. Would this be deemed an improvement upon the present order of nature? Besides, may there not be a most wise design in establishing so close a connection physically between parent and offspring, that the violation of physical law on the part of parents shall be visited upon their children, and upon themselves through their children; and, on the other hand, its conscientious observance shall be in the same way rewarded; both results coming in ways of most effective moral power? Is not that hand wisely guided which puts motives so powerful toward right conduct into the very constitution of the family, into the laws of offspring? Is it not safe to say that God cannot afford to lose from this moral realm of his an influence toward the observance of law so potent as this?

Exception has sometimes been taken against the law of development, under which man's intellectual and moral powers unfold slowly and late, compared with his susceptibilities to pleasure. His universal sinning is by some attributed to this arrangement, and it has been deemed unwise. But is it well considered how much opportunity and how much power for childhood culture and training are lodged in parental hands by this very arrangement? Suppose

the human offspring were to mount up into its complete development in as little time as kittens, and parental responsibility and care were to cease as soon? Would this be an improvement in a world of moral agents, where moral training involves interests so momentous?

Yet again, under the general head of fault-finding with our Maker for the laws of the human constitution, some will scarcely forgive him for permitting the existence of any susceptibility to animal enjoyment; or, in the more common phrase, any appetites, passions. Perhaps they fail to consider that without susceptibilities to happiness there could be no happiness; without appetite for food, no enjoyment from food, nor indeed any healthful functions of animal life. Verily, it was neither a mistake nor a misfortune that God made us capable of enjoying our daily bread, and, on the same principle, every other truly constitutional, created susceptibility to pleasure. It is no sin, nor even misfortune, to have these constitutional capabilities for enjoyment. It is a sin to indulge them beyond a certain line, not difficult to trace by the aid of human experience and common sense. That a moral being should be put on his moral trial; i.e. placed in circumstances where wisdom and duty require him to govern himself, and obey the revealed will of his Maker, whether made known in the scriptures or in the laws of his being, is altogether in harmony with the laws of his created constitution; is what he was made for; is entirely essential to his becoming virtuous and happy. Without such surroundings he might as well have had no moral nature.

But some one may say: "All this only brushes the surface of things. Why not go to the bottom, and admit that all the mischief lies in the intrinsic evil of matter, the virus of sinful flesh and blood? Why not admit that if God had made man a pure spirit, and kept him clear of any contact with matter, all had been well?"

The first point of reply may fitly suggest that, so far as we know, the first sin in the universe (that of Satan) had not the least connection with this assumed vitiosity of matter;

and it seems to have been the very worst possible form of sin. The assumption underlying this objection is therefore quite unsustained by the logic of facts pertaining to the first falling race.

But I would reply further: If this assumption were true — if matter, or more definitely, if human flesh and blood were inherently and essentially sin, or even if it were the necessary cause of man's sin — then we must meet the question: Who made it so? And, for one, I see no answer that I can consent to give. But I have this to say: The premises are utterly false. For sin is in mind, not in matter. Mind *can* sin; matter *cannot*. Sin may be in mind, and mind may be said to contain, or hold it; but sin never can in this sense be *in matter*. And as to its being the necessary cause of sin to man, I may reassert that it was by no mistake, or blunder, or fault of the Creator, that he gave existence to matter, and ordained the present wonderful connection of human souls with material bodies. Matter is to mind the primary means of culture, development, discipline, both intellectual and moral. Who knows that we could even begin to think without its aid? Where do we get our first words, our earliest mental conceptions, but from this material world? This subject is too vast to be discussed here. Let it suffice to say that those who make matter the primary fountain of all sin, and charge the responsibility for all sin upon it, and through it upon its Author, have probably more to learn in respect to the agencies and utilities of matter than they have ever dreamed of.

It is not assumed that the points made here in vindication of the ordained connection between Adam and his race exhaust the subject, or will explain its difficulties fully, and to the satisfaction of all. It is rather my purpose to show that the divine hand in the beginnings of sin in our race is not invested with unmitigated darkness; that his moral character is not thereby involved in inscrutable mystery, and, to all human view, in unrelieved perplexity. To show this is one thing. It is quite another to "find out the Almighty to perfection."

6. Other difficulties lie in the assumed doctrine that the question, how many and who of the race shall be saved, is determined in the counsels of God, *irrespective of man's agency*. The limits proper for this essay forbid an exhaustive discussion of this point, but must not forbid this brief reply; that in my view the assumption is not according to the scriptures. On the contrary, the scriptures state explicitly that the decision of eternal destiny, so far from being made by God "*irrespective of man's agency*," is made precisely *according to* man's agency, i.e. according to the deeds he has done or not done, and the character he has formed (see Matt. xxv. 31-46 and Rom. ii. 6-16). If it be replied that these passages contemplate the case only as seen on its human side, not on its divine; as seen in the revelations of time and of the judgment-day, and not as seen in God's eternal counsels, then I answer: No discrepancy is possible between God's purposes in eternity and their unfolding in time. The unfolding here must follow the plan there, and therefore must be to the view of men, and of all created minds, the illustration and development of those eternal counsels. The human side, so called, brought out thus before finite minds, cannot possibly give any false or distorted view of the divine side. All the principles involved in the processes of salvation here in time are simply the unfolding of God's eternal plan, and cannot possibly fail to represent that plan correctly. It were simply absurd to suppose that, viewed in its principles, God's eternal plan is one thing, and his actual administration in time and at the final judgment another. Hence, it is not only proper, but is demanded of us, that we relieve our minds of whatever perplexities and difficulties grow out of the assumption that God determines the future destinies of men irrespective of their own agency. There is infinite fitness and truth in his appeal to the reason of his sinning creatures: "Are not my ways equal? Are not your ways unequal?" (Ezek. xviii. 25, 29).

7. Lastly, it is thought inexplicable that the penal consequences of sin under God's law are remediless and eternal,

amounting to the utter wreck of well-being, the loss of all good, the endurance of eternal woe.

It is obviously not to be expected that our finite minds, so largely shut in within the bounds of our planet, and, indeed, scarcely beginning to comprehend the moral bearings of the divine law and of its penalties even here, should grasp all the mischiefs of sin, or measure all the interests to be protected by its punishment. Yet all good government, and all right conception of justice, assume that the penalty for the violation of law should in general be graduated by the value of the interests which transgression sacrifices, and which law with its penalty is bound to protect. Studying the law of God and its penalties in the light of this principle, we cannot yet see everything, but we can see some things: e.g. (1) That sin itself involves the wreck of the sinner's happiness, independently of the positive penalties of God's law. Hence it were simply unjust toward God to ascribe the loss of the sinner's well-being solely, or even mainly, to his positive penalties. (2) Within our actual knowledge of the extent of the moral universe, we can see that the interests to be protected by the penalties of God's law, i.e. by God's manifesting his utter displeasure against sin and sinners, are immensely great. (3) But if we enlarge our conception of God's moral universe, and assume (as we may) a perpetual process of new creations of moral races to be held in obedience by the moral power of these penalties on the sinning, our view opens out at once into infinity; we can set no limits even in thought to the vast interests to be protected, to the vast results of good to be reaped from the unending penalty visited upon transgression. (4) One more supposition may serve to heighten our view of the wisdom, and therefore the justice, of making the penalty for sin eternal; viz. that the problem before the divine mind may have been the choice between one eternal hell, and an eternal succession of hells, not eternal but temporary. Let it be granted by supposition that either at each sinner's death, or at the final judgment, or at any other point in the duration of his being, God terminates

his punishment by annihilation. Then there will remain no visible record of his doom, no witnessing testimony from his punishment, potent in its moral bearings to warn moral agents against sin. Assuming that created moral beings are finite in mental powers, they must gradually lose the impressions which the drama of sin and suffering will have produced. No matter, to our argument, how slow the process may be by which those facts, once so appalling, fade out of their minds. Given the least conceivable waning, and the time will come when the last vestige will have faded out, and the wholesome moral influence from sin and suffering will have utterly ceased to act. Then if there was moral value in those experiences and manifestations of sin and consequent suffering, it is at this point finally lost, and sin may enter again; other races may fall; and the same fearful experiences may all need to be repeated. Moreover, if we accept the supposition that new races are from time to time to be brought into being, it will be seen at a glance that it would be the extreme of unwisdom to incur the introduction of sin and its woes into the universe again. Infinitely rather let the two races that have sinned already, suffer according to the demands of justice for a whole eternity, and let God's wisdom and love be honored for choosing one eternal prison-house for the incorrigible sinners of these races, rather than an eternal succession of transient penalties, involving the ultimate loss of all the moral power thence accruing toward a holy and happy universe.

III. It remains to consider certain *hypotheses* which bear upon the main question, and which assign supposable, probable reasons for the divine arrangement under which sin and suffering exist in the universe. Some of these hypotheses having been suggested already, the ensuing discussion will only treat those points more fully.

That these hypotheses may be seen more surely in their true light, let it be considered: (*a*) That, in its very nature, holiness is intelligent, voluntary obedience to truth, i.e. to known truth respecting God and duty. This position needs

not argument, but statement only. (b) Hence truth is an indispensable means to holiness, and an essential element of power in the conflict against sin, whether for its prevention or its cure. The scriptures recognize this fact abundantly, representing that the Holy Spirit is "the Spirit of truth"; a teacher of truth, who shall "teach all things"; that regeneration is by and with the truth, since it is written: "He begat us with the word of truth" (Jas. i. 18); also, Christians are "born again by the word of God," and "purify their souls in obeying the truth through the Spirit" (1 Pet. i. 22, 23). Jesus prays, "Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth" (Jno. xvii. 17). Note also the language of the new covenant: "I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their heart." To "know the Lord" is synonymous with true piety. The faith that saves, is accepting and obeying gospel truth. (c) By a necessity common to all finite natures, the human mind needs to have truth illustrated, i.e. set forth in actual life, in real development, in order to see it clearly and feel adequately its moral force. Under this principle we have God manifested before human eyes in his incarnate Son. "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." Jesus revealed God to men, not in his words alone, but in *himself*—in every act, in every look, in every pain endured for men, in every tear. On the same principle God illustrated his moral law and government *in human history*, in the long series of events in which his righteous hand has been manifested from Adam to this hour. So also the penalty of this law has been set forth—only in symbol it is true and with imperfect illustration—in the sufferings which have been sent upon a sinning world as the witness of God's displeasure against sin, and of his condemnation of the sinner. In the infancy of his being, Adam must have lacked this element of forceful illustration of truth. He heard the words: "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die" (Gen. ii. 17); but the sense of these words must have been dim to his mind when as yet he had not seen in his own race the first case of literal death—the symbol of the penalty

threatened. The first human death gave him (apparently) the first element for the estimate by which to calculate the force of this penalty. A far deeper sense of God's displeasure against sin fell on those who saw the flood — a whole race of sinners swept from the face of the earth so suddenly and fearfully. More yet was seen when Sodom was "set forth as an example" of what it must be to "suffer the vengeance of eternal fire." Thus, step by step, the process went on of revealing truth concerning God, his law, and his character. It was a constant accumulation of the materials of moral power.

It is now in place to suggest certain hypotheses bearing (supposably) upon the purposes and agency of God in the existence of sin.

1. It is supposable, and by no means violently improbable, that the first sin in the universe — say that of Satan — was due largely to the fact, that he had neither experience nor observation as to the miseries of sin and its ruinous consequences; and no adequate sense of God's abhorrence of sin, or of the fearful curse involved in his displeasure. After the first sin, new elements come in to deprave the moral agent. The power of one sin to beget another and to intensify the sinning spirit is a law of moral agency, alas, but too well known in human experience, and yet, prior to human experience, never duly appreciated. In the case of our first parents, we may add to this list of antecedent occasions of sin, the infancy of their minds, and the subtle temptations of an already hardened and desperate rebel against God.

2. In projecting a scheme for the largest conceivable creations of moral races, running on down the ages indefinitely, not to say infinitely, God may have seen it to be practically impossible to fence sin out from the whole limitless field while permitting such range of freedom to his creatures as would secure the fullest development of their powers. It may, therefore, have been clear to the infinite mind that the best scheme possible to him would be one in which some sin might occur which he could turn to account,

taking advantage of it to evolve therefrom a mighty moral force against sin and unto holiness throughout his moral universe. In yet other words, the wisest scheme possible to God may have included the presence of so much sin as now is, and is to be, in the two fallen races — the angels that sinned, and man — this being suffered to exist because God foresaw that he could accumulate from it the materials of moral power for use in his infinite moral kingdom. (a) On this point it is legitimate to reason from the known moral character of God. Infinite love can have no pleasure in either sin or death, and would shut out from the universe both sin and suffering, if it could be done in such a way as would insure the highest holiness and happiness of his created universe. Infinite wisdom will never make the mistake of framing a system involving more sin and more suffering rather than one involving less, or none at all, save for the reason of a greater good to accrue from it than was possible to him upon any other system. That is to say, we may boldly infer *a priori* from the known love and wisdom of God that his reasons for creating moral agents at all who would (as he knew) sin and suffer, must be found in some compensating good which he saw that he could educe from their sin and suffering. No reasons other than this are at all admissible. This class of reasons, and this only, has no conflict with infinite love or wisdom.¹ (b) This hypothesis is favored by the consideration above suggested as to the

¹ This view of the divine economy as related to the existence of sin may need to be guarded against two possible misapprehensions; viz. (a) That God so changes the nature of sin as to make it, if not a good in itself, at least good in its natural, legitimate influence — a thing intrinsically absurd; (b) That the sin which God suffers to exist, he cannot honestly hate, forbid, and oppose. This notion also is to be utterly rejected. God is infinitely honest in his opposition to *all* sin. He abhorred, forbade, and punished the murder of his incarnate Son, and not a whit the less so for the fact that he wrought out by means of it the salvation of myriads of lost men. I must also suggest the importance of discriminating between the greatest good possible to God, some of his moral subjects opposing by their sin; and the greatest good possible, or at least supposable, on the assumption that no moral subject opposes, but all concur in perfect obedience.

necessity of illustrated truth to meet the wants of finite minds, especially in the infancy of their being. (c) It is also favored, not to say sustained, *by the moral history of our world.*

Here I make these points: That the moral forces of illustrated truth were at their lowest point, their minimum, in the age before the flood; that they received a very considerable accession from that fearful catastrophe; were heightened from that event onward by every judgment that fell from Jehovah's hand; also by all the demonstrations made of his parental faithfulness and mercy to his covenant people; that an immense accession accrued from the incarnation of the Messiah, and the mission of the Spirit sent forth to witness to the truth as to Jesus, and to utilize the moral forces of those manifestations of God in human flesh; and finally, that the moral force of truth is destined to reach its maximum when "the knowledge of the Lord shall fill the earth as the waters cover the sea." Reverting to the period of least moral power, we find that every known fact respecting the antediluvian age witnesses to the prevailing wickedness of the masses. "All flesh had corrupted his way"; "the wickedness of man was great in the earth." The causes, positive and negative, are not far to seek. Sickness almost unknown; the average physical vigor of the race at the highest point ever reached in human history; death far away, and present to their eyes only at long intervals; never was the principle so fearfully verified that "Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil" (Eecl. viii. 11). The moral power of suffering to restrain from sinning was at its lowest point. The whole arrangement looks like an experiment on the part of God, not to enlighten himself, but to enlighten the race of men, and, indeed, of angels as well, in respect to the wisdom and safety of prolonging so far the average period of earthly probation. God knew very well that cavillers would object to the limit of three score years and ten, as too short for the decision of

destinies so momentous, and; therefore, as morally implicating him in the ruin of souls. Hence this experiment, made in those earliest ages, was God's vindication of himself on the score of wisdom and love in permitting suffering and mortality to take on more fearful activity, greatly to the shortening of the average term of human life. This very vindication became an element of moral power. As soon as it became prudent to make the change, the intensified agencies of suffering and death in the race served to impress man with more fear of God and with a more adequate sense of the wrongs and the woes of sin.

I have already remarked the striking fact that during all the early ages of our race the first end sought in the moral culture of the race was to impress *the fear of God*. In the nature of sinning mind, this was the first thing to be done. The law must be the "schoolmaster to bring men to Christ." A sense of guilt and want is the hungering and thirsting for the waters of life,—is therefore absolutely essential to awaken any interest in a Saviour from sin and its curse. It was a great advance in the elements of moral power when Jesus came to our world, and made such manifestations, not mainly of the fearfulness of law and penalty, but of the unutterable compassion and love of God for lost man. If the question be asked: Why did the Lord delay the advent of the Messiah four thousand and more years from the fall, and what was he doing all this time in moral work for the race, the answer comprehensively would be: (a) developing the force of law and penalty (as shown above); (b) *Illustrating the grand idea of atonement for sin*. By a wonderful system of sacrifice (coupling the ideas of innocence and of suffering unto blood), he was unfolding the great central fact of redemption, and preparing men to grasp the true idea of a "Lamb of God" coming and dying "to take away the sin of the world." This fact was too momentous to be thrown out before the race without ample illustrative developments of its significance going before.

The main points, then, which I make from the history of

God's moral ways in our world are: the fact of constant *progress* from the lower elements of power to the higher; and the fact of a continued *accumulation* of moral forces. These facts are before us. It were simply folly to attribute them to divine sovereignty in such a sense as would rule out all inquiry for the reasons of these facts. Rather let us assume that God not only expects, but requires us to study his ways, and to infer from what he lets us see, how, and on what principles, he manages his moral realm in those provinces which lie beyond our immediate view.

3. It may be that we are only in the infancy of God's moral universe; that God has only begun to create moral beings; and, therefore, is now, and up to this point has been, accumulating the means of augmented and adequate moral power in order to prepare the way for creating and holding in obedience new races, on a scale more vast than we can comprehend. The human race is certainly in its infancy. Measured against the probable duration of our world under its gospel dispensation, and much more, measured against our immortal life — the revealed destiny of the race — we are only entering upon the threshold of our eternal being. That the fallen angels also are in the infancy of their existence is reasonably inferred from the revealed fact that their official, public trial and judgment has not yet transpired.

That these two are the only fallen races may be inferred from the following facts and considerations: (a) That the criminal docket for the final judgment-day, at the close of our present earthly probation, comprises these two races, and no other. (b) That the diverse circumstances connected with their fall seem to be exhaustive of all the varieties known or conceivable: the first race, without any antecedent tempter; the second, with and under such antecedent temptation: the first, sinning independently of any known relations of spirit to flesh; the second, under the influence of such relations; the first commencing their sin independently of any conditions of birth; the second (as a race) beginning to sin under conditions incident to birth from a fallen pair. (c) The

diverse methods of God's moral treatment of these two races are exhaustive of all supposable methods; being in the first case a system of unmixed simple justice; in the second, a system of blended justice and mercy. So far as we can conceive, there can be no third system. These two are exhaustive. (*d*) Finally, the revealed fact that all the holy beings of the then created universe are summoned, and will be present at the final judgment of these two races. All these points have the aspect of *summing up the moral lessons* of these two great exhaustive systems of God's moral government over the fallen of his universe, and bringing them out before all the intelligent beings then existent, putting them, so to speak, on eternal record, as a vast storehouse of the materials of moral power — *manifestations of the infinite God*, mighty in their influence both on those already born, and on races to be created in untold myriads, age after age.

4. It may be that God's plan contemplates (and is of purpose constructed to admit) the least amount of sin and suffering that will suffice to accumulate sufficient materials of moral power to hold the yet unsinning races in perfect obedience forever, and to hold in universal obedience all moral races yet to be created. This hypothesis makes two main points: (*a*) The *object* to be attained by permitted sin and suffering; (*b*) The *limitation* of the permitted amount to the least sum that will suffice to secure the object. In support of the first-named point, it need only be said, that the object is worthy of God, is in harmony with his revealed moral perfections, and in accord with what we see in his moral administration of our world. As to the second point, — the limitation of sin and suffering to the least amount adequate to secure the object, — let it suffice that his love demands precisely this limitation, and that, with the means of moral power which on these suppositions are provided, his wisdom knows how to secure it.

5. It being assumed that no other moral races have yet been created, save that known in the scriptures as "angels" (the fallen and the unfallen) and men; it being also assumed

that God's moral administration in respect to sin and suffering contemplates as one main object the accumulation of moral forces and the materials thereof for use against sin and in the promotion of holiness; it being assumed, also, that the final judgment will be the grand concentration of these illustrative forces, the great culminating point in their accumulation, we may advance to make two other main hypothetical suppositions, viz. (a) That in the eternal state beyond the general judgment (as in our present life) God will take into his service and utilize the activities of all his holy subjects, both the unfallen and the redeemed; employing them as his witnesses in respect to his character, his government, and the past history of his manifestations, and especially that he will use them in the education and culture of moral races thenceforward to be created. (b) That, making the close of the judgment scene the starting-point for new moral creations, God will proceed in this magnificent work of filling the material universe with moral agents as rapidly as the appliances of moral instruction and impression will admit. As to the first of these points, I cannot bring myself to question for one moment that God will make both his redeemed and his unfallen children as truly "laborers together with himself," "workers together with God," throughout the eternal ages, as he does now in time, both in earth and in heaven. It would be quite superfluous to cite proofs to show that God's plan here in time takes in his redeemed people as "laborers" together with himself, witnesses to himself and his truth; that Jesus trained and sent out men for this work, promising (and giving) his presence and his Spirit. The reasons for this arrangement were, perhaps, not so much Christ's need of their doing such work as *their* need of such work to do. The case may not exclude the former; it does specially include the latter. And must not the same law of necessary activity obtain in eternity as in time? Instead of asking whether we can afford to accept such a working existence for our eternal heaven, we might more fitly ask: How can redeemed souls possibly be happy in heaven without

something to do for their Redeemer, without positive *work* in the interests of his supremely great salvation as it looks abroad over the universe, and grasps the infinite moral welfare of myriads born and to be born from age to age forever? Gifted with capacities for perpetual growth in mental and moral power, and for perpetual progress in knowledge, and shut up to the great *law of activity* as the fountain of supreme blessedness; held, moreover, by the love they bear to their Redeemer, and by a sense of infinite obligation for his redeeming sacrifice, what nobler, loftier service for them to do can our little minds conceive as possible or supposable? The thought thereof being once suggested as within the range of possibility, it would seem that the hosts of the redeemed would rise up to implore that there might be no failure of a consummation so devoutly to be wished. We who are so often sad that our aspirations toward more service for Christ on earth should be so soon broken down by infirmity or cut short in death, let us think of these opening fields for everlasting service, with powers never waning, but ever growing, and lift up our heads with joy! That our elder brethren, the sinless angels, have active service in their present heavenly life, stands out all through the sacred word. "Are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to minister to the heirs of salvation?" And shall it be supposed that their interest and sympathy in the great things of God's kingdom are to die out, or their feet tire of their messenger service?

As to the second point in our last-named hypothesis,—viz. new creations of moral races taken up and pushed actively forward from and after the final judgment,—it would seem sufficient to suggest that after the developments made by so much sin, and after the sacrifices involved in so much suffering, jointly evolving materials of moral power so indefinitely vast, it is simply impossible that infinite wisdom and infinite love should not turn these materials of moral influence to account—should not utilize them toward the utmost possible amount of intelligent moral happiness. Here are facts of moral bearing concerning God abundantly ade-

quate (we may doubtless assume) to command the admiration of intelligent beings — facts, therefore, richly fraught with moral power to hold new moral races in joyous obedience. God's justice toward sin has been forever vindicated: the fearful penalties endured and to be endured by sinning, lost souls are before the universe; the unutterable compassion of God shines out in One who stands in the midst of the living ones and elders, "as a Lamb that has been slain" (Rev. v. 6); and there is a great cloud of witnesses to testify for God and to give the service of their utmost powers: how, then, can God forbear to multiply intelligent minds to be blessed forever with the knowledge and the love of his name? Let it be supposed that somewhere in the lapse of the endless ages God were to reach a limiting line in his creative work, and to issue his proclamation: No more creations henceforth forever! No more worlds to be filled with beings "made in our image," with exalted powers of thought, of love, and of bliss! What a recoil would be felt throughout all the then existing universe!

It may seem to some that our little planet which we call earth is a small *base*, astronomically considered, for such stupendous operations — out of all proportion to the vastness of the astronomical universe as brought within the range of our telescopic vision. Very well; it *is* small; but we may remember it is written: "Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy: I dwell in the high and holy place: *with him also* that is of a contrite and humble spirit" (Isa. lvii. 15). It *is* small in its physical, astronomical relations, but not too small to have been trodden by Immanuel's feet; not too small to have been wet with his tears, or to have held his cross, or to have drank in his atoning blood; not too small to have been the theatre of the Divine Spirit's glorious, though half unseen, power. It is not too small to have been the scene of many a sin and many a sorrow and many a penitent tear, which shall bear in their testimony a marvellous witnessing power to the infinite wisdom and love of God in bringing good out of evil, and in

making sin work out his praise — a power to be felt far down the ages of our eternal being, and far away in the worlds that people boundless space. Who shall assume to fix the limit in either time or space to the moral power that may go forth from the scenes of sin and suffering, and from the scenes of redeeming, restoring mercy that have impressed themselves into the history of this astronomically insignificant planet !

There is no occasion to push our hypothetical suppositions farther. Different minds will, doubtless, estimate variously the degree of probability belonging severally to the points suggested. It will suffice to justify their use *as hypotheses*, if they are fairly supposable, and cannot be proved impossible ; and if, moreover, they present a possible scheme of divine operations which will turn sin and suffering to account on a scale infinitely vast, making the wrath of sin subserve God's praise and the blessedness of his intelligent moral universe to such an extent as will manifest his perfect wisdom and ineffable love before all his creatures through everlasting ages. Such views of God's plan ought, at least, to relieve our anguish of heart and our perplexities of thought over the sin and suffering which exist in the moral universe of God.

ARTICLE VII.

WHICHCOTE'S APHORISMS.

(Continued from p. 393.)

The Chief End of Man.

19. That which is not original to itself cannot be final to itself. But to whom it belongs to be the first cause, to the same it belongs to be the last end: so God should be to us by our own act. He that is original to us by himself should be final to us by our choice. 848. It is certain that God intended himself to be the peculiar object of mind and understanding in man, because mind and understanding in man are beyond the satisfaction that is to be had in anything, but God himself: it is too big for the world, and too good for it. 762. Worship God in spirit, i.e. in the motion of the mind and understanding—in the free, full, noble, ingenuous use of a man's highest powers and faculties. To serve God with the determination of the understanding and the freeness of choice, first to judge, and then to choose; this is the immutable religion of God's creation, the service of angels and men, self-established, not depending upon institution, indispensable; the religion of the state of innocency, and there is nothing beyond this in the state of glory, but as perfected there.

The Moral and the Positive in Religion.

586. There are but two things in religion: morals and institutions. Morals may be known by the reason of the thing. Morals are owned as soon as spoken, and they are nineteen parts in twenty of all religion. Institutions depend upon scripture; and no one institution depends upon one text of scripture only; that institution which has but one text for it has never a one. 1084. The moral part of religion consists of things good in themselves, necessary and indispensable; the instituted part of religion consists of things made necessary only by the determinations of the divine will. He that denies the former is atheistical; he that denies the latter is infidel. 222. Institutes were never intended to be in compensation for failure in morals; but are all for the better security of morals, and give place to them, and are in subservience to them. 362. Ignorance of mere institutes may be invincible, because institutes must be declared by some instrument of God (by revelation); whereof the party may have no notice; but in morals we are made to know and judge and determine, and the light of God's creation is sufficient thereto; so that here there is no invincible, and consequently inculpable ignorance.

The Bible.

921. The sense of the church is not a rule, but a thing ruled. The church is bound unto reason and scripture, and governed by them, as much as any particular person. 1168. It is neither necessary, nor indeed possible, to understand any matter of faith farther than it is revealed; that is not revealed which is not made intelligible; that which can be put into words may be taken into a man's understanding. Mystery is not what is unintelligible, and cannot be understood now it is revealed, but that which is specifical and critical in the profession, which they only understand who are *μεμνήμενοι*, initiated. 1034. It is usual in scripture to sum up all religion, sometimes in a single phrase, otherwhile in one word. The reason may perhaps be, because never any of these is alone. 1008. Several forms of words in scripture express the same state, and so vary only the notion — differ not materially, but in substance are the same. To stand upon nice and accurate distinctions of them is needless, useless, since scripture uses them indifferently (regeneration, etc.). This is fit to be known, to avoid troublesome multiplicity in religion, and the possessing the minds of men with thoughts that religion is more intricate and voluminous than indeed it is; whereas truth lies in a little compass and narrow room. Vitals in religion are few. 1048. Scripture mentions several particulars often (as Eph. iv. 31, 32); not so much for the sake of making the distinction accurate, as the exclusion universal. 993. We may observe scripture, in matters of disputation, — not to speak curiously, but rather loosely, — with indistinction, and sometimes to appear to favor both parts. 578. In doctrines of supernatural revelation we shall do well to direct our apprehensions, and to regulate our expressions, by words of scripture. 505. Curious determinations beyond scripture are thought to be the improvement of faith, and inconsiderate dulness to be the denial of our reason; fierceness in a sect to be zeal for religion, and speaking without sense to be the simplicity of the spirit. 931. Determinations beyond scripture have indeed enlarged faith, but lessened charity, and multiplied divisions. 1182. Enthusiastic doctrines — good things strained out of their wits. Among Christians those that pretend to be inspired seem to be mad; among the Turks those that are mad are thought to be inspired. 796. Morality is acknowledged and owned, is farther settled and established, by the gospel — is settled, as much as possible, viz. by the creation of man, by the grace of the gospel. 878. They are, therefore, greatly mistaken who in religion oppose points of reason and matters of faith, as if nature went one way, and the Author of nature went another. Non aliud natura, aliud sapientia suadet. 1188. Where the doctrine is necessary and important, the scripture is clear and full; but where the scripture is not clear and full, the doctrine is not necessary or important. 869. There is nothing in religion necessary which is uncertain.

The Punishment of Sinners.

1003. There are sufferings which are no punishments; as, 1. The effects of God's absolute sovereignty (Jacob and Esau); 2. Those which come for probation and trial (Job); 3. Which come for exercise and increase of virtue; 4. Which we are involved in through the neighborhood of sinners (Josiah overborne by Manasses' sin). 5. Which prevent sin and misery (as, knowing the power of infection, taking the righteous away by death from the evil to come). Those sufferings in this world only are punishments where sin is the natural or moral cause of suffering. 810. It is blasphemy to say, 1. That God is a true cause of the creature's sin; or, 2. The only cause of the sinner's misery, so that, if it were not for God's power, a sinner, as such, might be safe, and, saving the prohibition, good and evil are both alike. 1002. God abates of his own right, that the condition of man might not be forlorn. Wherever there is a right, there is a power to moderate and abate of that right; yea, to part with it, if we please. Any man may take less than his right—may pardon upon any satisfaction, upon no satisfaction. We all say we have this right; and will we deny it to God? 809. Future misery is not a foreign imposition by power, but an acquired constitution of mind; it is guilt of conscience and malignity of spirit. 918. The evil of sin depends not only on the will of God forbidding it; there is an intrinsic malignity in it, and it is destructive of the subject. 311. Punishment is not an arbitrary act according to will, but a reasonable act, directed by wisdom and limited by goodness. 319. The judge is nothing but the law speaking. 309. The end of punishment, with respect to God, is the vindication of his uprightness and righteousness; with respect to the sinner, it is the reformation and amendment of his life; with respect to the innocent, it is warning to fear and do no such sin. 310. Even the worst of God, his punishments, will recommend God to us. 30. Nothing is more credible than that men's states shall differ as much as their spirits and tempers do differ. 518. The same goodness which pardons the penitent, who forsakes sin, punishes the impenitent, who are obstinate in sin. 165. As sin is the worst evil that is done, so it is meet it should fare the worst. 760. Had God borne with the iniquity of his creatures, he had condemned his own law. The import of punishment is, that the law is right, and that God will maintain it; that sin is wrong, and that men must forbear it. 268. Punishment has in it the notion of a remedy, and has the place of a mean, not of an end. Now, as no more of a mean is to be designed than what is necessary to the end, and a mean is considerable only as it has a relation to the end, therefore if the sinner repents there can be no necessity of punishment; for the end is obtained without it, and there is nothing in punishment, save as a mean, in which goodness can take content. 269. The execution of punishment is for the defence of righteousness. 701. If God punish sin

committed, it is no more than just. Justice in God doth not require that sin repented of be punished. Goodness doth require that contumacy in sin (impenitency) be controlled. Sin committed may be punished; sin repented of may be pardoned, may be not-punished, without injustice. It cannot be found anywhere in scripture that there is any such attribute in God as necessitates him to punish sin repented of and forsaken, in respect of any perfection inherent in him. 840. An impenitent sinner during his impenitency, cannot be pardoned, because God cannot contradict himself. The rule of righteousness is the law of his action and the law of his nature. 525. The ground of man's misery is not the first fall, but the second fault — a lapse upon a lapse; for a second sin is not only another of the same kind, but a consummation of the first.

Principles involved in the Atonement of Christ.

635. An ingenuous mind and a true penitent doth with more difficulty forgive himself than God doth forgive him. 398. It is a more difficult work to reconcile men to God than to reconcile God to men. 536. God is the creditor of that punishment which is due upon sin, and he has the right of abating, as well as the right of exacting. 490. There is a just which of right may be done, and there is a just which of right must be done. The rule or law of righteousness or justice requires that to be done which justly ought to be done; but it doth not require everything to be done which justly may be done. In the former sense, it is just to punish sin committed (Neh. ix. 33); in the latter sense, God is not obliged in justice to punish sin repented of. 580. It is not necessary to the satisfaction of him who is offended that a perfect recompense should be made by the offender; but the offended is master of his own right, and may accept of ingenuous acknowledgment only from the offender as satisfaction, if he pleases, and expiation is then made when that which is displeasing is taken away by something which is pleasing. 465. God might have pardoned sin by his own right; but he did not think that the best way, and what God does not think best we are not to think of at all. 466. If God had pardoned sin without any amends [satisfaction], God would have been thought to countenance sin, and man would have thought sin no great matter. 32. He that threatens may be better than his word, and very well save his word; for no man is worse than his word because he is better than his word. 1022. In the gospel we are taught the expiation and the extirpation of sin. Satisfaction was necessary to make expiation, that the law might not be counted void, that sin might not be counted slight, that repentance might not be counted sufficient (and what hope is left to the incorrigible of impunity, which is not even allowed the penitent without satisfaction?), that punishment might not be counted arbitrary, that pardon might not be counted indifferent (but a thing meet, fit, and necessary for discountenancing sin), that grace might not be counted

exorbitant, that prerogative might not be counted dishonorable. By this satisfaction God provided for the discountenancing of sin, on the one hand, and for the saving of the sinner, on the other. 1104. The great excellence of Christ's sacrifice did consist in the moral considerations belonging to it. 1150. In the death of Christ there are, (1) many excellences, worthinesses, as resignation to God, compassion to man; (2) singular virtues exercised, as faith in God, patience, meekness, and gentleness; (3) due acknowledgements made, as man's debt of obedience, God's demand of right, the law's authority, the sinner's cause not defensible, creature's insolency corrected, eminent instance of impartiality; (4) fitting submissions to God, to raze out the memory of man's misbehavior by affectation, usurpation, insolence, bold practice, to restore a creature state; (5) singular intimations of the causelessness, filthiness, and demerit of sin; 6. necessary ends served, impediment to divine goodness removed, man put in a new way of life. 435. In case of offence, the just man overlooks what is involuntary without taking notice of it, and forgets what is voluntary, upon the satisfaction of repentance. 1055. Expiation of sin is made when, upon something done or suffered (either or both), according to God's pleasure, appointment, and acceptance, God is pacified, the fault is pardoned, the guilt extinguished, the punishment prevented, and the sinner released (Ἀπολύτρωσις, Eph. i. 7; Col. i. 14; Heb. ix. 12. Καθαρισμός, Titus ii. 14; Heb. i. 3; 1 John i. 7. Ἀγιασμός, Heb. ix. 13. Ἀθέτησις ἁμαρτίας, Heb. ix. 26. Ἰλαστήριον, Rom. iii. 25. Ἰλασμός, 1 John iv. 10. Καταλλαγή, Rom. v. 10, 11). 1193. The law supposes that the judge is an advocate for the prisoner, and will suggest such defences as are lawful. 1199. In the reconciliation by Christ, the rights of God and the necessities of men are equally considered. 1119. Jewish sacrifice was Ἀνάμνησις ἁμαρτιῶν, Heb. x. 3. Christ's sacrifice was Ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν, Matt. xxvi. 28. 1069. The Jewish church was not so under the law as not to be under grace, and the Christian church is not so under grace as not to be under the law. 742. We partake of the death of Christ by passing into the spirit of Christ. The great work of Christ in us lies in implanting his own life (lively nature) in the lapsed, degenerate souls of men. Christ is not to be as in notion or history, but as a principle, a vital influence. 1063. It pleased God to provide such a justification of righteousness that it should be practised by Christ in the human nature of sinners, and such a condemnation of sin that the human nature of sinners, in which Christ practised righteousness, should notwithstanding die.

Pardon of Sin.

364. Our own righteousness is obedience; the righteousness of faith is pardon. 209. The sense of repentance is better assurance of pardon than the testimony of an angel. 1108. All acts of vindictive justice and merciful forgiveness are subject to wisdom. Actual punishment is not

necessary to the upholding of government, but only the power of punishing or pardoning, as seems good to wisdom. 768. When the sinner hath used his liberty to repent, and God hath used his prerogative to pardon, then sin, which hath been, is as if it had not been. 270. It is altogether as worthy of God, and as much becoming him, to pardon and show mercy in case of repentance and submission and reformation, as to punish in case of impenitency and obstinacy. 1156. (1) Sin is pardonable; (2) God hath a right to pardon; (3) It is very credible God will pardon those who repent; (4) It is not at all credible God will pardon obstinate and contumacious sinners; (5) In what way, in use of what means, upon what terms, God will pardon sin, lies in God wholly to resolve, determine, and declare; (6) It is declared in scripture that God doth pardon in and through Christ.

The second part of the volume containing Dr. Whichcote's Aphorisms (see pp. 384, 385 *supra*) is devoted to "Eight Letters of Dr. Antony Tuckney and Dr. Benjamin Whichcote, concerning the Use of Reason in Religion, the Differences of Opinion among Christians, the Reconciliation of Sinners unto God, the Studies and Learning of a Minister of the Gospel: written in September and October, 1651. 1753."

From the Preface to this second part of the volume, and from Dr. Dillingham's "Praefatio" to Tuckney's "Praelectiones Theologicae," we compile the following account of Dr. Tuckney. He was born in the latter part of 1599, "at Kirton, near Boston, in Lincolnshire, where his father was minister." At fourteen years of age he entered Emanuel College, Cambridge; took his first degree before he was seventeen years old; was chosen fellow of the college three years afterward. Having resided some time at the college, "where he "soon became an eminent tutor," he "went to Boston, as an assistant to the famous vicar of that town, Mr. John Cotton." When Mr. Cotton left the Boston of Old England for the Boston of New England, young Tuckney took Mr. Cotton's place in the famous church of old Boston, and was held in high estimation there as a preacher. He was one of the two men sent for the county of Lincoln to the Assembly of Divines at Westminster. "He is said to have been much considered in the Assembly, and obtained, as all the favorites did, a parish in London." "He is affirmed to have had a great hand himself in framing the Confession and Catechisms, and particularly to have drawn the exposition of the Commandments in the Larger Catechism." In 1645 Tuckney was made Master, and in 1648 Vice Chancellor of Emanuel College, Cambridge. In 1653 he was chosen Master of St. John's College, and in 1655 Regius Professor of Divinity in Trinity College. From both these preferments "he was civilly turned out" at the Restoration. He then repaired to London, "was nominated a commissioner, on the Non-conformist side, at the Savoy Conference, but never attended," being

shrewdly suspected to have the ἀργυράγχη. His library was consumed in the great fire of London. He died at that city, in February, 1669, aged sixty-eight years, and was buried in the noted church of St. Andrew Undershaft.

"Dr. Tuckney printed some sermons in his lifetime; and seven years after his death, Mr. Jonathan Tuckney, his son, published in a quarto volume forty of his father's sermons; which he followed, in 1679, by a collection of all his Latin pieces, consisting of Sermons *ad clerum*, Positions, Determinations in the chair and for his own degree, Lectures," etc. He was a man of vast learning, "a ready and elegant Latinist," frank, faithful, earnest, conscientious. He was "no enemy to the royal or episcopal power, but above measure zealous for church power and ecclesiastical discipline." His friend, Dr. William Dillingham, describes him as a man, "indole alacri et amaena, ac ubi res postulabat, satis vehementi;" "Virtutis verae custos, rigidusque satelles." In one of his Determinations on the subject of divorce, he speaks of John Milton as "*infamis et non uno laqueo dignus*." On page xii. of Dr. Salter's Preface, Tuckney is described as "narrow, stiff, and dogmatical"; but on p. xv. we read that in Tuckney's "elections at St. John's, when the President, according to the cant of the times, would call upon him to have regard to the *godly*, the Master [Tuckney] answered: No one should have a greater regard to the truly godly than himself; but he was determined to choose none but *scholars*; adding, very wisely: "They may deceive me in their godliness; they cannot in their scholarship." Such incidents induce even Dr. Salter to say of Tuckney: "He was worthy to have lived in better times and a less prejudiced or bigoted age."

Being a high Calvinist, it is easy to see that Tuckney must have been annoyed by the opinions, perhaps yet more by the phrasology, of his pupil and colleague, Dr. Whichcote. The correspondence contained in this volume betrays an occasional irritability in both these divines. They had been uncommonly attached to each other. Their theological differences caused an evident, perhaps a permanent, alienation. One prominent question on which they dispute is this:

Do all good men agree in doctrine substantially?

Whichcote contends that they do; that "for one *real* difference in matters of consequence, between persons considerable, there are twenty mistakes of meanings." Controversialists "too often study to represent each other in the worst sense. I perceive it in men alive, therefore suspect it of the dead" (p. 52). Tuckney treats Whichcote's word "*substantially*" as modern controversialists treat the phrase, "*for substance of doctrine*." That word, he says, "is a good salvo." How can we determine *who* are good men? The most "pestilent heretics" have not been "*sine larva pietatis*"; they "have been in outward demeanor, at least for a time, sober and some severe, but *sobrii ad evertendam rempublicam*; enough to

justify what I said, that we are rather to look at their doctrines than their persons" (p. 78).

As Whichcote contends that good men, "agreeing in scripture forms of words should rather think they do agree than not" (see above, p. 393), the question arises:

Shall theologians, in their teachings, confine themselves to biblical phraseology?

Tuckney says: "The child, it may be, will better understand the mother's lisping than when she speaks more plainly. All children's catechisms are not made up of the express words of scripture. Other words, expressing the true sense of them, may more distinctly and particularly discover any corruption; which was the occasion of orthodox divines in all ages framing of new words and expressions, more punctually to hold out old truths against heretics' innovations, that, as *they* in their own words give a false sense of scripture, so *we* in ours may give a true" (pp. 25, 26). In the course of the correspondence, the tables appear to be turned; and Dr. Tuckney, who condemns his colleague for exaggerating the importance of biblical phrases, condemns him also for departing in his style from the biblical standard. He advises him thus: "Affect not to speak in school-language, nor to run out in school-notions; it is far different from the scripture, both style and matter," etc. (pp. 37, 60). Of an expression used by Whichcote, Tuckney says: "It is "a stranger to scripture manner of speaking, which, as *all* should much heed, so I expect that *you* will, especially, who before, in contradistinction of the fallible expressions and forms of words of man's making, judged, and that truly, scripture expressions to be aptest to convey all saving truths to our understandings" (p. 35).

Dr. Tuckney often counsels his former pupil to read Plato and other heathen philosophers less, and the Christian divines more, and condemns him for devoting too much attention to the scholastic and the Arminian writers. Hence comes the question:

Was Dr. Whichcote misled by the schoolmen and the Arminians?

"I said," writes Tuckney, "I was sorry to see you tread, in these proposals, in somebody's footsteps. . . . Sir, those whose footsteps I observed were the *Socinians* and *Arminians*; the latter whereof I conceive you have been everywhere reading in their works, and most largely in their *Apologie*" (p. 27). "Some are ready to think that your great authors, you steer your course by, are Dr. Field, Dr. Jackson, Dr. Hammond — all three very learned men, the middle sufficiently obscure, and both he and the last, I must needs think, too *corrupt*" (p. 38). Whichcote's reply to these charges is somewhat conclusive: "And truly, sir, you are wholly mistaken in the whole course of my studies. You say you find me largely in their *Apologia*. To my knowledge I never saw or heard of the book before, much less have I read a tittle of it. I should lay open my weakness, if I should tell you how little I have read of the books and authors

you mention; of ten years past, nothing at all. I know not who should be your informer; but truly, in a thousand guesses, you could not have been farther off from the truth of the thing. And for schoolmen, I do not think I have spent four and twenty hours in them *divisim* these fourteen years. Dr. Field, on the church, I read, over eighteen years ago, but have not looked into him, I believe, these ten years; Jackson and Hammond I have a little looked into, here and there, a good while since, but have not read the hundredth part of either of them. Truly, I shame myself to tell you how little I have been acquainted with books, but for your satisfaction I do. While fellow of Emanuel College employment with pupils took my time from me. I have not read many books, but I have studied a few. Meditation and invention hath been rather my life, than reading; and truly, I have more read Calvin and Perkins and Beza than all the books, authors, or names you mention" (pp. 53, 54). "*Bene novi quam sit mihi curta supellex*" (p. 55).

A plausible charge made by Tuckney against his colleague regards not so much any single item as the *general proportion* of Whichcote's teaching. The power of the assailant is seen in his method of marshalling his forces for an assault along the whole line. The question is suggested:

Did Dr. Whichcote say too much of man's noble qualities, and too little of the sovereign grace of God as manifested in the gospel?

The aphorisms in the present Article, and in the Article on pp. 384-393, suggest the plausibility of this charge. With compressed force, Dr. Tuckney sums up his accusations thus: "The power of nature in morals too much advanced; reason hath too much given to it in the mysteries of faith—a *recta ratio* much talked of, which I cannot tell where to find, Mind and understanding is all; heart and will little spoken of. The decrees of God questioned and quarrelled, because, according to our reason, we cannot comprehend how they may stand with his goodness, which, according to your phrase, he is *under the power of*. Those, our philosophers, and other heathens, made fairer candidates for heaven than the Scriptures seem to allow of; and they in their virtues preferred before Christians overtaken with weaknesses. A kind of a moral divinity minted, only with a little tincture of Christ added; nay, a Platonic faith unites to God. Inherent righteousness so preached as if not with the prejudice of imputed righteousness, which hath sometimes very unseemly language given it, yet much said of the one, and very little or nothing of the other" (pp. 38, 39).

Some of the most eloquent passages of Dr. Whichcote contain his attempt to show that he exalted human reason in order to magnify the grace of God. "I endeavored," he says, "to make it appear that the truth declared by God concerning our relief by Christ was amiable, grateful, acceptable to mind and understanding, and such as spake itself from God, as our Saviour spake himself to be Christ to the inward sense

of the Samaritans. And to this purpose reason was made use of as a receiver, as a discerner, as a principle to be instructed and taught, not as an author or inventor or controller of what God speaks; divine truth always carrying its own light and evidence, so as that the mind receiving it is illuminated, edified, satisfied. *Sacra scriptura est ἀντίπρωτος est deo digna, est fide digna*; it speaks for itself; it recommends itself to its subject; it satisfies the reason of the mind, procures its own entertainment by its own excellency. I add, also, that the persuasion of the Holy Spirit contributes to the mind's assurance and satisfaction. I receive the truth of Christian religion in a way of illumination, affection, and choice. I myself am taken with it, as understanding and knowing it; I retain it as a welcome guest. It is not forced into me; but I let it in, yet so as taught of God, and I see cause for my continuance to embrace it. Do I dishonor my faith, or do any wrong to it, to tell the world that my mind and understanding are satisfied in it? I have no reason against it; yea, the highest and purest reason is for it. [What doth God speak to, but my reason? and should not that which is spoken to hear? Should it not judge, discern, conceive what is God's meaning?] (pp. 47, 48).

"That precept of wisdom, 'Acknowledge him in all thy ways,' I am sure, overrules me; head, heart, hand; it is the inward sense of my soul, digested into a temper, complexion, constitution. I never leave God out; I ever give him the principal place; *omnia a Deo, omnia sub Deo, omnia cum bono Deo*. In the sense of my mind, I was very far from taking from God to give to myself. God is really all in all to me; I hold of him, derive from him, live by him, enjoy myself under him, hope in him, expect from him. There is nothing more written in my heart than the sense of my dependency upon him; there is nothing that I am more free to acknowledge than his influence, operation, and presence. So far was it from me to understand what you fetch out of the words, that nothing seems to me more horrid, monstrous, violent, contra-natural. My heart riseth with indignation against such a thing; I have a perfect antipathy in my soul against it; I should sin against all the experience I have of God in my life, if I should say or think such a thing" (p. 58).

"With all my heart and soul I acknowledge and assert (and wholly depend thereon) the Holy Spirit's superintendency, conduct, presence, influence, guidance, government of man's mind in the discerning of the things of God. There is nothing that I have more insisted upon, and more carefully endeavored to demonstrate, *de industria*, upon texts purposely chosen; occasionally still interposing clauses to this purpose. Yea, it had a large place in my speech, at which, you say, so much offence was taken. I am not clearer, fuller in any point; I experimentally know it, I thank God, to be true; I have witness of it within me; it is my sufficiency; it is my strength; it is my security; God with me is all in all. God forgive them the palpable breach of the ninth commandment who have

defamed me in this kind. Nothing is less true of me; I might rather have been accused of any evil in the world" (99, 100).

"I count it true sacrilege to take from God to give to the creature; yet I look at it as a dishonoring God to nullify and make base his works, and to think he made a sorry, worthless piece, fit for no use, when he made man. I cannot but think of a noble, able creature, when I read, *ad imaginem et in similitudinem Dei*; or if, *in statu lapso*, it be as nothing, then you vilify the restitution by Christ" (pp. 112, 113).

Did Whichcote believe in the vicarious atonement?

In the letters of Dr. Tuckney there are intimations that his colleague regarded the death of Christ as operating not on God, but only on men; the ground of God's reconciliation being something in us, and not being his own free grace (p. 4). Whichcote replies: "Christ doth not save us by only doing for us, *without* us; yea, we come at that which Christ hath done for us with God by what he doth for us *within* us. . . . Christ is to be acknowledged as a principle of grace *in* us, as well as an Advocate *for* us. For the scripture holds forth Christ to us under a double notion: (1) to be felt in us, as the new man," etc.; "(2) to be believed on by us as a sacrifice for the expiation and atonement of sin," etc. "They therefore deceive and flatter themselves extremely who think of reconciliation with God by means of a Saviour acting upon God in their behalf, and not also working in or upon them to make them godlike" (pp. 13-15).

"I am very free to acknowledge Christ the only foundation since the apostasy and sin of man. He alone gave the stop to God's just displeasure; his interposing prevailed with God not to take the forfeiture; or, if taken, he procured the restoration and recovery" (p. 126). "You have no cause to suspect me for scant and narrow apprehensions of free grace, Christ's merits, and divine goodness. Yet I confess my shallowness; but that is my grievance and burthen, and I would have my apprehensions raised and my thoughts of the gospel enlarged. I attribute to the creature, upon its own account, nothing but unworthiness, inability, and insufficiency, and look at Christ as the only ground of acceptance, and his Spirit as the only principle of enablement, power, and sufficiency (p. 127. See also pp. 123, 124).

The suspicion that Whichcote was inclined to Socinianism he regards as a result of his reliance on argument and reason; but he says that, for employing rational proof against the opposers of orthodoxy, "I deserve as little to be called a Socinian as David for extorting Goliath's sword out of his hand and cutting his master's head off with it did deserve to be esteemed a Philistine" (p. 62).

The Westminster Assembly's Catechism.

It is evident that while Dr. Tuckney regarded his pupil as too liberal in his tendencies, Whichcote regarded Tuckney as exorbitant and domineering. In his Second Letter he makes the following significant allusion:

"For my own part, I plead not for liberty of proposing, though I would be very glad not to be imposed upon; for I understand our Saviour, 'Cast not your pearls [before swine] lest they [turn again and] rend you,' as granting a dispensation for reservation and secrecy in case persons will be mischievous" (p. 53). In Dr. Tuckney's Third Letter, he replies to this insinuation in a manner which will surprise those who know his interest in the Westminster Assembly (see p. 769 above): "For matter of imposing upon, I am not guilty. In the Assembly I gave my vote with others that the Confession of Faith, put out by authority, should not be required to be either sworn or subscribed to (we having been burned in the hand in that kind before), but so as not to be publicly preached or written against; which, indeed, is contrary to that 'liberty of prophesying' which some so call for, but you say you plead not for; though your second advice in your sermon seemed in mine and other men's eyes to look fully that way. But I believe what you now write, and only add that, as you plead not for that liberty, so what hath been said by others hath not been to impose on you, but only as freely to assert what they think is truth, as what you did assert was so in your judgment, and therefore were not culpable of maintaining, *ricas et lites*, as hath been charged. Though I heartily and humbly desire of God that we may either so inwardly agree, or outwardly not express disagreement, that we may not give occasion of advantage to more sorts of men than one that watch for our halting" (pp. 76, 77).

ARTICLE VIII.

NOTES ON EGYPTOLOGY.

BY REV. JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D., BERLIN, GERMANY.

THE science of Egyptology has sustained a severe loss in the death of M. le Vicomte Emmanuel de Rougé, Member of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres, Curator of the Egyptian Museum in the Louvre, Professor of Archaeology in the College of France, and a principal editor of the *Révue Archéologique*. For a quarter of a century M. de Rougé had stood at the head of French Egyptologists, and he had contributed as much as any scholar of his time to the elucidation of Egyptian antiquities. The following list of his principal publications will witness to the activity of his mind, and the fertility of his pen; many other essays are scattered through Reviews, and the Journals of Scientific Academies and Societies.

1846: L'examen de l'ouvrage de M. Bunsen. 1848; Sur les éléments de l'écriture démotique des Egyptiens; published in the form of a letter to M. de Saulcy. 1849: Mémoire sur l'inscription du tombeau d'Ahmes.

This memoir was read before the Academy, and attracted much attention in England and Germany, as well as in France. In the same year he published his *Notice Sommaire des Monuments Egyptiens exposés dans les galeries du Musée du Louvre*; a work which is not only a guide to the treasures of that collection, but a condensed treatise upon the history, the art, and the religion of Egypt. 1851: *Mémoire sur la statuette naophore du Vatican*; this treats particularly of the reign of Cambyses in Egypt. In the same year appeared his valuable *Rapport sur l'exploration scientifique des principales collections Egyptiennes renfermées dans les divers Musées publics*. Also a curious theological monograph, entitled *explication d'une inscription Egyptienne prouvant que les anciens Egyptiens ont connu la génération éternelle du Fils de Dieu*. 1856: *Note sur les noms Egyptiens des Planètes*. To this year belong also two of the most valuable of Count de Rougé's publications: *Le Poème de Pen-ta-Our*, and *Le Roman des Deux Frères*. The Poem celebrates the campaigns of Rameses the Great in a style which Renan has likened to the *Moniteur's* adulation of Napoleon III. (an improved translation was published in 1870, "*Recueil de Travaux*"); the Romance has some striking resemblances to the story of Joseph and Potiphar's wife, and its appearance in Rougé's translation produced quite a stir in religious circles, as well as in the world of science. 1858: *Etude sur une stèle Egyptienne*. 1860: *Etudes sur le Rituel funéraire des anciens Egyptiens* — a prelude to his great edition of the *Rituel* itself, which was begun a year or two later in folio numbers. To the same year belong his *Notice de quelques fragments de l'inscription de Karnak*; this was a discussion of the historical value of the *Annals of Thotmes III.* brought to light by M. Mariette. It was followed by a comprehensive essay upon the advance of Egyptology since Champollion: *Notice sur la Découverte, les Progrès et l'Etat actuel des Etudes Egyptiennes*.

In April 1860, also, he gave a résumé of the science, at the opening of his course of lectures; this was published under the title *Discours à l'ouverture du cours d'Archéologie Egyptienne au Collège de France*. 1861: *Monuments du Règne de Toutinès III.* This historical study was based upon recent discoveries of M. Mariette. It was followed in the same year by his *Note sur les principaux Résultats des fouilles exécutées en Egypte, par les ordres de S. A. le Vice-Roi*. 1863: *Inscription Historique du roi Panchi-Mériamoun*. In this year M. de Rougé was sent to Egypt by the French government, upon a scientific mission, and spent several months in the study of monuments, assisted by his son Mons. Jacques de Rougé, who has already won an honorable reputation in his father's favorite science; and in 1864 he published a *Rapport sur sa mission accomplie en Egypte*. 1866: as a fruit of the foregoing mission Comte de Rougé published in a fine quarto volume, with numerous plates, his *Recherches sur les monuments qu'on peut attribuer aux six premières dynasties de Manethon*. The importance of this work to Egyptian Chro-

nology was set forth in a notice in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1867. In 1867 M. de Rougé published part first of his *Chrestomathie Egyptienne*, followed by part second in 1868. 1869: *Moïse et les Hébreux d'après les monuments Egyptiennes*.

In addition to the above, Count de Rougé published many articles upon his favorite science in the *Révue Archéologique*. He had also been a valued contributor to the *Zeitschrift für Aegyptische Sprache und Alterthumskunde* since its foundation in 1864; but at the outbreak of the war between France and Germany, he commenced at Paris a separate Review, to be devoted to works relating to Egyptian and Assyrian philology and archaeology. As yet only two numbers have appeared, and it is to be hoped that the project will now be abandoned. The Berlin *Zeitschrift* is conducted in the most liberal spirit; it prints articles in German, French, and English, and allows great diversity of discussion — even to the criticism of the opinions of its editors. One monthly is equal to the present demands of Egyptology, and a second would only entail a needless expense upon students who wish to keep themselves *au courant* with the subject. What is needed is combination and concentration, not diffusion. The *Zeitschrift* for February 1873 pays a tribute of “grateful and inextinguishable remembrance” to the character and work of its former collaborator, from the pen of Lepsius himself, the fulness and heartiness of which should pave the way to the future co-operation of the French and German schools upon this neutral field of the long-buried past.

Unless M. de Rougé left manuscripts ready for publication, his most important works must remain unfinished, and that, too, at the critical point, where his conclusions were awaited as a positive contribution to science. These are (1) his *Chrestomathy*. Of this, two parts have been published; the first, an essay upon graphic systems, in which the hieroglyphic symbols are explained; the second, an abridged grammar, which treats of the substantive, the article, the adjective, pronouns, nouns of number, and numeral adjectives. The verbs, syntax, etc. had not been reached, nor the application of rules to a selection of Egyptian texts, with a translation and a running commentary, which had been promised in the prospectus. (2) His Egyptian history from the foundation of the old monarchy by Menes to the invasion of the Shepherds, which was to be a full exposition of the civil and political life of the ancient Egyptians, their art, religion, manners, customs; in a word, a picture of the nation as it was before it became deteriorated by foreign influences or was subjugated by invasions. Only the preliminary foundation for this great work was laid by M. de Rougé in his researches upon the monuments of the first six dynasties of Manetho; but the masterly analysis and the cautious induction which mark this volume give keenness to the regret that the author was not permitted to work out his own conclusions. (3) His magnificent folio edition of the *Rituel funéraire des anciens Egyptiens*. To obviate the

errors which have crept into the text of this liturgical "Book of the Dead," through the imperfect transcription of hieroglyphics, M. de Rougé sought to give the complete text in the hieratic writing, following the most perfect copy in the papyrus of the Louvre, and collating this with other standards. The text abounds in vignettes, used for the most part as headings of chapters, and in keeping with the subject-matter. The titles of the several chapters are translated in an Introduction, and the mythological significance of each vignette is there explained. But no fragment of the translation of the Ritual itself has been added to the author's *Etudes* upon Chapter XVII, published in 1860, in the *Revue Archéologique*; and the transcription of the original text had proceeded only to the one hundred and tenth of the one hundred and sixty-five chapters or sections into which the book is commonly divided. The reproduction of the hieratic text can indeed be completed by M. Jacques de Rougé, M. Paul Pierret, or other experts of the Louvre, but the grammatical analysis and the theological commentary which should have crowned the whole from the pen of the master, we fear would be looked for in vain. This is the more to be regretted, because his most accomplished colleague, M. Théodule Devéria, had preceded him to the grave, leaving also studies and works unfinished in the same department of Egyptian mythology.

Devéria, like de Rougé, was accurate, conscientious, and thorough in his researches, cautious and philosophical in his statements, and conservative and reverent in his spirit. A posthumous work from his pen, in folio, with fine plates, has been lately issued from the press of A. Franck, Paris: *Le Papyrus de Neb-Qed*. This is a copy of the "Book of the Dead" in hieroglyphics, carefully reproduced in *fac simile* by Devéria, with a description of the manuscript and an Introduction upon Egyptian mythology from the same hand, and a translation of the text by Pierret. The latter may be reserved for comparison hereafter, with the yet unfinished translations of Brugsch and Pleyte; but the substance of the former will be embodied in the remainder of this article, as a valuable contribution to comparative mythology. According to Devéria, the starting-point in the faith of ancient Egypt was Sabianism, and the sun was made the chief object of worship, as being the most conspicuous and the most beneficent of all divine manifestations. The same view has been advanced by de Rougé, and in a qualified form, by Lepsius; and a striking confirmation of it is found in the monuments of the reformer and iconoclast Amenophis IV., who is represented as destroying the temples of the gods, and substituting the worship of the sun without images or other accessories. But was this worship originally rendered to the sun as a power, or to the divinity of whom the sun was the most sensible witness? The latter view is favored by the facts, that the most ancient sacred texts are those in which the notion of the divinity appears under the most abstract form, and that the most ancient monuments seldom exhibit images or symbols

of the divinity. The supreme divinity is the "Hidden One"; he is self-originated — "the great God creating himself"; he is "the Creator of beings and existences"; he is "the soul of the sun,"¹ and the "engenderer of the Gods, who are the successors of the sun." But what the divinity is to the soul the sun is to the body, and as the vehicle of the divinely illuminating and vivifying *Potentia*, the sun came to be invoked as a divinity: "Oh sun in his egg, gleaming in orb, shining from his horizon, floating in his clouds, who hates sin, forced along under the conduct of Shu, without an equal among the Gods, who gives blasts of flame from his mouth, illuminating the world with his splendor."² The seeming diversity of the sun's phases led to the invention of analogous titles and attributes: the rising sun was *Horus* or *Har*, the sun in his diurnal course was *Ra* or *Phra* (with the article), the setting sun was *Toum* or *Atmou*, and the sun conceived of as sleeping during his nocturnal course was *Noum* or *Xnoum*.

The sun seems to be born when he rises, and to die when he sets; but his setting in the west was also a prelude to his rising in the east — his dying was in a sense a witness that he should be born unto a new day. Hence the speculative mind of the Egyptians inferred an analogy for man: his dying was but the prelude to another birth, and between these two, the setting and the rising, the soul, like the nocturnal sun wandering through the unknown regions of the lower hemisphere, would make its mysterious peregrinations in Hades.

The absolute certainty and regularity with which day and night, and night and day, succeed each other, led to the notion of eternal duration under all the phases of outward change, and the divinity typified by the sun became itself a type of the immortality of the soul: Horus the type of birth, Ra of life, Toum of old age or of death, and Noum, who also was assimilated with Osiris, the type of existence beyond the grave.

As the type of birth, Horus must needs himself be born; yet as a divine manifestation he was conceived of as eternal. This apparent contradiction was reconciled through a combination of the two ideas. His birth was a perpetual renewing, but this proceeded from himself. As the manifestation of the diurnal sun he was born of the close of the nocturnal sun, which in its turn was only a transformation of the foregoing diurnal sun. Here was the prototype of one of the grandest of mysteries, which, appearing in the early stages of the Egyptian theogony, has passed into the theologies of later nations, and even in this age of materialism is baptized anew by science under the name "Correlation of Force"; viz. the mystery of an eternal divine manifestation under all forms, and of perpetual regeneration. The Egyptians derived from this their faith in one or many resurrections of man.

¹ Todtenbuch, Cap. xvii. For a full account of this Book and a summary of Egyptian doctrine, see *Bibliotheca Sacra* for 1868, pp. 69–112.

² Cap. xvii. Birch's translation.

One personification led to another, until the first symbol of divine manifestation produced a pantheon. The sun engendered himself — brought himself forth anew day after day — in the bosom of the celestial spaces; hence these spaces were personified under the form of goddesses with the attributes of maternity. Space in its totality was personified under the name of the goddess *Nout*, and particular portions of space were further personified as motherly attributes. *Ra* was the sun in his fulness and strength, rising to the meridian, fecundating nature with his light and heat, the vivifier and regenerator, the dispenser of life, the type of all existence. The orbits which the sun appeared to describe around the earth were likened to the sinuosities of a serpent. Hence the sun was looked upon as fulfilling his course over the body of this emblematic reptile, and consequently as subduing and surmounting him. The serpent, under the name *Apap* (Apophis), the Python of the Greeks, was regarded as the original type of antagonism and of evil.

When once the Egyptians had adopted this great astronomical divinity, whose every phase, form, and name transformed some phenomenon of nature into a religious mystery, they could not stop there, but must meet the demands of the common mind through incarnations and anthropomorphisms, reduplicating the attributes of the primordial being. Osiris, the type of goodness incarnated to redeem humanity, was, in fact, only an effluence or a reduplication of the primordial deity. The good being thus personified, in order that this might triumph, it was necessary to provide for it an antagonist, the principle of evil: this was Set or Typhon. The conflict of these two, and the relation of the fable of Osiris to the Egyptian doctrine of the future state, were explained at length in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for January 1868. It was in Horus, that de Rougé saw the symbol of an eternal divine generation, “the mighty, the justified, the son of Isis, the child of Osiris. The divine chiefs unite themselves to him, they recognize the universal Lord himself.”

ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

A. GERMAN WORKS.

THE SCIENCE OF MORAL STATISTICS AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.¹ An Attempt to construct a Doctrine of Social Ethics on an Empirical Basis. By Alexander von Oettingen, Dr. and Professor of Theology in Dorpat. PART I. MORAL STATISTICS, 1868, 1869. Appendix, with Statistical Tables and Index. PART II. CHRISTIAN ETHICS. Deductive Development of the Laws of the Christian Life among Men. Section I. General Principles.

In the middle of the last century a German theologian, drawn to the work by the investigations of certain Englishmen, especially Graunt, was the first to state with full and conscious clearness the idea of a conformity to law in the apparently accidental occurrences in human life, and to substantiate this by statistics. Süssmilch had then to collect his statistical material out of church records. Since that time the study of the statistics of the masses has made rapid strides; so that Quetelet, the most noted of the successors of Süssmilch, could take up the idea of the latter with richer appliances and more brilliant results. While Süssmilch admires in the regularity of the statistics the plans of the divine government, Quetelet sees rather in them a new regularity of adherence to laws of nature; and this line of thought marks, for the most part, the more recent moral-statistical science, which takes after Quetelet. It is very evident what evil consequences to the doctrine of the independence of moral existence may result from these investigations as seen from this point of view, that of mere natural science; and these consequences have abundantly resulted. If statistics show that the annual budget of crime within certain ranks of human society is to be reckoned with almost the greatest regularity, just as the budget of occurrences which are less, or not at all, dependent on human arbitrary will, why should not materialism cry: Here you may see that the soul acts according to the same laws of nature to which all other material is subject. Independence of the life of the soul, freedom

¹ Die Moralstatistik und die christliche Sittenlehre. Versuch einer Sociaethik auf empirischer Grundlage von Alexander von Oettingen Dr. und Prof. der Theologie in Dorpat. I. Theil. Die Moralstatistik, 1868 u. 1869, 994 Seiten. Anhang mit statistischen Tabellen u. Register, 194 S. II. Theil. Die christliche Sittenlehre. Deductive Entwicklung der Gesetze christlichen Heilslebens im Organismus der Menschheit. Erste Hälfte. Allgemeine Grundlegung, 388 S. Erlangen, bei Andreas Deichert. 1873. gr. oct.

of the will, attribution of guilt, are illusions which statistics overthrow. Moral and natural law are identical (Löwenhardt). Every criminal feels in his inmost soul that he suffers innocently (Dankwardt). In like manner, other classes of thinkers inimical to Christianity have mastered the results of moral statistics in order to draw troublesome consequences from them. It is only necessary, here, to call to mind Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*. Especially have sensational talkers made an outcry in this region, and, by quoting a few figures in a setting of loud-sounding words, have occasioned much mischief. They could do this with all the less hinderance, because philosophers and theologians have hitherto troubled themselves very little with the results of moral statistics; and therefore all the more abundant play was afforded to unclarified philosophical and theological ideas.

For this cause, the work which Oettingen has undertaken is an important and meritorious one, namely, that of bringing together the results of moral statistics, analyzing them, and presenting them in their bearing upon Christian ethics.

In the First Part of the work before us, the author has accomplished this task in an admirable manner. Although he is not a statistician by profession, yet a number of eminent statisticians have borne testimony to the book, that its statistical effort "bears not the character of an amateur performance, but carries in itself the evidence of solid, methodical labor." No systematic theologian can henceforward pass silently over the facts which are certified by moral statistics, and Oettingen's work makes possible for the theologian a view of all which has as yet been done in this field, in a thorough, clear, and attractive manner. In a long Introduction, the author first speaks to the effect that realism has a place even in the sphere of ethical science; that even here inductive and deductive investigation must go hand in hand. A science of ethics without historical investigation is inconceivable. It has to investigate the laws of the will and of duty with regard to human existence as a whole. The science of ethics must not be the ethics of the individual or of the person, and hereon the author lays great stress; it must be the ethics of society: for only as a member of an organically built whole is a man a moral being, and not as an isolated soul-monad, existing for himself alone; and only as such can he act. Therefore statistics have a peculiar scientific value, and that precisely for Christian ethics, inasmuch as they are a means of observing the movements of the moral body-collective and its laws, and of scientifically estimating that which has been observed. The ethical philosopher is enabled to test, by inductively established facts, his abstract investigations concerning the freedom of the will and its relations to necessity, moral and natural law, the organic relation of the individual to the race, the moral system of the world. For this purpose the author undertakes, in the first, or inductive part of his work, to take from the mass of material before

him, and to use so much as appears adapted to his object, viz. the confirmations, by experience, of the laws of moral movement in the sphere of human social life. He treats of the history, the definition, and the method of the science of moral statistics. He then analyzes the statistical data: 1. Respecting the Propagation of Life in the Human Race. Under this topic is handled the numerical equilibrium of the sexes, with the relative principles of compensation; the intercourse of the sexes, together with prostitution; and the movements of population in connection with the fruitfulness of marriage. He considers the statistical data, 2. In Relation to the Occupations of the Race, viewed socially and ethically; and first, in the sphere of civil rights, where the so-called social questions, "die Socialen Fragen," receive a moral and statistical examination; and secondly, in the sphere of intellectually aesthetic culture, where the relation of the state to the church and the school, the production of works of art, and the press, come under consideration; and lastly, in the sphere of religious morals, where the central point of consideration is, ecclesiastical and confessional character in their influence upon the popular morality. He discusses the statistical data, 3. As they concern Death in the Race. Under this topic are considered disease and mortality in their connection with moral factors; and finally, murder and suicide, in their social relations, are treated in the light of statistical facts. In the Appendix, the author gives the statistical tables which form the basis of his investigations.

As the science of moral statistics is especially fitted to display the connection between the individual and society, and thus to present the moral action of the individual will as an integral part of the moral action of the great national or social whole, so in the Second Part of Oettingen's works in the deductive unfolding of the laws of the Christian life, chief stress is laid on the principle that the science of ethics should be that of social ethics. The author protests against the idea that in the social ethics we lose sight of the importance of the Christian individual, since the individual always exists only as a member of a whole, and therefore must be conceived as such. By this emphasizing of the element of society, ethics appears in an entirely new light. Just at the present time, in dogmatics, a current of thought is appearing, which can be traced back to Schleiermacher, and which makes the idea of the *kingdom* of God, the element of society, a fundamental dogmatical principle. In psychological science, also, the present tendency is to show that the psychology of the individual is inadequate and misleading, and to supplant it by a psychology of society (Lazarus and Steinthal). Just so, the ethics of Oettingen before us, as social ethics, gives a new tone to ethical investigations. Schleiermacher's idea of the highest good appears here in a new form, and resting upon an empirical basis. The section of the Ethics which has already appeared justifies, at the outset, thoroughly this idea of an ethics of society by an analysis of the idea of morality into its three factors--the universal

religious factor, the social factor, and the individual or personal factor. Every philosophy of morals must pay equal regard to each of these three factors in the treatment of every moral question. But when the question is concerning the natural and historical form in which these factors in the moral life of man become evident in experience, it cannot be denied that it is the social factor which stands in the foreground, when we have regard to the ruling customs and the peculiar human organization, that is, when we regard the historical and natural forms of our moral existence. Hence the name "social ethics" receives its justification as opposed to all purely spiritual or personal ethics, and all materialistic natural philosophy of society. These three factors of morality appear again in the methodical division of the subject of Christian Social Ethics. Here the Scriptures (corresponding to the universal-religious factor) have authority as divine norm for Christian ethics. Again, ecclesiastical tradition (corresponding to the social factor) serves as "regulative" principle. And lastly, personal Christian experience (corresponding to the individual and personal factor) has the value of reproductive principle for Christian ethics.

In conclusion, it remains to state the division of the system, from which the effect of the new point of view on the subject-matter of ethical science may be most easily perceived. The central idea of the system is the Christian life in the human race according to its legitimate development from its beginning in the new birth. This is arranged thus: 1. The Christian life in its internal development in the kingdom of God; 2. This life in its outward activity in concrete social forms on earth. Each of these parts is subdivided into three sections. In the first part is considered: (Section *a.*) The unrenewed man as a member of the natural human race, and his relations to moral law; (Section *b.*) The new man as a member of the organic kingdom of Christ, and his relations to the law of God; (Section *c.*) The war between the new and the old man, or the wrestling after the highest good within the membership of the Christian kingdom. The matter of the second part is arranged with reference to the three great concrete historical forms of society, and so discusses the action of the Christian life (*a*) in the family, (*b*) in the state, (*c*) in the church. The system thus arranged, which forms the last volume of the Second Part of the whole work, will appear in a few months, and from what is already published we may be assured that it will afford us a rich abundance of ethical material treated by a master hand.

Other books which have recently appeared are:

Tischendorf: Jerome's Latin Translation of the Scriptures. *Biblia sacra latina Veteris Testamenti Hieronymo interprete ex antiquissima auctoritate in stichos descripta. Vulgatam lectionem ex editione Clementina principe anni MDXCII et Romana ultima anni MDCCCLXI repetitam testimonium comitatur codicis Amiatini Latinorum omnium antiquissimi.*

Editionem instituit, suasore Christ. Carolo Josia de Bunsen, Theodorus Heyse; ad finem perduxit Constantinus de Tischendorf. Cum tabula. Lipsiae: F. A. Brockhaus. 1873. 8vo. mag. pp. 990. 5½ Thlr.

Nippold: Biography of Richard Rothe. Richard Rothe, Doctor und Professor der Theologie und Grossh. Bad. Geh. Kirchenrath zu Heidelberg. Ein christliches Lebensbild auf Grund der Briefe Rothes entworfen von Fr. Nippold. I Bd. Wittenberg bei Hermann Koelling. 1873. 8vo. 545 S. 2½ Thlr.

Brandes: History of the Ecclesiastical Policy of the House of Brandenburg. Geschichte der kirchlichen Politik des Hauses Brandenburg von Dr. Friedr. Brandes. I Bd. Geschichte der evangelischen Union in Preussen, zweiter Theil: Die Zeit der Unionsstiftungen. Gotha: Fr. Andr. Perthes. 1873. 8vo. 611 S. 3 Thlr.

Tholuck: Translation and Interpretation of the Psalms, for Pastors and Laymen of the Christian Church. Uebersetzung und Auslegung der Psalmen für Geistliche und Laien der christlichen Kirche. Von Dr. A. Tholuck. 2^{te} Auflage. 2^{ter} Abdruck. Gotha: Fr. Andr. Perthes. 1873. 8vo. 758 S.

Weiffenbach: The Views of the Lord Jesus concerning his Second Coming. Der Wiederkunftsgedanke Jesu. Nach den Synoptikern kritisch untersucht und dargestellt von Dr. Wilh. Weiffenbach, Lic. u. a. o. Professor der Theol. in Giessen. Leipzig: bei Breitkopf und Härtel. 1873. 8vo. 424 S. 3 Thlr.

Mühler: Rudiments of a Philosophy of the Doctrine of State and Right. Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Staats- und Rechtslehre nach evangelischen Principien, von H. von Mühler, Doctor der Theol., der Rechte u. der Philos., Königl. Preuss. Staats-Minister a. D. Berlin: bei Wiegandt und Grieben. 1873. 8vo. 290 S. 1½ Thlr.

Luthardt: Compendium of Dogmatics. Compendium der Dogmatik von Dr. Chr. Ernst Luthardt, Prof. der Theol. Vierte verbesserte u. vermehrte Aufl. Leipzig: bei Dörffling u. Franke. 1873. 8vo. 330 S. 1½ Thlr.

B. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN WORKS.

ROUSSEAU. By John Morley. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 344, 342. London: Chapman and Hall. 1873.

Julius Müller has said that if Christ were a mere ideal, that ideal is worth dying for; that if Christ had never lived it would be a noble act for a man to lay down his life for the sake of giving to future generations the ideal of such a man. Dr. Channing was wont to remark that he preferred to write the word "virtue" with a capital letter, and thus express his veneration for moral excellence. The idea of Jehovah is, we should suppose, sufficiently grand and august to induce Mr. Morley to make the initial letter of the word a capital one, but he withholds this honor. We read

in his volumes not of God, but of god, and although we find Judaism we do not find Christianity, but mere christianity. This fact expresses the *religious* character of the volumes. The *moral* character of them has some redeeming traits. The faults of Rousseau are stated with candor. Mr. Morley does not hesitate to admit the dark stains upon the character of the man whose influence he so highly extols. We think that he ascribes too much power to Rousseau; but we are deeply interested in the narrative which he gives of that remarkable writer. It is the biography of a most eccentric, but real genius; of one in whom it is difficult to trace the line where sanity ends and insanity begins. If Rousseau had been an earnest Christian he would have been generally pronounced insane. A theologian, as well as a philosopher, may derive valuable instruction from these volumes. They illustrate the evil influence of the infidelity which Mr. Morley loves to defend.

LITERATURE AND DOGMA. An Essay towards a better Apprehension of the Bible. By Matthew Arnold, D.C.L. Formerly Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel College. 16mo. pp. 316. Boston: James R. Osgood and Co. 1873.

"I keep silent at many things, for I would not mislead men, and am well content if others can find satisfaction in what gives me offence." Mr. Arnold quotes this expression of Goethe (p. v) as illustrating the fact that a man is not always to proclaim his opinions on religious subjects. At the present day, however, the tendency to renounce the Bible altogether is so common that it ought to be resisted, and Mr. Arnold supposes that his own views of the Bible will tend to counteract this proclivity. He is not at all willing to be stigmatized as an infidel: see a remarkable paragraph on pp. 162, 163.

Mr. Arnold not only denies the existence of a personal God, the fact of miracles, of any supernatural inspiration, the canonical authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Apocalypse, the Second and Third Epistles of John, the Second Epistle of Peter, but he also denies the implicit trustworthiness of any part of the Bible. He will admit the excellence of remarks made by Jesus Christ, but he affirms that some of these remarks are inaccurately reported. The writer of the Fourth Gospel was more metaphysical than Jesus himself, and gave wrong interpretations of the teacher's words. "Jesus was over the heads of his reporters; what, therefore, in the report of him, is Jesus', and what is the reporters'?" (p. 149.) This is the question. Every man seems left to answer the question for himself. When Mr. Arnold decides, with his usual confidence, that certain remarks attributed to Jesus were never made by him, we miss a statement of *reasons* for the decision. The volume is written in a fresh, vigorous, lively style; is sometimes flippant, often sarcastic, generally dogmatic, always interesting.

HALF TRUTHS AND THE TRUTH. Lectures on the Origin and Development of prevailing Forms of Unbelief, considered in Relation to the Nature and Claims of the Christian System. By Rev. J. M. Manning, D.D., Pastor of the Old South Church, Boston, and Lecturer on the Relations of Christianity to Popular Infidelity at Andover Theological Seminary. 8vo. pp. 398. Boston: Lee and Shepard; New York: Lee, Shepard, and Dillingham. 1873.

In this volume Dr. Manning has illustrated the possibility of combining philosophical study with pastoral work. Faithful and diligent in his preparations for the pulpit, he has also carefully examined the scientific works of the day in their relation to theology. The results of this examination he has communicated in various Lectures, some of which are published in the present volume. He exhibits a rare degree of candor and fairness in his treatment of anti-Christian literature. His argumentation is solid, and is given in a vigorous style. He has exhibited the different phases of Pantheism very clearly, and shown the immeasurable superiority of the Christian's faith in one personal God. His Lectures ought to be studied by every minister of the Gospel, not only for their sound logic and agreeable rhetoric, but also for the numerous illustrations which they present of biblical truth. They quicken the mind of the pastor who reads them, and nerve him for his grapple with the infidelity of his hearers. Disguise it as we may, it is still a fact that many regular worshippers in our sanctuaries are tinctured with the infidelity of our times, and are confirmed in it by the impression that the clergy are unable to confute it. Dr. Manning's volume proves that this impression is a false one. The clerical readers of this volume may be stimulated to make the proof still more decisive.

M. TULLII CICERONIS DE OFFICIIS. Libri tres. With explanatory Notes. By E. P. Crowell, A.M., Moore Professor of Latin in Amherst College. 16mo. pp. 370. Philadelphia: Eldredge and Brother. 1873.

This is a volume belonging to the Chase and Stuart Classical Series; edited by Professor Thomas Chase of Haverford College, Pennsylvania; Professor George Stuart, of the central High School, Philadelphia, and Professor E. P. Crowell of Amherst College. The text which is here used of Cicero *De Officiis* is in the main that of Baiter. It fills one hundred and twenty-four pages of the present volume; the Introduction and the Synopsis are compressed into twelve pages, and the Notes fill two hundred and twenty pages. The Notes are concise and clear. Some of them appear to us eminently judicious. The entire volume is well fitted to excite an enthusiasm in the study of Cicero's writings. When compared with those editions of the same Treatise which were studied in our colleges fifty and even twenty-five years ago, it illustrates the rapid progress made in Classical literature during that period.

CHRISTIANITY IRRESPECTIVE OF CHURCHES: Thirteen Letters to an Italian Nobleman on the Christian Religion. (Published in Italian, in Spanish, and in French.) 12mo. pp. 120. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

"The greater part of" this book is "little more than an abridgment of" another work entitled: "The Churches: a History and an Argument, by Henry Dunn." That work we have not seen. This Abridgment is devoted to an unmethodical statement of reasons for discountenancing the existence of churches, and endeavoring to promote the interests of religion without any ecclesiastical institutions. Such a proposal is in opposition to the current of history and to the very nature of the human mind, not less than to the intimations of the Bible.

THE DIETETICS OF THE SOUL; or TRUE MENTAL DISCIPLINE. By Ernst Freiherrn von Feuchtersleben, M.D.; Edited by Colonel H. A. Ouvry, C. B., and revised from the 32d German Edition. 12mo. pp. 224. London: Kirby and Endean. 1873.

A very suggestive work, illustrating one of its own sentences: "Aphorisms are more calculated to stimulate than to satisfy, to excite than to give knowledge" (p. 177). It is a series of shrewd, often incorrect, but generally quickening and invigorating remarks on "the means by which the soul is preserved in a state of health"; on the imagination, will, understanding, temperaments, affections, etc. The volume would be characterized by many as German. True, the style is pure English, but the ideas are Teutonic rather than Anglo-Saxon. To some minds, this is a recommendation of the work; to others, the reverse.

THE NEW THEOLOGY; or, ADVANCED TRUTHS ON SPIRITUAL SUBJECTS. Edited by Henry B. Browning, M.A., Rector of St. George with St. Paul, Stamford, England, Author of "Words in Season." With a Copious Index. 12mo. pp. 198. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co. 1873.

This volume is a compilation from the works of C. Kingsley, F. W. Robertson, John McLeod Campbell, E. H. Sears, Holcomb, W. F. Evans, Chauncey Giles, and many others. A prominent fault of the work is its indefiniteness. This arises partly from the fact that it is a compilation, and the different paragraphs do not always cohere; partly also from the inaccurate use of words, as the word selfishness for self-love: partly likewise from the title and the index, the title not exactly answering to the contents of the book, and the index failing in precision. Still the volume contains many fine paragraphs, and is in several parts of it highly instructive as well as pleasing.

CHURCH BOOK, for the Use of Evangelical Lutheran Congregations, by Authority of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. With Music; arranged for the Use of Congregations. By Harriet Reynolds Krauth. Published with the Recommendation of the the General Council. 8vo. pp. 620. Philadelphia: Lutheran Book Store.

This book, arranged, as the title indicates, for the use of evangelical Lutheran churches, is one of the best that has ever come under our observation. As the author informs us in the preface, the whole range of musical literature appropriate to the subject has been carefully examined, and it is evident that only those selections that satisfied a critical taste, a musical ear, and a devout habit of mind have been adopted. Especially is the music for the Liturgy complete and excellent, embracing many of the chants of old English and German ecclesiastical writers, as well as adaptations which owe their grace and appropriateness to the editor. The hymn-tunes, as well, merit particular attention, being selected with discrimination from the strongest chorals, and the most famous English compositions of the kind. Their harmony is here presented to us, pure, unaltered, and free from the innovations which constitute so great an objection to many books, while their simplicity and range of pitch will enable almost any congregation to learn them easily.

It is likewise a source of great pleasure to find that in all cases where it is possible, Miss Krauth has adhered to the music of Tallis, Monk, Hullah, and Havergal for long known and much used hymns, instead of adopting modern arrangements, which have nothing to recommend them.

The mechanical execution of the work deserves all praise. The paper is good, the type clear, and the form convenient, while the numerous and copious indices, render its contents available even to those who are but little acquainted with the church service.

THE CONGREGATIONAL PSALMIST; (Third Section) Church Anthems, etc. By the best composers, ancient and modern. The Music and Words arranged for Congregational use. Edited by Henry Allon, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton; Novello, Ewer, and Co. 1872.

The first Section of the Congregational Psalmist includes Tunes and Chorals, and the second Section includes Chants, Sanctuses, etc. Dr. Allon is well known in this country as an editor, author, and preacher. His musical taste and skill are highly prized in London, throughout England indeed. He is well known to be an able and consistent advocate of Congregational singing, and the present volume of Church Anthems is admirably designed for Congregational use. Few American congregations, we think, are capable of using this collection without careful rehearsals. With such rehearsals it might be used; and we should rejoice to see it introduced into our church service.

NOTE.—On page 718 we referred to a work by Rev. John W. Haley, M.A., on “Biblical Discrepancies.” The following are the titles of other works on the same topic. We limit ourselves to some of the more ancient treatises.

Andreas Althamerus; “*Conciliationes locorum Scripturae qui specie tenus inter se pugnare videntur.*” Nuremburg, 1528.—Bayle thinks the work was first issued previous to 1528.

Ludovicus Rabus; “*Conciliationes locorum S. Scripturae in specie pugnantium.*” Noribergae [MD]LXI.—A very rare work; possibly the same mentioned by Moreri under the title, “*La Concordance de divers passages de l'Ecriture.*”

Christoph. Obenheimius; “*Locorum N. Test. pugnantium expositio.*”—Basiliae, 1563.

Manasseh ben Israel; “*Conciliador, o de la conveniencia de los lugares de la S. Escript. que repugnantes entre si parecen.*”—Francof. 1632 et. Amst. 5041. Latin translation, 1633; English, 1842.

Johannes Scharpius; “*Symphonia Prophetarum et Apostolorum in qua ordine chronologico loci Sacrae Scripturae specie tenus contradicentes conciliantur.*”—Genevae, MDCXXV.

Michael Walther; “*Harmonia Biblica, sive brevis et plana Conciliatio locorum V. et N. T. adparenter sibi contradicentium.*”—Strasburg, 1626.

William Streat; “*The Dividing of the Hoof; or seeming contradictions throughout sacred Scriptures, distinguished, resolved, and applied.*”—London, 1654.

II. Mayer; “*Manuale Biblic (contradictiones apparentes).*”—Frib. 1654.

NOTE.—We deviate from our usual course in calling the attention of our readers to the two Parts of the Essay on Paul's Panegyric of Love which are found, the first, in our January Number, Art. VI., and the second, in our July Number, Art. IV. This Essay was prepared at our request, and has cost its author at least three hours a day for nine months. We think that no more thorough treatment of any portion of the *text* of the Greek Testament has ever been attempted than is exhibited in this Essay. In its immense number of Patristic citations none have been taken on trust; but all the references have been verified by the writer, except the very few which could not be found in America, and which he has distinctly referred, in his Essay, to their proper origin. He has personally and carefully examined all that pertains to his subject in the standard editions of the prominent Church Fathers down to the time of Chrysostom inclusive; also, in the collections of Cotelier and Gallandi, and in the first one hundred and four volumes of Migne's *Patrologia Graeca*, together with Occumenius and Theophylact. In several particulars he has corrected the published results of the labors of Tregelles and Tischendorf, and has made important additions to them.

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